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ABSTRACT.
Foreign influence on the modern history of Japan has 
been enormous, but little serious work has been done on the 
policies towards Japan; of countries other than the United 
States. This is especially true of the seminal Meiji 
period, and this thesis attempts to fill a gap in our 
knowledge of these years by investigating French policy 
from the opening of Japan up to the period immediately 
preceding the Sino-Japanese War. Particular attention 
has been paid to the career of L6on Roches, the French 
Minister whose whole-hearted support for the Tokugawa 
Government had an important effect on Japanese polities 
in the period leading up to the Meiji Restoration; to the 
hesitant and unsuccessful attempts of the Ferry Government 
to involve Japan in France*s dispute with China between 
I883 and 1885$ and to the French attitude towards Japan's 
attempts to revise the 'unequal treaties* imposed on her in 
1858. The other major topics dealt with here, either for 
the first time or in greater detail than before, are the 
motives and circumstances of the French entry into diplomatic 
relations with Japan; the efforts of the first French 
Minister in Japan to maintain relations; French policy 
during the Meiji Restoration and the crucial early years of 
the Meiji Government; French attitudes towards the Meiji 
Government's early foreign policy; the French concern with 
prestige and influence in Japan; and the influence of trade
— 2 —
on French policy. The conclusion discusses the 
formulation and character of French policy towards 
Japan, and its significance in Japanese history.
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CHAPTER I
THE ESTABLISHMENT OF TREATY RELATIONS BETWEEN
FRANCE AID JAPAN
1(a) The Background of French Activity in the Far East, #
The signing of the first treaty "between France and 
Japan on October 9th, 1858, followed a long period of French 
interest and activity in the Far East, stretching back more 
or less continuously to the time of Richelieu. To place 
in perspective France*s entry into diplomatic relations with 
Japan, some account of the main features of this period is 
necessary, especially in view of the degree of continuity 
that can be seen in French foreign policy, both in motives 
and methods, over the centuries*
From the early 17th century, the age when France first 
turned her attention to the Indian Ocean and beyond, until 
the 1850*s, the point at which a serious interest in Japan 
began to develop, France was represented in the Far East 
principally by missionaries, trading companies, and naval 
officers* Of these, only missionaries were active through­
out the whole period* From about 1625, when Pere Joseph 
de Tremblay used his position as director of missions in 
the Levant to send a number of French Capuchins into India,
1* Most of what fol3.ows in this section is based on 
J*F*Cady, The Roots of French Imperialism in Eastern Asia* 
Hew York 1954; H.I.Priestley, France Overseas Through the 
Old Regimen Hew York 1939% and H*Blet, Histolre de la 
Colonisation Fran^aiseq (vols. 1 & 2), Paris 1946.
BW ^  IW
China, Japan and Persia, in order to "establish a series 
of missionary stations thereby land communications with
2the seats of Oriental trade might be rendered permanent/1 
until the reign of Louis-Philippe, \tfhen religious revival in 
France9 joined to the decisive military superiority which 
Europe had just acquired, brought to their work in the Far 
East a new significance9 Frenchmen engaged in religious 
work could always be found somewhere* In many ways their 
efforts can also be regarded as the most important French 
activity9 for many of the missionaries sent out by the most 
active French-dominated religious organisation, the 1663 
Paris Socxete des Missions Etrangeres, either penetrated 
into hostile regions where they suffered persecution, or 
(though here the Jesuits were more prominent) acquired 
positions of Influence at Eastern courts* They provided 
a possible means of political penetration in their wake, 
and there were notable examples of this happening in Siam 
in the 17th century and in Annam at the turn of the 19th.
In Annam especially, the military and administrative 
ability of Pigneau de Behaine produced an exceptionally 
promising situation, but France was too occupied with the 
Napoleonic Wars to take advantage of it, and when, in 1821, 
she sought a treaty of commerce, she was refused by the new 
ruler. In the 1830's the latter instituted a policy of
2. Priestley, op. cit., p.92.
3. On this episode, see Cady, op. cit., pp. 12-14.
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persecution against the missionaries and their position 
was still, desperate at the time of the first French treaty 
with Japan* The 1850’s, however, did see the first serious 
attempts at French intervention, which incidentally proved 
something of a hindrance to the establishment of relations 
with Japan*
It was not only in Siam and Annam that French 
missionaries created opportunities for intervention which 
France was unable or unwilling to take up until the Second 
Empire* Persecution in Korea from the 1830*s onwards 
inspired no determined effort to intervene until 1866,^  
while in China, where the famous quarrel between the Jesuits 
and the other missionaries, including those from the 
Missions Etrangeres, had brought about the proscription 
of missionary activities, occasional executions of French 
priests vent virtually unheeded until 1844. In that year, 
the diplomatic missions sent out by Louis-Philippe were fortun­
ate in that China’s concern with more demanding ’barbarians’ 
led her to make a few religious concessions* Not until 
the death of Chapdelaine in 1856 did France feel like using 
persecution as a pretext for taking up arms on behalf of 
missionary interests, and then only because Britain also 
had a claim to press against the Middle Kingdom*
4* On this unsuccessful French expedition, see R.
Ristelhueber, "Un diplomate belliquex declare la guerre 
a la Coree (en 1866) ,f Revue d’Histoire Diplomatique*
1958. No. 2. pp. 111-117*
TOF ^  m m
Of the other strands of French activity in the Far 
East 5 trading companies belonged to the 17th and 18th 
centuries. Richelieu had provided the first impetus, 
but it was Colbert who made them important. One of his 
creations was the French East India Company of 1664, which, 
among other things, had control of the China trade. Like 
its immediate predecessors, however, the Company made no 
use of its privilege, and France1s backwardness in trade 
with the Far East was confirmed rather than reversed.
In 1719 the China trade finally passed into the hands of 
the Compagnie des Indes and there was some increase in 
activity, with 92 French ships entering Canton between 1720 
and 1770. This Company disappeared in 1791? and thereafter 
trade was left to the initiative of private merchants.
Under the new conditions there was a slight improvement in 
the volume of trade. Three or four French ships per year 
on average visited Canton in the first quarter of the 19th 
century. Nevertheless, trade figures such as these were 
small for the new industrial age, and according to Cady, 
"commercial considerations played a very minor part in the 
19th century revival of French Interest In the Far East11. 
This view finds some support in the assertion of Dunham that 
“most French manufacturers had no interest in foreign trade,
• ext, p # 2.
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knew little or nothing about foreign markets or the needs
and wishes of foreigners , and sold goods for export only
6when they could not sell them at home11* The situation 
was to change somewhat with Napoleon XII1 s establishment 
of credit institutions such as the Comptoir d!Escompte which 
(lrnot only performed well the services of a commercial bank, 
but by engaging actively in colonial and Far Eastern 
affairs5 became a valuable economic instrument of
7
penetration91 / but not to any appreciable extent before 
the i860!s•
If trading companies had played their part and 
individual merchants had not yet assumed an important role, 
naval officers were, in the 1840!s just coming into their 
own* With the establishment of a regular naval station 
in the China seas after the first Opium War (1839-42) 
they were as important around the mid-century as the 
diplomats whom France was just beginning to send out.
This was especially so because the Ministry of Marine was 
not always disposed to subordinate its schemes to those of 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and because individual 
captains often took advantage of the distance that 
separated them from Paris to act according to their own 
inclination* The annexation of Tahiti without the 
autnorization of the French Premier gives some indication
6* A*L« Dunham, The Industrial Revolution in France,
/ iiiiiiMiil ii nil 11 m m iwmi i iwrinfiii i»rri> i hi i i <i i<ii i* nw i j ||-t-if— m n r nif •lifinrrrr  i r ' f m — n— ir n — — n.*— j
1815-48, Mew York 1955? P- 3»7*
7. S.B. Clough, Frances A History of National Economics?
178Q-1Q^Q. New York 1939? p. 173-
- 8 -
O
of -what a bold naval commander could do , and though few 
were as adventurous as this, there were frequent instances 
of officers intervening to help missionaries.
This brief summary of the background of French 
activity is necessary to give some idea of the French 
position in the Far East at the time when she became 
interested in securing a treaty with Japan. Nevertheless, 
the French tradit5_on of earlier years should not* in an 
account of the opening of Japan, receive too much attention. 
In the first place there was something of a break in the 
tradition at the time of the Revolution, and when a real 
interest emerged again in the 184-0 fs the balance of power 
between Asia and the West had changed dramatically, with the 
effect that while some of the traditional activities, such 
as the work of missionaries, continued to be important and 
to some extent acquired new significance, a new element had 
arisen in the situation, which placed everything in a new 
perspective. Technical progress in Europe had made 
possible, for the first time between Europe and the Far 
East, direct relations between government and government, 
and this placed individual or unofficial activities in a 
definitely subsidiary position* In the second place, after 
two centuries France had achieved little in the way of 
tangible gains* She had acquired no base which would serve 
as a launching point for an expedition to Japan, nor was
8. On this episode, see Cady, op. cit., p* 29 ff«
m m Mi
there anything in her Far Eastern tradition that bore 
directly upon that country. French missionaries had 
played no part in Japan1s 1 Christian century1, nor had 
French ships, in the early 19th century, paid her the 
attention that British and Russian ships had shorn. In 
any case, Japan was, on account of her remote position and 
her stubbornly-maintained traditional policy of isolation, 
a somewhat different proposition from other Far Eastern 
countries. As later events were to reveal, what happened 
in the rest of Asia did not necessarily happen in Japan.
(b) The Motivation Behind the Treaty
' - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - n r - m r m r i f w r i r y i  i r a m  m iw  i w  ■ w r n i n ~ f f T n i w  n n  i— i T w g m r i n w - i i w r w  '  w f f t Q 1
The above warning is justified by the testimony of the
9French documents relating to the opening of Japan. In
fact, none of the traditional elements In French Far Eastern
activity played a decisive part in the establishment of
treaty relations between France and Japan# Missionaries,
it is true, were among the most ardent advocates of such a
policy, which was hardly surprising, since the memory of
the century when Japan had been open to Christianity and
9* The documents in question are contained in the 
archives of the Quai d*Orsay. Most are to be found in 
the series Correspondence Politique. Chine, (hereafter 
cited as C.P* Chine)5 but there are also a number of 
important dispatches and communications in two series 
devoted to Japan, the Correspondanc© Politique. Japon, 
(hereafter C#P#Japon), and the Mdmoires et Documents.Japon, 
(hereafter M#D.Japon)• Several of the documents in the 
first of these series are quoted at length by Cordier,
1 Le Premier Traite de la France avec le Japon11, T*oung Pao
xxii (1912) pp.209-29©.
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'when conversions had taken place on a scale 'Which seemed
astonishing in the 19th century, had not been allowed to 
10die. France, too, was now the obvious and recognised
m aritim e
protector to whom they looked, as the onlyACatholic country
which remained in the first rank among the Powers *
But though Japan's opening was in some ways the prize most
desired by the missionaries in the Far last, their position
was much weaker than in other neighbouring countries
because of the complete success of Japan's exclusion policy
which meant that they could not provide the navy with any
pretext for intervention or intimidation. Only in 1844
was a very slight breach made in that policy. In that
year French missionary and naval needs came together when
Captain Fornier-Duplan brought to the Ryukyu islands, which
vaguely acknowledged both Japanese and Chinese suzerainty,
a priest from the Missions Etrangeres, M. Forcade, soon
to become, as bishop of Samos, vicar apostolic of Japan,
and now intended to learn Japanese there in anticipation
11of its opening. Two more French missionaries were left 
in 1846 but two years later one had died and the other 
was returned to Hong Kong on Admiral C§cille's instructions 
after Chinese protests at his presence. In the meantime,
10. For some idea of missionary feeling at this time, see 
A.Launav. Histoire G6n6rale de la Soci6t6 des Missions 
Etrangeres. voT. Tir. Paris, l894. pV 201 ff.
11. For full details of this and other missionary activity 
preparatory to the opening of Japan, see F. Marnas,
La 'Religion de Jesus1 (Yaso JaKyo) Ressuscit6e au Japon« 
Paris-Lyon, 1898. vol. I.
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the promoted Forcade had briefly returned to Europe in
1847. In Paris he was granted interviews not only with
the Foreign and Prime Ministers, but also with Louis-Philippe•
His pleas for greater help for French missionaries in the
Far East, however, met with little sympathy save from
Guizot and he was sent away without so much as a promise.
In 1855 several more missionaries were sent to the Ryukyus,
but no-one ever came near setting a foot in Japan itself.
The final proof of the comparatively small part played by
the missionaries in the opening of Japan to France is shown
by the instructions given to Baron Gros, the diplomat chosen
IPto head the French expedition to China and Japan in 1857* 
Missionary wishes notwithstanding, he was enjoined not to 
press the religious question, save to obtain permission for 
Frenchmen to practise their religion in the open ports, a 
concession which had already been obtained by other Powers 
by the time France signed her treaty.
That France, whose primacy in Far Eastern missionary 
operations had been recognized by the Pope in I839 and whose 
new ruler was still showing himself eager to ensure religious 
support for the Second Empire, should go no further to advance 
missionary interests than Britain or the United States requires 
some explanation. Part of it lies, no doubt, in the fact 
that her naval power was inadequate to compel Japan to
12. These instructions, dated May 16th, 1857? ere in both 
C«P.Japon I (as a first draft), and C*P.Chine XXI. They are 
unsigned«
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concede more than she had to the other Powers, especially 
when Annam and China were making simultaneous demands 
on that power. Moreover, Britain and the United States 
might well have objected, had any special demand been 
pressed and had it led to a renewal of open Japanese 
hostility to foreigners. nevertheless, reports from 
China had occasionally suggested during the previous few 
years that the Japanese had bercome less hostile towards 
Christianity and at one point it did look as if a special 
religious demand would be made, for in the draft instructions 
concerning Japan drawn up for Baron Gros on May 16th, 1857? 
there appears the following passage:
* Je me contenterai done de signaler a votre attention... * 
le prix que nous attaeherions a obtenir pour nos missionnaires 
la liberie de penetrer et de s*etablir dans le pays...^
II est d‘un interet general que les lumieres et les 
bienfaits dui christianisme aien le moyen de se repandi*e 
au Japon et d‘y modifier avec le temps, les prejug6s 
religieux qui contribuent pour une si forte part, a fermer 
aux strangers l!accds de cet Empire#*'
It is true that Gros was warned that he must proceed 
with caution, but the fact nevertheless remains that he 
was originally intended to seek for missionaries the right 
of access to the interior of Japan.
In fact, such a demand was not made in the 1858 
negotiations, even in the most diplomatic and reserved 
manner. Before Gros* instructions were finally approved, 
the passage concerning religion was crossed out, because, 
a note in the margin explains, it would be dangerous to 
12a, C.P.Oapon. I* May 1 6 , 1657*
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raise the q u e s t i o n . ^ h e  reason why the Quai d!Orsay
changed its mind so speedily is not stated in the
Correspondance Politique, hut does come to light in the
first volume of M6moires et Documents, Japon. In this
there is a memoire for the Foreign Minister, dated May 1857?
which begins by saying that missionaries abused their position
in Japan in the 17th century and continues: 1 Les prejuges
et la haine du gouvernement japonais & cet dgard sont depuis 
lors restes les memes; un frangais qui a residd quatre ans 
au Japon comme fermier du commerce hollandais me disait 
dernierement que si on entrait en negociation avec ce pays, 
il faudrait eviter avant tout, sous peine dfexciter une 
mefiance profonde, et tout compromettre, de soulever la 
question religieuse.1
'* II pourrait done §tre prdfdrable dd supprimer dans 
les instructions donnees a M. le Baron Gros, ce qui rapporte14 
a la faculte pour les Missionnaires de s!etablir au Japon.”
Evidently this advice was followed.
This alteration of Grosr instructions has two interesting 
aspects. In the first place, it seems to have been done with­
out any regard for the hopes of the missionaries who had spent 
years waiting eagerly for the opening of J apan and without 
any consultation with their Director in Paris. Secondly,
13* The renunciation was not quite total. In the instruc­
tions later given to de Bellecourt (C.P.Japon.1. June 8 1859) 
it was anticipated that despite the limitations placed upon 
them, missionaries would still succeed in penetrating to the 
interior, in which case France could not abandon the right of 
protecting them. The prediction proved over-optimistic.
14. M.D.Japon I. May 1857* Faugere to Walewski.
15* There can be no doubt that it was Delprat who was referred 
to. He was the only Frenchman at this time who had lived in 
Japan. His position and experiences at Nagasaki from 1845 
to 1849 as a trader who had bought a trade monopoly from the 
Dutch, are referred to in a memoire which he wrote for the 
Quai d'Orsay in 1854 (M.D.Japon,I. Nov. 1854).
15and somewhat ironically, the Frenchman, Charles Delprat,
whose views were given so much weight, may well have been an
anti-clerical who saw the prospect of missionary penetration
of Japan without relish. His very admission into Japan
suggests that he could not have been a Catholic, but more
substantial evidence can be found in the tone of the memoirs
1 ^
which he supplied to the Quai d’Orsay in 1854. In this
he praised Japanese civilisation, asserted that there were
worse examples of persecution by Christians in Europe than
of persecution of Christians in Japan, and implied that they
could not really complain about their exclusion. An article
written by him for the Bevue des Deux Mondes strengthens the
impression of anti-clericalism. Unlike other Frenchmen, he
did not speak of the benefits which the Christian religion
could bring to a re-opened Japan* Rather his conclusion
suggested the opposite; ffEn §tudiant de pr&s les moeurs, 
les institutions, les lois des Japonais, on finit par se 
demander si leur civilisation, parfaitement appropriee a 
leur pays, a quelque chose a envier a la ndtre, ou d celle 
des Etats-Unis.1 He claimed for Japans 1 la disette 
impossible, I1absence d*imp6ts, la liberty $ir le peuple...\ 
ce sont la pour les Japonais autant d'elemens de bonheur 
et de bien-etre que leurs pretendus civilisateurs* auront de 
la peine & perfectionner17* The odds are that the
alteration inspired by Delprat*s warning made no practical
difference to Franco-Japanese relations, but it is just
possible that, in certain circumstances, such as negotiation
with strong naval support, retention of the original provision
15. See previous p^ -ge.
16. Ibid.
17. 1 Le Japon et le Commerce European1 Revue des Deux Mondes,
Oct. 1856. p.640.
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might have led to serious repercussions.
If missionaries did not play the key role in deciding
France to enter into relations with Japan, neither did naval
officers. Yet in one way they had a better opportunity
to do so, for at least It was not Impossible for them to
visit the country. Nevertheless, their contribution was
small, and before 1855 the French flag appeared in a Japanese
18port only on one occasion. Moreover, when in May of that
year Captain Tardy de Montravel appeared at Nagasaki with
four ships and was offered a treaty identical to that signed
with Admiral Stirling, he refused on the ground that he did
lbnot possess the necessary powers. ' It Is true that his
refusal was principally motivated by his awareness that the
Stirling convention was not regarded as satisfactory in 
20Europe, but there does seem to have been a lack of enter­
prise and interest in his unwillingness to negotiate something 
better. A similar failure to take advantage of a possible 
opportunity had occurred in 184-8 when the officer who removed 
the French missionary from, the Ryukyus made no attempt to 
use the attack by the populace In the previous year as an 
excuse for putting pressure on the local ruler. Presumably
the navy saw no strategic or imperialistic possibilities in 
Japan.
18. In 1846. See footnote 29.
19- For his letter to the Nagasaki bugyo (officials) and his 
report to the Ministry of Marine, see Cordier, op.cit•,pp.228-3T•
20. On this point, see W.G.Beasley, Gt.Britain and the Opening; 
of Japan, London 1951, pp. 129-130, 1 4 5 ^ W T ™ ™ “™
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As regards the part played by trade, the evidence is
inconclusive but seems on the -whole to show it to have been
not of such outstanding importance as might have been imagined*
It is true that the Ministry of Agriculture, Commerce and
Public Works was interested in opening Japan to trade and on
more than one occasion made its wishes known to the Foreign 
21Ministry, * and it would also seem that occasional articles
in newspapers and journals, particularly in America,
sometimes envisaged the prospect of a lucrative commerce when
2?once Japan was opened. “ But against this must be weighed 
the absence of any indication of pressure by French merchants 
ot chambers of commerce and the slowness of the former to 
arrive in Japan after the ratification of the treaty. At 
this date Frenchmen were still unaware of the potentialities 
of J apanese silk and silkworms, later the main item of trade
between the two countries 5 and the opinion of Delprat, as
tta . ,expressed inAwidely-read Revue des Deux Mondes  ^ that,since
raw silk was imported into Japan from China, it was permissible
to Mdouter que le Japon puisse jamais alimenter les retours
d’un grand commerce,’1 was hardly encouraging. In actual
fact, Delprat’s pessimism seems not entirely to have been
accepted by the Quai d’Orsay, and the desire to extend
French trade must have been important. Nevertheless, if
even Britain, whose commercial prospects were far brighter,
21. u.P.Japon.I. June 10 18545 Ibid. June 18 18555 Ibid
21 Oct 1857.
22. They were ridiculed by Delprat in his article on J1Le Japon 
et le Commerce European!t op.cit. p.634.
23. Ibid. p. 635*
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was willing to wait for the United States to open Japan,
it Is hard to believe that for France trade was the
immediate factor. No doubt her commercial interests would
have led her to seek a treaty once trade with Japan was
firmly established, but they do not in themselves explain
why the French government established relations with Japan
as early as it did.
What then, if not the machinations of missionaries,
the ambition of admirals, or the pursuit of profit, was
the chief impulsion behind the attempts to secure a treaty
In the l850*s? An answer is suggested by Delprat1s
already quoted article. ,?La France,1 he wrote, "se dispose
a joindre ses efforts a ceux que viennent de faire
d'autres nations: elle ne peut rester dtrangere, quo! qufil
arrive, au mouvement qui se porte vers cette partie lointaine 
24du monde," In view of the fact that Delprat saw no
bright future for trade, it is hard to account for his 
desire to see France emulate the other Powers in securing a
25treaty except by some invocation oi the motive of prestige, ' 
Nor should he be considered untypical in his concern with 
this factor. That it was prestige that prompted France -
24. Ibid, p. 645*
25* Delprat did refer (Ibid, p. 638) to the desirability of 
Japanese ports being opened in order to provide a haven during 
storms, but this can hardly be regarded as an important 
motive. He felt that France would find it comparatively 
easy to secure a treaty from the Japanese because “L1admiration 
qu'Ils ont d’ailleurs pour la gloire militaire a popularise 
chess eux le norn de Napoldon'1. (Ibid. p.645)
- 18 -
the feeling that it would lower Francefs standing in the
world if she were not to show herself interested in the Far
East-is a view for which there is a good deal of evidence
in the correspondence between the Quai d*0rsay and the French
representative in China, de Bourboulon, the man first entrusted
with the powers to negotiate a treaty. The evidence is
particularly striking in the instructions given by the Quai
d'Orsay to Gros. In this important document the reason
for his mission to Japan is stated thus: "Le Gouvernement
de I1empereur est depuis longtemps convaincu que la France 
ne saurait continuer a rester ©n arri&re des nations qui 
ont ddja cherc^ d a assurer a leur commerce l!acces d*un pays 
riche et populeuse et que le moment est venu pour elle de 
se placer a cet egard sur le pie«d dfegalitd avec les Puissances 
qui I’ont devanc&e dans cette voie." 2o.
The scarcely hidden emphasis of this language makes it
difficult not to feel that considerations of trade were
overshadowed by the preoccupation with France1s status as
a leading Power. Similar indications of the influence of
prestige are found in the story of France!s attempts to
secure a treaty.
(c) The Attempts To Secure a Treaty. (1854-1858).
The date at which France first decided that she wanted
a treaty with Japan is a matter of some doubt. One could
trace it back to the age of Colbert. According to one
P719th century writer, 1 Louis XIV* s indefatigable minister 
26. C.P. Japon. I. May 16, 1857.
27* B. Fraissinet, Le Japon. Vol. II. Paris 1853? pp.4-5•
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lured into the service of France an ex-Dutch factor at
Hirado, Francois Caron, with the intention of establishing
trade relations with Japan, among other Oriental countries.
He appears to have had a plan to obviate Japanese religious
objections by sending only Protestants. The scheme was
soon brought to nothing, however, by the death of Caron.
The next serious thoughts about Japan may have been
in 1841, when, it has been alleged, two French warships
were sent "to occupy if possible some island to the south
of Japan, which would be valuable for strategic and commercial
purposes, and to make treaties of trade and friendship with
28Japan, and especially with Korea." Whether or not there 
was such an intention Japan did not in fact see the French 
flag until July 1846,^  when Admiral Cecille appeared at 
Nagasaki on his own initiative with three ships and the 
double purpose of securing a promise of good treatment for
28. M.Medzini, "Leon Roches in Japan" in Pacers On Japan, 
vol. 2, Harvard 1963, p. 184*. Medzini is here quoting W.E. 
Griffis, Corea, the Hermit Nation. New York 1911, but Griffis 
derived his information on this point from C.Dallet, Histoire 
de lfEglise de Coree. Paris 1874 and in repeating Dallet1s 
account he made a slight but significant alteration. What 
Dallet wrote was that Cecille "avait aussi 1*intention de 
conclure des traites de commerce avec les royaumes voisins de 
la Chine, specialement avec la Coreel' *Ibid.p .257* Nowhere is 
Japan specifically mentioned. For the Orleanist Government to 
have contemplated an isolated attempt to secure a treaty with 
her would have been quite out of character.
29• There has been some uncertainty over the date of the first 
visit by French warships to Japan. Most authorities who refer 
to it give it as July 1846, but Cady states that It was Nov.1846 
Fraissinet 1847, and G.B.Sansom (A History of Japan 1615-1867. 
London 1954) 1848. There can be little doubt that the first 
visit was July 2.9-31 1846. It is just possible that there may 
have been another visit in one of the following years.
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any French sailors who might be shipwrecked on the Japanese 
coast and of displaying France’s naval strength* He left 
empty-handed after three days* but his visit is said to have 
made a favourable impression on the Japanese.
Meanwhile the French had been showing some interest 
in the Ryukyus. Already in 1844 Captain Fornier-Duplan 
had been rebuffed when he attempted to secure a commercial 
treaty with the islands, and Cecille met with the same 
resistance immediately before his visit to Nagasaki. French 
ships continued to call there occasionally, however,^ and 
there may possibly have been some trade in arms with Satsuma 
In the 1850’s the Ministry of Marine became concerned about 
rumoured American designs on the islands, and as a result a 
treaty was secured with them by Rear-Admiral Guerin in 
December 1855*
This very favourable treaty was never ratified. 
Difficulties in China in 1856 naturally diverted attention 
from the tiny Ryukyus. However, since on this occasion
31. For details of the visits of French naval officers to
the Ry&ky&s, see H.Cordier, Les Franpais aux lies Lieou K ’ieou. 
passim.
32. Y. Takekoshi, Economic Aspects of the History of the 
Civilisation _of Japan, vol. 3,London 1930? PP* 277-79? says 
that Satsuma received from the Bakufu secret permission to 
tradd with the French. Sansom, on.cit. p.229? alleges that 
Satsuma arranged through the RyukyUs one transaction, a 
purchase of arms and machinery. Such a transaction appears 
to have escaped the notice of both the Quai d'Orsay and of 
contemporary writers, such as Delprat or Fraissinet. Nor is 
there any mention of it in a report of Aug. 1856 on t!Commerce 
avec le littoral Japonais et les lies Liou Tchiou”, by an agent 
of the Ministry of Agriculture, Commerce and Public Works,
A. Heurtier, to be found in Annales du Commerce Exfcerieur 
(Chine et Indo-Chine. 1855-67TT ™  "
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France as well as Britain was militarily involved and a 
powerful expedition was Being sent out, hope could now be 
entertained of a direct approach to Japan proving successful.
It was not, however, the first time that plans for a direct 
diplomatic approach had been laid, for already in 1854, at 
the time of the Perry expedition, the Quai d!0rsay had 
become interested in signing a treaty. The story of its 
failure to achieve this throws some light on the workings of 
French diplomacy.
The first step towards a treaty was taken in March 1854, 
when the Quai informed the French Minister in China, Bourboulon, 
that, as the Americans looked like being successful, he was 
being sent the full powers necessary to negotiate in his turn. ^
When he received this dispatch, however, Bourboulon did not
feel in a position to act on it directly. He was busy
trying to revise the treaty of Nanking, and did not think
enough was known of the details of Perry1s success. Above
all, there was no French ship available. He had been
offered passage by Bowring and Stirling but had declined.
1 Quelle serait en effet,11 he wrote back, n la position d*un
Pl^nipotentiaire Fran5ais se pr^sentant dans un pays comme le
Japon pour y negocier un traite sans 4tre accompagn6 par un
seul batiment de sa nation, et comme 1*humble protege d*une
grande Puissance etrangere?11^  This was reasonable enough,
33• C.P.Chine, XV. March 6, 1854. Drouyn to Bourboulon.
34. C.P.Chine, XV. May 19? 1854. Bourboulon to Drouyn.
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but Bourboulon*s concern for French prestige went a good 
deal further. Notwithstanding the Quai's statement that 
Bowring had also been given full powers and that ,f 1* intention 
de son gouvernement comme celle du gouvernement de l'Bmpereur 
est que vous vous prgterez un mutuel appui,''3  ^ Bourboulon 
maintained that action in common presented grave objections.
It might well give rise to embarrassing difficulties over 
precedence, and it would show French naval strength in direct 
comparison with British. His suggestion that the Japanese 
might in such circumstances be led to regard France as a 
British satellite, coupled with another plea that the 
British were regarded by Japan with extreme suspicion and 
that it would be unwise to appear in association with them,^ 
induced the Quai to modify its instructions. 'Mutuel appui* 
was no longer to be interpreted as enjoining simultaneous 
action.
By this time, indeed as early as August Bourboulon
had decided that "une expedition au Japon se trouve maintenant
forcdment ajourn£e par 1'dtat avanc6 de la saison jusqu'au
commencement de l'ann§e prochaine.''^ He was by no means
displeased by his enforced inaction, nor by the effect of the
Crimean War in preventing both Britain and France from
negotiating a treaty so far, for he had learned that Admiral
35* C.P.Chine. XV. March 6, 1854. Drouyn to Bourboulon.
36. 0 .P.Chine. XV. Aug. 3? 1854. Bourboulon to Drouyn.
37* C.P.Chine. XV. Oct. 7? 1854. Drouyn to Bourboulon.
38. C.P.Chine. XV. Aug. 3? 1854. Bourboulon to Drouyn.
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Laguerre was to receive considerable reinforcements which
would enable him to visit Japan in style in 1855* The
belief that an impressive display was necessary when dealing
with Japan was as much a feature of French thinking as it
was of British.
The Ministry of Marine had indeed decided in June to
send out several more ships-" and these would have been
sufficient for Bourboulon's purpose in the following year.
By 18559 however, the unfavourable reception of Stirling's
convention in Europe had made the whole question of treaties
with Japan uncertain, and the Quai d'Orsay was unwilling to
make arrangements with the Ministry of Marine until it knew
40Britain's plans. Clearly France did not feel herself 
capable of isolated effort. In any case, in the Far East 
itself, Bourboulon would have suffered from the same 
difficulties that beset Bowring* in that while it was 
possible for both French and British squadrons to visit Japan 
in the course of their war duties, the very nature of war 
rendered any precise prediction of the time of these visits, 
and hence the planning of a diplomatic mission, out of the
41question.
Between the end of 1854 and the start of 1857 Britain 
seemed to lose Interest in the question of Japan, and consequent*
ly it was more or less shelved by France too. Then with the
39 . See C, P. J a p o rp  I, T u n e  , 1&54- M a rin e  to  Q ua h
40. See C.P.Japon. I. Feb. 16 1855* Drouyn to Walewski (London).
41. On the difficulties encountered by Britain, see Beasley, 
op.cit., especially Chapters V-VII.
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Arrow and Chapdelaine incidents came the sending of imposing
British and French expeditionary forces to the China Seas.
Given Japanese fears that they might suffer the same fate
42as the Chinese, there was nothing now which could prevent 
the signing of France1s first treaty with J apan save a 
failure to bring to a speedy end the war with China or a 
refusal of the naval commander to allow the subsidiary 
diplomatic mission to Japji a high enough priority to be worth 
the dispatch of a nyal force. In fact, while the first 
of these possibilities was more or less excluded by mid-1858, 
the second nearly materialised. When, in July, Baron Gros 
sought from Admiral Rigault de Genouilly the means to carry 
out the part of his instructions relating to Japan, he 
found that the Ministry of Marine’s plans differed somewhat 
from those of the Quai dfOrsay. All that the Admiral could 
spare from his expedition to Cochin-China were three unpre­
possessing vessels, one of which was not even a ship of w a r .^ 3
4-2. The immense influence of the Arrow War upon Japan has 
often been remarked upon. In the words of one leading Japanese 
historian, ”at that time China was being continually defeated. 
This state of affairs made a great impact on the Bakufu leaders. 
Consequently they greatly feared that, if they went on persis­
tently refusing Harris’ strong demands, it would finally lead 
to war, and would result in Japan sharing China’s fate...«^
That is to say, through this war between China and Britain 
and France, the great military strength of the Western Powers 
made  ^deep impression on the Bakufu leaders too, and caused 
them to make these bold concessions.1 ^ Oka Yoshitake, Kindai 
Nihon no Keisei. (The Shaping of Modern Japan) Tokyo, 1947^ 
p -34.
43. C.P.Chine. XXV. Aug. 2, 1858. Gros to Walewski.
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It was this mediocre naval support which was responsible 
for the British and French treaties with Japan being negotiated 
separately. When Gros was given his instructions in May 
1857? Bourboulonfs views were no longer accepted, and the 
Quai!s attitude was that wil ne pouvait quf<§tre avantageux 
a nos vues et a celles du Cabinet de Londres de nous associer 
a lui dans la negociation qui viendrait a £tre entam^e au 
J a p o G r o s  accepted this, but because of the inferiority 
of his force he decided not to accompany Elgin on July 3^> 
when the British Envoy set sail for Nagasaki in order to 
make a preliminary reconnaissance. He understood that Elgin 
would shortly return to settle Chinese tariff problems and then
return to Japan with a smaller force which the French could
45accompany without too great a feeling of inferiority. '
In the event Elgin returned on September 2nd with a treaty 
already signed. Gros had no alternative but to sail for 
Japan alone. His unimpressive showing may well have lost 
him the chance to secure some of the special concessions 
which he sought and which co-operation with Britain might 
have final possible.
The mission of Baron Gros resulted in the signing of
a Franco-Japanese Treaty of friendship and commerce in Edo
44. C.P.Chine. XXI. May 16, 1857-
45. C.P.Chine. XXV. Aug. 2, 1858. Gros to Walewski.
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46on October 9bh# In content it differed very little from 
the American, Dutch, and British treaties and like these it 
contained a most-favoured-nation clause, which guaranteed 
that France should enjoy any rights that Japan might grant 
to other Powers in the future. The most important concession 
which had been secured was the right of foreigners to reside 
and trade at Nagasaki, Hakodate, and Kanagawa immediately 
after the ratification of the treaties, and at Niigata and 
Hyogo from i860 and 1863 respectively• They were also to 
have the right to trade at Edo from 1862 and Osaka from 1863.
In another important clause the Bakufu promised that no
J-“ trrirr’tr-itiimniwrrin i jim a +*
internal obstacles to trade would be imposed. Import and 
export duties were established at an average level of between 
10$ and 20^, though some luxuries in which France specialised 
were as high as 35% • The French treaty also contained, 
in common with the others, some jurisdictional clauses which, 
though not without ambiguity, ensured that Frenchmen could 
not be prosecuted in Japanese courts of law and could there­
fore under no circumstances be forced to suffer the rigours 
of the Japanese penal system. As regards the religious 
provisions In the treaty, these were limited to the right
46. There exist two accounts of Gros* negotiations in Japan 
by members of the expedition. They ares Ch. de Chassiron,
E°J^S sur le Japon. la Chine, et l'Inde, Paris 1861, and 
Marquis de Moges, Souvenirs d!une Ambassade en Chine et au Japon 
en 1857 et 1858. Paris lS'So . The former is more valuable 
for Japan. The treaty itself is printed by Cordier, wLe 
Premier Traite” pp. 278-290.
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of Frenchmen to worship within the foreign settlements| 
missionaries were given no special position. The right 
to travel within the interior of Japan was granted In theory 
to diplomatic representatives, as was the right to establish 
legations in Edo, but the details of such matters were left 
to be arranged in collaboration with the Japanese authorities. 
Finally, it was stated that revision of those parts of the 
treaty which had proved inconvenient could be demanded by 
either contracting party, one year's notice having been 
given to the other, from August 1872*
About the negotiations leading up to the signing of 
the French treaty little need be said. They did not prove 
particularly difficult, since the Japanese authorities were 
already reconciled to the sacrifice they were to make.
The success of the Europeans against China had made a deep 
Impression on the Ro.iu, who Intended to take no chances of
47provoking hostilities, whatever the opposition within Japan. 1
To some extent their fears were unjustified, for Japan was
in no immediate danger of attack In 1858. Indeed, as far
as France was concerned, Gros* instructions emphasised the
friendly character which the Emperor desired to give the 
48negotiations, and this fact, together with his weak force
47* The Bakufu position Is explained by Beasley op.cit., 
pp.172-184.
48. They concluded^.fnous n'avons point de griefs a faire 
valoir contre le Japon, nous ne pouvons done songer a employer 
la force contre lui pour le contraindre d negocier avec nous 
oi* a acceder d nos propositions s'il les croyait prejudiciables 
a ses intdrdtsC.P.Japon. I. May 16, 1857*
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and lack of valuable presents, inevitably restricted Gros1
negotiating power* in the six conferences that were held
between September 27 and October 9* Within these limitations
he displayed considerable skill, combining firmness with
flattery and with assurances of France*s pacific and
friendly sentiments. He even succeeded in off-setting the
disadvantage of not being able to bestow lavish presents
by implying that these would follow upon the exchange of
ratifications. flDepuis ce moment, une intimite reelle et
49cordiale s’est etablie entre nous,” y he wrote. Despite 
this claim, Gros was not conspicuously successful in 
improving upon the toerican and British treaties for the 
benefit of a special French interest. He found it 
impossible to secure a reduction in the 35# duty on wines, 
whereas Elgin had been able to get the duty on cotton and 
woollen fabrics cut to 5#* Nevertheless, when the French 
envoy left Edo on October 10, he did so well satisfied 
and with a high opinion of the Japanese. The treaty was
<C\
received by the Emperor with fune vive satisfaction.1^
(e) Conclusions
The main conclusion that emerges from the story of 
France’s relations with Japan before the signing of the 
treaty in 1858 and of her attempts to secure that treaty
49. C.P.Chine. XXVI. Oct. 6, 1858. Gros to Walewski.
50. C.P.Chine. XXIX. Jan. 8, 1859* Walewski to Gros.
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is that Japan did not rank very high on France’s list of
priorities. The missionaries, it is true, were passionately-
concerned , but their influence can easily be overrated.
It seems obvious that they were not consulted on the
concessions to be sought fron Japan. Trading interests, which
might have exerted greater influence, showed no enthusiasm.
This was hardly surprising considering that even the opening
of China had brought but few French merchants to the East.
If the Ministry of Agriculture, Commerce, and Public Works
displayed greater concern, even this was not exclusively
commercial. The first note that the Ministry sent to the
Quai on this question shows this. It declared that it
had been informed that the Americans had secured trade
concessions from Japan, and it might be that these could be
shared de facto by other nations. Nevertheless, it added,
1 cette situation subordonnerait au Japon les interets comme
1’influence des autres pays maritimes A ceux de la Nation
Americaine, et je ne pense pas d&s lors qu’elle soit de
nature a etre volontiers accept6e par eux, sp6cialement par 
^1la France.”-' If trade without the accompanying influence 
and prestige that would come from the actual signing of a 
treaty seemed unsatisfactory to the Ministry of Agriculture, 
Commerce, and Public Works, it Is scarcely to be wondered at 
that for other Frenchmen these were important factors*
51. C.P.Japon. I. June 10, 1854.
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This desire for influence and prestige owed something, 
no doubt,to the belief that success abroad would bolster 
up the rdgime at home, but at a deeper level it sprang from 
the conviction that France must show that she remained a 
great p o w e r . Since as a trading nation, she clearly 
could not compare with Britain or America, Frenchmen 
tended, to prove France*s greatness, to emphasize other 
attributes and qualities. Among her naval officers, Rear- 
Admiral Guerin provides an illustration of this. In August 
1855 he visited Hakodate and, reporting his impressions, 
made the following remarks on Japan*s attitude to foreign 
countries s
"Entre feoutes les nations europ6ennes, celle qui 
devait se montrer in leurs yeux la plus ddsinteressde et 
la plus loyale, est la France dont ils connaissent l*histoire, 
dont ils comprennent la politique dans la lutte actuelle 
et qu*ils ne redoutent que parce qu* elle represente dans le 
monde le principe catholique. Mais ce danger tout moral 
doit moins les effrayer que 1*esprit envahissant des 
marchands anglais et americains, que 1*ambition persdvdrante 
de la Russie. De la cette bienveillance dont je vous parlais 
et ce desir extrfme de voir un trait§ se conclure entre les 
deux Empires.,f 53* A still more striking expression of
52. It is possible that the desire for influence in Japan 
sprang also from international rivalry in the Pacific between 
Britain, France, and the United States, and Russia. Barraclough, 
in his essay ,fEurope and the Wider World in the 19th and 20th 
Centuries*1, in A #0.Sarkissian (ed.) Studies in Diplomatic 
History and Historiography. London 1961, seems topoint to such 
an interpretation. Great Power rivalry may have coloured the 
Quai*s attitude to the opening of Japan, but since it was never 
explicitly mentioned in this context, it is hard to regard it 
as more than a marginal influence on French policy. If It existed 
It was soon forgotten when the Powers discovered that they would 
have great difficulty even In maintaining trade relations with 
Japan.
53* Quoted by Cordier, '*Le Premier Traitd1 p.233.
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this belief that France*s greatness was fundamentally 
different from that of other nations, and would be recognised 
as such, was that of a man whom Louis-Philippe*s government 
employed as diplomatic observer in China in 1841-3? Dubois 
de Jancigny. In his unofficial negotiations then he sought 
to impress the Chinese with France*s independence of Britain 
and her willingness to help China practically. In 1850, in 
a book on East Asia, he attacked Britain’s desire to force 
Japan open to her manufacturers and asked:
**La voix desinteressbe de 1’humanite intelligent© pourra- 
t-elle dominer ces clameurs avides? La France oserait-elle 
alors, noble et prevoyante mediatrice, se poser entre la 
soif des conqu§tes, l’amour intempestif du gain, l*abus de 
la force d*un cdte, et de 1*autre la resistance meurtridre 
d*une nationality herolque autant qu*egoiste dans le rdve 
d*exclusion perpdtuelle que caresse son ignorance et son 
orgueil?** 54.
His optimistic conclusion was that *'/...la voix de 
la France y serait ecoutee quand elle s*eleverait pour defendre 
1* independance relative des peuples asiatiques, et nous avons 
preuve pour la Chine ce que nous n*h§sitons pas & pr£dire 
pour le Japon, savoir, que notre intervention, dans les cas 
ou les evdnements viendraient proclamer son opportunity aux 
yeux de 1*Europe liberal©, serait accueillie aux confins de 
1*Orient par la confiance de ces populations, m^nac^es de 
subir le joug de la speculation Britannique.1 55 •
Jancigny*s views can be discounted in part; they were extreme
even for a Frenchman. Also, the French Foreign Ministry 
had a proper respect, in practice, for the facts of inter­
national power and national interest, and for the sake of 
European politics was careful to follow a policy akin to
54. Dubois de Jancigny, Japon. Indo-Chine. Empire Birman 
(ouAva). Siam. Annam. (ou CochincliineTr Pdninsule Malaise. 




Britain's. Nevertheless such views found an echo too 
often to be ignored and they help to explain some significant 
aspects of French policy towards Japan in later years.
Even so, although the desire for prestige and influence 
was the dominant motive, in that, without it, the Quai 
d'Orsay would probably have been content, like Prussia or 
Austria, to leave until the l860!s the signing of a treaty 
with Japan, the strongest impression which emerges from 
the French archives is that this desire would have remained 
unsatisfied without the opportunity provided by the efforts 
of other Powers* Only after the groundwork had been 
prepared by the United States, Russia, Holland, and 
Britain, and co-operation had been arranged with the 
latter, did France seriously envisage sending an envoy to 
Japan. Had France alone been concerned, Japan would have 
remained in seclusion for many years to come*
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THE STRUGGLE TO ENFORCE THE TREATIES. 1859 - 1864
(a) The Implementation of the Treaties
The years 1859-1864 were dominated by the efforts of
the Foreign representatives to ensure that Bakufu
procrastination and anti-foreign reaction did not whittle
away or even extinguish altogether the concessions secured
by the Treaties. This fact was not surprising in view
of Japan’s long resistance to foreign intercourse and was
to some extent anticipated in the instructions given to
1Duchesne de Bellecourt in May and June 1859* Their burden 
was that his main duty would be to ensure that the Treaty 
was properly and completely implemented. In addition he 
was to see that Frenchmen did not lack any privileges enjoyed
■*fc
by nationals of other Powers, and, if possible,Asecure further 
concessions from the Japanese Government, such as a reduction 
in the duty on wine. The European ignorance about the 
situation in Japan was revealed, however, by the Quai d!Orsay’s 
expectation that this task would not involve Bellecourt in 
any political activity.
1. Bellecourt was the first permanent French representative 
in Japan. He served there as Consul-G^n^ral from September 
1859 bo February i860, when the title Chargd d’Affaires was 
conferred on him to raise his standing with the Bakufu.
In June, 1862 he was made Ministre Plenipotentiaire. He 
was succeeded by Leon Roches in April, 1864.
«■> 3 4  —
"Nayant, du reste, aucune action a exercer sur le cour 
de Yedo, au dehors de la sphere des interets naturellement 
places sous la protection du consulat-general, vous n’avez 
a remplir au Japon, au point de vue politique, qu'un role d!
p
observation11, he was informed and the fact that he was 
appointed as Consul-General rather than Minister emphasized 
this expectation. Almost immediately upon arrival, however, 
Bellecourt found that his interest in Japanese politics 
would necessarily become closer than that of a mere observer.
His very first report from Edo announced thats "Dans I’etat 
actuel des choses il est Evident que le Gouvernement Japonais 
est en ce moment travaille dans les conseils Imperiaux, par 
un parti essentiellement hostile aux Etrangers et fort mecontent 
des Traites conclus avec eux,«!!.^ and he intimated that the 
presence of a warship was necessary to prevent attacks on 
foreigners. Apart from this general impression of hostility, 
however, his ideas about the situation in Japan were very 
imprecise. At this period, and for several years more, the 
Foreign Representatives were only able to gain sporadic 
insights into Japanese politics and it was a continual complaint 
of Bellecourt that the Bakufu« under the pretext of guarding 
them against hostile ronin, was preventing them from coming 
into contact with any Japanese who might give them an
2. C.P.Japon. I. June 8, 1859* The drafter of the instruc­
tions is unnamed.
3* C.P.Japon. I. Sept. 10, 1859* Bellecourt to Walewski.
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impartial account of the true state of affairs. Thus they 
were ignorant that li Naosuke, who had gained control of 
the Bakufu in 1858, had failed to secure the prior sanction 
of the Imperial Court at Kyoto for the Treaties, though they 
represented a fundamental reversal of a tradition lasting 
more than two centuries. They were also unaware at first 
that the Bakufu was in decline, owing both to grave financial 
difficulties and to internal dissensions centring around 
the branch houses of the ruling Tokugawa family and the 
more bureaucratic elements in the- governmental system. 
Japanese politics were in a grave state of flux, with 
differences of personality and of policy adding to the 
financial and structural weaknesses of the Bakufu, and 
with powerful han like Satsuma and Choshu eager to play 
a role in national politics and more particularly one which 
would help diminish the virtual de facto sovereignty of the 
Shogun. The situation was further complicated by the 
disposition of the Emperor Kbmei, prompted by some of his 
Court Nobles, to reassume something of the old Imperial 
authority, and also by the presence in H*do and elsewhere 
of numerous ronin, samurai who had left their han, whose 
anti-foreign feelings were so violent as to lead them to 
make attacks on high-ranking members of the Bakufu, on 
individual foreigners, or even on Foreign Legations. 
WmmsBrnfcssam. In this maze the one thing that was clear 
to Bellecourt was that their presence was hotly resented
36 *
by almost all the ruling class and that the commercial 
privileges they had been granted -were a source of acute
A
embarrassment to the Bakufu.
The way in which the Japanese reaction against the
treaties involved Bellecourt in something more than strictly
consular activity was not any open refusal to ratify the
1858 treaty, but what he considered a deliberate policy
of paring it down to almost nothing in practice. The
situation seemed so bad that by the end of 1859 he was
writing5 “A vrai dire, les Traites n* existent plus - on 
s*en joue a l*aide de promesses et de paroles... <* Les 
restrictions sans nombre que les Autorites locales imposent 
arbitrairement au commerce indigene paralysent toutes les 
transactions et les negociants songent deja a quitter le 
pays si le Gouvernement Japonais ne se decide pas d changer 
de politique.* 6, His conclusion was that:,fLa crainte 
seule d*une action co^rcitive de la part des Puissances 
etrangdres peut encore arreter le Gouvernement Japonais 
dans cette pente funeste. C'est la derniere carte a 
jouer et^quelque circonscrit que soit le r61e qui mfait 
§te trace ici, je dois dire que mon attitude ne peut se 
borner a un simple role dfobservation# Je serai prudent, 
mais je ne puis me separefc compldtement de mes Colldgues; 
car, il faut le dire, on ne fait au Japon aucun distinction 
de nationality tous les Strangers, a quelque pays qu!ils 
appartiennentfy sont I'objet des memes repugnances et des 
memes procedes inconvenants pour ne pas dire injurieux.1* 7*
What he wrote here was significant, not only in its
anticipation of the various political actions taken in the
l860fs but also in its clear recognition of the necessity
4# For the best explanation of the complexities of the 
Japanese political scene and the impact of it on foreign 
diplomats, see the introduction to W.G.Beasley, Select 
Documents on Japanese Foreign Policy# 1853-68# London 1955*
5 * This was effectedin September 1859? the Bakufu was still 
too conscious of what Britain and France had been able to do 
to China to risk an open defiance of their demands.
6# C.P. Japon. I. Dec. 10, 1859* Bellecourt to Walewski.
7* Ibid.
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for close entente "between the Powers if any headway were 
to he made against the anti-foreign tendencies. Between 
France and Britain especially this; movement towards entente 
was reinforced hy political considerations in Europe.
Close co-operation between the Powers, with the exception 
of Russia and occasionally the United States, which anyhow 
played a secondary role during the Civil War, was the rule 
up to 1865 and even afterwards it was religiously observed 
in name if not always in practice.
Given the Bakufu* s reluctance to accept the implications 
of the treaties, there were, broadly speaking, two lines of 
policy which might be followed by the Powers. Bellecourt1s 
preference was for the strong measures advocated by Alcock, 
the British Minister, rather than for the cautious patience 
of Harris, who presented the American view that the problems 
arising out of the new relations between Japanese and 
foreigners could eventually be settled by peaceful reasoning. 
Inevitably, however, owing to their lack of clear knowledge 
about the situaition inside Japan, the policy of the English 
and French representatives was predominantly negative for 
the first two or three years. All they could do was to 
threaten the Bakufu with retribution if it persisted in its 
restrictive measures, while taking care to protect themselves 
and their nationals. Even these limited objectives were 
only imperfectly attained. On the one hand there were
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frequent attacks on foreigners and their legations* with 
the result that* at one point, in 186.1, Alcock and Bellecourt 
went so far as to withdraw their legations to Yokohama until
o
Bakufu promised stronger action against the r5nin.
On the other hand various modifications had to be made to the 
Treaties at the urgent request of the Bakufu„ even though 
the Foreign Representatives, ever apprehensive of a return 
to the restrictions that had been imposed on the Dutch 
during the long period of isolation, were doubtful as to 
how seriously the Bakufu plea that to carry out all the 
Treaty provisions would lead to civil war should be taken•
At the end of 1859 they agreed that Niigata need not be 
opened from the start of the following year, but when in 
September i8 6 0, the Bakufu began to insist that a postpone­
ment be allowed for all four ports or cities due to be opened 
by 1 8 6 3* acceptance was far less easily obtained and it 
required a Japanese mission to Europe in 1862 to achieve 
this important, if not vital, objective. Indeed, if things 
had been left to the Foreign Representatives alone, the 
outcome might well have been different, and a clash between 
Japan and the Powers, with possibly fatal consequences for 
the former, would have been hard to avoid.
The question of postponement deserves attention, not 
only because it was the focal point of diplomacy for two 
years, but also because it shows something of how French
8. See C.P. Japon. Ill, Jan 25* 1861. Bellecourt to Thouvenel,
.  39 -
policy was formulated, and in particular the importance
.France attached to co-operation with Britain* When he
first received the Japanese request, Bellecourt1s reaction
£
wass 1 Pour ma part, il me semble que ceder aux exigences
de ce gouvernement serait compromettre cfavantage encore
llinfluence Occidentale au Japon/' and he commented
bitterlys HApres avoir, durant toute une annee, annihile,
une a une, toutes les clauses du Traite, on en arrive, en
ce moment3 a en demander ouvertement la non-executionI“^
The Quai d1Orsay, however, showed itself somewhat more
cautious* The power which France could bring to bear upon
Japan being limited, it preferred to act in unity with
Britain* As a result of its feelers it learned that the
British Government did not feel the demand to be reasonable
but that budgetary considerations made it very probable
that it would not insist on strict enforcement of the
treaty."^ At the end of January, 1861, therefore.
Foreign Minister Thouvenel wrote to Bellecourt informing
him that if both London and Washington ended by accepting
■fche Bakufu demandi/' je ne pense pas que nous devions seule
11revendiquer les embarras d!une attitude contraire.*1
This did not prevent Bellecourt from repeating his view in
July that "on pourrait, au Japon, d^naturer cette concession
9. G .P.Japon. II* Sept. 179 i860. Bellecourt to Thouvenel.
10. C.P.Japon. III. Jan. 1861. Flahault to Thouvenel.
11. C.P.Japon. III. Jan. 26, 1861. Thouvenel to Bellecourt.
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bienveillante en le representant comnie consentie sous
le coup de 1T Intimidation11, and he argued that only part?
12at most, of the Japanese demand should be accepted.
The Qua! naturally gave some consideration to the views
of its agent and in October Flahault was again asked to
make inquiries, this time being informed of the Quai*s
13view9 that concession offered serious objections. No
sign that Britain would be influenced by French views was
forthcoming3 however, and in November Thouvenel again wrote
to Bellecourt implying that France no longer objected to 
14-postponement a ‘ He claimed that the Japanese had recently
been showing signs of good will, but the real reason was
clearly that Britain9 as a further dispatch revealed^
had herself more or less decided to accept postponement in
return for compensations, such as the opening of Tsushima5
which the Foreign Representatives were instructed to agree
upon together. Before this arrived,however, another
dispatch from Bellecourt showed that the agents of Britain,
France and Holland felt strongly enough about the unwisdom
of a policy of concession to have insisted on the opening of
16Osaka and Hyogo after all. Their intransigence had
12. C.P.Japon. IV. July 12, 1861, Bellecourt to Thouvenel
13* C.P.Japon. IV. Oct, 1861. Thouvenel to Flahault.
14. C.P.Japon. IV, Nov. 269 1861. Thouvenel to Bellecourt,
15. C.P.Japon, IV. Dec. 10, 1861. Thouvenel to Bellecourt.
16. C.P.Japon. V. Feb. 26, 1862. Bellecourt to Thouvenel,
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already led the Bakufu to decide on the sending of a mission
to Europe in the hope of securing better terms, and this
meant that the burden of decision was brought back to the
French Government again* When the Japanese Envoys arrived
in Europe in April, 1862, Thouvenel1s opinion, as notes
addressed by him, both to them and to the British Government 
17reveal, was still that postponement could only be allowed 
in return for such compensations as the opening of three 
ports in Tsushima and Korea, the extension of the foreign 
concession in Yokohama, and indemnities for assaults on 
Frenchmen* This was a slightly more moderate attitude than 
Bellecourt1s, but for the Japanese it presented much the 
same objection in demanding an immediate and inopportune 
extension by the Bakufu of relations with foreigners. One 
month later, however, Thouvenel had swung right away from 
his representative’s way of thinking. The cause of this 
transformation was an interview he had with Alcock, who had 
returned to Europe on leave. Alcock had become convinced 
that the Powers ought either to accept the Bakufu demand 
in toto, or prepare for war, and it is clear that he 
persuaded Thouvenel of the validity of this unpleasant set 
of alternatives. The position of France was such that she 
could only choose the former. As the French Foreign 
Minister expressed it to Flahault: "Je suis, plus que jamais
17. C.P.JAPON. V. April 24, 1862. Thouvenel to Japanese 
Envoys5 Ibid, April 1862. Thouvenel to Russdll (via Flahault).
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port6 a penser apres tout ce que m*a dit M. Alcock que nous 
nous ne saurions songer a exiger de Japon l1execution stricte 
et immediate de nos traitds sans courir le risque dfune 
rupture politique avec ce Gouvernement, c*est a dire sans 
nous exposer a nous ;Jeter dans tous les embarras et dans 
toutes les depenses d*une expedition lointaine dont lf utilite 
serait, peut-etre, en derniere analyse tres discutable .,f 18
Political and financial considerations like this weighed 
heavily in the calculations of the French Government, the 
extent of whose concern with J qpan at this time may be 
gauged by the fact that, in September 1862, the Ministry 
of Marine decided for reasons of economy that it could not
19maintain a permanent presence in Japanese waters any longer. y 
All' thought of opening new ports as compensation was dropped, 
and in the end, the only condition made by either France 
or Britain to their acquiesence in a five year postponement 
was that the clauses of the treaties should be executed in 
better faith, especially as regards the restrictions placed 
on the commercial operations of foreigners.
This last was more a pious hope than a real expectation. 
Ever since Bellecourt*s arrival in Japan the Qua! d*0rsay 
had been receiving dispatches recording the weakness of the 
Shogun* s authority, and it was hardly likely that a mere 
postponement of the opening of these ports and cities would 
do more than give the Bakufu a momentary respite. In fact, 
before long it was again forced by internal political and 
economic* pressure, to try to restrict still further the
18. C.P.Japon. V. May 275 1862. Thouvenel to Flahault.
19* C.P.Japon. VII. Sept. 10, 1862. Marine to Quai.
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provisions of the 1858 treaty. Above all, Bellecourt reported
at the end of January, 1863, the Bakufu was under strong
pressure to close Yokohama altogether and confine foreign
20trade to Nagasaki and Hakodate. This threat which, if 
carried out, would have reduced trade by well over a half, 
combined with the frequent requests to the Foreign Represent­
atives: to prepare for possible attacks by ronin, and to avoid 
dalmyo. and other important personages on their way in and 
out of Edo, led the exasperated Bellecourt, together with 
Neale, the English charge d'affaires, to make, in May 1863, 
a proposal of military aid to the Shogun in the hope of 
re-establishing his authority. To see this in proper 
perspective, however, it is necessary to retrace the 
attitude towards the political situation taken by Bellecourt 
from the time of his arrival in Japan.
(b) Bellecourt and Japanese politics
In discussing Bellecourt1s attitude to Japanese
politics it is important to recognise that his position was
not such as to make him an objective observer. The
Government with which France had signed her treaty was that
21of the Shogun. The Bakufu y therefore, was the only 
authority in Japan which France could claim in strict
C.P, Ja.poYv,
20.A SSL, VIII. Jan. 29? 1863. Bellecourt to Drouyn.
21* 1Bakufu1 was the name generally used by Japanese to
denote the governmental framework set up by Tokugawa leyasu 
in the 17th century.
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conscience to have undertaken a legal obligation to the 
22Powers, and in view of the evident hostility of Japanese 
generally, it was important that it should continue to 
wield power. This consideration was re-inforced by others.
The Powers were well aware that Edo, the centre of Bakufu 
power, could be intimidated from the sea where their own 
strength lay.2  ^ They were also in the position, especially 
in the first two years, of receiving their information about 
the internal situation almost exclusively from Bakufu officials 
and, not unnaturally, the latter invariably painted their 
own enemies as being violently hostile to foreigners,even 
going so far as to imply that it was solely due to the treaties 
that the Bakufu itself was resented by the various han.
In addition, despite Bellecourt1s valiant effort to clarify
22. The home governments, even in their most indulgent 
moods, never allowed themselves any doubts about the 
validity of their treaties, but from about mid-l86l their 
representatives began to have strong suspicions that the 
authority of the Mikado (Emperor) was potentially greater 
than that of the Shogun, and from 1864 most of them were in 
no doubt of the advisability of securing the former1s assent 
to the Treaties. Surprisingly, the second French minister, 
Roches, was one of those who shared this feeling. In a 
dispatch of Sept. 23, 1864 (C.P.Japon. XII. Roches to Drouyn) 
he stated bluntly that the Mikado was the sole legitimate 
Sovereign and the Taikoun (ShSgun) only his deputy, and that 
all important measures such as the Treaties must be sanctioned 
by the former. Bellecourt, on the other hand, after all his 
criticisms of Bakufu weakness, wrote just before he left that 
Mikado would never acquire the strength of the Taikoun 
and that it was unnecessary to treat with him. (C.P.Japon. XI. 
March 19, 1864, Bellecourt to Drouyn).
23* See e.g. a dispatch of July 23, 1863 (C.P.Japon. IX) 
where Bellecourt, writing to Drouyn, not only makes this 
point but also envisages the possibility of the Powers 
establishing control over central Japan.
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the political background by drawing up a statistical list of
f 24the revenues of the Bakufu and the dalmyo, his view of 
Japan5 like that of his colleagues, was dominated hy an 
over-riding concern with trade and the treaties, and this 
led him to ignore or misinterpret important events or trends. J 
It was not until the Legations produced men like Satow and 
Siebold, whose ability enabled them to make close contacts 
with influential Japanese of all parties, that it became 
possible for the Foreign Representatives to take a more than 
superficial view of the various claims which were made by 
the opposing Interests. As far as France was concerned, 
one final factor which may be mentioned was that, possibly 
because of their own political tradition, neither Bellecourt 
nor Roches showed any favour for the suggestion that the 
Bakufu should share Its power with the powerful han. This 
was an idea which both Alcock and Parkes came to advocate, 
but the two Frenchmen always felt that any reduction in the 
Bakufu1s power was more likely to lead to conflict and pro­
longed instability than to hamony.
In his first reports on Japanese politics Bellecourt 
was content to reproduce the views of Alcock, who had arrived
24. C.P.Japon. III. May 20, 1861. Bellecourt derived this 
information through his interpreter Bleckman, from illicit 
contacts with pro-foreign Japanese and from secret Government 
publications. Unfortunately, he entirely omitted the important 
han of ChSshft, shortly to play a leading role in national 
politics.
2?. An example of this can be found in a dispatch of June 
26, 1862 (C.P.Japon. VI. Bellecourt to Thouvenel) where the 
growing authority of the Emperor was interpreted solely in 
terms of an attempt by reactionaries to invalidate the legal 
basis of the treaties.
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in Japan earlier than his colleague, and had mJn m m w  
established a considerable influence over the Frenchman.
As these early dispatches portrayed the situation, the 
central Government of the fTaikoun* or ’temporal Emperor* 
ruled over the reactionary vassal ’Princes of the Empire* 
some of whom were friendly to him,while others were hostile, 
on account of the admission of foreigners. These hostile 
Princes, or Daimvo. of whom Mito, a Tokugawa collateral, 
was the most prominent, maintained numerous cohorts of warriors 
in Edo and looked for support to the ’Mikado* or ’Spiritual
P6
Emperor* in his capacity as guardian of the laws. The 
ambiguity of a situation where it was unclear which of the 
two Emperors they should regard as sovereign somewhat troubled 
Bellecourt*s logical French mind even before the treaty was 
ratified, but he was soon persuaded by Alcock that the 
Mikado played no active part in affairs and could be ignored.^ 
Their acceptance of the Shogun* s sovereignty was criticised 
by later arrivals, but in terms of foreign knowledge of Japan 
in 1859 it was entirely justifiable.
This early picture of Japan gradually became more subtle 
as additional information filtered through or past the Bakufu. 
but its essentials continued to be accepted for practical 
purposes for a considerable time. The main modification was
26. C.P.Japon. I. Sept. 10, 1859* Bellecourt to Walewski.
27. C.P.Japon. I. Sept. 19, 1859* Bellecourt to Walewski.
"■ 4 7  —
a gradual realisation, which came from its failure to
punish criminals for offences against foreigners, that
the BakufuT s power and friendliness were more limited than
they had at first imagined. This led to some ominous
reflections in Bellecourt*s mind in September i860.
Having already reached a conviction that#1 les Japonais ne
peuvent se faire a la pensee que les traites puissent modifier
leurs anciens erremens et que leur inddpendance ne leur est
guarantie qu’ala condition d1observer scrupuleusement les
termes de leur pacte avec la civilisation occidentalef,f
he went on to draw the conclusion that to set this state
of affairs aright it would not be sufficient simply to
bring the Bakufu back to recognition of its obligations
towards the Powers. ,fJe suis convaincu que ce n’est pas 
seulement par une action uniquement dlrig&e sur Yedo que 
le Japon peut @tre astreint a tenir ses engagements, mais 
que si cette heure venait a sonner, il serait n§cessaire 
aussi d’agir en particulier sur plusieurs des Princes de 
ces pays, tant sur les provinces cdtidres que sur le centre, 
facile & attaquer par mer vers Osacca, afin d*interrompre 
les communications entre le nord et le sud de I’Empire.
G’est ainsi, pour suivre cette hypoth&se qu’il me parait 
qu!on pourrait determiner facilement un tout autre cours 
d'id^es chez les divers membres de cette feodalite dont le 
corps s’agite d Yedo, mais qui y changeraient vraisemblable- 
ment d1attitude s’ils se sentaient atteint jusque dans leurs 
propres possessions .1128 As yet, these were just ideas *
Within four years, however, they were to be put into practice, 
with results not unlike those which Bellecourt had predicted.
28. C.P.Japon. II. Sept. 17, i860. Bellecourt to Thouvenel.
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In the meantime, Bellecourt's political dispatches 
mostly recorded the -weakness of the Shogun.. This had become 
very marked since early i860, when the authoritarian rule 
of Ii Haosuke had been replaced, upon his assassination, 
by the weak government of Ando Nobumasa and Kuze Hirochika, 
whose desire to avoid war with the Powers was matched by
29the conflicting need to placate the Court and powerful han. '
In April, 1861, the charge d'affaires was sufficiently 
struck by the effect of this to writes
“On peut done se demander encore si les Puissances 
Occidentales n'auraient pas eu plus de certitude dans leurs 
relations avec cet Empire en concluant des traitss s€par6s 
avec les grands Princes feudataires plutot qutavec le 
Gouvernement actuel qui parait ne tenir sa force que des 
appoints que lui fournissent les Grands Princes qu'on peut 
consid^rer & juste titre comme de veritables RoisJ'30
However, the fact remained that it was with the Shogun 
that France had signed her treaty, so, regardless of the 
suspicion that began to be voiced in 1862 that some of the 
supposedly hostile daimvd had been misrepresented, the only 
practical policy was to work through the Bakufu. This meait,
in part, exhorting the Bakufu to adopt a more friendly and open 
attitude. It also meant that the French and British 
representatives gave serious consideration to the question 
of whether there was any way of ending the seemingly ever­
lasting state of affairs in which they could never feel sure
29. On their dilemma, which they sought to solve by the 
marriage of the Shogun to the Emperor's sister and by the 
promise to rid Japan of foreigners within ten years, see 
Beasley, Select Documents, pp. 51-54.
30. C.P.Japon. III. April 18, 1861. Bellecourt to Thouvenel.
—  49 * * *
that a wave of reaction would not force the Bakufu to side
(A  n 't 1 -  f  o re i gfl)
openly with the Joi cause and thus force upon the Powers
the unpleasant choice between costly war or ignominious
withdrawal. Though it was contrary to their previous
policy of abstention from internal politics and to their
Governments' known wishes, the conclusion towards which
they moved was that they must provide the Shogun's
government with material help in crushing their mutual
enemies.^ When in January, 1863, they were given to
understand by the Roju, the Bakufu ruling council, that
"la reaction des Daimios, reaction prepares depuis
longtempis, menace 1'existence des relations amicales 
✓ ^2etablies par les Traites,"^ and when this was followed
by further warnings about possible attacks by r5nin and by a
great deal of procrastination over Neale's demands for
compensation for the murder of Richardson by Satsuma gamurai,
they felt they could delay no longer. For France, there
existed the additional encouragement to action that for 
once she had a considerable naval force in Japanese waters
under the command of Admiral Jaur£s.
The incident which appears to have provided the
immediate incentive to act was the acquisition of a letter
purporting to have been sent from the ShOgun to the Emperor
indicating that the former had accepted the latter's demand
for the expulsion of the foreigners. The two Representatives
31. C.P.Japon. VIII. Jan. 23? 1863. Bellecourt to Drouyn.
32. C.P.Japon. VIII. Jan, 29, 1863. Bellecourt to Drouyn.
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feared an imminent attack on Yokohama and took some
measures to protect it. They then decided in conference
that2 "pour sauvegarder les droits et la dignite des nations 
Occidentales il n'y avait que deux moyens - ou de se refuser 
a de nouveaux attermoiemens avec le Gouvernement du Taicoun 
et d'entrer immediatement dans la phase des hostilites 
contre tous, Taicoun et Daimios, ou de mettre inopindment 
le Gouvernement du Taicoun en demeure de se prononcer 
nettement dans la question exterieure en lui offrant un 
appui immediat et complet contre les opposans quels qu'ils 
soient qui I1entrainment a manquer a sa parole. Si le 
Gouvernement du Taicoun est loyal, s'il veut conserver 
la paix avec I'exterieur, il accepters cette proposition 
et 11 entralnera par sa decision les trois quarts des daimfctts 
contre l'audacieuse minorite qui agite en ce moment le pays 
contre les etrangers." 33
In fact Neale and Bellecourt envisaged putting into 
practice only the second of these two policies^ the first 
would have been beyond their means and would have involved 
a blatant, instead of just a partial, breach of their 
instructions. It can only have been mentioned to give 
their governments some idea of the seriousness with which 
they viewed the situation and to make it appear that the 
policy they intended to follow was one of moderation.
Exactly what they had in mind is unclear. Ishii Takashi, 
a leading authority in post-war Japan on Bakumatsu diplomacy 
assumes that it was to send a joint fleet, first to the 
Inland Sea, to support the Bakufu1 s^ actions In Kyoto, then 
to the territories of the respective d a i m v o Such action
33. C.PoJapon, VIII. May 3, 1863, Bellecourt to Drouyn*
34. Ishii, Gakusetsu Hiban Mel.ii Ishin Ron, Tokyo 1964, p.264
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would have been in accord with Bellecourt*s earlier
thinking and with the policies adopted in the following
May,
two-and-a-ha1f years. InAl863, however, their plan was
premature. The Bakufu agent to whom they proposed It, 
Takemoto Masao, neither accepted nor refused It outright. 
While indicating that*"maintenant le Gouvernement de Yedo
n'en a pas encore besoin: plus tard, si cela etait
* 15necessaire, le Taicoun demanderait cet appui,"^ he asked
them to wait for an answer until the Bakufu leaders in Kyoto
had been consulted. The reply was brought at the end of
the month. It was a definite refusal:"... *le Taicoun
aurait ete fort sensible a cette amieale proposition des
Puissances contractantes: mais 1'amitie etant retablie
entrejce Prince et le Mikado, il reviendrait prochainement
dans sa capital (Yedo) pour y regler les affaires pendantes
et donner cours a une politique toutefavorable a I1extension
des relations commerciales avec les etrangers ^
A refusal couched in such terms and promising the
decisive attitude of open acceptance of the treaties which
had been their chief aim obviously took away from the
Foreign Representatives, however belligerent their Instincts,
any pretext for implementing their plan of armed action.
However, xrn6icfeent was more than just an
anticipation of the 1864 Shimonoseki Expedition and the
35* C.P.Japon, VIII. May 10, 1863. Bellecourt to Drouyn,
36, C.P.Japon. VIII. May 27? I863. Bellecourt to Drouyn.
*" ? 2  —
186? Hjtogo demonstration. According to Ishii, 1 the 
important proposal of the English and French ministers gave 
great encouragement to the Bakufu faction which favoured 
the extension of Bakufu power and friendship with
07
f o r e i g n e r s I t  thus made less likely the success of 
the policy of co-operation which Satsuma and some of the 
other powerful han had been working for in conjunction with 
some of the moderate members of the Bakufu and its supporters.
It is questionable whether, even If the Shogun1s govern­
ment had accepted the offer of aid, Neale and Bellecourt 
could have carried out their plan to completion. For 
the reaction in Europe to such intervention was unfavourable I
j
to say the least. When the French Foreign Minister, Drouyn j
de Lhuys, read in Bellecourt1s May 3rd dispatch that the
two representatives intended to send for reinforcements I
from China, he could not forbear writing in the margin a •
blunt *non*. His disapproval was expressed at somewhat
greater length in his dispatch to Bellecourt of July 18th:
aJe ne puls approuver, davantage, lfoffre que vous avez 
faite au Gouvernement Japonais de lui preter votre assistance. 
pour triompher de 1*opposition des Daimios. La plus simple 
rdflexion suffit pour d6montrer que nous nous lancerions 
ainsi & l!aventure dans les risques d*une immixtion des 
plus compromettantes dans les affaires interieures du Japon. 
Or, en l*§tat present des choses, quand sur tant dfautres 
points du globe, des questions d,une importance capitale 
reclament notre attention ou absorbent deja notre politique, 
il serait difficile de trouver une seule raison qui put 
justifier une entrcprise ou les sacrifices du Goyernement 
de l*Empereur seraient si disproportionnees aux avantages 
hypoth8ques qu'on aurait en vue.rt38. In Drouyn*s and the
37* Ishii, op.cit. p.26?.
38. C.P.Japon. 132. July 18, I863. Drouyn to Bellecourt.
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Minister of Marine1s view, Bellecourt and JaurSs might have 
pointlessly jeopardized French interests in Cochin-China.
In his own defence Bellecourt claimed that he had had no 
intention of acting before receiving Paris* approval, but 
this seems doubtful. Drouyn de Lhuys* warning, however, 
was sufficient to ensure that the French Representative 
followed a more cautious policy until his departure in the 
following, year. It is worth noting that the Quai d*Orsay 
doctrine here laid down of avoiding entanglement in 
Japanese politics remained official policy throughout the 
whole Bakumatsu period, save for a brief moment in 1864, 
when immediate decisions were placed in the hands of the 
Foreign Minister himself, owing to the visit of the Ikeda 
mission.
The remainder of Bellecourt*s stay was mainly taken 
up by continued efforts to re-secure Bakufu acceptance
■** v  w » |ii ii  niTOTnKWmHi l'H* ***
of the provisions of the Treaties, for it was soon found
that not only was the Shogun* s promise to take strong measures I 
against hostile daimvo not being put into effect but that 
once more the Bakufu was being drawn into the position of !
k f
promising the Court that it would expel the foreigners.
At first this did not seem such a serious problem, for it 
was clear that the Bakufu feared the strength of the Power(fe* 
warships more than it did its internal opponents. This 
was shown in June 1863, when the authorities in Edo, led 
by Ogasawara Nagamichi, and using Bellecourt*s good offices, *
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said that they had again received orders to demand the 
evacuation of Yokohama by the foreigners but asked for the 
co-operation of the Foreign Representatives in refusing 
their demand. As Bellecourt reported it, their plan was 
that Ogasawara 1 ecrilra. separement a tous les Representans 
dtrangers une lettre identique et il conseille k ceux-ci 
de repondre d cette notification dans les termes de la 
plus vive indignation car il est desirable que ces 
responses qui seront montrees a Yedo et a Kioto, y
produisent une profonde impression sur l1esprit des plus
 ^ 9^recalcitrants.” With this the Foreign Representatives
complied, Bellecourt remarking thati"1*acte qui vient de
s!accomplir n'a certainement pas de precedent dans l,histoiret(
40
and that it was Hbien Incomprehensible11. His uncertainty
suggests that he was not taken into the confidence of the
faction which wished to re-establish Shdgunate control to
41any great extent and despite Bakufu requests that 
Bellecourt be retained in Japan when he was about to be 
replaced by Roches the following year, it would be a gross 
exaggeration to liken the position of the former to that 
of his successor. It may well have been, indeed, that 
the Bakufu intended to make use of France as a powerful
39• C.P.Japon. IX. June 24, I863. Bellecourt to Drouyn.
40. Ibid.
41. A contrary view may be found in Ilattori Shiso, Kindai 
Nihon Gaiko-shi (A diplomatic history of modern Japan)", "
Tokyo, 1954,“'"p. 55*
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friend anu intermediary, for Bellecourt remarked on 
"la pi*<5 Terence marquee que lej Japonair; affeotent do 
donner en ce moment aux auto rite., fr. ..nqaises", but nis 
reaction to thin mac quite different from Lin successor1s, 
for he added: niiouG devens 6viter aussisj de leur donner 
jamais a penscr qu’ils pourraient .jarvenir a nous ^eparcr 
de nos allies, pensee qui g. pcut-dtre ete ou concue ou
. ,  , . - t2-uggdr ce , ’1
The cause of .Bellecourt1 s unwillingness a v;as undoubtedly
niLo suspicion tnat tue wulufu nau not yet , ,ivon up ami none
of casing its position by securing ti.e removal of foreigners
by some means or another. he never changed his original
conviction that the Japanese Government1 s real desire v;-„s
to return to conditions such f. L  JLi. ( 1  been imposed upon t,_e
Dutch at ..,eshima, xn this he was probably not far wrong.
-.he greater the extension given bo for vj j_ gj il b I* IX Cl 0 9 t h e -L G Zj S
chance the .-akufu had of controlling it for its own benefit
ana the more disruptive the effect on the economy. ellecourt
even considered that the .oalcufu was flaying "une sort©
de double jeu qui consistcrait a mettre en avmnb itille
pretextss pour eloigner une arise toiv L e n 1 i ul s s a nt .. e s
_ rinces les plus de terminus commencer des hostilitlAc qu’on
pourra uecuvouer si ellcs ne reussisscn.it pa0 et sur Icoquellcs on
uour -L cX. IL C KJ * appuyer ,^i ellls avaient quel quo chance de succccj^
and ho warned a vicc-siiiioter t.„at nl * indepen-.mnce du Jap on
t-2. ) C.P.Japon. IX. June ,-elle court mo Drouyn.
■p.; C.P.Japon. IX. July 2y, 1 uo j>. ...ellecourt to Drouyh.
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serait affectde par cet etat de choses bien plus vivement 
que par 1*execution loyale de traites conclus en vue 
dfavantages mutuels.*4^ This sort of language, however, 
was forgotten after the arrival of Drouyn*s July 18th 
dispatch.
His Foreign Minister1s displeasure made a considerable 
difference to Bellecourt*s diplomacy* This was especially 
seen in October when, after reporting the murder of a j
Lieutenant Camus and rumours that big merchants trading 
with foreigners were being attacked, he not only witheld 
from urging coercive action again, but even went so far as {
to conclude, resignedly, thati 1111 deviendra bientot j
preferable d*abandonner la place, plutot que de voir *
continuer un etat qui ne leur offre que peu dTespoir de
stability.'* J Finally he informed the Quai d*0rsay that j
the Bakufu seemed about to demand the closing of Yokohama 
again, this time in earnest. lie had refused to discuss 
it with Japanese officials, informing them that any 
decision to alter the Treaties must be made in Europe,
|
A postscript announced that the Japanese government was |
considering a new embassy to Europe for that purpose. ^
(c) The 1864 Embassy to France and the Shimonoseki Expedition!
The second Japanese embassy to Europe was announced '
to Bellecourt as definitely decided upon in December*
44* Ibid*
45* C.P.Japon. X. Oct. 23? 1863. Bellecourt to Drouyn.
46. C.P.Japon. X. Oct. 31, I863. a
-  57 -
He had encouraged it, as he thought it would relieve the
pressure on the Bakufu from its internal enemies and on
the foreigners from the Bakufu. Drouyn de Lhuys, however,
did not welcome what he considered to be an unnecessary
and inconvenient distractionSeparated by so many
thousands of miles from Japan, he could not feel the
tensions or appreciate the subtleties of the political
situation to the extent that his agent did. The reports
Bellecourt had made indicating that Satsuma and some other
han were now definitely known to be in favour of foreign
trade, even if only secretly, appear to have convinced him
that it was safe to refuse outright the demand for the
closure of Yokohama, and he did not realise, as Bellecourt
vaguely did, that Satsuma1s conversion had not necessarily
strengthened the Bakufu1s position. He was unaware that
the emergence of the Strengthen-the-Bakufu-Friendship-With-
Foreigners faction as the dominant voice in the Bakufu
in Edo had been followed by the forcible expulson of Joi
samurai by Satsuma from Kyoto. This success had greatly
boosted Satsuma1s prestige but it had also increased the
jealousyvand distrust for this han felt by the Strengthen-
the-Bakufu faction, which had attempted to do the same thing
as Satsuma two months earlier without success, and by the
48most important Bakufu leader, Tokugawa Yoshinobu.
47* C.P.Japon* XI. March 20, 1864. Drouyn to Bellecourt.
48. See Ishii, op.cit., pp.268-9- Yoshinobu1s name is 
often read as Keiki.
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As a result, the Bakufu1s relations with Satsuma became 
much less harmonious than in the previous two years, and 
at the start of 1864 it showed that it was no longer 
prepared to work with Satsuma in changing the Court’s 
position on foreign affairs.4  ^ In short, the Shogun’s 
government was almost as weak and isolated as before, and 
the sending of an embassy to Europe was necessary in order 
to forestall the criticism that it was doing nothing to 
put into effect the expulsion order which the Court had 
issued in 1863#
Some Bakufu leaders, with the 1862 mission in mind, 
may really have hoped to achieve the closure of Yokohama* 
Others may only have expected to gain time* In either 
case, the new embassy proved a grave disappointment*
Having left Japan at the end of January, 1864, it returned 
before the end of August, having visited only one country.' 
That country was France and it is not unreasonable to suppose 
that the French Foreign Minister’s reception had a good deal 
to do with the shortness of the embassy’s stay in Europe. 
Drouyn*s attitude to the Japanese envoys showed nothing 
of the cautiousness that had marked his own instructions 
to Bellecourt. On the contrary, he displayed an unwilling­
ness to make concessions that seemed to suggest a considerable
49* See Beasley, Select Documents, pp.72-4.
50. The account of the missionb leaders has been translated 
Into English. Ibid. pp. 274-82.
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degree of belligerence. For once the fear that France 
might be compelled to enforce her demands should they be 
refused was forgotten* It may well be that personal 
contact made the Foreign Minister feel that he could 
control the situation, whereas he did not fully trust 
Bellecourt1s assessment and feared that he might take 
advantage of the four months it took to reply to dispatches 
to become involved more deeply than Paris was prepared to 
risk. There seems to be no other explanation for the 
volte-face of his offer of aid to^Shogun, should the
pH
latter require it to overcome his internal difficulties.
Nor was this all. In the second conference on May 11,
Drouyn also sought, as proof of the Shogun* s good will, 
that the three ports already open be made free, and he 
threatened to insist on the immediate opening of Osaka and 
lido if his demand were refused. When the envoys said 
that to make Yokohama, Nagasaki and Hakodate free ports 
would provoke fresh hostility within Japan, the Foreign 
Minister’s reply was:'*Alors, la France devra employer la 
force.1 Upon this the envoys hastened to say that they
51. The offer was made on May 7? in the first of six confer­
ences with the envoys. A proces-vertoal of the 
conferences is included In C.P.Japon. XI. June 1864. Two 
other documents relating to the mission, one a memorandum 
drawn up by its adviser, the elder Siebold, are to be 
found in Memoires et Documents, Japon. I. Siebold urged 
France to support the Shogun and he may have influenced 
Drouyn and possibly even Napoleon III (See Otsuka, Bakumatsu 
Gaiko-shi no KenkvCU (Studies in Bakumatsu* Diplomatic 
History) Tokyo, 1950- p.288). It Is difficult to see, 
however, how this influence could have been more than 
marginal. The main factor was probably Drouyn*s assurance 
from personal contact that such intervention could not turn 
into a war with the Sheguns government Itself..
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were not refusing, merely making an observation. In
their fifth conference with Drouyn they proposed making
Nagasaki and Hakodate free in return for the closing of
Yokohama and also offered compensation for traders at the
latter port* Despite their plea that 1 le sort du Japon
depend de la decision qui va etre prise a cet egard par
la France et ses allies,1 Drouyn refused* The decisions
taken in the six conferences between May 7th and June 10th
were embodied in a convention on June 20th. The main
provision was that France would aid the Bakufu in opening
the Shimonoseki Straits, which had been closed to foreign
ships by Choslift’s batteries for a year, if they were
still closed in three months1 time. France dropped her
absolute insistence on the freeing of the three ports but
secured the promise of reductions in import duties and
an indemnity of 140,000 dollars for Ghbshuls bombardment
of a French ship# In return Drouyn promised to allow
Japanese students to study in Paris and to sanction the
purchase of arms and some older warships# In the final
conference the envoys stated that they no longer intended
to visit any of the other European capitals® It may well
be that, in view of Drouyn de Lhuys1 attitude, they felt
that it was less dangerous to negotiate in Japan than in 
Europe.^  *
52. The text, together with a number of dispatches, was 
printed by the French Government in Documents Diplomatiques V .' 
Paris, 1865.
53# Ikeda, the leader of the mission had also become convinced
that the Bakufu must abandon without delay the dangerous
policy of trying to evade the provisions of the Treaties.
See Beasley, Select Documents, pp*277-81#
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The 1864 Japanese embassy was a failure in every
respect save perhaps that it gave the 'Bakufu the assurance
that France still regarded it as the sole legal Government
of Japan* It had failed to secure a significant breathing-
space ? and worse still, it rendered the Bakufu even more
open to joi attack, in that by the June 20 convention its
envoys had accepted the help of a foreign power against
other Japanese* It is consequently not surprising that
the new French Minister, L6on Roches, was secretly very
relieved at the Bakufu1s refusal to ratify the convention
Ga
although he naturally pretended to be indignant*'**’ To 
understand his feelings fully, however, it is necessary 
to turn to events In Japan during the Embassy1 s absence*.
With the return of Alcock from leave in Mareh/L864, 
determined never again to submit himself to the 
uncertainties of Japanese politics, a new era in diplomacy 
was foreshadowed. By the time Roches arrived to take 
up his post as Minister in Japan on April 279 the British 
Minister was already planning to put the strong fleet at 
his disposal to good use* On May 19, Roches reported that 
he had received a letter from Alcock proposing punitive 
action by the Treaty Powers against Choshu in the hope 
not only of opening the Shimonoseki Straits which the 
latter had threatened with its batteries since June I863, 
but also of weakening the bastion of anti-foreignism and
54. C.P.Japon* XII. Aug. 26, 1864* Roches to Drouyn*
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strengthening5 if possible5 the co-operative elements
■within the Bakufu ^  Since both the American and Dutch
Ministers were in complete agreement with this scheme9
Roches1 position was a difficult one* On the one hand 9
he could not be ignorant that Bellecourt1s tentative
efforts to support the Shogun had brought down upon him
a severe reprimand* On the other hand9 it was customary
for France to act in common with Britain in Japanese affairs.
q 6
At first Roches maintained an equivocal attitude9 but 
his natural inclination towards bold measures and his 
conviction that the situation would deteriorate if the 
Powers did not counteract the internal pressure on the 
Bakufu by a show of Western strength made it inevitable 
that he would sooner or later find a way of collaborating with 
Britain. Already before the receipt of Alcock1s letter? 
Roches had reported that the prospect facing foreigners 
was eventual expulsion5 once the Japanese had bought 
Western axvns in sufficient quantities ^  A week later ? 
he added that in his first interview with the Ro.iu ? the 
demand that the Powers accept the closure of Yokohama had
55* C.P.Japon* XI. May 19? 1864. Roches to Drouyn.
56. Ibid.
57* C.P.Japon. XI. May 17j 1864. Roches to Drouyn. At 
this stage Roches was still receiving advice from Bellecourt 
who remained at Yokohama till May 28.
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been accompanied by a declaration that the Bakufu would 
soon be unable to protect foreigners there and that trade 
would become impossible. This, he claimed, was a threat 
to the treaty which he had been instructed to observe rel­
igiously, and justified him in according his moral support 
to his colleagues1 scheme if the Japanese Government 
continued in its attitude. He had also promised his 
material support in protecting the persons and goods of 
their nationals.
When this dispatch reached Paris at the start of 
August, Drouyn de Lhuys was somewhat disturbed, though 
not as much as he would have been had he known what Roches had 
been doing in the meantime. He 1 invited* Hoches to 
dissociate himself from any action that went beyond the 
immediate protection of foreigners, arguing that the
convention he had just signed would bring the Bakufu back 
59to sanity. y On August Ip, he followed this up with a
telegram stating that London persisted in its peaceful
(Soapproach and had recalled Alcock. Both these missives 
were fated to arrive too late to halt events, but Roches 
had in any case made virtually certain that there would 
be no official interference by not writing again until 
August 17* He then informed his Foreign Minister that
58. C.P.Japon. XI. May 25, 1864. Roches to Drouyn.
59* C.P.Japon. XII. Aug. 10, 1864. Drouyn to Roches.
60. C.P.Japon. XII. Aug. 15, 1864. Drouyn to Roches.
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he had requested Admiral Jaures to participate in the
expedition9 if the Bakufu should fail to act against
61
Choshtt itself* Though he admitted that some persuasion
had been needed, his statement made no mention of the
sustained campaign to overcome Jaurds1 resistance to
which the letter’s reports to the Ministry of Marine
62between June 15 and July 25 bear ample witness. They 
also show that Boches had made up his mind long before 
he admitted it. Though he eventually Justified his decision 
by quoting a Bakufu official to the effect that the Shogun
it? at
desired ChSshQ’s punishment but as he could not carry it
he
out itselfAwould readily give his tacit consent to the 
Powers1 action, J it is obvious that Roches was prepared 
to engage French ships even without this guarantee that 
it would not lead to war with the legal government of 
Japan. It is obvious too that the three months1 de3.ay 
which Bakufu ratification of the Paris Convention would 
have necessitated would have ended the chances of an 
allied expedition. In Its place, there was no real 
guarantee that France would provide the force to carry 
out the task in an Imposing manner, yet because of it 
the Bakufu would have laid itself open to further nation­
alist attack. It was for these reasons that Boches reported
61. C.P.Japon. XII. Aug. 17, 1864. Boches to Drouyn.
62. These dispatches were passed on to the Quai d’Orsay by 
a disgruntled Minister of Marine. See C.P.Japon.XII. Aug.26? 
1864. Ibid. Sept. 16, 1864. Ibid. Oct. 13, 1864. All 
Marine to Quai.
63. C.P.Japon. XII. Aug. 175 1864. Boches to Drouyn.
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the rejection of the Paris Convention of June 20 with 
scarcely concealed satisfaction.
The return of the 1864 Embassy had occurred on the
eve of the expedition’s departure, but it did not delay
it for long. By September 23? Boches was able to report
its complete success. The Choshu batteries had been
disarmed and, helped by the fact that a considerable number
of Choshft samurai were in Kyoto, attempting to regain the
control of the Emperor which they had lost in the Satsuma
coup of the previous year, the allied forces had been able
to occupy Shimonoseki and impose terms on the defeated han.
A month later the Bakufu agreed to pay a three-million
dollar indemnity for the damage done to foreign ships
and for the allies* consideration in not buying the town
of Shimonoseki. ' The indisputable success of the
expedition meant that the Foreign Representatives had
no need to fear for their careers on account of their
independent action, but before its results were known in
Europe, Boches in particular was condemned severely for
his breach of orders. f*Je n'admets pas, Monsieur,”
wrote Prouyn on October 1, *’que la distance autorise, 
comme vous paraissez le croire,des agens d se ddpartir 
ainsi de la ligne de conduite qui leur a ete formellement 
prescrite et, en vous reiterant mes precedentes directions, 
Je dois vous rappeler que vous ne pouvez vous ecarter de 
leur stricte observation sans encour»ir la plus grave 
responsibility “66 Even when he learned of the outcome
64. C.P.Japon. XII. Sept. 23? 1864. Boches to Drouyn.
65. See C.P.Japon. XII. Oct. 31? 1864. Boches to Drouyn.
66. C.P.Japon. XII. Oct. 1, 1864. Drouyn to Boches.
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he did not altogether relent. His only comments were 
that he understood the motives for the expedition, that 
the admirals were to "be congratulated on not allowing the 
fighting to turn into a war, and that his own pacific 
policy was not wrong and must he maintained.^ For 
Roches himself there was no word of praise.
The Shimonoseki Expedition had an enormous effect 
on diplomacy in Japan. The Japanese Government could 
never again dare to think of solving its problems by demand™ 
ing the withdrawal of the foreigners. Since, however, 
its internal enemies could no longer attack it on this 
score, its stability was less threatened than before.
For Roches too, the Expedition was important. By freeing 
the Foreign Representatives from their perpetual concern 
with survival, it allowed them to develop more ambitious 
ideas about their role in Japan. Roches was extremely 
alert to this possibility, and the fact that he had been 
proved right over the action against Choshu, gave him a 
strong hand in his future dealings with his Foreign Minister. 
Moreover, another result of the Expedition was the recall 
to London, and then the posting to Peking, of the able 
Alcock. Up to then, he had dominated the Japanese scene. 
When the next forceful British Minister arrived in mid-1865 5 
he was to find that Roches had succeeded to “this position.
67. C.P.Japon. XII. Dec. 10, 1864. Drouyn to Roches.
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LEON ROCHES AND FRENCH SUPPORT OF THE BAKUFCJ. 1864-1868.
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With the Shimonoseki Expedition the first period of 
diplomatic relations between Japan and the Treaty Powers 
came to an end. Thereafter the Foreign Representatives, 
satisfied that their presence was accepted both by the 
Bakufu and by the powerful daimyo, no longer felt any 
grave doubts about the future of trade, and the securing 
of Imperial Sanction for the treaties a year later did 
not mean a great deal in practical terms. For France 
the decisive factor was probably the lifting of restric­
tions on the export of silk and silkworm eggs, which 
Roches reported on October 15, 1864. That date may be 
regarded as an important turning-point in another way, 
for the same dispatch also contained the following 
passages 1 Je mm puis mdme ajouter que le Gorojo m*a 
donne des temoinages de consideration et de confiance 
dont je crois inutile de rendre compte au d6partement mais 
qui me font esperer de remplir avec fruit la mission que 
le gouvernement de l!Empereur m !a confine.1
This dispatch of October 15, 1864, was the first sign 
of the special relationship between Japan and France which
1. C.P.Japon. XII. Oct. 15, 1864.
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distinguished the final years of the Tokugawa Bakufu and 
played so important a part in the latter1s downfall*
Despite the attention that has been paid to this relation­
ship, some uncertainties still remain. They are centred 
on? firstly, the ultimate aims which Leon Roches was 
pursuing; secondly, the problem of whether the policy 
he was following was his own or his Government1s; and 
thirdly, the extent to which the policy of France diverged 
from that of Britain. Without an examination of these 
aspects, it is impossible to understand the true nature 
and significance of French policy or to attempt an answer 
to the question of whether French assistance to the Bakufu 
was doomed to failure from the start or whether it could 
have given the Shogun the strength either to subdue his
enemies or, at least, preserve a large portion of his 
2power.
Before discussing specifically any of the problems
connected with French policy during this period, however,
it will be well to describe the main features of diplomatic
relations between Japan and the Powers up to the end of
1867, and the ways in which the Bakufu-France friendship
developed. Roches1 special contribution can be seen in
both spheres from an early stage. In the field of general
2. Unfortunately the evidence available on these points 
is not all that might be hoped for. Of all the Represent­
atives whom France sent to Japan in the 19th century,
Roches was by far the most irregular correspondent and 
the most secretive. Consequently the questions which arise 
from his activities can In most cases be answered only in 
terms of probabilities.
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diplomacy the first problem to arise was that of the 
Shimonoseki Indemnity. In the settlement following the 
Expedition, the Bakufu, which had been allotted responsi­
bility for ChoshU's offence, was given the choice of either 
paying a huge indemnity of three million dollars or 
opening another port. Britain, in particular, desired 
the latter and gained the support of the United States 
and Holland. The Bakufu, however, had strong objections 
to this. Even if the port were to be in Bakufu territory, 
which seemed unlikely, it would mean an increase in trade, 
with its attendant inflationary effects on the cost of 
living; even worse, perhaps, the opening of another port 
would also mean that the Bakufu would be extending, rather 
than restricting, the treaties, and this would seriously 
weaken Its position vis-a-vis the Court and hostile daimyo 
by removing any credibility which its profession that it 
was working for the gradual removal of foreigners still 
possessed. Nevertheless, as it was in no position to 
pay the indemnity, it is very doubtful whether the Bakufu 
could have succeeded in resisting the pressure of the Powers 
had it not received the diplomatic support of France. Not 
that Boches1 pro-Bakufu sympathies were France!s only 
reason for prefering the indemnity to the opening of a new 
port. Money was always welcome, while French trade was 
not substantial enough at the ports already open to make 
her want another one, unless it should be the famed Osaka.
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With limited budgets moreover, the expense of providing
protection for their nationals in a new port was by no
means a negligible factor. More important still was
the suspicion that the port would be Shimonoseki and that,
were this to be opened, by some means or other Britain
would come to, gain some special advantage* This fear
of Britain winning a march over France through her naval
superiority was one which had troubled Bellecourt and had
been responsible for his taking active steps to associate
France with Britain during the Bichardson affair. Boches1
tactics were different. Instead of trying to control
British policy by co-operating with it, he sought to nullify
it by preventing the Powers^taking a unanimous stand and
relying on the probability that England would not act in
the absence of an entente* In this he was successful.
Although Drouyn de Lhuys had stated in 1863 that what
4Britain did in Japan was no concern of France, now, at 
the start of 1865, Boches secured his support on the 
Indemnity question, and without France1s adherence to a 
joint demand, neither Winchester nor Parkes, the two 
British Representatives involved, could force the Bakufu 
to concede what they desired.
3. C.P.Japon. XII. Oct. 3^ -? 1864. Roches to Drouyn5 
M.D.Japon. III. Jan. 10, I865. Marine to Quai.
4. C.P.Japon. IX. July 18, 1863. Drouyn to Bellecourt.
5. C.P.Japon. XIII. Jan. 10, 1865- Drouyn to Boches.
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It was his initial failure on this score that induced
Parkes to make the next important move in diplomacy.
This came in November, 1865, when the English Minister
led his Dutch, .American, and French colleagues in a
powerful fleet to Hyogo. The avowed purpose of the
operation was to facilitate negotiation with the Shogun*
who had for some time been resident in Osaka., The Powers
had three objects in mind - Imperial sanction of the 1858
treaties, lower tariffs, and the opening of Iiyogo and Osaka,
in return for which they were prepared to waive payment of
the remaining two-thirds of the indemnity. Beyond this,
the expedition was intended by Parkes to give the Bakufu
a forceful reminder that Britain had the power to disregard
it, if it proved impotent or unsatisfactory, and negotiate
directly with the Court or the leading han. The French,
or rather Roches*, response to Parkes* action (the Quai
d*Orsay did not hear of it until it was all over) was
similar to his attitude over the Shimonoseki Indemnity,
but less effective. At first he opposed the idea altogether;
then when he found Parkes adamant he agreed to the Ro.iu* s
request that he accompany the English Minister and contribute
6a restraining influence. Claiming to be ill, he took no
part in the negotiations on the British flag-ship, but it
seems he helped to draft the final note with which the
—
Bakufu partially satisfied Parkes. His own dispatches 
make no mention of the last fact.
6. C.P.Japon. XIII. Oct. 31, 1865* Roches to Drouyn.
7. See Beasley, Select Documents * p. 82.
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Diplomatic activity from the end of 1865 was centred
upon two issues, the first of which was the negotiation
of a new Commercial Convention, Following its promise
of November, the demoralised Bakufu reduced the import
tariff to a general level of 5%° In deference to the
superior interest of Britain in the Japan trade, Roches
allowed Parkes to act for him In these negotiations, but
it is worth noting that, in a dispatch to Paris, he
claimed the credit for predisposing the Japanese towards
more.liberal ideas concerning international trade and his
advocacy may well have been crucial.® With this matter
settled, however, differences between France and Britain
again became evident, for the second Issue concerned the
attitude the Powers should adopt regarding the Bakufu-
9Choshu conflict. Here Roches1 actions were motivated
8, C.P.Japon. XIV* June 26, 1866. Roches to Drouyn*
9* This conflict, which eventually proved disastrous for
Bakufu authority resulted from the Bakufu*s decision to 
regain prestige by punishing ChoshU for influencing the 
Court against it* The attempted coup d!btat by Choshu 
samurai in Kyoto in 1864 provided an excellent pretext.
The Bakufu expedition at the end of 1864 was an imposing 
one which forced the Choshu leaders to come to terms but 
the apprehensions of Satsuma and other great daimyo prevented 
it from pursuing its advantage, and in a very short time It 
found Itself opposed once more by new leaders In Choshu, 
who had attained power by armed force and were pledged to 
the Bakufu1s overthrow. It was therefore necessary for 
the Bakufu to undertake a new expedition, but the prepara­
tions were not completed until July 1866, by which time 
Choshu had made a secret alliance with Satsuma and was 
amply equipped to resist that attack, which was called 
off before the end of the year. The essential book on 
this subject is A.M. Craig, Choshu in the Meiji Restoration 
Cambridge, Mass* 1961*
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entirely by his friendship with the Bakufu. Already,
in June 1865? he had secured the agreement of the other
representatives to the proposal that the Powers follow
a policy of absolute neutrality in the Bakufu-Choshu 
10conflict and the practical effect of this was to put 
a stop to the direct import of arms into Choshu by foreign 
traders* In mid-1866 the Bakufu became greatly concerned 
at Parkes1 relations with some of the South-Western daimyo.nn vacaB u iH H d iM  uu-mjf
The approaches to Britain by agents of both Satsuma and
Choshu had become known and had given rise to the fear
that the British Minister might take some official action
that would reduce the Bakufu1s prestige and encourage its
enemies. Consequently, in July of that year, Roches was
asked by one of the Ro.iu to follow Parkes to Nagasaki and
11counteract his influence. Previously he had always 
eschewed contact with the powerful feajp. Now he readily 
agreed to do what he could to help the Bakufu in this 
direction. He met a Satsuma envoy at Nagasaki and
10. See C.P.Japon, XIII. June 26, 1865. Roches to Drouyn.
11. See C.P.Japon. XIV. Aug. 27? 1866, Roches had already 
exerted some restraining influence on Parkes through his 
home government. His complaint that Parkes was acting 
rashly by opening direct relations with the daimvo was 
taken up by the Quai df0rsay with the Foreign Office, 
which instructed its representative to act with the utmost 
prudence. See F.0.46. LXIV, No. 82. May 7, 1866.
Clarendon to Parkes? F.0.27. MBCXVI. No. 588. May 4, 1866. 
Cowley to Clarendon,
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addressed him with "un langage qui n'a du laisser aucun 
doute dans son esprit a l’egard de la politique prudente 
et loyale que les Puissances Etrsngeres sont decidees a 
suivre a I'egard du Japon," With some relish his report 
adds* II etait facile de lire le desappointement sur la
Ip
physionomie de 1* Off icier de Satsouma.'* Roches also
succeeded in accompanying Parkes on his return from
Nagasaki, but failed to persuade him to join in an offer
of mediation to Choshu when they passed through the
Shimonoseki Straits. What Roches meant by mediation was
shown in the note which he sent to Choshu in which he
spoke of the han* s illegal actions and offered to
facilitate its 'submission* to the Sh&gun.^ Even so,
his attitude towards Choshu was more moderate than that
of the Bakufu» mainly because he saw how the struggle was
weakening both the resources and prestige of the latter.
His preference really would have been for a settlement
14that would have saved the faces of both sides. It
1^
would appear, from information given to Parkes, ' that 
it was only when the French Minister found the Bakufu 
unwilling to agree to his mediation on such a basis that he 
urged it to prosecute the war more vigourously. Rumour 
had it that he had then made an offer of military aid.
12. C.P.Japon. XIV. Aug. 27? 1866.
13. F.0.46. LXX. No, 131* Aug. 13? 1866. Parkes to Stanley 
Inclosure.
14. C.P.Japon. XIV. Aug. 27? 1866. Roches to Drouyn.
I?. F.0.46. LXX. No. 141. Sept. 2, 1866. Parkes to Stanley
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The Bakufu was said to have declined it, hut it can he 
imagined that its enemies can hardly have been happy at 
the possibility that it could turn to a great Western 
Power for help if necessary. It is likely that the 
concern felt by the South-Western han at the growing 
intimacy between France and the Bakufu, a concern which 
is attested to in the reports of Satow, the English inter­
preter who had close contacts with important daimvo and 
l6samurai, played a considerable part in bringing them
together in an alliance which their mutual jealousies
would certainly have delayed, if not prevented altogether.
In reality, the fears of those han were not without
foundation. By the end of 1867, when the political
turmoil finally came to a head, the Bakufu had been receiving
material assistance from France for nearly three years,
and with a few years more its position would have been
significantly strengthened. The process had begun at
the start of 1865 when the Bakufu officially requested
French help in the construction of a maritime arsenal,
which was intended to give the 8hogun a clear naval
17supremacy over the daimvd . ' Thanks to Roches1 skilful 
advocacy, this was agreed to at once. The Quai d*Orsay
16. See e.g.Fl.0.46. LXXVIII. No.8. Jan. 18, 1867. Parkes
to Stanley. Inclosure. InUwajima, Satow found,"The intimacy 
of the French with the Bakufu (Tycoon!s Government) appeared 
to be a subject of great" suspicion with [the fex-daimyoj11 
Ibid.
17. G.P.Japon, XIII. Jan. 16, 1865* Roches to Drouyn.
rjC
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and Ministry of Marine even responded favourably to 
the accompanying request for sixteen of the new 1 canons
l8ray6s!, which previously had been denied to the Japanese.
Plans for this arsenal and dockyard, on which the
Bakufu proposed to spend up to thirty million francs,
were rapidly set afoot. A pre3.iminary survey was entrusted
to Lieutenant Verny, a French engineer, and after he had
suggested Yokosuka as a suitable site he was put in charge
of constructing there Japan1s first modern arsenal and
dockyard. Materials and personnel were sought in France
and in March^l866, work was commenced. Skill and
experience were supplied by 45 French workmen, many of
them from the French navy. Partly to provide interpreters,
and partly for more general cultural purposes, a French
school under Roches1 interpreter, Mermet de Cachon, was
set up in Yokohama also. Unfortunately for the Bakufu
the Restoration occurred before it could derive much
19
benefit from the huge project. Much the same thing 
applied to the small factory that was built with French 
help at Yokohama at about the same period.
18. G.P.Japon. XIII. March 18, 1865* Drouyn to Roches.
19. A short and rather superficial account of the dockyard 
J. Raoulx, ,!La Creation de I1 Arsenal de Yokoska” can be 
found in La Revue Maritime. May 1939? pp* 588-635*
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Of more immediate value was another Bakufu-French 
enterprise, ’La societe generate d’importations et 
d1exportations dans 1*extreme Orient,* also known as 
’la compagnie Franco-Japonaise.’ First indications of 
this project were given by Roches on October 1®, 1865, 
when he reported that he had been approached by the Roju 
with a proposal that ’une puissante Compagnie Etrangere’ 
should be formed in France for the purpose of ’’nouer, 
au dehors de son action officialle, des rela tions avec 
une association du meme genre composee de sujets Japonais.”
As he pointed out, although it was understood that wle 
gouvernement japonais renoncerait a toute action sur ces 
Compagnies autre que celle qu’exercent les gouvernements 
Europ§ens sur des associations de ce genre,” it seemed 
not impossible that ‘’les avantages immenses qui seraient 
assures a une Compagnie a laquelle ce gouvernement 
accorderait simp lament sa bienveillance1 would ensure that 
H le Japon serait pour nous ce que la Chine est pour
OA
1*Angleterre, c’est a dire un marche Francais.”
Roches envisaged a huge trade being built up on the
base of French exports to Japan and Japanese exports of
raw silk to France. The idea was blessed by the
Quai d’Orsay and the Ministry of Commerce and a company
was soon formed in France. Its activities never, of course,
20. C.C.Yeido. IV. Oct. 17, 1865* Roches to Drouyn.
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reached the heights anticipated by Roches but it did 
play a by no means unimportant role, for although the 
contacts made by its representative, Coullet, with Japanese 
merchants had no time to come to fruition. It was used 
extensively by the Bakufu to Import war materials of 
various sorts in 1866-7.
The military power of the Bakufu might have received 
an even greater strengthening by yet another project which 
depended largely on French aid. During the final years 
of the Tokugawa period the inadequacy of the traditional 
military system was becoming generally recognised and 
several han experimented with foreign methods. The 
military structure of the Bakufu particularly needed reform 
and at the start of 1866 a request was made to France, 
through Roches, to send a military mission to assist In
pi
forming the nucleus of a new army. The Ministry of 
War readily provided a group of able young officers, who 
applied themselves to their task diligently, after they 
arrived in Japan in January 1867. Unfortunately for the 
mission’s promoters, however, it had to be withdrawn from 
its task of instruction in April of the following year 
owing to the civil war, and in such a short time of
p p
operation its efforts could hardly bear much fruit.
21. C.P.Japon. XIV. Feb. 15, 1866. Roches to Drouyn.
22. This and later military missions have been studied 
in detail by E. Presseisen, Before Aggression <> Tucson,
1965 •
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Even with the military mission the list of changes
initiated by the Bakufu under Roches’ guidance is not
exhausted. In fact, the end of 1866 saw the first steps
towards a political reform which has been considered by
Japanese historians to be the most significant of all the
2^changes produced by the Bakufu-France friendship. J The 
reason for this judgement is not so much the effect of 
the reform on the political situation - it would seem 
that Tokugawa Yoshinobu, who promoted it after he replaced 
Iemochl as Shogun, was only able to implement some of its 
least fundamental aspects - as the evidence it provides 
for the view that the Tokugawa Government was changing
24from a feudal organisation Into an absolutist bureaucracy. 
Whatever the truth of this view, it is perhaps worth noting 
that, for Roches, advocacy of political reform was meant, if 
his own statements can be believed, to pave the way for the 
eventual Introduction of a liberal civilisation once the 
challenge to the Shogun*s power was defeated.* As regards 
the details of the projected reform, Roches’ advice to
23* The most detailed account is by Honjo, Bakumatsu no 
Shin-seisaku« (The New Policies of the Bakumatsu Period), 
f5kyo7T93T7 pp. 188-199* A more recent, shorter, version 
can be found in Ishii, Mei.ii Ishin no Butal-ura. (Behind the 
Scene in the Meiji RestorationJT^Tokyo? 1960.pp.160-167•
24. Inoue Kiyoshi, while agreeing vehemently with Ishii 
that what the Bakufu was aiming at in its last years can 
best be termed ’Tokugawa comprador absolutism* dissents 
from the general view by holding that there was a real 
danger of its succeeding. See Ishii, Gakusetsu Hihan Mei.ii 
Ishin Ron.(The Meiji Restorations A Critical Discussion of 
Scholarly Theories) Tokyo, 1961. pp.276-7*
25* C.P.Japon. XV. March 1, 1867.
■* Bo “
Yoshinobu ranged boldly over the whole field of government. 
To the question of how to reform the old feudal system, 
the representative of France, working from his understanding 
of his own country’s history, urged the necessity of 
extinguishing the power of the great Tozama dairnyo and the 
incorporation of the fudai daimvo and their retainers,
piMwriiimii i     a /
together with the hatamoto, into a rationalised govern­
ment structure, with the able being allocated to the 
proposed new army and navy, while those unsuited to this 
role would be made to transfer to agriculture and commerce. 
Bakufu institutions themselves would undergo fundamental 
alteration, the R5.iu and Wakadoshiyori being replaced by 
western-style Ministries, headed by specialists and 
staffed by men of ability, virtually regardless of rank.
As Ishii remarks, this was little different from the policy
2dput into effect by the Meiji Government a few years later.
In Roches* scheme of things, however, the Emperor was to 
be returned to his former impotence and was to be so 
educated and controlled that he would never again provide 
a focus for anti-Tokugawa agitation. To establish a 
better financial support for the new modernised structure, 
Roches emphasised the necessity of reforming the fiscal 
system also. New taxes on many items were proposed as 
an addition to the traditional one on land, and a budget 
system based on the sale of all the Bakufu* s rice revenues
26. Mei.ii Ishin no Butai-ura. p. 165.
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was also envisaged. It may be questioned whether 
Yoshinobu intended to make use of all Roches1 advice and 
whether he had not, in any case, a fairly good idea already 
of what was needed for Bakufu modernisation. What does 
seem certain, though, is that he placed an enormous amount 
of trust in friendship with France. This was shown in 
his readiness to send his younger brother, together with 
other young Japanese, to Paris in 1867, for the purpose# 
of receiving a French education. His appreciation of 
Roches* efforts was expressed in several messages to the 
French Minister, but nowhere as strikingly as in a letter 
which he addressed to Napoleon III at the start of I867.
After referring to the new outlook and changes in Japan, 
he wrotes
"Mais je serais injuste et ingrat si je ne disais 
pas que ces heureux changemens sont, en grande partie, 
dus £ Votre Repr6sentant, Ldon Roches, qui a epuise pour 
nous tout ce qu*il y a de vrai, de sincere et de bienveillant 
dans son coeur. J*ai en lui une confiance illimitee, 
et je compte bien, & l*avenir>en faire mon conseiller intime 
pour toutes les affaires etrang£res. * 27
Even allowing for flattery, such language indicates 
something more than mere technical co-operation, and it 
is worth mentioning in this context that in February 1867, 
an anonymous Quai d!Orsay review of Roches* career stated 
that '•M. Roches a su obtenir une si legitime influence 
dans ce Pays, qui lui doit sa transformation depuis 1864, 
qu*il correspond direetement avec le Taikoun et que plusieurs
27. M.D.Japon. I. It Is dated Keio 2.12.29• (Feb.3, I867).
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fois lorsque les ministres Japonais ont voulu faire adopter
un plan par leur Souverain, ils lui ont demande de lfappuyer
aupres de lui.H  ^ In all this, however? it is important
to remember that Roches1 relations with Yoshinobu were a
much later development than his links with some influential
middle-ranking Bakufu officials9 notably Oguri Tadamasa and 
K»on
Kurimoto and it was their influence which had
prompted most of the previous requests for aid.
(b) The Repudiation of Roches* Policy
In this brief outline of the growth of Bakufu-France 
co-operation9 one important item has still not been 
mentioned. If the long-term plans for the re-establishment 
of Tokugawa power were to have any chance of success? the 
immediate challenge of the South-Western han would have 
to be suppressed? and for this the strengthening of the 
Shogun1s army was urgently required. As an important 
step to this end9 agreement with Coullet had been reached 
in 1866 for the supply of arms and equipment on a large 
scale. Immediate payment for this, however5 was impossible 
for a government whose finances were based on a system 
long out-of-date and whose resources were being further 
depleted by indemnities to foreign countries. The only 
solution possible was a foreign loan and^not surprisingly, 
it was planned by Roches and Oguri that the bulk of the
28. G.G^IV. Feb. 1867.
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five million dollars needed for this and future require­
ments should be sought in France. There can be little 
doubt that when the project was worked out, in the autumn 
of 1866? it seemed perfectly capable of realisation.
Within a matter of months, however, circumstances had 
changed, and by the time Yoshinobu returned the Shogunate!s
 ^ *  v BfTiBn i «Trn'fllif|/ iin .flliti r.jifliuamhJwjaCT
powers to the Emperor in November 1867, virtually all hope
of success had disappeared. To understand the reasons
29for the failure of this important scheme, y it is necessary 
to return to the three basic questions about French policy 
formulated at the start of this section.
These questions become relevant from the fact that, 
in 1867, when movements to negotiate the loan were under 
way, the differences between French and British policy 
towards Japan reached a point where they could not help 
but clash, even if this clash did not take the shape of 
open antagonism between Roches and Parkes, but was masked 
by a change of Foreign Minister in Paris and diverted, to 
some extent into a difference between Roches and Drouyn 
de Lhuys1 successor, the Marquis de Moustier. This clash
29* Ishii puts it even more strongly, "Bearing in mind 
the fact that the funds for completing the military prepara­
tions by means of which the Bakufu intended to suppress the 
powerful anti-Bakufu han were to come from this loan, one 
can say that it was on its success or failure that the 
Bakufu1 s existence really depended Mei.ii Ishin no 
Butai-ura* pp.170-171 *
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not only proved a vital factor in the failure of the 
foreign loan but also tied Roches’ hands almost completely 
thereafter3 as far as help for the Bakufu was concerned*
Why this clash occurred and why it had so decisive an effect 
cannot be understood unless it is realised that French 
policy in Japan between 1865 and 1867 was largely the 
personal creation of Roches himself* Before discussing 
this point9 however9 it is appropriate to examine more 
closely the actual differences between French and British 
policy*
Up until 18649 although there were occasional 
disagreements between France and Britain5 their fundamental 
attitude towards Japan remained the same. It was5 as has 
been described* one of general support for the Shogun*
/ '—  J* ■uumiii —  ■iB'ii.wji
This picture began to change even before the Shimonoseki 
Expedition and it was the English Minister9 Alcock, who 
first diverged from the earlier view. Contacts with 
Satsuma5 after the British bombardment of Kagoshima9 had con 
vinced him that the daimvo were by no means as anti-foreign 
as they had been painted9 and this9 combined with an aware­
ness of Bakufu weaknessj led him to believe that the best 
solution both for Japan and for foreign trade was a 
constitutional compromise whereby the Shogun would share 
his power with an assembly of daimvo This view was
30. See Ishii 9 Mei.ii Ishin no Butai-ura« pp. 10 -12. Some 
of Ishii*s conclusions3 however9 are arguable.
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more or less taken over by Parkes, It must be emphasized 
that neither the British Government nor any of its 
representatives desired the overthrow of the Shogun* s
**• .   — >P ij' »■ mu w
power completely. Their desire was for something similar 
to the Kobu Gattai programme9 which had been attracting strong 
support from Satsuma and other great daimvo in the early*• *■ wiji a ii iu M f >■ ’W v
Q1
sixties. They were certainly not aiming at the replace­
ment of the Tokugawa by Satsuma and Choshu9 and it cannot 
even be said with certainty that Britain desired the 
abolition of the ShSgunate, To interpret Parkes* visits 
to the South-Western han as meaning that he supported the 
aims of their more extremist samurai-leaders is to ignore 
the fact that Britain had important trade interests to 
protect9 which would be endangered by the civil war which 
must surely result from an overthrow-the-Bakufu policy.
As this is different from the accepted view, some quotations 
in its support from Parkes* dispatches to the Foreign Office? 
may be appropriate. On July 24, 1866, while he was in 
the middle of his visit to Kyushu and Shikoku, Parkes wrote 
from Nagasaki that **In regard to the political condition
31• To suggest as both Ishii and Inoue do9 that Britain 
supported the powerful daimvo in order to prevent a 
revolution ‘from below* in Japan, however, is surely to 
ignore the numerous exhortations by every British 
representative and Foreign Minister to the Bo;iu to 
encourage merchants and foster the growth of a ‘middle 
class *.
86
of Japan, the Tycoon1s Government appears , as far as I 
can judge, to he the only power in the State which is 
able to preserve general order, and secure the faithful 
observance of our Treaties.1 As for the purpose of 
his visits to the South-West, it was largely to make 
contacts and gain information, and in this context it is 
worth noting that he wrote on February 28, 1867s ,f It is 
by no means desirable that our communications with the 
Daimvos should be confined to that section who appear 
opposed to the existing G ov er n me n t .”33 Qne might also 
cite his acceptance of an Interview with Yoshinobu at the 
start of 1867? though conscious that this, in his own 
words, 1 might be of material service to him at a time 
when a considerable section of the daimvos are not disposed 
to submit readily to his authority.1* ^  It is also
32. F.0.46. LXIX. No.123• July 24, 1866. Parkes to Clarendon
33. F.0.46. LXXVIII. No.29. Feb.28, 1867. Parkes to Stanley.
34. F.0.46. LXXVIII. No.l. Jan.16, 1867. In his private
correspondence with Hammond, Parkes came out in support
of Yoshinobu still more decisively: “At the same time I am 
quite disposed to give him all the support I can in whatever 
position he occupies;...*he certainly appears to me to be 
the most superior Japanese 1 have yet met and It is possible 
he will make for himself a name in History.” (F.0.391° XIV. 
May 6, I867). His enthusiasm paled somewhat at the end of 
the year when the Bakufu failed to find the murderers of 
some sailors from H.M.S. Icarus. He never, however, 
shared the strong anti-Bakufu sentiments of Satow, whose 
opinions, as expressed in A Diplomat in Japan. London 1921, 
are often taken to represent official British policy.
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difficult to square with the policy of unqualified support 
for the South-Western daimvo« which Parkes is generally 
considered to have held the fact that he threw all his 
Influence Into ensuring that the Sh5gun employed a British 
mission for the training of his naval officers, and not 
content with this, even attempted to acquire a share in 
the training of the army.^ 411 ±n all, it is difficult 
to avoid the conclusion that Parkes only supported Satsuma 
and Ch5shu claims to a limited extent and in so far as 
they could be achieved by Constitutional1 means, and that 
he was probably given a misleading impression of their 
intentions.
In reality, then, the British attitude to the i
{
Japanese political situation underwent relatively little j
1
i
change, and had French policy remained what it was in early j
j
1864, there need never hdve been a clash between the two. j
1
As has been seen, however, if from one viewpoint French |
policy changed less than the British in that she maintained 
in full her support for the Shogun, from another angle, it :
changed much more owing to the Intensity of its implementation.; 
Some of the assertions about French policy In this period, 
however, are misleading. It Is alleged, for instance, that 
Roches was sent out by Drouyn de Lhuys with a special mission
35. See e.g. F.0.46. LXIX. No.123. July 24, 1866. Parkes 
to Clarendon.
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to establish a new policy.J In fact, there is no 
documentary evidence in favour ofthis assertion, hut a 
great deal to suggest that Roches was told to carry on 
where Rellecourt had left off. Paris had very little 
knowledge of Japanese affairs and Roches himself acknow­
ledged his debt to his predecessor for informing him 
fully about conditions there on his arrival.^7 Drouyn’s 
strictures on him for his participation in the Shimonoseki 
Expedition indicate that official Quai d1Orsay policy was 
still most concerned with avoiding risks of involvement.38 
The most that can safely be said about the appointment 
of Roches is that it indicated the desire of Napoleon IIXfs 
government to extend her unsatisfactory commercial 
relations with Japan by sending there a man of known 
ability, who had special links with the French silk 
i n d u s t r y T o  treat his appointment as a 'new line*
36. See Medzini, op.cit. p.183, where he maintains that by 
the 1864 Paris Convention, France <f cut herself loose from 
the policy she had pursued since 1859* The new 'line' was 
entrusted to her new envoy in Japan - Leon Roches.*1 Ishii, 
Mei.ii Ishin no Kokusai-teki Kankyc?. (The Meiji Restoration 
in its International Per spec tlveO?" Tokyo, 1957* p. 500., 
also sees the appointment of Roches as marking a reversal 
of French policy.
37* C.P.Japon. XI. May 15, 1864. Roches to Drouyn.
38. C.P.Japon. XII. Oct. 1, 1864. It would appear that 
Drouyn was led to believe by Ikeda that the Bakufu would 
deal with the Shimonoseki problem by itself.
39* Roches originally came from Grenoble. He was well 
acquainted with E. Duseigneur, a leading silk merchant in 
Lyons. See C.C.Y^do, III. Sept. 1, 1864. Roches to Drouyn.
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for this reason, though, is to forget that Bellecourt
had already taken steps in this direction himself by
sending back to France some examples of Japanese silkworms
and by constantly urging the Bakufu to remove the restric-
40tions on their export. In any case, the desire to 
boost trade can hardly be regarded as exceptional in the 
i8601s, or peculiar to France,
The 1 new line1 theory also carries the implication 
that the initiative towards Bakufu-France friendship came 
entirely from Roches, This again seems to rest on 
predisposition rather than evidence. As Roches1 own 
dispatches tell the story, it was entirely a question of 
his responding sometimes hesitantly, to approaches by the 
R6.1u or their agents. If Roches* own account be 
suspected of disingenuousness, there are still other 
factors that would support it. In particular it should 
be noted that right from the beginning of treaty relations 
the Bakufu had looked for help from one of the Foreign 
Powers, Their purpose was obvious. Good relations 
with one of the Powers could reduce the danger of 
isolation and provide Japan with information about the 
wider world, as well as a channel for the import of arms 
and other material requirements. It might also temper 
the hostility of the Powers in a period when the Bakufu * s
40. See e.g. C.C.Yedo. I. Oct. 3? 1861. Bellecourt to 
Thouvenel.
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inability to execute the treaties made it highly 
vulnerable. Until his departure from Japan in 1862,
Townsend Harris to some extent played this role.
Thereafter there was something of a gap which the Bakufu 
partly managed to fill with Pruyn, Harris* successor, and 
also, fleetingly, with Bellecourt, Neither proved 
really satisfactory. Bellecourt, though sufficiently 
flattered by Japanese attentions in 1863, to be willing 
to act as mediator between the Bakufu and Britain, was 
too suspicious of Japan*s ultimate intentions to accept
41the idea of her possession of the most up-to-date weapons, 
ftruyn, on the other hand, was all too ready to act as a 
supplier of arms, but appears to have had too much of an
eye on personal profit for the Japanese Government*s
42 *liking. In any case, the U,S,A. was too deeply involved
in the Civil War to be of much use to Japan diplomatically.
However, neither Russia, because of her territorial ambitions,
nor Britain, because of her demands for the extension of
trade, could be envisaged in the role of protector,
Holland, on account of her political insignificance, and
Prussia, not yet a naval power and with a highly unsympathetic
minister, were also out of the question. Therefore, if
the Bakufu were to continue to seek a special relationship
with any of the Powers, that Power could only be France,
41. C.P.Japon. VII. Oct. 10, 1862. Bellecourt to Thouvenel.
42. See F.0.46. LV. June 239 1865. Winchester to Russell.
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which, though diplomatically of very considerable weight, 
had not the strength in the Far East to be a real danger 
and had,since late 1863, shown much restraint. And, 
once the ambiguity of the Bakufu*s attitude towards the 
Treaties had been removed by the Shimon©seki expedition, 
what reason had Roches for refusing a role which might 
bring added prestige to France? That the new relation­
ship was so quick to emerge is explicable by the fact that 
Kurimoto m s l , one of the Bakufu officials, was already 
on friendly terms with Mermet de Cachon.4  ^ Of equal 
importance was Roches* own personality, especially his 
ability to treat Japanese officials with respect and to
flatter them, his moderate and reasonable attitude, and
4.4.
his wide-ranging imagination and ambition. Though he 
may have gone further in responding to the Bakufu approaches 
than he admitted, however, his reports and actions during 
his first six months in Japan when he criticised the 
Bakufu in the customary manner, are clear indication that
43. The impression given by Kurimoto in his memoirs, 
Kurimoto Joun Iko« Tokyo, 1943« edM pp.108-9? is^certain 
Bakufu leaders were eager to take advantage fof his unusual 
friendship.
44. Roches* sympathies for the Japanese people were often 
visible in his dispatches* It is hard to imagine Parkes 
detecting a likeness between the Japanese character and 
that of his own country, as did Roches. See G.P.Japon.
XIII. Jan. 10, 1865. Roches to Drouyn.
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he did not arrive with any pre-conceived idea of forming
any special tie with the Shogun1s government.
The crucial aspect of the Bakufu-French friendship,
as far as the clash with British'policy is concerned,
was not, however, its origins, hut the use to which
Boches put it and the goals which he envisaged for it.
He himself, in his dispatches, J claimed to be working
not only for the consolidation of a pro-French government,
but also for the good of the Japanese in general, and
since he still supposed the dissident daimyo to be
violently anti-foreign and reactionary, he may well
have been sincere when he urged that under the guidance of
Yoshinobu alone could Japan be made prosperous by the
influx of foreign capital and the exploitation of her
resources. That her introduction to the benefits of
liberal Western civilisation would have a strong French
flavour was particularly gratifying. However, this
policy had other implications, of which Roches^■HnanHpn
well aware. Most important was the potential addition
to French strength and influence in the Far East which
would result from the acquisition there of any ally, and
4 6perhaps a naval base, from the immense increase in trade
45. See especially G.P.Japon. XV. March 1, I867. Roches to 
Moustier, where he developed his views at some length.
46. The suspicion that France wished to use Japan as a 
base for a renewal of her 1866 expedition against Korea 
held a prominent place in Parkes1 private letters to 
Hammond in I867. See e.g. F.O. 391? XIV, Feb. 1. I867.
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that would follow,and from a new outlet for French 
capital.
These results, had they ever been realised, would 
have presented a considerable challenge to Britain*s 
political and economic predominance in the Far East, and 
it would thus have been surprising if she had not 
attempted to sabotage the Bakufu-France friendship on 
this ground, despite Roches1 skill in minimising the import­
ance of his projects. Nor should one ignore the resentment
of Parkes at being forced to take a back-seat in Japanese
47affairs after his experience in China. f Unfortunately 
for Roches, the point at which British opposition made 
itself felt coincided with the launching of the Franco- 
Japanese trading company and the preparations for the 
crucial loan. Such a consideration may not have been 
foreign to the mind of Parkes, at least. News of an 
undertaking of this nature was bound to spread, especially 
as part of the money was sought from the Oriental Bank 
of Yokohama, which was an English concern. Parkes 
himself made no open objections to the loan, but in a 
letter of November 14, 1867, to Hammond, he referred to 
Roches* position in a revealing passages lfThe Company 
■which he and Coullet have endeavoured to form has proved 
an utter failure from their not being able to get their 
shares taken. Their stock In trade would have been
4-7. Roches insinuated this In C.P.Japon. XIV. Aug. 27, 1866.
Roches to Drouyn.
contracts with the Japanese Government and finance 
operations, in the way of loans on their account, but I 
have had something to do with checking these operations. 
Most of the contracts the Japanese Government thought of 
making have been abandoned as also the idea of raising a 
loan, and the proposed Company therefore find themselves 
without a field for their enterprise. I should, of course 
not allow such a company to obtain any Exclusive privileges 
Parkes did not, unfortunately, specify what steps he took 
to obstruct the French scheme but it is possible that he 
advised the Oriental Bank not to co-operate with the 
Shogun1s government. Such a lack of response by the 
bank-on-the-spot would certainly have had a discouraging 
effect on French investors. Parkes also advised Japanese
48. F.0.46. L X X X II .  Nov. 14, 1867. Private. With this
report Parkes enclosed copies of four letters written to 
Roches, including two from Coullet and one from Fleury- 
Herard which are extraordinarily revealing* Exactly why 
Roches showed them to him Is not clear, though it may have 
been Intended to prove to him that the Comte de Montblanc!s 
military mission to Satsuma did not have official backing* 
In the light of Coullet1s first letter, of Aug* 9? 1867, 
Parkes* statement that his Company had proved an utter 
failure seems slightly exaggerated. Though Coullet 
admitted that the public subscription for it had failed, 
he added that#1 il n*y a rien de perdu* On va reprendre 
l*affaire comme on aurait du le faire dSs I1origine* *. 
le capital, plus restreint pour commencer, sera form§ par 
les adherents immedlats du groupe des fondateurs, et 
j’esp^re que nous aurions un retard rnais non pas un dchee.*’ 
As far as large scale operations were concerned, however, 
Parkes1 remark seems true enough, for Coullet admitted 
that the prospects of a loan had completely vanished. 
,fVoussave2; deja qu*en ce moment il ne saurait dtre question 
d*emprunt Japonais.1*
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officials against contracting any heavy obligation, but 
if he thought this had been effective, he -was mistaken, 
for the Bakufu subsequently sent Kurimoto flNMR to Paris , 
in an endeavour to achieve their object more quickly, and 
their earnestness was shown by the fact that he was 
empowered 9 in Roches1 words , dejconceder a une Compagnie
Internationale 1*exploitation des forets et des mines de
A _ 49
la grande lie de Yezo.” y Because of the failure to
attract public support for the trading company, the idea
of a loan had to be abandoned, but the basic cause of
failure was not Parkes, but an ex-diplomat, Laurence
Oliphant. In April, I867, he gave notice of a question
in the House of Commons concerning French ’official
trading1 This intention, which became known in
France, must have been an additional factor in making
Coullet1s and Fleury Herard1s schemes seem extremely
49- C.P.Japon, XV . July 12, 1867. Roches to Moustier.
50, Presumably Oliphant was prompted either by a 
newspaper report of this or by a request from a member, 
or members, of the English community at Yokohama. He 
was put off by Lord Stanley and, contrary to what Ishii 
states in Mei.ii Ishin no Hokusai-teki Hankyo, p .596,v ■ rr ■ '!■' «*-■■■■-■■ -| iMT—f 1 ia> • iniiiiiiK 1 i —'1 t 1 'i 1 ir'T—n miwinm iht" i« iihiiiihiii i h inr ~i ib~ un h i iirAi* — / J- ^  ^ f
the only question concerning Japan that was asked by him 
in Parliament was an innocuous one, concerning the 
stationing of European troops at Yokohama. (See Hansard’s 
Parliamentary Debates» 3rd Series, CLXXXVI, April 4, iS&fT™ 
p. 11077- Nine days later, however, the Feb. 14th edition 
of the Japan Times, which contained a stronger attack 
on Roches, arrived, and this convinced the Foreign Office 
that Oliphant1s original question could not be Ignored.
See M.D. III. April 18, I867. Cowley to Moustier.
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hazardous9 especially when it led to action by the Foreign
Office itself. Lord Cowley, the British Ambassador in
Paris9 was instructed to bring to the French Foreign
Minister’s notice the reports in the Japan Times which
had accused Roches of violating the Treaties9 and request
51an explanation so that Parliament might be satisfied.
Whether this action was deliberately intended to exert
pressure on French policy or whether it was no more than
it appeared9 it had an effect far beyond what the Foreign
Office could have hoped for. The Marquis de Moustierp
the French Foreign Minister, who had already become
concerned at British rumours of imminent Civil War in
Japan 9 decided to take a hard look at what his agent had
been doing. The result was the effective dissociation
of the Quai d’Orsay from the policy to which Roches had
devoted so much effort. Within France itself this new
orientation was seen in the Quai d’Orsay1s refusual?
during the Paris Exhibition? to allow the Shogun’s claim
to sovereignty over Satsumav which was also represented 
52there. Such a refusal coming together with the anti- 
Tokugawa propaganda in the Paris press of the Comte de
51. Ibid. Cowley’s note spoke of the Japan Times imputing 
to Roches 1 a course of proceeding of which it is certain 
the Imperial Government would not approve”
52. See M.D.Japon. I. May 18675 unsigned memorandum;
M.D.Japon. I. Jan. 9? 1869<> unsigned memorandum. Also 
Otsuka9 op.cit.9 p.310.
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Montblanc and Mermet de Cachon,  ^and the departure later 
in the year of Montblanc*s military mission, provided 
with passports for Satsuma, spelled doom for any last
<A,
hope the loan might have had. With regard to Roches1 
own position, a dispatch written on May 18th warned him 
that what he had done already was quite enough and that 
he should not associate France too closely with a government 
which might soon be overthrown. It was made clear to 
Roches that he could expect no support for any independent 
action in the future and that English views on Japan were 
considered more reliable than his.
53# Montblanc, after his failure to be accepted as 
adviser by the Ikeda mission, developed contacts with 
Satsuma samurai in Europe from 1865, and wrote pamphlets, 
raised loans and bought arms on Satsuma1s account.
Mermet de Cachon, Roches* right-hand man, who had returned 
to France jra the footsteps of Tokugawa Mimbu's mission, 
was disappointed in his hope of becoming the young prince^ 
tutor and adviser. He suddenly turned against the Bakufu 
and attacked its authority both in the press and in a 
memoire addressed to the Quai d'Orsay. (See M.D.Japon. I.
May 9, 1867). His rejection by Mukoyama and the other 
leaders of the^mission was apparently due to his religious 
status. See Otsuka. op.cit. p.304.
54. Whether the loan ever really had much chance is 
doubtful. With regard to Egyptian securities, a French 
banker wrote in 1861 that French capitalists ft do not like 
to risk their funds in little known enterprises1', and 
!,consider, rightly or wrongly, that the countries of the 
Orient offer little in the way of guaranteesn. (D.Landes, 
Bankers and Pashafi. London 1958. p.105.) In 1867, the 
end of the Egyptian boom and the collapse of the Credit 
Mobilier had made investors even more cautious. In such 
circumstances the Bakufu loan could have been a serious 
proposition only if the Shogun had been known to possess 
the unqualified support of both the French and British 
governments.
55# C.P.Japon. XV. May 18, 1867. Moustier to Roches.
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How is it possible to explain this apparent
willingness to abandon a successful policy at the first
hint of British displeasure? Two factors have generally
been cited - the worsening of France*s position in Europe
after the Austro-“Prussian War and the Mexican Expedition*
and the replacement of Drouyn de Lhuys , wvV  regarded
as the supporter of Roches and the Bakufu-French special
^6link, by the Marquis de Moustier. The new Minister, 
it is held, was above all anxious not to offend Britain 
or become deeply involved in affairs outside Europe, and 
this caused him to repudiate Roches, This view is not 
entirely satisfactory. If these two factors alone were 
involved5 why, since Moustier was in office for more than 
six months before May 1867, was France*s Japanese policy 
not changed in 1866? What evidence, moreover, is there 
to indicate that Drouyn was any less concerned than 
Moustier about involvement in distant parts? His 
instructions to Bellecourt and Roches in 1863 and 1864 
are full of admonitions on this score, and he insisted 
after the Shimonoseki Expedition that his views, had not 
changed. Even if one accepts that the basic cause for 
the change of policy was the fear of being involved in
56. Ishii, Mei.ii Ishin no Kokusai-teki Kankyg, p.596, 
sees the change of Minister as providing France with an opp­
ortunity of returning to her former policy, Otsuka, op.cit. 
pp.290-1,regards the change of Minister as the vital 
factor.
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complications both with Britain and with a new and 
hostile Government in Japan, there are no good grounds 
for believing that much the same warning would not have 
been made by Drouyn too, had he remained In office, even 
though his attitude to the Japanese mission in I867* 
might have been less cold. The point is not without 
significance, since by attributing the reversal of 
policy solely to international conditions and a new 
Minister it has been possible to ignore one of the most 
important characteristics of this period, namely, that 
French policy was made by Ldon Roches and to a large 
extent remained his personal policy.^ It was not the 
change in Foreign Minister that rendered French policy 
so vulnerable to British pressure but the fact that 
that policy was the work of the agent rather than the 
home government.
57* It does not seem fanciful to suggest that for 
Japanese historians,especially those with Marxist 
leanings or commitments, like Ishii and Inoue, there 
exists a certain temptation to see their country as 
having been a prey to Western Imperialism and in a 
state of semi-colonisation. It is obvious that the 
idea of the French government pursuing a policy of 
influence (or domination) in Japan fits this picture 
better than the Idea that a mere diplomatic agent was 
chiefly responsible.
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In support of the view that it was Roches* personal 
policy that was involved, rather than an official policy 
previously worked out In Paris, a great deal of evidence 
can be produced. The fact that Drouyn had nothing to 
do with the commencement of the Bakufu-French link has 
already been commented on. That policy continued to 
be decided in Japan is clearly indicated by the observation 
made by both Winchester and Parkes, that Roches used the 
words * politique personnelle* when discussing his 
actions, though, not surprisingly, these words never 
appear In his own dispatches home. Evidence that it 
was Roches who set the pace on the French side can be 
seen in the way that he presented the Japanese requests.
He went out of this way to make a favourable case to 
the Qua! d*0rsay, invoking Japanese preference for 
France and the need to strengthen the power which 
guaranteed the treaties, in such a way as to make 
refusal extremely difficult. Even so, Paris was not
58. See e.g. F.0.46. LIU. Feb. 28, 1865, Winchester to 
Hammond (private). According to Winchester, Roches 
declared!!. . A  that he would never deviate from common 
action in all that concerns commerce, land distribution, 
general advancement of Foreign influence, reserving what 
he termed his ’politique personnelle* to obtain such a 
share of influence or preponderance*1. Also F.0.391- XIV. 
March 16 1867, Ibid, Sept. 19, 1868 (Parkes to Hammond). 
Lest it be thought that this was merely a blind to conceal 
the Quai d!0rsay*s Machiavellian designs, it should be 
added that Roches* successor, who would presumably have 
been informed on such a point, in speaking of his 
predecessor stated* 11II n*a fait ici que de la politique 
personnelle.'* C.P.Japon. XVI, Aug.22, 1868. Outrey to 
Moustier.
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easy to convince. On the question of the military
mission, for example, the Quai d*Orsay and the Ministry
of War decided not to send as many instructors as Roches
had asked for, on the ground that 41 il serait prudent de
ne pas donner tout d*abord a la mission qui serait forme
59une importance trop grande.1 ^  Nor was Roches able
to persuade Drouyn to ease the Bakufu* s financial 
difficulties by renouncing France*s share of the Shimono- 
seki Indemnity, an# obvious action for the Foreign 
Minister to take had he been really concerned about 
the furtherance of a Bakufu-French link. The dispatch 
in which Drouyn refused to make this concession is
worth quoting, in fact, for in it he defined French 
policy in terms to which even an English Minister would 
have found it hard to objects
"Je crois sans doute utile, dans les cifcconstances 
actuelles, que nous contribuons a accroitre les ressources 
propres du Taicoun parce que je me plais a penser avec 
vous que nous l*aiderons ainsi a triompher des resistances 
que lui opposent les Daimios ennemis des traites. Mais 
les cessions d*armes et de projectiles que nous avons d£ja
consenties en sa faveur de mdme que le concours que nous
sommes prdts a lui accorder pour la creation d*un arsdnal 
d*artillerie et de chantiers maritimes prds d*Yokohama 
repondent suffisamlment & ce but, et vous vous rendrez 
facilement compte des raisons qui ne nous permettraient 
d*aller plus loin.11 60
59* C.P. Japon. XIV. May 15, 1866. Drouyn to Roches.
60. C.P.Japon. XIII, June 17, 1865* Drouyn to Roches.
Bee also Ibid. Dec. 19, 1865, when Drouyn commented on 
Roches* renewed request, * Je ne crois pas bon de faire 
la remise de ce qui nous est du. Ilabituer ces gouverne- 
ments a ne pas considerer comme serieux les engagemens 
pris envers nous, me semble une mauvaise politique*1.
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Perhaps even more important than the fact that
French policy had not been inspired by the Foreign
Minister, was the Quai dl0rsayts ignorance of the full
scope of French involvement. Roches1 dispatches were
few by any standard, but their infrequency is especially
remarkable in view of the numerous important developments
6ltaking place in Japan at this time. He excused himself 
by saying that all his time was taken up by action, and 
the fact that the Quai did not question this excuse^ is 
worth noting, as it lends support to the view that there 
was, in Paris, a basic lack of positive interest in Japan. 
Because of this Roches was more easily able to conceal 
those aspects of his policy for which he could not expect 
approval, and It is significant that the Quai d!0rsay was 
not informed by Its representative that he had advised
_ 62the Bakufu 011 the tactics to employ against Choshu.
However, it was not only a question of insufficient
reports but also of misleading information. When Roches
misrepresented the views of the South-Western dalmvo
the deception may not have been deliberate, for he
himself had no direct contacts with them. It can
scarcely have been anything else, however, when he
reported Japanese requests for aid as emanating solely
from the Japanese side. This fact was particularly
61. Roches1 four years are covered by only five- volum.es 
of Correspondance Politique and two of Correspondance 
Commerciale, all of average length or under, compared 
with ten and two for the slightly shorter period of 
Bellecourt. 62. Roches1^military advice is known
only from Japanese sources. See Otsuka, op.cit., p.286.
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important with regard to Yoshinobu’s government reform 
plans, for Moustier must have regarded them as something 
entirely Japanese in origin, for which France had no 
responsibility whatsoever.
What were the motives behind Roches* method of 
diplomacy can, through lack of evidence, only be guessed 
at. It is by no means impossible to see ambition as the 
basic factor. If, when he came to Japan, he saw the 
chance of playing a key role, he must soon have realised 
that the Quai*s caution would provide a check to any far- 
reaching schemes. By dissembling he may well have hoped 
to win for himself and his country a special position 
in a new Japan before Paris realised the depth of French 
involvement. The general picture of the man from his 
dispatches suggests strongly that this was so, and his 
previous career provides additional evidence in its favour. J 
With ambition may have gone a genuine sympathy with a 
government which was trying to modernise itself in response 
to internal and external challenge. It is significant 
that the Comte de Turenne, who later, as charge d’affaires, 
was one of the most sympathetic observers of Meiji 
modernisation,gained his first experience of Japan as
63. His career In North Africa as a young man contained 
all the ingredients of a romantic novel. His own two- 
volume account, Trente-deux ans £ travers 1* Islam., Paris 
1884-5, which does not suffer from excessive modesty, 
has been accepted in essentials, at least as regards one 
important episodeby the study of J. Caille. Une Mission 
de Leon Roches a Rabat en 184?. Casablanca, 1947:-----~ ~
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Roches* attache. On his return to Paris in 1866,
moreover, Turenne wrote a memorandum for the Quai
d'Orsay which concluded a review of relations between
the Shogun and the Powers with the wordss ^Nous pouvons
compter sur son concours interesse, et par ce concours
64esperer de civiliser le Japon.'* It would be strange
if this attitude was not one which represented Roches* 
feelings too.
There is a further explanation, which, if true, 
would also account for the fact that Roches kept so much 
from the Quai d*Orsay, namely, the possibility that he 
had a financial Interest in the Bakufu-French friendship.
No evidence appears to exist on this point, nor indeed 
did an on-the-spot inquiry by the Yokohama Chamber of 
Commerce in 1866 find anything compromising.^
Nevertheless, it is hard to dismiss the suspicions entirely. 
The very fact that it was Roches* own banker, Fleury Hbrard, 
who was appointed Japanese consul-general in Paris and 
employed in all the Bakufu* s financial transactions in 
Europe suggests that some sort of commission for the 
minister would have been easy both to arrange and conceal. 
The same would apply, to a lesser extent, to Coullet's
64. M.D.Japon. I. The memorandum is undated but was 
clearly written early in 1866.
65. See F.O.39I* XIV. May 6, 1867 (Parkes to Hammond).
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operations too, and to at least one silkworm egg
transaction. However, unless something more
substantial turns up, the verdict must be 'not proven*.
In any case, even if financial interest did exist, it
need not have excluded other motives. Whatever the
reasons for Roches’ methods of diplomacy there can be
little doubt that for most of the time he was in Japan,
French policy possessed a personal character. The
importance of this fact cannot be ignored. It means,
firstly, that, however* significant the Bakufu-French
special link may appear to Marxist historians, the
French Government cannot be suspected of harbouring any
design of establishing an economic and political
protectorate over Japan. Secondly, it explains the
apparent volte-face on the part of the French Foreign
Minister. If Roches’ policy had been one which the
French Government or the Foreign Ministry had laid down
Itself, it is hardly conceivable, even allowing for the
change of Minister, that It could have been abandoned 
67so lightly. In fact, Moustier was unaware of the
66. On this subject and Roches' contribution to French 
trade generally, see Chapter VIII.
67. This is not to suggest that the French Government 
would ever have gone so far as to intervene during the 
bivil war in favour of the Tokugawa and It is doubtful 
whether any help short of direct military and naval aid 
(which in any case would probably have been refused) 
could have preserved the Shogunate, though strong moral
■** .ip h  1 n nr nr “w ar r w  n i - ' ihiw lfrmr'frm 4  n—> w
support by the French Government might conceivably have 
boosted Bakufu morale.
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68full extent of French Involvement in Japanese politics. 
Consequently the Bakufu-French link was regarded as a 
luxury -which could he abandoned without much loss to 
either side* It was this that made the clash with 
Britain so decisive.
(c) Roches and the Mei.ii Restoration
Though Moustier1s May 18 dispatch was, in form,
cautionary rather than censorious, it clearly meant the
end of Roches1 fpolitique personelle1 and this fact was
recognised by the latter, for in his answering dispatch
69he tendered his resignation* y Thereafter Roches1 hands 
were effectively tied, for the Foreign Minister had 
made it clear that he would stomach no 1 ingerence trop 
marquee dans les affaires interieures du pays*1.^
From this time on Moustier assiduously underlined all 
the statements in Roches1 dispatches which referred to 
‘the ShSgun1 s actual weakness, obviously considering them 
of more significance than the latter*s plans for recovery.
68. It might even be argued - and the mild language of 
the May 18 dispatch favours such an argument - that when 
Moustier repudiated Roches* policy, he was not aware that 
he was doing so, but imagined that he was merely taking 
precautions against the possibility of any such policy 
developing.
69. C.P.Japon. XV. July 13, 1867. Roches to Moustier.
70. C.P.Japon. XV. May 18, 1867. Moustier to Roches.
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Despite this clear intimation of official dissatisfaction, 
until the arrival of his replacement, Boches remained in 
a position to give the ShQgun his moral support and help 
smooth any diplomatic difficulties that arose. With 
regard to one such difficulty he was able to be especially 
helpful since it was an affair which involved Frenchmen. 
This was the Uragarni problem, which first became a diplo­
matic issue early in 1867.^ As it turned out the 
problem became no more, for the Bakufuu than one of the 
many complications resulting from intercourse with 
foreigners, but it might have been a good deal more 
damaging had it not been for Roches* handling of what 
was potentially an explosive situation. In the area 
centring on the village of Uragami, near Nagasaki, several 
thousand Japanese Christians, whose families had preserved 
something of their faith from the seventeenth century, 
had been rediscovered by French priests in 1867. By 
I867 their difficulties with local Buddhist priests and 
their more open Christian worship had created problems 
which the local Tokugawa officials decided to settle by 
the imprisonment of some of their number. This naturally
71* There is a detailed article on the Uragami problem 
In I867 by Fujii Sadabumi, *Uragarni Kyoto Mondai o 
meguru Nichi-Futsu Kankei*. (Japanese-French Relations 
over the Problem of the Uragami Christians) in Kaikoku 
Hvakunen Klnen Mei.ii Banka - s hi Rons hu (Essays in Meiji 
History to Commemorate the Centenary of the Opening of 
the Country), Tokyo, 1953? PP*73-123.
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led to lively protest by the Catholic priests, and,
given a deeply religious or hostile French Minister,
could have provided the pretext for strong diplomatic
pressure. Had this occurred, the Shogun would have
been placed in an extremely awkward position. To
alienate the Foreign Representatives by repressive
measures at a time when he seemed at last to have
secured their approval as a progressive ruler would have
been to throw away a considerable asset and risk outside
Intervention. Yet to allow toleration to the Christians
was impossible, for the long tradition of hostility
towards Christianity in Japan meant that the enemies of
Tokugawa power could have made great capital from the
accusation that Yoshinobu was allowing the notoriously
pernicious religion to creep in again. Thanks to Roches,
the dilemma never really had to be faced. The French
Minister did not entirely disregard the plight of the
Christians or the pleas of the priests, but he was easily
satisfied by the Shogun* s promises that harsh measures
would not be used and he stressed in his communications
with the missionaries, the limitations imposed by the
72Treaty on their movements. The fact that Roches* 
main concern was for the Bakufu1s position was only 
partly concealed by his attempts to secure promises of
72. See C.P.Japon, XV. Aug. 8, 1867, Roches to Moustier.
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lenient treatment for the local Christians, and his
evident preference for the Bakpfu1s version of what
had been happening rather than that of the missionaries led
to bitter criticism from some of the latter.^
However, the whole question was submerged at the end of
the year when the struggle for power in Japan came to a
head and it was the new Meiji Government which had to
solve it in the end.
It remains to describe Roches1 actions during the
period oof transition lasting from the resignation of
Yoshinobu as Shogun to the consolidation of the new
Government's control over the major part of Japan.
There is some indication that by this time Roches1
influence over Yoshinobu had declined. At any rate,
the French Minister appears to have been caught off-
balance by the sudden turn of events. When rumours
first appeared in the Yokohama papers that the Shogun
74had abdicated Roches greeted them with derision, only
to find himself, on November 2 8, forced to admit that
such an act had taken place after all, though he strove
vainly to convince the Quai that it would not really
73* The missionary writer, Pages, reviewing the course 
of the persecution in Les Missions Catholiaues« V\ Jan.31? 
1873? wrote of 1 ... #la connivence de M. L§on Roches, 
ministre de France. II btait bien naturel qu*il en fut 
ainsi, car M. Leon Roches, ne catholique, avait abjure 
la foi de son bapteme, et s'etait fait musulman a Alger."
74. See C.P.Japon. XV. Oct. 15, 1867* Roches to Moustier.
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■weaken Yoshinobu1 s position.^ At first Roches1 hopes
were high that Tokugawa power would not he endangered*
Even when the South-Western Daimyo had gained the support
of the Emperor, by their coup d!etat of January 3, 1868,
Roches encouraged the ex-Shogun to resist them, in the
76belief that success was well within his capacity.
At the same time, he assured him of France1s moral
support, but it is questionable whether, as has been 
77implied, Roches made any offer of direct material 
support. On the one hand his instructions so 
emphatically forbade this that he could have entertained 
no hope that his Government would acquiesce in any such 
involvement. More concretely, it is doubtful whether 
he possessed the power to involve France anyhow. The 
Ministry of Marine had always resented being regarded as 
the lackey of the Quai d1Orsay and on more than one 
occasion had adopted an independent attitude. By the 
s^agt of 1868, moreover, the co-operative Jaures was no 
longer in command of French naval forces in the Far East, 
and the obvious failure of Roches1 policies made
75® C.P.Japon. XV. Nov. 28, 1867® Roches to Moustier.
He called the Nov. 8 return of the Shogun1s powers to 
the Emperor "une demarche qui n*est pas sans grandeur 
et qui, je l!esp£re, sera sans danger pour l!avenir de 
son autoritS.1 Yoshinobu1 s action was a compromise 
solution, favourable to the maintenance of Tokugawa 
predominance, which had been proposed by Tosa.
76. C.P.Japon. XVI. Jan. 10, 1868. Roches to Moustier. 
77® e*g« by Yanaga, Japan Since Perry. New York, 1949® 
p . 4*6.
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Admiral Ohier little inclined to provide the same 
uncritical backing as his predecessor. Indeed,on 
February 15, he visited Yoshinobu in Edo in person, and 
•while assuring him of France*s sympathy, gave him to
78understand that no armed support could be looked for.
In such circumstances any promise of direct action by 
the French Minister was inconceivable.
This failure to provide military aid does not mean 
that Roches did not make some attempt to help the Baknfu 
in the period of uncertainty at the beginning of 1868.
He had promised France*s moral support and he gave it by i
endeavouring to persuade his colleagues not to make any i
79 irash changes in the diplomatic situation. x His success 1
in this was not complete, but the proclamation of neutrality j
t
by the Powers that did result from the foreign representatives*? 
discussions was not without value to the Bakufu. The !
South-Western Dalmvo had, after all, the huge advantage of {
recognition by the Emperor, who for some years had been j
generally regarded as the ultimate sovereign of Japan. !
Roches was hampered however, by the uncertainty of the 
situation. Any decision designed to benefit the Bakufu 
might in a matter of weeks prove a disadvantage. Later, 
when events had turned against Yoshinobu, Roches hoped
that the Powers would intervene to stabilise the situation
78. See M.D.Japon.I. April 1, 1868, Ohier to Marine, copy sent 
from Marine to Quai d*0rsay. 79• See C.P.Japon XVI.
Feb. 17? 1868. Roches to Moustier. also F.0.4-6, XCI. No.35*
Feb. 155 1868. Parkes to Stanley.
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but Parkes refused to co-operateand after this point, 
the French Minister made little effort to influence events. 
Even allowing for the fact that Roches was limited 
by his instructions? his influence on the early stages 
of the Meiji Restoration was surprisingly small considering 
his previous role. This is particularly remarkable in 
view of the fact that in the first months of the war two 
incidents occurred involving attacks on Frenchmen which 
afforded ample opportunity for diplomatic, and possibly 
military, interference. The first of these, it is true, 
was the fairly minor Bizen affair, in which other nationals
81
were involved. In this case Roches was given no chance
to act independently because Parkes was quite as offended
and disturbed as his colleague, and when the Foreign
representatives took drastic steps by seizing Japanese
r\
ships, apologies and punishments were soon for thcoming.
The Sakai massacre was somewhat different. It occurred 
on March 8, 1868, just over a month after the Bizen incident 
and this time concerned France alone. Eleven sailors of 
the frigate Dupleix who had landed near Sakai were killed 
by a band of anti-foreign samurai from Tosa. Despite
80. See F.0.391* XIV. March 11, 1868., Parkes to Hammond. 
Also C.P.Japon. XVI, March 11, 1868. Roches to Moustier.
81. The crossing of a column of Bizen samurai by a French 
soldier at Hjfcogo prompted a display of aggressiveness on 
their part against foreigners. There was no loss of life, 
however. See F.0.46, XCI. Ho.22. Feb. 13, 1868. Parkes to 
Derby, for a full description of the incident.
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this considerable provocation, Roches did not use the
incident to break off relations but accepted the apologies,
compensation and promise to execute the offenders, which
8?
the Meiji government speedily offered. Such action, or
inaction by the French Minister, denoted, in the circumstances,
a surprising moderation*
Why Roches did not adopt a stronger line was probably
due to several factors. One was the swiftness of the new
Government to make amends, which compared favourably with
the Bakufu*s tardiness and gave little ground for complaint#
Another was the need to protect the interests of French
nationals at the treaty ports* A further factor was the
attitude of the other Powers# By associating themselves
with France, they ensured that reparation was speedily
forthcoming and also made i*£ difficult for her to make
separate demands without seeming highly unreasonable. The
chief reason, however, was Roches* growing conviction, as
the Civil War progressed, that the Meiji Government was
going to succeed and that therefore it was pointless to
risk alienating it.  ^ This conviction was made more
acceptable by the fact that,for the first time, he was in
possession of reliable information about the Meiji leaders,
84thanks to the co-operation of Montblanc. It was against
82# See C.P.Japon. XVI. March 11, 18685 Ibid, March 19? 1868# 
Roches to Moustier.
83. Bee C.P.Japon. XVI. Feb. 24, 18685 Ibid, April 14, 1868.
Rn oh o *ho Mnn cs h pt*
84. C.P.JAPON. XVI. March 25 1868. Roches to Moustier.
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this background? and perhaps also as a result of disappoint 
ment at Yoshinobu*s failure to resist the South Western 
Daimvo after so much had been expected from him, that 
Roches, at the end of March, even accepted the new Govern­
ment * s invitation to an audience with the Emperor, an act 
which more or less set the seal of foreign approval on the 
new regime. J He never, up until the time of his departure 
in June, 1868, entirely gave up hope that the Tokugawa 
might recover some ground, but the influence this had on 
his attitude towards the Meiji Government was virtually 
nil.
85. Roches explained to Moustier that he did not wish 
to leave to Parkes **llhonneur de voir seul et le premier 
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The main interest in Franco-Japanese relations during
the decade and a half following the overthrow of the
Tokugawa Bakufu centres on the French attitude and
contribution to the consolidation of the Meiji Government*
The position of the latter was for a considerable time
precarious and its permanence unassured. There was no
certainty that the victorious coalition would hold together,
nor that it would adopt policies that would ensure its
stability in the long run. The problems faced by the
able samurai from South-West Japan who had plotted the
overthrow of the Tokugawa in the name of the Emperor were
enormous3 and these problems were made even more complicated
by the fact that they were forced to work, for more than
three years, through nobles and daimvo whom it had been
necessary to appoint to the highest offices in the new
Government in order to retain Court support and to dispel
1distrust of Sat-Cho ambitions. Many of these samurai 
leaders realised the need for fundamental changes of 
attitude and the erection of a strong central government
1. Satsuma and Choshft, together with Tosa and Hizen, 
dominated the lower ranks of the new Government and it was 
widely suspected that they would attempt to create a new 
Bakufu. For an account of constitutional arrangements during 
the first years of the Meiji era, see R.A.Wilson, The Genesis 
of the Mel.ii Governments 1868-1871. (Berkeley, 19570
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to defend Japan against any threat to its independence,
‘but they were hindered not only by the conservatism and 
prejudices of most of the Court nobles, but also by the 
han loyalties of many samurai« including some important 
leaders. Until the establishment of the nucleus of a 
regular central army, drawn from their own han, in 1871? 
and the political defeat, and resignation from government,
o
of the more traditionally-minded samurai leaders in 1873? 
the hold of men like Okubo, Kido and Okurna over the direction 
of national policy was far from secure and they had to move 
cautiously in their pursuit of reforms. In this situation 
the attitude of the Western Powers remained of great 
importance, for the Meiji Government could not risk 
incurring their displeasure without rendering itself liable 
to attack on two fronts - the dilemma which the Bakufu had 
been unable to solve and which had proved fatal to it. 
Moreover, even when the Meiji Government had become strong 
enough to be able to abolish the han and set up prefectures 
in their place in 1871? it was still dependent on the West 
for expert assistance and guidance in the achievement of 
its basic aim of 1fukoku kvohei1 (rich country, strong 
army).
2. The dispute within the government was over a 
foreign policy issue, whether or not to invade Korea*. (Seikan 
Hon), but it was also marked by differences over domestic 
policy and leadership.
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During this period of transition in Japan, French 
diplomacy was marked by an almost total lack of positive 
direction. Indeed, it would hardly be an exaggeration to 
say that for most of this period France had no policy towards 
Japan, only relations with her. This does not mean that 
she did not continue to enjoy the privileges she had gained 
earlier or to defend them if they were chalD-enged.^ Nor 
does it mean that France refused to co-operate with Japan 
in her efforts at modernisation, especially if some gain 
in prestige were expected as a result. But there was no 
consistent attempt to build up a favourable position in 
Japan either by securing financial and economic advantages 
on the one hand or by offering protection and friendship 
to the new Government as it strove to develop Japan1s 
resources and restore her full sovereign rights. Glimpses 
of both policies were seen, especially the latter, but 
they were not followed up with any persistence, and were 
in fact, liable to fluctuate considerably.
Such fluctuation was partly due to the fact that
France was represented by no fewer than ten men during
these years, and of these, only one, Outrey, remained for
3 * The main challenge was a general one, the Japanese 
attempt to revise the 'unequal treaties', which affected all 
the Western Powers. The process of Treaty Revision, which was 
probably the chief aim of Japanese foreign policy, lasted 
well over 20 years, acquiring almost a separate diplomatic 
existence of its own. France's role in this is treated in 
Chapter VI.
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4more than two years. This was a far from negligible 
factor in French diplomacy? for though communications with 
Europe gradually improved9 Tokyo remained a post where much 
was left to the man on the spot? particularly since the 
Cabinet changes in France itself were so common that no 
French Foreign Minister could have more than a superficial 
understanding of developments in Japan. France*s lack 
of interest In Japan9 however9 was due to deeper reasons 
than those of mere personality. The first decade of the 
Third Republic was a period of cautious readjustment in 
international affairs5 and this resulted in her representa­
tives being compelled 5 at l^ J&t until the Republican 
triumph in 1879? to follow a policy of avoiding entanglements 
at all costs. As far as the Far East was concerned^ this
4-o Even Outrey asked to be moved after little more than 
a year5 see the letter of tag. 3? 18695 in the Moniteur 
des Soies of Oct. 29 1869? from a French merchant who 
claimed that ,fM.Outrey desire vivement rentrer et deja 
demande au Clouvernement de lui envoyer un successeur.n 
The Quai refused to give him another post9 so he stayed 
in Japan. See C.P.Japon. XIX. Sept. 9? 186 9 . Auvergne 
Lauraguais to Outrey. Tokyo was clearly not considered a 
very desirable post from the angle of prestige. Nor? until 
the 18801s when the habit of spending the hottest months 
in more refreshing surroundings was adopted were the 
working conditions of foreign representatives always 
pleasant.
7. Frenchmen in Japan were very conscious of this. With 
pardonable exaggeration L*Echo du Japon claimed in 1883 
that whereas Britain ordered her representatives 1 & tout 
prix d6fendre et faire triompher les interets anglais ?‘! 
instructions to French diplomats lt commencaient et se 
terminaient invariablement par cette recommendation 
supremes Surtout? ne nous creez pas des embarrasl1'
(L*Echo du Japon. weekly edition? June 29 1883.)
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represented little change from the position in the 1860*8
'but It was reinforced in the case of Japan by the reaction
against Roches1 active diplomacy which had almost brought
France into collision with the Restoration Government and
possibly Britain as well. On the economic side? there was
a further reason for France to lose interest? in that from
the early 1870's Japanese silkworms became less vital to
the French silk industry as her own silkworms began to
recover from the ravages of the previous decade. It was
mainly for these reasons that French diplomacy played a
smaller part in the formative years of Japan1s emergence
6as a modern state than might have been expected.
(a) Recognition of the New Regime.
The negative character of French diplomacy was in 
evidence from the early months of 18689 when the most 
urgent question for both Japan and the Western Powers 
was the attitude of the latter to the new Imperial Government
6. It might be objected that Finance could never have had 
much of an impact owing to the differences of national 
character? political background and social institutions 
between the two countries. No doubt France was less close 
to Japan than, say, Germany was in many ways, but there were 
several aspects of French civilisation, in particular her 
highly centralised administrative structure which possessed 
considerable attraction for Japan. Bearing in mind this and 
the fact that France had a Far Eastern policy which did not 
conflict with Japanese interest^ it seems reasonable to 
suggest that French influence on Japan might have been 
greater especially in view of her outstanding contribution 
to the economic development of Southern and Eastern Europe 
and the Middle East in the preceding half century.
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The latter had already received de facto recognition by 
Roches? when he agreed to an audience with the Emperor? 
and there could be no question of Outrey altering this* 
Nevertheless? there remained room for differences in the 
Interpretation of the proclamation of neutrality of Feb. 18.
A strong show of sympathy for the Tokugawa would have given 
the new leaders cause for concern? and had it been combined 
with a determined attempt at mediation by France? as seemed 
possible on at least three occasions during the Civil War? 
it might have forced the Government to consider some 
modification of their demand for unconditional surrender. 
Outrey? who arrived in Japan on June 79 1868? was? in fact? 
tempted by this possibility? but only briefly. Basically? 
he had none of Roches1 ambition and imagination? and his prev­
ious career as consul at Alexandria had accustomed him to
7co-operation with Britain. As a result? therefore? both 
of official policy and of personal temperament? France was 
disinclined to adopt an independent line and made no real 
attempt to obstruct the consolidation of power by the 
South-Western han.
The pattern of Outrey*s relations with the Meiji
Government was established within a month of his arrival?
when in early July he sent the Comte de Montebello to
Osaka to convey to it the most cordial assurances of his
7. Some details of Outrey*s career in Egypt can be found 
in Landes ? Bankers and Pashas? passim.
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sympathetic feelings* That this was not designed to 
conceal continued relations with the Tokugawa is shown 
by the decided views he expressed a month laters 1 La 
seule chose que I1on puisse affirmer sans hesitation, 
cfest qu!il n !y a aucune chance de voir se retablir le 
gouvernement du Taicoun et qu*il a M en reellement disparu
o
de la scene, au mo ins pour tr£s longtemps.1 He had,
it is true, a certain sympathy for the previous Government
and when in September the Foreign Representatives were
sent a manifesto by the rebel Northern daimvd . Outrey
wrote thats Msans nous d§partir de notre attitude de
neutrality9 nous devons conserver quelques managements
pour un parti qui avait tres probablement fond§ de grandes
esperances sur l!appui de la France.11^  Despite the fact
that this appeal opened a way to possible foreign mediation,
however, Outrey never really attempted to transform these
faint pro-Tokugawa feelings into action* Even when the
Meiji Government itself sought his mediation in December
1868, he refused to allow himself to be involved and on
] 0two other occasions he ignored similar opportunities.
8«
9. C.P.Japon. XVI* Sept*30,1868* Outrey to Moustier.
10. The approach by the Meiji Government through the 
Governor of Yokohama was reported in C.P.Japon, XVII,
Dec* 16, 1868, Outrey to la Valette. He indicated that the 
rebels would be given land in Hokkaido if they surrendered. 
Outrey rejected any idea of treating with disobedient officers, 
so it is hardly surprising that in Feb. he failed to support 
the appeal of the Hokkaido rebels for a Franco-British 
mediation. See M*D.Japon.III, undated letter from Brunet to 
Chanoine. Also Outrey1s report in C.P.Japon.XVIII, Feb.10.1869* 
A possible opening for mediation for which Outrey showed even 
less enthusiasm had earlier been prepared by Commandant du
/continued over.....
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Outrey*s unwillingness to respond to the rebels1 
appeal to mediate may have been partly due to his reluctance 
to offend the new Government at a time when France had 
financial claims to make on it. One of the legacies of 
the Boches period was the claim for payment for the 
merchandise worth nearly four million francs which the
] i
Bakufu had ordered from Coullet, ' and this claim could
only be satisfied by the new authorities. The question
was settled to the Soci6t6*s satisfaction in October,
but the Meiji Government1s preference for paying off the
whole sum with a loan from the Oriental Bank of Yokohama
rather than by twenty monthly instalments, as Outrey
suggested, caused the latter to concludes * J!,.. il est
facile de voir l*ardeur que met le Bepresentant de la
Grande Bretagne a entretenir chez les Japonais un sentiment
de defiance contre les intentions de la France a l*<5gard
I pdu Gouvernement du Mikado.
10. (continued) Petit Thouars in July 1868. See M.D.
Japon.I. July 25, 1868. Captain Challie to Ministry of 
Marine, copy sent by Marine to Quai.
11. Two and a half million francs* worth of goods had not 
reached the Bakufu and were held by the Customs. C.P.Japon. 
XVII. Oct.7? 1868. Outrey to Moustier.
12. Ibid. The reason for the Meiji Government*s haste was 
that the Bakufu had pledged the Yokosuka dockyards as security 
for payment for its order. There is no indication, however, 
that France was eager to take advantage of Japanese impecunity, 
or even thought of possession of Yokasuka as a serious possi­
bility. Except for this mention in Outrey's Oct.7* dispatch, 
after the matter was already solved, the mortgage of Yokosuka 
does not figure in the correspondence between Paris and Tokyo* 
For Parkes* views, see F*0*391? XIV. Sept. 19, 1868. Parkes
to Hammond.
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Outrey*s growing awareness of Japanese suspicion of
France9 which he soon realised to be more than superficial,
reinforced his natural tendency to caution* In January
I8699 while remarking on Prussian and Italian jealousy of
English influence9 he outlined his policy as followss
,lDans la situation actuelle le seul moyen de 
contrebalancer cette influence est d1avoir une politique 
dirig^e dans une voie parallele a celle des agents Anglais, 
de s*associer a eux pour tout ce qui est equitable et 
conforme aux veritables interets BuropRennes et enfin, de 
bien convaincre les Japonais que nous agissons sans -1 ^ 
partialite et dans des vues tout-a-fait desinteressbes *,f
This policy was eventually successful but in the short
term it meant that France renounced the use of all means
of influence9 negative as well as positive*
The inevitable consequence of this policy of temporary
abnegation was that France played an undistinguished role
during the civil war in Japan. On only one occasion did
Outrey adopt a strong tone towards the Meiji Government9
when he warned it not to send warships to seize foreign
vessels trading with the rebels, but in this he was safely
1Afollowing a British lead* " When in January9 1869? 
Iwakura, one of the leading figures in the Government , 
sought from the Powers the withdrawal of their proclamation 
of neutrality, Outrey did. Indeed, make a tentative effort 
to act as mediator between Britain and Holland, who wished
13. C.P.Japon. XVIII. Jan.14, 1869* Outrey to Moustier.
14. See C.P.Japon. XVII. Oct.10.1868. Outrey to Moustier.
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to accept the Japanese request, and Prussia and Italy,
who opposed it. His compromise proposal of withdrawal
after one month, however, did not receive the favour of
either side, and although the Powers were ready to agree
that the civil war had effectively ended, the legal position
remained unchanged until Feb. 8, when the resistance of
Prussia and Italy was finally o v e r c o m e T h a t  diplomacy
had really resumed its normal course was shown In May when
the Powers requested of the Japanese Government the
16payment of the rest of the Shimonoseki Indemnity.
(b) The Brunet Affair
For all Outrey1 s caution, France did become involved
in the Civil War in a very direct and embarrassing way.
The involvement resulted from the unauthorised action of
Captain Brunet, one of the young officers chosen to form
part of the military mission which the Bakufu had requested 
17
in 1866. ' In common with the British naval mission, the 
French mission, had, at Parkes1 instigation, ceased to 
function in April 1868, but its members continued to receive 
their pay from the Bakufu until July. This situation
15. See C.P.Japon.XVIII. Feb.10. I869. Outrey to La Valette. 
France*s acceptance that the civil war was over amounted to 
full recognition of the Meiji Government.
16. C.P.Japon. XVIII. May 10, 1869* Outrey to la "Valette.
17. Brunet had come to Japan as a Lieutenant. He was in 
charge of artillery instruction and acted as second-in-command 
of the mission.
18. See a document entitled •Historique de la Conduite de 
M.Brunet,*1 drawn up for the Quai d*0rsay by the Ministry of 
War on Oct. 11, 1869. M.D.Japon. HI.
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became more and more intolerable as summer advanced and
the Tokugawa forces -were pushed back without the French
officers being able to do anything, despite their strong
sense of obligation and loyalty towards their previous
19employers and collaborators.  ^ When in the autumn it
became certain that the mission would soon have to return
to France, the temptation to yield to the continual requests
from Tokugawa officers to assist in the struggle against
what they saw as a usurping clique, became irresistible
to Brunet. On October 4, he suddenly disappeared, taking
POwith him one N.C.O. named Gazeneuve. Two months later 
it was reported that Tokugawa forces had seized control of Yezo 
*■ (Hokkaido) under his command.^
Outrey1s reaction to these developments was predictable. 
After months of effort, his attempt to dissociate French 
policy from Hoches* involvement with the previous regime 
was now being sabotaged by a young soldier acting with a
19. Ibid.
20. Ibid. Three other officers attempted to resign and 
follow Brunet, but were dissuaded by Chanoine. Three more 
H.C.0.!s however, did succeed in joining him without delay. 
Eventually Brunet had nine Frenchmen assisting him. Accord­
ing to a report by Outrey^(C.P.Japon. XVII, Nov. 13, 1868) 
there were between sixty and eighty foreigners, mostly 
English and .American adventurers, involved in the civil war 
at the time of the siege of Wakamatsu.
21. G.P. Japon. XVII, Dec. 16, 1868. U
- 126 -
reckless disregard for the diplomatic complications he 
was causing. His indignation was so plainly genuine 
that the incident never, in fact, assumed the proportions 
he feared. It was obvious both to the Meiji Government 
and to Parkes that Outrey was not implicated and had no
o p
intention of siding with the rebels. Not only did he
refuse to have any dealings with them, but he also did
his best to secure Brunet1s dismissal from the French 
23Army.  ^ Thanks to his consistent attitude no lasting 
damage was done to French influence in Japan, even if 
there was some momentary ill-feeling which manifested
OA
itself in a number of attacks on French nationals and 
In a few hesitant attempts by the Meiji Government to
of,
assert its right to an indemnity
The position taken by Outrey was a grave disappoint- 
ment to Brunet and his sympathisers, among whom was numbered 
Captain Chanoine, the leader of the mission. They felt 
that the seizure of Yezo under French guidance presented
22. See F.0.391* XIV. Nov.13, 1868. Parkes to Hammond.
23* See M.D.Japon.Ill. July 9, 1869. Guerre to Quai.
24. See C.P.Japon. XVIII, May 8, I869. Outrey to la Valette. 
25* See C.P.Japon. XIX. Aug. I.I869. Ibid. Sept. 4, 1869, 
Outrey to la Valette. Outrey resisted these insinuations 
strongly. 1 Ce serait accepter le rdle impossible de vaincu 
et 1*Insolence des Japonais n!aurait plus de bornes/1 he 
wrote In his Sept. 4 dispatch.
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Outrey with an outstanding opportunity of emerging from 
the negative role in which he had so far been confined 
and of making France a power to be reckoned with once more. 
Their hopes, which persisted for several months before 
the recapture of the island in June 1869, are to be seen 
in a number of fascinating letters written by Brunet and 
a fellow officer to Chanoine, and in two memoranda drawn 
up by the latter for the Ministry of War. In April 1869, 
Chanoine reported that since the seizure of Yezo, Brunet 
na pris en main...la direction des affaires politiques, 
il negocie un arbitrage combine de la France et de l1Angle- 
terre au sujet de Yezo qui deviendrait un fief destin6 au 
Prince Mimbu Tayo sous 1T investiture de Mikado.1 His 
action, Chanoine added, Hpeut produire au point de vue
de la politique Francaise le plus heureux effet, si M.
t 26Outrey/en sait tirer parti.1
What Brunet really had In mind regarding the eventual
position of Yezo is not clear. In January he was working
for 1 un arrangement politique entre mes Tokoungawas et les 
/ 27gens de Yezo,1 but there is 110 suggestion of any 
concession being offered other than the recognition of 
the Mikado's sovereignty, an act which might have meant 
very little in practice. He felt his position to be a
2 6 . M.DoJapon.I. April, 1 8 6 9. Chanoine to Marshal Niel.
27* See M.DoJapon.Ill. March 28, I869» Brunet to Chanoine,
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strong one. In his force of 3000, he claimed, there were 
1500 samurai who had received training from the French 
mission and among whom strict discipline was maintained.
?8Brunet doubted whether an army could be sent against them* 
These assertions indicate that Brunet believed his 
influence in the Tokugawa camp to be dominant* It would 
be easy to dismiss them as the illusions of vanity, and 
it may well be that Enomoto and the other Tokugawa leaders 
did feel it advisable to encourage Brunetfs conviction 
that it was he who was in control* However, the evidence 
of a French officer who stayed at Hakodate for nearly two 
months 011 board a French ship indicates that Brunetfs 
importance really was considerable. In a letter to 
Chanoine this unnamed officer stated that Brunet had 
taken complete charge of things. Once at Hakodate, he 
had begun to organise everything - customs, municipality, 
fortifications, armys '‘tout a passd par ses mains. Les 
bonshommes Japonais sont des marionettes dont il joue avec 
un grand talent.” More than this, ,!I1 a fait un veritable 
*89 dans ce brave Japon, le suffrage pour nommer des chefs 
et les grades donnes au mdrite et non a la naissance, ce 
sont des choses fabuleuses pour ce pays la, et il a pu le 
faire tres bien, vu la gravite de la position.” ^
28. Ibid.
29® M.D.Japon. III. June 22, I869.
— 129 *"
These reports make it difficult to believe that
/""V
Brunet1s aims extended no furjhier than the hand-over 
of Yezo to the Meiji Government in return for the right 
to colonise it. Given his almost fanatical hostility 
to the South-western han who had overthrown the Bakufu 
with9 he fervently asserted, England’s, aid, it does not 
seem unreasonable to ssume that Brunet hoped that Yezo 
would provide a rallying point for those supporters of 
the Tokugawa who planned revenge and were waiting for 
dissension to appear in the victorious coalition. It 
is significant that Paris itself believed that much more 
was involved than appeared on the surface. In an 
anonymous note of April 1869, it is argued thats
11M . Chanoine voudrait que I1 initiative prise par 
le capitaine Brunet fut sanctionnSe par le Gouvernement 
de l’Empereur et qu’on permit a d*autres officiers francais 
d’aller le rejoindre, c1est-a-dire que nous preniojjs * 
indirect^ment possession de l’ile de Ydso, peut-§tre m§me 
d’une plus grande partie du territoire Japonais. Au 
systdme de M. Roches qu’il blame avec raison, c1est-a-dire, 
a l1exploitation du Japon par des spficulateurs francais 
privilegies, M. Chanoine substituerait simplement la conquete 
par les armes. Car il ne faut pas se dissimuler que 
l’aventure commence© par le capitaine Brunet, s’il y peut 
arriver avec lui quelques hommes energiques et si elle est 
conduite avec habilet6, n ’irait a rien moins qu!a jeter 
dans la balance de la guerre civile du Japon un poids 
considerable, peut-etre preponderant, et que nos officiers 
transform6s en Daimios pourraient a un moment donne devenir 
les arbltres et meme les maltres de 1*Empire.1
Even If this was all somewhat fanciful, it does suggest 
that the situation held certain possibilities. These 
possibilities, however, were rejected by Paris, just as they 
had been by Outrey. The note endeds 
Z<*a. M. D.Tapon. IU, ^p™l,
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1 Si on laissait les choses prendre une pareille 
tournure, il faudrait naturellement s’attendre a des 
reclamations energiques des Puissances particulierement 
de l’Angleterre. II n!est pas besoin d'ajouter que ce 
serait rompre avec le Gouvernement du Mikado que nous 
venons de reconnaitre. Oni ne pense done pas que le 
Gouvernement de l'Empereur puisse rien faire qui implique 
l’apparence d!une approbation quelconque donne a l’entre- 
prise de M. le Capitaine Brunet.1 30
Even if the decision had been different, it would 
have had no effect at that late stage. Contrary to what 
Brunet predicted, the Meiji Government quickly brought 
together a force sufficient to recapture the northern 
island, and Brunet was forced to seek refuge on a French 
ship, the Coetlogon, on June 9? 1869.^
(c) The Uragami Question
The Brunet affair had arisen out of the ambiguous
position in which the French military mission had been
forced to remain inactive while its contract still had
some time to run. This question of the fate of the mission
was one of the numerous problems which Outrey complained
privately had been left to him by Roches and which hindered
the establishment of a satisfactory relationship with the
Meiji G o v e r n m e n t it was not, however, the most
difficult of these problems. That distinction belongs to 
the Uragami question.
30. M.D.Japon.III. April I869. Though anonymous this memorandum 
undoubtedly emanated from within the Quai d1Orsay.
31. Brunet was punished by being suspended from active service 
M.D.Japon,III. Oct.2^9I869. Guette to Quai. The Japanese Gov«t» 
withdrew its complaint against him in 1873? and he eventually 
reached the rank of General. See Chanoine, Documents pour 
servir a I’histoire des Relations entre la France et le Japon. 
(Paris, n.d.) p.83*
32. See Outrey1 s letter to Saint~Vallier, C .P . Japon.XFI^^ ig£g,
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As has been seen, persecution of Japanese Christians 
had first occurred in 1867 while Roches was Minister but 
careful handling of the affair by both sides together with 
the outbreak of civil war, had pushed it into the background. 
It did not take long, however, to come to the fore again, 
since the new Government adopted exactly the same policy 
towards the Christians as its predecessor, the only 
difference being that its execution was more ruthless.
The resumption of persecution was a grave disappoint­
ment to the missionaries, who had to some extent moderated 
their activity. Their restraint was partly a result of 
Roches1 pressure, partly in anticipation of a more liberal 
attitude from the new authorities.^ 3 The action of the 
latter can hardly be considered surprising, however, in 
view of the joi background of the anti-Bakufu movement.
Hatred and suspicion of Christianity had been one of the 
basic elements in the Bakoku policy which the Bakufu had 
surrendered to foreign pres sure 5 and even if a number of 
the new leaders had been forced to the conclusion that 
isolation was no longer possible and that to catch up with 
the advanced Western nations was an urgent necessity, It 
did not mean that they were ready to tolerate the spread 
of a religion which was traditionally associated with 
political dissent. Even those of them who like Satsuma1s
33• See Les Missions Catholiaues. I. July 17, 1868
Komatsu9 had no personal hostility towards Christianity9 
had an acute awareness of the danger to their cause that
04
concessions to Christianity might bring. Nor were
Japanese objections regarded as baseless even by the French. 
Outrey recognised that there were good reasons for the 
Government1s annoyance at missionary zeal. He held that:
1 le Christianisme introduit forcement avec lui les idees 
d*egalite ou d1independence sociale qui sont de nature a 
bouJ-everser 1'organisation du pays par castes et professions 
In addition^ he.felt that a struggle between Christians and 
Buddhists would be inevitable9 thus leading to a schism 
in society. A similar evaluation of Japanese motives was 
provided by Captain Challi6? who spent some time In Japanese 
waters during 1868 and had the advantage of discussion with 
Montblanc9 a Frenchman who had close links with Satsuma 
leaders. Challie!s view was that the Meiji Government was 
greatly disturbed by the appointment In 1868 of a bishop? 
who could serve as a rallying-point for the spread of 
Christianity. This step might lead to even worse things. 
The Government9 he declaredf ^redoute surtout que les 
etrangers puissent scruter la vie interieure du pays. La 
crainte de les voir au moyen des chretiens repandre leur 
propaganda 9 penetrer peut-etre dans le Japon et y annoncer
34. See C.P.Japon. XVII. Sept.10.1868. Outrey to Moustier. 
35* C.P.Japon. July 7 9 1868. Outrey to Moustier.
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un autre mattre plus puissant que le Mikado, dornine toute 
autre consideration et donne a cette question une importance 
tres serieuse.11-5 It is likely that doth Outrey and 
Challie exaggerated the extent to which purely theological 
considerations had a part in Japanese thinking, and it 
seems improbable that the possibility of a struggle between 
Christians and Buddhists was a factor which caused the new 
leaders much concern. But the prospect which Challie 
hinted at of the Japanese Christians providing a pretext 
for foreigners to go beyond the limits of the treaty ports, 
and for Western powers to interfere with Japan1s sovereign 
rights as they already had with China1s, was clearly one 
which in the new Governments eyes called for speedy and 
drastic measures.
The measures it took, however, had to be such as not
to call down upon it the fate which it was seeking to avoid.
Indeed, the whole period when the issue of religious
toleration was at stake is characterised by the Japanese
Governments endeavour to plot a safe course between an
inaction which would allow the evil to spread and an excessive
rigour which would stir the Powers to action while the new
regime was still insecure. In the first phase, lasting
36. M.D.Japon.I. July 30,1868. Challi£ to Marine.
37® The Meiji Government’s policy towards Christians was 
probably affected also by shifts of influence within the 
Government itself and the period of severest repression did 
coincide with a temporary weakening of the reforming central- 
tsars1 position during 1870. Nevertheless the basic factors 
involved were clearly traditional prejudice and foreign 
pressure.
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from 1868 to the start of 1870, the Meiji Government
tended, while occasionally lurching towards the second
course, to favour a reasonable approach. That is to say,
although maintaining its right to deal with its own subjects
as it saw fit, it proved willing in practice to pay heed to
the protests of the Powers by making comparatively few
arrests and by treating the prisoners without too much
harshness. It was, for the most part, willing to make
promises of a more liberal treatment, even when it did not
intend to carry them out. The earliest example of this
policy occurred in May 1868, when the Foreign Representatives
protested at the bad treatment of the Christians and the
new leaders had to postpone their measures on account of
18their weak position.^ This was while Roches was still 
Minister. The problem was to confront Outrey almost upon 
arrival.
Outrey1s ability to see something of the Japanese 
side of the question has already been noted. Even if 
more concerned personally than Roches about the fate of 
the Japanese Christians, he had no desire to make a great 
issue out of what was still, in July 1868, a comparatively 
small affair, involving just over a hundred people. He had, 
in any case, a duty to avoid French involvement in internal
380 See C.P.Japon. XVI. May 27? 1868. Roches to Moustier. 
Also M.D.Japon. I. July 30, i860. Challie to Marine.
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affairsj and this duty was confirmed with respect to 
religious affairs in September 18689 when Moustier accepted 
that the treaties did not give France the means of intervening 
effectively in favour of the Japanese Christians. Outrey 
was further inhibited by his fear that too direct an 
interference on the part of the Powers would compromise 
the missionaries and diminish their chances of eventual 
success. Nevertheless, in view of France*s special 
position as protector of Catholics and the fact that all 
the Catholic missionaries were French, he could hardly 
remain inactive. Outrey*s activity, however, lay rather 
in the frequency of his representations to the Japanese 
Government than in the intensity with which he pursued 
them. In this he was a considerable disappointment to 
the missionaries who, as in the 1840 * s and 18J01s, found
themselves unable to influence French policy to any
o q 40
marked degree. ' Despite an appeal from Petitjean,
and the letters complaining of persecution that appeared
39* It was alleged by Leon Pagds in 1873 that on the 
demand of fSH 18 deputies the Government had agreed to 
reinforce the French squadron in the Japan Seas, but was 
prevented by the Tientsin massacre and the Franco-Prussian 
War. Les Missions Catholiques, March 14, 1873. To some 
extent this may be regarded as an indirect success for 
missionary pressure, but there is no other evidence that 
the Quai d'Orsay was contemplating an actual change of 
policy.
40. Gee C.P.Japon. XVII. Sept. 10, 1868. Outrey to Moustier.
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in *Les Missions Catholiaues* in the summer, Outrey was
reluctant to take any decisive step. In July 1868, he
accepted his colleagues1 decision not to make any written
protest in order to 1 eviter une intervention isolee, qui
en peu de temps, donnerait fatalement a notre politique
au Japon un caractere special dont il serait facile a tirer
parti pour compromettre notre influence morale et nos
interets m a t e r i a l s a n d  in September, after failing
to get an agreement about the sending of a collective
note, he again contented himself with expressing his
42views verbally to Komatsu.
Though unable to secure any definite promise from 
the Japanese Government, Outrey found enough in 1868 to 
remain basically optimistic. In November of that year 
he announced that there had been no complaints for two 
months, and though he believed that some new arrests had 
just taken place in Akashi, he was encouraged by the 
commentary in an official journal which, he claimed,
"semblef vouloir preptarer I1opinion publique a accepter 
les faits avec des sentiments de mod6ration.11^  In 
January 1869? he momentarily adopted a stronger pose when 
he was visited by Uwajima, a Vice-Minister for Foreign 
Affairs, who was anxious to forestall any official
41. C.P.Japon. XVI. July 7? 3-868. Outrey to Moustier.
42. See C.P.Japon. XVII. Sept. 10, 1868. Outrey to Moustier 
43* C.P.Japon. XVII. Nov. 12, 1868. Outrey to Moustier.
- 137 -
intervention on account of harsh treatment of the Christians 
in the Goto Islands. The French Minister informed him 
that s
1 Les puissances europeennes ne pouvaient rester 
indiff^rentes a des mesures odieuses qui blessaient les 
sentiments religieux de leurs peuples et que9 si le 
gouvernement japonais ne prenait pas des dispositons serie™ 
uses pour arreter les persecutions, il devait s!attendre 
un jour A voir une indignation generate s*emparer de 
1!opinion publique et entralner peut-etre les Puissances 
A intervenir dans les conditions qu*aujourd !hui elles ont 
a coeur d*eviter. **44
This warning, however, Outrey was careful to add,
\<ias couched in an essentially amicable form. Nevertheless , 
he claimed the credit for the fact that the Japanese Govern­
ment eventually sent the Foreign Representatives an official 
note declaring that cruel penalties would be replaced 
by more humane ones. The note was regarded as efgreat 
significance by Outrey. He saw it as marking a real change 
in the attitude of the government, adding that iril reconnalt 
en quelque sorte notre droit de parler au nom de ses sujets 
chretiens9 et, une fois sur ce terrain, la diplomatie 
europeerPe ne peut pas manquer de faire prevaloir les principes
d'^quite, de justice, et d*humanite qu'elle invoque en
• 45faveur de ses coreligionnaires.n In reality, it soon
became clear that the Government was not carrying out all
its promises. The French Minister*s reaction to new reports
of persecution was more in keeping with his habitual policy
44o C.P.Japon XVIII. Jan, 12, 1869. Outrey to Moustier.
4?. C.P.Japon, XVIII. Jan, 12, 1869. Outrey to Moustier,
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of caution, however, than with his veiled threats of 
January, He advised his Foreign Minister that the Japanese 
Government was probably powerless to give them complete 
satisfaction and asked permission to '!agir lentement et
tl A.f,
avec beaucoup de managements. This cautious attitude
was maintained throughout the year despite continuing
reports of persecution.
With the turn of 1870 the situation became more tense
as Japanese Government politics showed signs of the
increased influence of the traditionalists. In January
of that year Outrey reported that over 3000 Christians had
been forcibly taken from Uragami, dispersed among several
47han and set to work on public projects® ( Reports from 
missionaries alleged that families were being deliberately 
split up. All the Foreign Representatives protested at 
once, but though they secured the promise to stop the 
process temporarily, they were not confident of having 
much effect 011 the Japanese Government. After their 
conference with Sanjo, Iwakura, Sawa, and Terashima, Outrey 
came to the conclusion that 1 Le Gouvernement Japonais est 
decide a ne pas tolerer cette religion et il ne reculera 
devant aucune extremite pour empecher qu*elle se r6pande 
dans le pays/.*. .11 me parait impossible desormais,*' he
A O
added 1 de rien obtenir par la voie diplomatique.1
46, C.P.Japon, XVIII. May 11, 1869. Outrey to la Valette.
47, C.P.Japon. XIX. Jan.22, 1870. Outrey to Auvergne Laura-
48, Ibid. guais
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The hardened attitude of the Meiji Government made 
the position of the Foreign Representatives very difficult.
To do nothing in the face of large-scale persecutions would 
arouse dissatisfaction in Europe3 yet to achieve any 
success would call for more drastic counter-measures than 
had yet been envisaged. Outrey, encouraged perhaps by 
the unanimity of his colleagues1 reaction, momentarily 
leaned towards strong measures. 1 Je suis tres-dispose 
& croire1 he wrote, 1 que le Gouvernement Japonais cederait 
devant une demarche comminatoire, si elle etait faite en 
commun, mais II ne faut pas se dissimuler quelle devrait 
etre appuyee par une demonstration Imposante
Outrey was not the only foreigner to favour intervention 
at this time® In a private letter to the Comte de Montebello, 
a Quai d1Orsay official, a combined demarche was strongly 
advocated by another diplomat, whose Identity is not stated, 
though the tone of the letter suggests that he was a Minister?^ 
Discussions with Terashima, a Satsuma progressive, had 
convinced him that the Japanese Government would abandon 
its repressive measures If it really believed that these 
were going to endanger Its good relations with the Powers. 
However, the likelihood of Paris authorising a naval 
demonstration was slight. The Comte Daru had only recently 
taken over the Quai dT0rsay and was scarcely in a position
49. Ibid.
50. The letter is dated Feb. 20, I87O and is in C.P.Japon.XIX.
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to act decisively* In May a Quai d*0rsay review of the 
question concluded hy saying that the instructions sent to 
Parkes left very little doubt about the determination of the 
English Government to abstain from measures to force the 
Japanese Government to carry out its p r o m i s e s T h e r e  
was no further comment as to the effect of these instruc­
tions on French policy, nor was one necessary* That France 
could not act in isolation had, by this time9 become one of 
the tacit assumptions of French policy®
Even if Paris had been more responsive and England 
more co-operative it is doubtful whether any new step would 
have been taken. It was not long before Outrey again
fjO
modified his views on the best course to be followed*
The main reason for his change of line was seen in May 1870 
when he reported that the Japanese Government had been 
showing itself more friendly to France. A  month later 
another dispatch revealed the c a u s e . I t  was one which9 
though not directly connected to the question of religious 
toleration9 had a considerable influence upon it. Two
years after the dismissal of the first French military 
mission9 the Meiji Government had decided that Japan needed 
further French assistance in establishing a new army 
51* C.P.Japon® XX. May 7? 1870.
52. In April he accepted the Japanese rejection of a 
moderately-toned collective note without demur* C J? •Japon.XX. 
April 129 I87O® Outrey to Daru.
53• C.P.Japon* XX. May 119 1870. Outrey to Daru.
54. C.P.Japon. XX. June 4 ? 1870 * Outrey to Daru.
55* For a discussion of Japanese motives9 see E.L.Presseisen* 
Before Agression, pp.25-39*
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Its approach had immediate effects. On the one hand 
France became reluctant to push the religious question 
too hard lest she lose her new chance of influence and 
prestige. On the other hand? Japanese need of French 
help gave Outrey a bargaining counter9 which he was not 
slow to utilise. In the same interview in which Terashlma 
made the military request? the French Minister bluntly 
posed the question - 1 Croyez-vous que la France soit d6sireuse 
d1aider au developpement de cette force si elle doit etre 
employee d des persecutions que la civilisation et 
lUiumanite r6prouvent?1 TerashimaTs reply was encouraging;
”11 a laisse & entendre quron avait cede a lfopinion 
publique d*une grande partie du Japon qui ne peut oublier 
les evenements du XVlie siecle? mais qufen realit6 le 
Gouvernement n*ayant aucun parti-pris contre le Christianisme9 
n*aurait aucune objection a se departir d!une rigeur imposSe 
par les circonstances le jour ou9 se sentant plus fort9 plus 
solidement 4tabli5 il pourrait sans danger r6sister d des 
prejuges inveteres dans le pays"56*
Terashima!s arguments more o n  less convinced Outrey.
He recognised that coercive measures would be dangerous5 
especially since he was inclined to believe that Parkes 
f,entretient les Japonais dans la pensee que la propaganda 
de nos missionnaires est une manoeuvre de la diplomatie 
frangaise*1 and he concluded; 11II me semble que la solution 
la plus vraie est celle que llon obtiendra naturellement 
et sans efforts par la diffusion dans les masses de nos 
principes civilisateurs.1
56o G.P.Japon* XX. June 4 9 1870. Owfc-rey to Pa.ru,
57® C.P.Japon® XX. June 4? 1870* Outrey to pa.ru.
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Outrey1s decision not to press Japan on the Uragami 
question was not disputed by the Quai d*Orsay. It meant 
that the Japanese Government need no longer fear outside 
intervention from the Power most concerned? provided it 
avoided sensational measures* Its hand was further 
strengthened by the outbreak of the Franco-Prussian War 
in August* Even If France had wanted to intervenes she 
would have had insufficient means for enforcing her will*
Not surprisingly5 therefore9 the religious question dis­
appeared from the correspondence between Paris and Tokyo*
The problem reappeared again only in January 18729 when 
French affairs were in the hands of the Comte de Turenne9 
who had served under both Roches and Outrey* This final 
phase dragged on until the end of 1873? tot was mostly 
devoid of excitement or threats* Turenne9 like Roches? 
was usually ready to accept the Japanese Government1s 
explanations9 and there was, in any case9 some movement 
towards toleration in practice* Perhaps the most interesting 
feature of this period was the comparative success of 
religious interests in putting their views across In Paris? 
but this success did not come until late 1872 when it 
could have but little effect* Already at the start of 
the year9 the picture being presented in dispatches from 
Tokyo was a much more favourable one* In February 18729 
seventy newly-arrested Christians were released following
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an appeal by Turenne/ On April 1st, the charge d*affaires
announced that the edict imposing severe penalties on
native Christians had just been secretly revoked, and
in May came news that Japanese were now permitted to
practise Christianity so long as they did not seek to make 
doconverts« Turenne*s confidence in the Meiji Government1s
liberal tendencies was strengthened by its release of more
6i
imprisoned Christians on his request. In return he
urged the missionaries, whose unthinking zeal he criticised* 
to maintain an extreme reserve.
Turenne*s views evidently carried some weight with 
his Foreign Minister, but in December, with the arrival 
of the Iwakura mission Imminent^the Comte de Remusat was 
forced to regard the matter in a sterner light. The 
sufferings of Uragarni, he informed the chargd d*affaires, 
had produced an emotion ,!assez profonde poui* trouver de
 ^ 6p
lr6cho au sein de ltassemblee nationale <2* The incident
he referred to was a demand for French intervention by the
Comte de Richemont on December 7? which had been received
with applause, forcing Remusat to assure the Assembly that
68he would take action. He therefore instructed Turenne
to remonstrate with the Japanese Government. He himself
would do the same with Iwakura when the Japanese mission
visited France. 64.
58. See C oP.Japon.XXI. Feb. 19, 1862. Turenne to Remusat.
59* C.P.Japon. XXI. April 1, lo72. Turenne to Remusat.
60. C.P.Japon. May 8, 1872. Turenne to Remusat.
61. C.P.Japon. XXI. Aug. 28, 1872.
62. C.P.Japon. .XXI. Dec. 20, 1872.
63. See Les Missions Catholiaues, Dec. 20, 1872.
64. C.P.Japon, XXI. Dec. 20, 1872.
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Iwakura arrived in Paris in January 1873? a d^- his
interview with Remusat took place on the 24th of that
month* A month later the decision was taken to abandon
the old policy of suppression* According to one Japanese
historian9 this change was the result of the experiences
66of the Iwakura mission* If so, France was jointly
responsible9 but her attitude cannot be considered decisive.
Despite religious pressure, R6musat remained statesmanlike,
simply advising Iwakura that 1 Le moyen le plus prop re a
attirer au Japon les sympathies de I1 Europe et de UAmerique
serait que le Gouvernement japonais ambandonnat les errements
suivis par lui jusquTa ce jour et quhil se montrat bien-/
\ 66 veillant a llegard des C h r e t i e n s a n d  when the Japanese.
envoy replied that, though he could make no definite promise
the Japanese Government intended to establish religious
toleration as soon as it was opportune, Remusat declared
himself satisfied* ' Despite his final reminder that the
question was Important to France, the tone of the Interview
was friendly, and there was no suspicion of any threat of
force*
65* Hanabusa Nagamichi, Mei.11 Gaikosh 1 (Diplomatic History of 
the Meiji Period; (Tokyo, I960) p.9«




In Japan? Turenne was even more understanding of
the Japanese position® Before receiving Remusat1s
instructions he had pointed out that toleration would be
delayed on account of the tension caused by samurai 
68discontent? and he had strongly advised against any
pressure being put on the Meiji Government? which was
69continuing to act liberally® y He did? in February? go
so far as to inform the Gaimusho of Richemontls intervention
and Remusat*s concern^but was satisfied with a vice-ministers
assurances that the accusations were distorted.^ The whole
question was settled a few days later so far as Turenne was
concerned? when he learned of the decision to abrogate the
anti-Christian edicts and return all the Uragami Christians
71to their home village*'
This was not quite? however? the end of the religious
toleration problem* It the end of June? Turenne was
replaced by the new Minister., Berthemy? who was less than
sympathetic to the Japanese and was soon suggesting that
the old- edicts might be involted again if the Christians
no
proved an embarrassment*' Nevertheless? the sudden
attempt to reactivate the question came not from him but
from Paris® In March six deputies had addressed to the
68® C.P.Japon. XXI. Dec® 23? 1872® Turenne to Remusat•
69® C.P.Japon. XXII. Jan. 20? 1873* Turenne to R6musat.
70. C.P.Japon. XXII. Feb. 15? 1873° Turenne to Remusat.
71. C.P.Japon. XXII. Feb. 24? 1873° Turenne to Rdmusat.
72. C.P.Japon. XXIII. Sept® 22? 1873° Berthemy to Broglie.
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Quai d*Orsay a letter demanding that Prance require 
from Japan complete religious toleration and free access
Whether there was any direct connection between this letter 
and the change in the Quai d(Orsay attitude is not clear, 
but the Due de Broglie instructed Berthemy to raise the 
religious question in his coming negotiations on Treaty 
Revision, and the position which he directed his represent­
ative to adopt was essentially that which the deputies had 
advocated:
* Nous nous bornons a considerer comme essentielle 
l1adoption par le Gouvernement Japonais des principes de 
liberte de conscience consacres par nos conventions avec 
d'autres Cours moins rapproch^es des id6es Europ4ennes, 
e'est ft dire, pour les indigenes le droit d'embrasser 
et de professer librement la foi, pour les missionnaires 
la faculte de l^nseigner sans entraves. . * pvous ne sauriez 
mettre trop d1insistance, dans le cas oft vous recontriez 
une opposition qu*il me rdpugne de prdvoir, pour assurer 
le triomphe du principe que nous tenons a honneur devoir 
constamment d^fendu.’1 74
Broglie1s instructions, if followed by Berthemy, 
would have created considerable suspicion of French motives 
in Japan and would have made the maintenance of good
73* M.D.Japon.II. March 2 1 8 7 3 *  signatories wanted
^des garanties analogues a celles qui nous ont et& donn6es par 
le Gouvernement chinois dans le trait6 de Tientsin.1 
74. C*F.Japon.X X I I I, Aug. 7? 1873* Broglie to Berthemy. The 
government which Broglief had done much to create in May 
contained an influential legitimist element, and it had 
already taken several steps which, in Seignobos1 words, 
’•annoncaient que les legitimistes comptaient sur le secours 
divin pour vaincre 1 la Revolution1.w See Ch.Seignobos,
Le Declin de I1Empire et l!Etablissement de la e^ Rgpublique„1
miTT ^ h  p—rmwiT T~inn>—       n hi /
VO
for missionaries to the interior, as in China.
Lavisse, Histoire de France Contemporaine)
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relations between the two countries extremely difficult.
Berthemy9 for all his dislike of the Japanese, realised this.
He had already asserted, before he received Broglie*s
dispatch, that the zeal of the missionaries,when exercised
prematurely, was prejudicial to the cause of religion in
Japan. ' When he heard that he was expected to seek new
rights for missionaries he warned that it would be imprudent
to insist on any such provision. His reason, based on
an analysis of events since 1868 which stressed the jealousy
of England, was one which normally carried much weight with
the Quai d!0rsays no other Representative would join him
and the demand would be met with a blunt refusal by the
76Japanese Government. Whether Berthemy1s^argument would
have convinced Broglie is uncertain. By the time his
dispatch reached Paris a Cabinet reshuffle by Broglie had
brought to the Quai d1Orsay a new occupant, Decazes, whose
77opinions were less extreme. He acknowledged that his 
predecessor had been unrealistic in his demands and 
accepted Berthemy1s view that the missionaries could make
78best use of their zeal by devoting themselves to teaching.
Thus, an ugly incident in Franco-Japanese relations was averted.
75- C.P.Japon. XXIII. Sept. 22, 1873• Berthemy to Broglie.
A pencilled comment says wCette dep&che est un peu froide 
pour les Missionnaires.,f
76. C.P.Japon. XXIII. Oct. 1?, 1873. Berthemy to Broglie.
77* Decazes was, in fact, more opposed than most Orleanists 
to the legitimist cause and his entry into the Conseil des 
Ministres in November 1873? marked the break with the extreme 
right. See Seignobos, op.cit. pp.377™8.
78. C.P.Japon. XXIII, Dec. 1, 1873* Decazes to Berthemy.
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With persecution at an end9 and with the gradual 
surreptitious penetration of the country by missionaries5 
the religious issue vanished from diplomacy9 and except 
for a brief and relatively unimportant period in the 1 8 8 0 1s9 
the fortunes of the Christian religion were henceforth to 
have no bearing whatsoever on French policy towards Japan.
(d) The Withdrawal of Foreign Troops
The religious question was not the only problem in 
Franco-Japanese relations which stretched over several 
years. One which5 though basically far simpler5 took 
even longer to settle5 was the problem of withdrawal of 
French and British troops from Japanese soil. First 
raised in 1869? it was only settled in 1875. The reason 
for this long delay was that9 like Treaty Revision^ it was 
a question in which the European Powers were satisfied with 
the status quo and saw no compelling reason for change.
The Japanese Government on the other hand? though anxious 
to get rid of their humiliating presence9 was not disposed 
to offer any inducement or compensation that might have 
hastened the troops’ departure and placed its hopes on 
wearing down the two Powers by continual appeals to their 
understanding of Japan’s problems. This policy might in 
certain circumstances have been successful but too often 
it ran up against the lack of imagination that so often
- 149 -
characterised European thinking about Japan. Indeed?
but for reasons of economy? the situation might well have
prolonged itself for some years more.
The origin of the problem went back to the troubled
79years that followed the opening of treaty relations. x
The evident hostility of the Japanese to foreigners made
it natural for marines to be landed or troops to be called
for to protect the legations and residents in Yokohama.
As time vent by? and the political situation inside Japan
remained tense? the position of the British and French
troops assumed a permanent character. In 1863? reports
that the Bakufu had agreed to expel foreigners led the
British and French admirals to fortify Yokohama9 excluding
80Japanese troops In the process. For its part5 the Bakufu 
was not altogether displeased by the possibility that the 
Western military presence might be taken by its enemies to 
indicate that foreign support was available to the Shcham, 
if necessary.
The Meiji Government was much less happy with this 
arrangement. The presence of foreign troops9 numbering 
around 1 0 0 05-hardly represented a direct threat to its 
own power9 but it did offend national sentiment and it did
79* A detailed account of the whole question from the 
Japanese side can be found In Ilora Tomio s "Bakumatsu Ishin 
ni okeru Ei-Futsu Guntai no Yokohama-chuton11 (The Occupation 
of Yokohama by British and French Forces in the Bakumatsu 
and Restoration Periods) In Mei.ii Seiken no Kakuritsu Katei 
(The Consolidation-process of the Meiji GovernmentT^ Meiji 
Shiry&‘ Kenkyu Renrakkaifed) Tokyo9 1956.
80. In May 18635 the Bakufu sent Colonel Heale a letter which
appeared to accept the occupation. Ibid. pp.5189-90•Eventually 
it" even provided barrack areas .
i5o -
imply a want of confidence in the power and stability of 
Japan1s new rulers. Little could be done to alter the 
situation while the civil war continued In the North and 
while attacks on foreigners showed that old jojL feelings 
really were still far from under the Governments control, 
but In September 1869, these obstacles no longer seemed to 
remain. Parkes, who was then still enjoying his role as 
the Meiji government's mentor, tentatively suggested to 
Outrey that they withdraw their forces. He was met with a 
blunt rejection. The reason given by the French minister 
was security, but In reality an equally important factor 
was prestige. The existing set-up gave Outrey the same 
status as Parkes. MLe pied d'egalite sur lequel se trouvent 
ici la France et 11Angleterre", Outrey explained, "eette
superiority que donne indistinctement, aux deux puissances,
la presence de leurs troupes a terre, le geneht extr&mement
*- 81 dans ses vues de preponderance absolue." Thus Japan was
hindered, as so often later In her pursuit of treaty revision, 
not so much by the inadequacy of her case, as by the mutual 
jealousies of the Foreign Powers. In another form, this 
fact was again shown, when the Meiji Government made a 
second attempt In December, 1870, first through Parkes, then 
direct. This time Outrey1s objection was that Prussia 
had recently threatened to demand the expulsion of French 
forces from Japan, and that such a step would therefore be
81. C.P,Japon. XIX. Oct. 2, 1869. Outrey to Auvergne-Lauraguais
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wounding to France's dignity.®^ Nothing therefore, could
he done while the war in Europe lasted. In actual fact,
even before the war ended, there was some thought in Paris
of ending the maintenance of the 260 French marines# Not
surprisingly it was the financial burden that prompted the
reconsideration and the Ministry of Marine that was feeling
89the pinch. It conveyed its views to the Quai d1 Or say, J
and when Outrey received them in June, he no longer had any
reason for refusing to be co-operative. When he consulted
Parkes, however, he found that the British Minister had
ceased to favour the idea, claiming that Japan was under-
84going a grave internal crisis. Nevertheless, Outrey
now thought that the time for withdrawal would probably
not be later than the following year.
This prediction proved too sanguine. Before 1871 was
out, the Quai d’Orsay began to have doubts about the wisdom
of an early withdrawal. Since the Japanese Government had
declared its intention of revising the treaties in 1 8 7 2,
R6musat wrote to the Ministry of Marine in September,
nnous pourrions regretter de nous etre priv6s d'un moyen
8q
d!action qui n'est pas sans valeur." J A s it happened, 
no fresh approach was made by the Japanese Government 
during 1 8 7 2, probably because it placed its hopes on the 
Iwakura mission, and when the issue was raised again, it
82. See G.P.Japon. XX. Dec. 24, 1870. Outrey to Favre.
8 3 . G.P.Japon. XXI. April 8 , lo71* Marine to Quai*
84. G.P.Japon. XXI. July 1, 1871# Outrey to Favre*
85. G.P.Japon. XXI. Sept. 21, I87I.
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•was Turenne who was responsible. He suggested to the
Quai d’Orsay that France might derive some credit from 
86withdrawal and shortly afterwards mentioned his views
87to a delighted Soyejima. The British charge d*affaires9 
Watson9 who was unaware that Turenne had already made the 
French initiative known to the Japanese9 was then persuaded
op
to urge this course of action upon the Foreign Office,
Turenne*s manoeuvre proved unsuccessful. For once the
joint recommendation of the men on the spot was overruled.
By the time it reached Europe the two Foreign Ministers
had already informed Iwakura that the troops could not yet
be recalled. Remusat explained to Turenne that Granville
had told the Japanese Envoy that the security of the British
8q
Representative required their presence. y There was no
thought on the French side of acting alone. Nevertheless5
the French Government did not feel strongly about the
matter and Iwakura had been given to understand that action
90would not long be deferred.
A speedy settlement would certainly have been pleasing
to the Ministry of Marine. In June9 1873? raised the
question for a second time* not unnaturally showing a certain
91amount of impatience. Berthemy therefore9 after delaying
8 6 . G.P.Japon. XXI. Dec. 6 9 1872 9 Turenne to Remusat.
8 7 . Soyejima had been left In charge of the Foreign Office 
during IwakuraTs absenee abroad.
8 8 . See G.P.Japon. XXI. Dec. 23. 1 8 7 2. Turenne to Rdmusat.
8 9 . C.P.Japon. XXII. Jan. 30 ? 1873* Rdmusat to Turenne.
90. M.D.Japon. II. Compte-rendu of conference between Remusat 
and Iwakura. Jan. 24-9 1873*
91. See C.P*Japon. XXIII. June 26 9 1873• Broglie to Berthemy.
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in the hope of influencing the Treaty Revision negotiations,
took the matter up in November, but again the objection of
92Parkes proved insuperable•y Nevertheless the pointlessness
of the troops1 presence was now so evident that in February,
18743 the French Minister decided to allow one company to
leave5 only postponing the evacuation of the rest on
Parkes* lively representations. J
Not until January, 1875* hid the Foreign Office decide
to recall the British contingent, at the same time asking
94that France should do likewise.y The Ministry of Marine 
needed no encouraging and embarkation took place on March 1st* 
Seven years after assuming power the Meiji Government had 
at last received the final Western recognition of its 
stability ^
(e) The French Contribution To Japanese Modernisation
One final field in which French policy had some influence
011 the consolidation of the Meiji Government was one which
was only indirectly political* The remarkable conversion 
of the Meiji leaders to a belief in the necessity of wide­
spread modernisation was a development which carried some
dangers? particularly from the many discontented samurai * 
but was, on the whole, conducive to their maintenance of power.
92. G.P.Japon* XXIII* Dec. 1, 1873* Berthemy to Decazes.
93* G.P.Japon* XXIV. Feb* 7 9 1874, Berthemy to Decazes.
94* G.P.Japon. XXV, Jan* 21, 1875* Lord Lyons to Decazes.
95* Before the troops left, Iwakura significantly secured 
Berthemy1s permission to publish their correspondence to show 
that ftles Puissances etrangdres ne conservent plus de doute 
sur la stabilite du Gouvernement aetuel.'1 C .P, JaponXXV.
Feb. 15? 1875* Berthemy to Decazes.
*" 1^4 ■"
On the one hand, it was evident to the politically-aware 
that the government was doing all it could to strengthen 
the country against possible foreign threat5 on the other, 
in several fields, and particularly the army and communica­
tions, modernisation brought to the central government an 
added ability to deal with any physical threat to its power 
from inside, and this was made so evident by the failure of 
the Satsuma rebellion in 1877 that thereafter opposition 
was forced into the relatively pacific form of political 
parties. Much of the French contribution to Japanese 
modernisation came from individuals and was unconnected with 
French diplomacy, but in some of the more important fields 
the co-operation of the French Government was essential. 
Moreover, although in the Bakumatsu period the Bakufu and 
various ban had made occasional requests to Americans,
Dutchmen and Englishmen, it was the French Minister, Roches, 
who first showed that a foreign country might be willing to 
lend a hand in the radical reshaping of Japanese government, 
economy and society, when he developed a close relation 
with the Bakufu from 1864 onwards.^
Space permits no more than a brief outline of the 
various French contributions to Japanese modernisation* 
Undoubtedly the most important was the help given by French
9 6 . For all Harris1 moral encouragement it is doubtful 
whether America would have been willing or able to supply 
the Bakufu with the means of removing the obstacles to 
centralised power, while the reaction of the British and 
French Ministers to requests for Information about Western 
military technique had been uniformly unfavourable* Roches was 
the first important foreigner to believe that the Japanese 
would not use the West's weanons against the West itsell •
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soldiers in the creation of a modern army* It 'will he 
recalled that the sending of a French military mission was 
part of the Hoches-Bakufu plan to reassert Tokugawa control 
hut that,largely owing to its limited period of operation, 
this mission accomplished little* Nevertheless its 
political significance has drawn to it a good deal of 
attention,while the second mission, which, militarily,
0 9
was of far greater importance, has heen ignored. The
achievements of the second mission have heen summarized
hy the recent historian of the European contribution to
the Meiji army, Presseisens 11 The French taught the
Japanese to organize, train, and command military units
from the company to the brigade* They demonstrated the
use of artillery and insisted on the importance of field
batteries despite the problems of the terrain* They
drilled troops, educated the officers, and put their
greatest efforts into the establishment of an officers1
academy, which they rightly regarded as the key to a
modern army* The mission must also he given credit for
helping in Japan1s industrial development hy promoting
98military manufacture»s*rty French assistance did not
97 o Most general historians say nothing of the work of the 
second mission though it lasted far longer than the first - 
from 1872-80 * By the time of its final departure, however, it 
had heen considerably reduced in numbers*
98* Presseisen, Before Aggression p«67» The author points 
out, however, the French failure to encourage the development 
of a General Staff* On the other hand, the fact that the 
French influence, .before it faded from 1878 onwards, worked 
in favour of civil control of the military has recently been 
emphasized by Umetani Noboru in his Mel_.il Zenki Sei.ii-shi no 
Kenkyu0 (Studies in Early Meiji Political History) , (T^^o ^ 63)
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completely end with the departure of the Mission. From 
1885 to 1888 two French officers were again employed at 
the Military Academy* and the number of Japanese students 
who were admitted to French military schools between 1878 
and 1894 amounted to 114* compared with 87 in Germany.^
If in the long run German influence prevailed* in the 1870*s 
the French contribution played an essential part in 
strengthening the early Meiji Government* and this would
have been impossible without the co-operation of the French
«  4- 100 Government *
French assistance in another military field was also 
secured through governmental agency. The ability to build 
warships was a prime necessity for a country so open to a 
naval attack9 yet until the close of the Tokugawa period 
there was no opportunity to develop such skills and even 
at the end of the 19th century Japan was still heavily 
dependent on Europe for additions to her navy. That she 
was beginning to build an increasing number of warships 
herself was partly due to France, Here again* the French 
contribution originated in the Roches period. The Yokosuka 
dockyard and arsenal was one of the earliest fruits of the
99« See the table compiled by the military attache* Labry*
for Minister Harmand in C.P*Japon.LXIV. Aug. 5? 1895*
Harmand to Hanotaux.
100, It is worth noting that the French Ministry of War sent 
to Japan some of its most promising young officers. See 
G.P.Japon. XXI* March 2 6 * 1872, Remusat to Turenne, At least 
six of the fifteen officers who served there became generals. 
See Chanoine* op.cit. p.8 3 ,
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Bakufu-Hoches collaboration and its value was immediately 
obvious to the Meiji Government in 1868, The French 
engineer* who had planned this naval establishment* and
101who continued to direct it until 1 8 7 6* Lieutenant Verny* 
had conceived it as the Japanese equivalent of Toulon* and 
in scale it far surpassed the other shipyards where various 
han had experimented in the construction of steamships.
At the time of the Restoration the Yokosuka arsenal had 
not yet reached the stage where ships could be built there* 
but it had already begun to prove its value for the purpose 
of ship repairs. In November* 1873? work was commenced 
there on the first warship to be built in Japan* an 840 ton 
4 gunned vessel named the Seiki* which was successfully
10 Plaunched in the presence of the Emperor on March 5? 1875*
In the 1890’s the dockyard began to be enlarged to build
|
ships of 8000 tons and over* and it remained one of Japan’s j
I
most important naval bases till the Pacific War* by which j
time the construction of 40*000 ton vessels was p o s s i b l e , 1 0 ^  j
\
The French contribution to Yokosuka ended in I878 when the i
104.last of the numerous French workers employed there left Japan,
101. When Verny left in 1 8 7 6* after eleven years* his functions 
as adviser to the Japanese head of the arsenal, were taken over •
by another French officer* Thibaudier* who remained a further
year. See C.P,Japon.XXV. Nov.20*1875? Ibid* May 14*1876.
Both St, Quentin to Decazes.
102. See C«P.Japon.XXV.March 15? 1875* Berthemy to Decazes.
103. See J.Ray* Le Janon, (Paris* 1941) pp.99-100.
104. Throughout most of the period 1865-78 there were about 
40 Frenchmen employed at Yokosuka.
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The value of their efforts -was assessed highly by Foreign
Minister Terashima in a letter to the French representative,
Geofroys wIls ont fonde au Japon lrart des constructions
navales et c’est & eux que nous devons 6galement de pouvoir
constater aujourd 1 hui I1achievement de tous les services
10 5ayant rapport aux Constructions n a v a l e s x The 
importance of the role of diplomacy in all this was 
indicated by Terashima when he correctly added? ,fCes 
resultats sont certainement le fruit du zele et de I’activite 
deployds par ces fonctionnaires, mais crest de la bienveil- 
lance de votre Gouvernement pour notre Fays qu’Ils tenaient 
leur mandat
In naval construction, as in military training,
French criticisms that their assistance had been dispensed
with too soon for Japan’s own good,10*'7 were partially
justified by Japan’s employment of a further Frenchman from
1886 to 1890• However, there was a significant difference
in the level of help required. Louis-Emile Berttin, the
man In question, was an outstanding Ministry of Marine
105* C.P. Jap on. XXVI <> Nov. 21, 1878. Geofroy to Wadding ton, 
106. Ibid.
107- See e.g. G.P.Japon. XXV. Nov. 20, 1875- St. Quentin 
to Decazes, reporting conversation with Terashima. It 
should be observed, however, that there were good financial 
reasons for Japan’s action, in that the first half of the 
1880*s were a time when M&tsukata, the Finance Minister, 
was consistently pursuing a policy of economy and deflation 
to stabilise the erratic financial situation of the late 
1870's.
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engineer, with an internationAreputation as an innovator
i a O
in naval construction. His reputation and his previous
instruction of Japanese students at Cherbourg decided the 
Japanese Government to appoint him as counsellor of the 
Navy Minister at a time ■when plans were being laid to give
to
Japan a navy equalAor approaching that of any other Power
to*)
in the Far East, Bertin1s main tasks were to advise
on construction and superintend the establishment of new naval
arsenals? and he was given the privilege of direct access to
110the Navy Minister, In addition it was his recommendations
as to what types of ships and materials should be purchased
that led to the Japanese navy acquiring9 among many smaller
vessels? three warships of over 4,000 tons each? two of
111which were built in France and the other at Yokosuka,
108. One of Bertin’s books, La Marine Moderne, first pub­
lished in 1905 went into two editions. In the iBSO’s, he 
was already known for his pioneer work on cellular bulkheads. 
See the commemorative pamphlet9 Louis-Emile Bertin5 Son Role 
dans la Creation de la Marine Japonaise7^PaH!!iT3^^^ ? 
written by a Japanese naval attach^ in France, Captain Togari,
109 0 See Matsushita Yoshio , Mei.ii no Guntai  ^ (The Meiji Armed 
Forces), Tokyo I960, pp.86-92. The Navy Ministry’s need for 
Bertin is shown by the language used by Admiral Kawamura in 
requesting French Minister Sienkiewicz1s co-operations 
”Les constructeurs japonais de I1Arsenal de Yokosuka formes 
a I’ecole de M.Ferny, ont tout d’abord tres-bien travailles, 
mais abandonees d eux-memes, n’ltant plus au courant des 
progres de la science ils ont besoin actuellement d’etre 
guides,” C.P.Japon. XXXI. Sept. 17 1885. Sienkiewicz to 
Freycinet.
110, Ibid, See also Togari, op.cit. p ,17-18.
111. Togari, op.cit., p,20~2l5 G.P.Japon. XLV. Jan.8, 1896. 
Harmand to Hanotaux.
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It is further claimed for Bertin, that the specifications
which he laid down for these ships made possible new battle 
112tactics9 and their effectiveness was praised by Admiral
Ito in December9 18945 after his victory in the battle
of the Yaluj when he wrote to Bertin calling them nles
elements formidables de notre flotte.1*
Bertin was clearly an adviser of highstanding and
ability? but the Frenchman who had the greatest single
influence was unquestionably Gustave-Emile Boissonade de
Fontarabie? a professor of law. Boissonadespent more than
twenty years in Japan3 from 1873 t0 1895? but time alone
is insufficient to explain his importance3 which derived
essentially from two factors3 one the Impersonal attraction
for the Japanese of the Codes Napoleoniens3 the other
Boissonade1s personal dedication to the cause of international
equality for Japan. This latter factor made him important
not only in legal modernisation but also in Japanese foreign
policy9 for he gave valuable assistance to Okubo in his
114negotiations with China In 1874? as well as enthusias­
tically providing the Japanese Government with ammunition
1] S’in Its struggle to wrest Treaty Revision from the Powers.
112o Togari9 op.cit. p.22.
113. Togari3 op.cito p«23.
114. See Mp Iwatar Okubo Toshimlchi„ (Berkeley 1964)9 pp. 
205~-222o Iwata speaks of Boissonade as Okubo1 s ‘trusted 
adviser* and concludes that Okubo “would not have been so 
successful without the dedicated counsel of such men as 
Boissonade and Legendre.Tl (p 0222)0
115• In a dispatch written In May I889? Sienkiewicz wrote?
"M. Boissonade a3 d‘ailleurs? bien merite du Japoni il a 
combattUj par tous les moyens dont il disposal!« la politique
(continued.........
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It was* however 9 his work in drafting new legal codes
that adsorbed most of Boissonade’s energies and provides
his main claim to fame. Boissonade was not the only
13 6legal adviser employed by the Meiji Government " but he
117was certainly among the most distinguished* { and it was
115. (continued)
des Puissances dtrang^res et notamment celle de la France 
dans I’affaire de la revision des Traites.1 (C .P *Japon.
XXXIV 0 M&y 8* 1889) Boissonades’ loyalty to the Meiji 
Government and dedication to his task is shown not only 
by the jurist’s length of service In Japan* but also by 
his unremitting attention to his work. In reporting his 
departure on leave for iltami in Nov. 1884* the Echo du 
Japon addeds 1 Les journaux Indigenes, qui annoncent le 
depart de Mo Boissonade* font observer que c’est la 
premiere fois qu’il prend un congd* depuls douze ans qu’il 
est au service du gouvernement japonais.” (L’Echo du Japon* 
weekly edition* Nov. 21* 1884)* More striking evidence 
still is provided by Boissonade1s declaration* at the 
funeral, of a legal colleague*JM; Gambet-Gros* that he 
desired to be buried next to Okubo. (Ibid. Nov. 2?* 1881) 
Though all foreign experts were well-paid* and the more 
outstanding advisers received as much or more than Japanese 
Ministers * it Is doubtful whether the dedication of 
Boissonade (and* despite Sienkiewicz’s insinuation* of 
others too) can be explained except in a way which takes 
account of their sense of participation in the construction 
of a new state and a new society. This was not a factor 
which weighed heavily with French diplomats* who were 
primarily interested in the prestige and influence which 
their own nationals might bring to France. It is revealing 
of the great Importance which France attached to prestige* 
particularly cultural prestige* that Sienkiewicz considered 
the harm done by Boissonade to France’s material Interests 
to be more than compensated for by the effect of such an 
example of conscientiousness on the French reputation for 
loyalty and dedication.
116. Among the other German* American* English* and French 
lawyers in Japan was Georges Bousquet* author of Le Janon de 
nos Jours (Paris 1877)* For his preparatory work* see Umetani 
Noboruj 0 ' . n .. ^   ^ '
(Tokyo 19
• Vol.Y.(l873) pp .275-7.
117. Boissonade was a 48 year old professor In the Faculty of 
Law at Paris when chosen. He was also joint editor of the 
Revue de Legisla. tlon Anclenne et Moderne Francalse et
yaror u-a:l k q unin, uionouraDJLe roreign mmpxoyees; 
777-S27 a T s o the ^ _  ^ " 1....
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he who was entrusted with the hulk of the huge task of 
compiling the new legal codes which the Japanese Government 
required to prove her modernity to the Treaty Powers* to 
establish the legal foundations for a capitalist economy* 
and* in the Marxist view* to erect a firm base for the
-j -j Q
establishment of absolutism. There is no room here
to chronicle the various stages of Boissonade’s work* but
It is worth pointing out that* although he took the French
codes as a base he was also concerned both to introduce
Improvements which other European countries had made and
to relate this draft to the particular conditions of the
119Japanese social system. ' In fact* the concessions
118. See Toyama Shigeki’s unfavourable assessment of Eto 
Shimpei* the Minister responsible for the appointment of 
the French legal advisers in ,!Mimpo-ten Ronso no Seijiteki 
K5satsu“'(A Political consideration of the Dispute over
the Civil Code)* his contribution to Minken ronkara Nashion- 
arisumu e (From People’s Rights to NatIona11sin)"Tokyo"’"l95^• 
pp.247-52. Choice of a French jurist to draft the new codes 
was determined by the reputation of France as a highly 
modernised state and of the Napoleonic Codes as a major 
foundation of this development* and by the difficulty of 
adapting the rival Anglo-Saxon concept®** of law to Japan 
with the necessary speed. See Y. .Noda* Introduction au 
Droit Japonais. Paris 1966. p.51*
119. Among numerous testimonies to these facts* that of 
French Minister Roquette Is particularly worthy of mention. 
His dispatch of July 29* 1881 (C.P.Japon XXVIII) contains
a detailed analysis of the new penal code* See also L ’Echo du 
Japon* weekly edition* Oct.22* 1879* Aug. 19* 1880. As 
regards the later Civil Code* Boissonade himself argued 
strongly that he had taken as much account of Japanese custom 
as was compatible with Japan’s progress as a modern state.
See ”Les Nouveaux Codes Japonais”* Revue Frangaise du Japon 
Noo8. Sept. 30? 3-892. There are several other articles in 
this short-lived periodical which are illustrative of 
Boissonade’s views.
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which he and his Japanese associates made to the fami3.y 
system did not go nearly far enough to satisfy the Confucian 
traditionalists9 but it is probable that the chief reason 
for the postponement and redrafting of the Civil Code by 
a joint committee was the desire of the opposition parties 
in the Diet to make use of any means of putting pressure 
on the Hanbatsu Government* whose power they were challenging. 
Even though Boissonade’s Civil Code was finally reshaped 
In a form more like that of the German Code* a good deal 
of its contents went unchanged* while the Penal Code which 
he had drawn up in 1877 remained in force from. 1882 to
IPO
1908. " By the start of the twentieth century* it is
true* French legal influences had been largely ousted
by more authoritarian German ones. Nevertheless^In the
intervening period* from his standpoint as an advocate of
Natural Law* Boissonade had done much to propagate ideas
of a universalist character which contributed to the
loi
development of liberalism in Japan.
The army* shipbuilding* and the lav/ were the fields
in which French influence on Japanese modernisation were 
strongest* but there were many others In which Frenchmen*
120. See Noda* op.cit. pp.54~£0.
121. It may be added that Boissonade’s interests also
included political economy. At the start of I876 he gave 
a series of lectures to members of'the Sei-in and Genro-in* 
including Okubo and Ito . The views he expressed would
not have done discredit to Cobden. See L’Echo du Japon«
Jan. 10* 1876; Jan. 13* I876; Feb. 3? 187^
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or French example, also played a part* In education^it
has been maintained, the system which was established
by law in the fifth year of Meiji (1372) - which became
the foundation of the new educational system of Japan -
was9 in the main, established also upon the basis of the
] 22
French system.n ' The main attraction here was the high 
degree of centralisation achieved by France, and this led 
to several official missions being sent to France to study 
other aspects of this centralisation - In particular, the 
police and administrative systems However, individuals
also filled an important function * A considerable number
of Frenchmen taught at what In 1885 became Tokyo Imperial 
University, several of them in the sciences. In the realm 
of economic and material advance, the best-known example
122* K.Yoshida, 1 European and American Influences in 
Japanese Education,'1 in I. Nitobe, ed*9 Western Influences 
In Modern Japan, (Chicago, 1931), p.27.
123* That this aspect of French influence was noticed at 
the time is shown by a letter written by a Francophile 
Japanese to IF Echo du Japon. After referring to a number 
of institutional similarities, however, he then went on 
to claim that 1 les institutions japonais sont, en general, 
une imitation des institutions frangaises *11 Even the 
Echo felt obliged to comments "Nous croyons qu'il exagdre 
un pen*1 (L'Echo du Japon  ^weekly edition, Nov* 2?, 1881) 
A clear case of French institutional influence working 
against the development of liberalism was cited by 
Geofroy, the French Minister, in 1878, when reporting the 
Genro (non-elective Senate) debates on the proposal to 
elect Gep a r tmenta1 ass embli es» See C.P.Jap on XXVI,
Aug* 105 I8780 Geofroy to Waddington*
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of French influence was the model silk-“reeling filature
established in 187! at Tomioka with the help of a French
merchant5 Brunat, but many Frenchmen were involved in
other enterprises? particularly the development of 
124mining• In all, at least 177 Frenchmen played some
part in the modernisation of industrial techniques at 
some point between i860 and 1 9 1 4 If this was small 
compared with the numbe3?s of Englishmen, it still left
i p6
France at roughly the same level as America and Germany, 
and if one concentrates on the formative first decade of 
the Meiji Period and government employees alone, France1s 
contribution seems even more significant <> In 1872 49 
out of the Meiji Governments 213 foreign employees were 
French? fewer than the 119 English admittedly, but 
considerably more than the 16 Americans or 8 Germans 
In 1874 the proportion had gone down slightly, but the 
overall total had been more than doubled * Out of 503 
foreign employees, 108 were French, compared with 269
“] Q0
English, 47 Americans and 37 Germans, ~u Even in I879 
when the French influence was waning somewhat, the 34
124, Bee Saigusa Hiroto, Nozaki Shigeru and Sasaki Takashi,
(The Westernisation 
of Industrial Techniques in Modern Japan) (Tokyo i960)
PP*17-57-
125, This figure is based on the list of about 1400 names 
which Saiguga, Nozaki and Sasaki have compiled and which 
cannot be far from complete. Bee Ibid, pp,277-361,
126, The figures for Britain, America and Germany are 649, 
177 and 135 respectively,
127* See Umetani, 0-yatoi Gaikoku.iln*, p,2l2»
128, Ibid, p*212.
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French nationals employed by the Government still out­
numbered the 30 Germans and were only slightly fewer than 
the Americans
Much of this French contribution to Japanese modern­
isation had no direct connection with French diplomacy *
Indeed it would seem from the Quai d'Orsay archives that France’s 
representatives in Japan knew nothing of the great majority 
of industrial experts and skilled workers referred to above. 
Nevertheless? diplomacy was a factor that cannot be ignored 
for much of the really significant French assistance had 
to come through official channels. This is obvious in 
the case of the military missions and the naval engineers? 
but It applied to some individuals as well. Boissonade5 
for instance? remained in Japan as long as he did partly 
because his position at Paris was kept open for him,, on the
request of the Quai d*Orsay3 by Ministry of Public Instruc- j
i o n  !
tion intervention. J Examples can be found on the 
economic side9 too? of diplomacy at least lending a hand 
in the introduction of Frenchmen or French techniquesP 
the most Important being Outrey1s support for the creation 
of the model silk-reeling filature at Tomioka which proved 
influential in the improvement of Japan*s main export
129* Ibid. p.215* The total number was 277? of whom 140 
were British.
130. See G.C.Tokyo. -£bis, July 6. 1882. Tricou to Freycinet. 
Also C.PoJapon.XXXI. Sept.18, 1885. Seinkiewicz to Freycinet.
131. See C.P.Japon.XX. Aug. 1? 1870. Outrey to Gramont.
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The role of diplomacy as a channel for French assistance 
meant that the character of the diplomats themselves assumed 
a certain significance. When the Japanese Government 
desired to employ Frenchmen in official or semi-official 
positions 9 - and many of the most important foreign 
employees belonged to this category - It found it necessary 
to secure the approval and co-operation of the French 
Government5 since few men were likely to come to Japan 
even on high pay5 unless they were assured of being able 
to resume their normal career when they returned home. 
Japanese policy9 therefore5 was to make a preliminary 
unofficial approach to the French representative in Japan5 
since it was clear that if his support was secured9 their 
request would have a better chance of being accepted by 
Paris. In addition this policy enabled the Meiji rulers 
to avoid the possible humiliation of formal rejection by 
a foreign Power. However9 the absence of explicit
jo 9
Instructions on this point made it possible for 
representatives to encourage oT reject approaches as they 
saw fit 9 and since5 if their reaction was unsympathetic? 
there was little likelihood of the Japanese proceeding
132. Although the Quai df0rsay never refused a Meiji 
Government request and from 1875 showed a great deal of 
concern for the continuation of the military mission and 
French supervision at Yokosuka, it always left the 
Initiative to Tokyo9 presumably assuming that new 
opportunities for French advisers could only be detected 
and evaluated by their representative on the spot.
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with a formal request, French diplomats were in a position 
to discourage informal approaches without fear of the Quai 
d*Orsay ever learning of their action.
The importance of this personal factor is seen when 
one looks at the reasons why the Quai d*Orsay favoured 
French participation in Japanese modernisation and at 
the different characters of the men which it chose to 
represent France in Japan. In the i860 1s and I870fs 
the Quai favoured the employment of French experts because 
it believed that French prestige in the Far East, especially 
her military prestige, gained considerably from the implica­
tion of French excellence which Japanese requests carried.
In addition, these requests helped to restore French morale 
after the catastrophe of 1870-1, and i^ ere particularly 
satisfying when Frenchmen were chosen in preference to 
Germans or Englishmen. In the l880*s, however, the 
question became more directly political and was more 
urgently considered. Japan was becoming a power in her 
own right whose friendship was worth cultivating, and it 
was believed that having advisers there could provide an 
extremely useful way of influencing her in favour of F r a n c e .  "^3 
By this time, however, Japan was less In need of foreign 
help than earlier and there were thus far fewer opportunities
133. The first, and most notable expression of this belief 
occurred during the Franco-Chinese dispute, when it was 
anticipated by Foreign Minister Challemet-Lacour that Japan 
could, by such means, be Induced to ally with France or 
attack China. See C.P.Japon.XXIX. July 6, I883. Challemel- 
Lacour to Viel-Castel.
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of acquiring new means of influence in this direction.
For the most part, therefore, they were forced to place 
their hopes on the men who had been appointed to influential 
positions In the first decade of Meiji modernisation.
This being so, the attitude towards Japan of the 
earlier French diplomats assumed. In retrospect, considerable 
Importance. It was fortunate for France that in the key 
period before and after the Restoration she was mostly 
represented by men who were sympathetic towards the 
progressive tendencies of the Meiji leaders. Roches and 
Turenne were both enthusiastic advocates of Japanese 
modernisation, and after two years in Japan Outrey also became 
convinced of its desirability. It is not surprising, 
therefore, that the years 1864-1873 saw a large number of 
requests for French assistance and several study missions 
to France. During Turenne*s final year as chargd d*affaires 
Japanese approaches were especially numerous, so that the 
complete cessation of all requests under his successor, 
Berthemy, is all the more striking. In view of the 
letter's strong views on the changes taking place in Japan, 
however, the change can hardly be regarded as accidental.
11 Les Representants dtrangers qui ont aspire a I1 honour 
de crder une soclete nouvelle pendant la durde de leur 
exercice diplomatique et de 1 'inviter aux bienfaits de 
la civilisation,1 he wrote, a fortnight after his arrival,
'ont oublie, ce me semble, qu'il est malaisd de construire 
un edifice lorsque l'on a fait disparaltre la base sur 
laquelle reposait celui qu'il est destine a remplacer.
U s  ont oublie surtout que, dangereux parfois pour les peuples 
de race superieure, le progrds, tel qu'il est generalement 
compris, est mortel aux races inferieures." 134
134. C.P.Japon.XXII, July 9, 1873* Berthemy to Broglie.
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Bearing in mind the fact that 187? sa^ the replacement 
of the notoriously anti-Japanese German Minister, von Brandt, 
and that most succeeding French representatives tended to 
accept Berthemy1s rather than Roches' approach, it seems 
possible that the tendency that was apparent in Japan from 
the late 1870's to look towards Germany as a model may not 
have been due solely to the impersonal factor of similarities 
in the two countries' political development.
(f) French Views of the Political Development of Japan.
The differing attitudes of successive ministers towards 
French participation In Japanese modernisation and their 
handling of the problems with which they had to deal can be 
better understood if taken in conjunction with their views 
011 the wider question of the changes and tendencies that 
were shaping the new Japan. A brief description of their 
reactions to political developments should also provide a 
convenient introduction to the question of French influence 
on Japanese foreign policy since, in a period when so little 
positive control was exercised from Paris", much depended on 
the twist or emphasis given to French policy by the diplomat 
in Tokyo*
The obvious starting-point in a review of this kind 
is the French attitude to the Meiji Restoration Itself.
What was its nature and what was its likely outcome?
Outrey's first thoughts on these matters were expressed 
little more than a month after his arrival in Japan.
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In the circumstances his observations were surprisingly 
acute. While admitting that the Impact of foreigners 
had been partly responsible for the troubled situation in 
Japan? he addeds
•'Mais ce n’est pas 1& ? d’apr£s moi? la cause premiSre 
dfun bouleversement aussi complet des institutions sdculaires 
du Japon% le pays traverse une crise sociale des plus 
sdrieuses et insensiblement une classe intermediaire de la 
population semble tendre a se substituer a la classe super- 
ieure qui seule jusqu’a ce jour a occupe la scene politique J1 135
The situation was too complex? however? for him to 
have any confidence about the outcome? and his inability 
to disentangle the thread of the future from the web of 
conflicting and overlapping political interests may have 
been partly responsible for the verdict he passed on Japan 
in a private letters ’C’est? en sornme? un pays des plus 
mediocres? a tous les points de vue,’1 ^ 6
It took two years for a less pessimistic attitude to 
emerge. In the meantime Outrey was consistently sceptical, 
first?of declarations that a far-reaching transformation 
was being aimed at? then? when he had be^come convinced of 
the reformers’ sincerity? of their ability to carry their 
projects out. In September? 1 8 6 8? he refused to believe 
’ces semblants d’abnegation* when it was rumoured that the
137
South-Western han were aiming at a unified Imperial government?
and when in April? I8 6 9? he learned of the actual handover
135 • C .P .Japon .XVT. July 9 9 1868. Outrey to Moustier.
1 3 6. C .P .Japon .X5FI. Aug.22? 1868. Outrey to Saint-Vallier.
137» C .P .Japon .XV*I I .Sept. 2 8? 1868. Outrey to Moustier.
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to the Emperor of han registers by the Satsuma, Choshu,
Tosa and Hizen daimvo he found it inexplicable, adding that 
public opinion did not believe in their sincerity 
By May, his grasp of the situation was better* lie realised 
now that the daimvo were being manipulated by the samurai 
leaders, many of whom were genuinely seeking to establish 
a centralised government, but he doubted if the country 
was ready for such a radical change„“*”39 f or
experiment in public debate which the early Meiji Government 
felt obliged to inaugurate with the establishment of 
assemblies representing daimyo and samurai? Outrey, like 
his colleagues^was uninterested in any liberal potentialities 
these bodies might possess, and did his best to secure 
their abolition on account of the frequent expression of 
anti-foreign opinions in the course of the debate
138* G .P .Japon.XVIII, Apri3_ 12, 1869* Outrey to la Valette * 
139* C 0P.Japon.XVIII« Mayll,l869. Outrey to la Valette.
140• See C .P .Japon .XIX. Aug. 1, 1869* Outrey to la Valette. 
Technically It cannot be said that the Foreign Representatives 
actually demanded the abolition of the assemblies, since 
the only action they took was to present three questions to 
the Meiji Government to elucidate the exact status of the 
assemblies. However, it is clear from Outrey's report 
that the questions were intended to warn the Government of 
the danger of allowing the discussion of proposals contrary 
to the stipulations of the treaties. The Foreign Representa­
tives 1 intervention may have been a contributory factor in 
the Government's decision to allow the assemblies to fade 
away.
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Throughout 1869 and early 18709 Outrey persisted in
believing that there could be no significant change in
Japan. In March9 I87O 5 for instance, he described the
Japanese Governments plan to build its first railway
line^ nune enttpeprise trbs problematique dans ses rdsultats.”
Then in June 1870, he struck a different notes MLe Japon,*1
he declared, ,?est en voie de transformation* Contrairement
a ce qui se passe dans les autres pays d1Orient et particu-
librement en Chine, il se jette r£solument et avec ardeur
✓ 142dans les Idbes europeennes•" It Is significant that
this conclusion followed the first definite request by the
Meiji Government for a new military mission from France0
No doubt the conversations he had just had with Iwakura and
other leaders had given Outrey a new insight into Japanese
political realities, but the Meiji Government still had
some very important hurdles to cross, before it could be
said to have firmly established both its own power and its
modernising programme* Outrey1s conclusion, therefore,
was somewhat premature, and It Is hard to dismiss the
suspicion that his thinking on this subject was coloured
141* C *C*Y<§do .VI * March 15, 1870 * Outrey to Darn* See also 
C*P*Japon.XIX. Jan.20, I87O, Outrey to Auvergne-Lauraguais. 
The Qua! d’Orsay did not feel the same way* A pencilled 
comment on Outrey1s March dispatch readss ”11 est regrettable 
que 1TIndustrie francaise s!est trouvbe tout a fait btrangere 
d cette entreprise *,l The result was a cryptic instruction 
to renew his efforts to secure such a contract if the 
opportunity arose again* C .C „Y£do .VI. Aug* 259 1870* 
Auvergne-Lauraguais to Outrey.
142. C .P. Japon.XX. June 4, 1870 * Outrey to Daru*
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by the fact that France had been asked to play an important
part in Japan's transformation, He -was delighted that
French advisers had been chosen in preference to Prussian,
even though he was too experienced a diplomat to let the
Japanese Government be aware of this, and it was a further
satisfaction that the Meiji leaders held to their decision
in spite of the Franco-Prussian War, It would appear,
then9 that in the case of Outrey, French participation in
Japanese modernisation was motivated by a* desire for prestige
and influence and that his assessment of the political
situation was dependent on the extent of French participation
rather than vice-versa.
Whether the same was true of Turenne is uncertain.
Although he shared to the full Outrey1s desire to increase
French prestige by contributing to Japan's development, the
general tone of his dispatches suggests that he was in favour
14-4of Japanese progress whoever was responsible for it, ~ '
143. The first time that Outrey spoke of Japan's transformation 
in a tone which implied that it might prove permanent was 
after an official dinner given in him by Iwakura, Iwakura's 
language had convinced him5 he wrote, that this influential 
leader M se rend compte de la loyaute de notre politique et 
qu'il a fini par comprendre que n'avant aucunearriSre-pens6e, 
nous pouvons £tre un grand appui dans la vole des reformes 
dont il est un des principaux promoteurs•t Ibid,
144, See e,g, C«P,Japon.XXI• March 24,1872, Turenne to Rerausat;
1 ,*,durant ces derniers mois je n'ai neglige aucune occasion
de recommander notre code civil® a 1*adoption du gouvernement 
Japonais,*1 In a later dispatch he made some interesting 
observations on the Increase of French influence in Jaapan and 
the attitudes of the French and Japanese governments to it, 
endings 1 Aujourd1 hui qu'il sait que notre politique extirieure 
est une politique d1expectation, il se laisse aller plus 
librement h ses sentiments de sympathie a notre egard. Si eette
/continued.,, ,«
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It may be, in fact, that his genuine sympathy for the Meiji
Governments efforts was one of the reasons why the latter
was so ready to approach him with requests for help in a
145
variety of forms. Gratification at this renewal of
trust in France was undoubtedly one of the main reasons 
why Turenne, with Remusat’s approval, adopted a much more 
reasonable attitude on important political questions such 
as the Uragami Christians, the withdrawal of French troops, 
and even Treaty Revision* Indeed, the growing cordiality 
of relations between the two countries, during Turenne*s 
service in Japan was beginning to approach that of the 
years from 1864 to 1867, and,as in the Roches period, it
T /\ f
carried the promise of commercial advantage*
144. (continued)
observation est juste, notre rdle devient celui de Conseiller 
du Gouvernement Japonais. Rous ne saurions nous en plaindre.*1 
C.P.Japon.XXI. Sept* 25, 1872* Turenne to Remusat.
145* These requests concerned such matters as the provision 
of advisers, the reception of Japanese study missions in 
France, and the communication of French laws and regulations 
concerning public salubrity and police organization* It is 
significant that though the documents required in the latter 
instance were not only unpublished but also scattered among 
various sections, the Minister of the Interior was willing to 
make a special compilation for Japan*s purpose* See C.P.Japon. 
XXII. April 11, 1873* Remusat to Turenne.
146* Towards the end of Turennefs stay, he reported a 
conversation with Okuma, the Minister of Finance, in which the 
latter spoke 1 du desir qu’eprouvait le Gouvernement Japonais 
de se procurer en France pour une nouvelle ligne de chemin de 
fer un materiel complete *' This led the charge d’affaires to 
conclude that 1 nos grands etablissements m§tallurgiques, tout 
du meins me donne lieu de le penser, vont trouver par ce moyen 
au Japon un nouveau debouche, d*une importance r6elle pour 
1*ecoulement^de leurs produits.1* C .P.Japon.XXII„ March 17,1873. 
Turenne to Remusat. Turenne made it clear that he believed that 
Okuma*s feeler would have been impossible had not Franco-
/continued......
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With the coming of Berthemy in June 1873? this 
cordiality vanished® Whereas Turenne had 'welcomed every 
progressive move by the Mei^i Government, and had ■willingly 
accepted that France should play a full part in promoting 
change5 Berthemy showed nothing but distaste for the 
innovations that had been introduceds "Entreprise sans 
method©, sans etudes prealables, poursuivie avec une precipi™ 
tation fievreuse, cette transformation11, he immediately 
proclaimed, "est de nature a fair© naltre de serieuses 
apprehensions p*ur lfavenir du pays.11*^ '7 The reason for 
such condemnation transpired in his next dispatch, which 
discussed the problem of the Japanese attack on extra­
territoriality® In it, Berthemy lamented the# ^ pew cl9
146 (continued)
Japanese relations reached such a high point* Although he 
made no reference to Roches, It seems likely that his service 
under his outstanding predecessor had some influence on his 
policy* His success in Japan, however, was not appreciated 
by other Foreign Ministers. After subsequent appointments to 
Athens and the Holy See, In 1877 he was sent to Rio de Janeiro, 
having been promoted to Secretary, First class, at the by no 
means early age of 35• Tn Dec. 1878, his career temporarily 
came to a halt when he was retired, a victim, presumably, of 
the Republican triumph of 1877* He re-entered the service as 
Consul, First class, in 1884, but was still on the same rank 
ten years later, when his post was Budapest. Only in 1899 Hid 
he achieve the rank of Ministre. See the Annuaire Diplomatique 
et Consulsire•
147. C.P.Japon XXII. July 9? 1873* Berthemy to Broglie® This 
verdict seemed harsh even to Broglie, who was much less liberal 
than Remusat had been® Nevertheless, although he pointed out 
that "II est impossible de meconnaltre les progrds realises 
dans ces derni^res anndes,M he did nothing to limit Berthemy1s 
freedom of action and ensure continuity of policy* C*P.Japon. 
XXIII# Oct.17? 1873* Broglie to Berthemy.
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entente qui semble exister entre les Repr6sentants 
etrangers relativement a 1!attitude qu'il convient d1observer 
vis-a-vis du Gouvernement Japonais A 1Toccasion des questions 
nouvelle*s journellement soulev6es par lui. La plupart 
d1entre eux paraissent n1avoir d*autre objet en vue que 
d*obtenir pour leurs nationaux des places largement 
retribu4es; II en rgsulte une veritable rivalite et 
afin de faire triompher son candidat on se laisse parfois 
entrainer a des complaisances compromettantes *1 148
This situation was the more objectionable to him in
that he had been sent to Japan, after serving as Minister
in Peking and Washington,for the express purpose of
149securing Treaty Revision on Western terms® Without
the full co-operation of his fellow-diplomats his mission
would have no hope of success and his own prospects of
advancement would hardly be improved. For the first time,
therefore, since the early i8601s the French attitude to
Japanese modernisation, and with it French willingness to
participate in the process^were subordinated to what was
170considered a higher political Interest.
148. C.P.Japon. XXII. July 12, 1873* Berthemy to Broglie.
149o Bee Chapter VI.
170. Berthemy was even willing to see the end of the military 
mission. He urged Decazes to withdraw it, together with 
French personnel at Yokosuka, in the event of war breaking 
out between Japan and China over the Formosan expedition.
See C«P .Japon.XXIV. Sept .8, 1874. The Qua! dTOrsay, however, 
was not prepared to abandon sources of prestige which 
France already possessed and a telegram was sent instructing 
the mission to withdraw temporarily to a French ship for 
the duration of the conflict. O.P*Japon XXIV. Oct .30, 1874. 
Decazes to Berthemy. A dispatch of the same date spoke of 
w la prevoyance qui nous recommande de lie pas dSsorganiser, 
sauf necessity absolue. I1important 6tablissement d!instruc­
tion militaire que nous avons fond6 au Japon.1 Ibid.
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Berthemy1s hostility to the Meiji Government over its 
treaty revision policy seems to have affected his attitude 
towards Internal politics also. At any rate, he showed 
more sympathy for Soyejima and his allies after their 
defeat over Korean policy in October, 1873? than for the 
surviving members of the Government. This, however, had 
nothing to do with the liberal manifesto which the former 
group issued in January, 1874, calling for a parliament.
Indeed, Berthemy1s comment on the proposal was scathing;
1 Lf etablissement d’un gouvernement representatif, he 
wrote, ,!serait, je le era Ins, fatal au pays He
justified this contention by an analysis of the Japanese 
character s
"Les Japonais ont 1*esprit mobile, Impressionable, 
facile d entrainer dans une voie ou dans une autre; ils 
sont en mdme temps superficiels, aussi disposes a imiter 
que hors d*6tat de cr6er.. . .#Loin d!etre en 6tat de se 
gouverner eux-memes, Ils ont par consequent besoin, plus 
que d’autres, d*etre diriges et contenius«1 152
His preference for the opponents of the Okubo-Iwakura 
Government can only be explained by his belief that their 
manifesto was simply !une arme d1opposition* which would 
be forgotten if they came to p o w e r  an£ that In the
matter of Treaty Revision they would be more pliable than the 
existing leaders.
151® C.P.Japon.XXIV. Feb.10.1874. Berthemy to Decazes.
1520 C.P.Japon.XXIV. Feb.10.1874® Berthemy to Decazes.
153• Ibid. It is worth noting that Berthemy had been on fairly 
good terms with Soyejima, and had continued to discuss affairs 
with him after his resignation® He did maintain earlier that 
"le liberalism© relatif de Soyejima n*a pas ete Stranger a la 
chute de ce dernier,!1 but this referred more to his attitude 
towards Treaty Revision than internal politics.0.P.Japon.XXIII. 
Nov.9.1873•Berthemy to Broglie. ___
- 179 -
Berthemyfs views remained constant throughout his
stay in Japan. In January3 18755 in fact3 he even committed
the near-heresy of questioning whether the opening of Japan
154to the West had been to the former's advantage. y 6 His
successor? St. Quentin? was less decided in his opinions3
but he too showed little liking for the changes taking
place3 especially^ those not Introduced and controlled by
the Government. His approval of the 1876 law3 which
curbed the freedom of the vigorous new press3 revealed
that he would continue what was becoming almost a French
tradition of antipathy towards any threat to authoritarian 
155rule? and he was quick to point out that the publication 
of more liberal laws had been followed by an apparent 
increase in c r i m e . U n l i k e  Berthemy3 however9 he did 
not lack concern for the prestige that France derived from 
the military mission and the French personnel at Yokosuka3 
and much of his time was taken up in urging the Meiji 
Government to maintain them.
154. See C «P.Japon.XXV. Jan.4.1875. Berthemy to Decazes.
155* St. Quentin commented that the newspapers’ advocacy of 
assassination9 atheism3 and complete democracy was such as 
to 1 fa ire douter de la bonne influence de la civilisation 
Europ&enne sur ce pays." C.P.Japon.XXV. Sept*5.1 8 7 6. St. 
Quentin to Decazes.
156. C.P.Japon.XXV. Aug.15? 1 8 7 6. St.Quentin to Decazes.
- 180
Sto Quentin left Japan in May? 1877* His successor? 
Geofjby? who had earlier served as Minister in China also 
showed some disposition at first to condemn Japan for her 
haste in adopting new ideas• In reporting the death of 
Saigo Takamori? he praised him for wishing to lfrevenir 
en arriere? ou, tout au moins? enrayer le mouvement 
inconsidere de reformes dans lequel le Japon est jet§#
IMidee etait juste si les moyens employes n*£taient pas 
corrects? et il eftt rendu un grand service a son pays en
1 <n
essayant de la realiser d'une fagon plus reguliereJ1 v f
By I8785 however5 closer acquaintance with Japan had
led Geofroy to modify his views« In August? he admitted
that many reforms had proved useful and only criticised the
158Japanese for not going far enough* His comment on
Okubo9 when this dominant figure was assassinated by the 
admirers of Saigo? was even more favourable than his obituary 
of Saigo himself; J'L'histoire de sa vie est liee a celle 
de l’etonnante reforme qui a transforme le Japon?11 he wrote?
157® CoP*Japon* XXVIc Oct* 6 ? 1877• Geofroy to Decazes. 
About the Satsuma Rebellion itself Geofroy had little to 
say? but in this he was typical of most French ministers? 
who did not conceive it as part of their task? once order 
had been established? to report on Japanese politics in 
detail *
1588 C«P,Japon* XXVI* Aug* 11? 1 8 7 8. Geofroy to Waddington* 
He was perceptive enough to realise the importance of the 
family system and claimed that “Tant qu’ils n’auront pas 
regie ce point fondamental on peut tenir leur oeuvre pour 
superficielle et precaireo1
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characterising him as 1 le promoteur eclaire de la civil­
isation Europe ei£e dans son pays • it is not without
interest that in his second year as Minister, Geofroy questioned 
the French stand on Treaty Revision and co-operated with 
Japan in Korean affairs to an extent which would have 
horrified Berthemy or St, Quentin.
It did horrify Geofroy1s successor, Balloy, who was 
swift to dissociate France from Japanese foreign policy,
160Ba3.1oy!s impressions of Japan were entirely unfavourable.
In the harshness of his criticism, though not in the depth 
of his judgement^he exceeded even Berthemy. His first 
dispatch declared that good relations would be difficult 
because aLes Japonais sont la vanite meme? et voient partout 
des atteintes portees a leur droit de Souverainte•
His attacks generally centred on the Meiji Government whose 
squeezing of the peasantry and patronage of commercial 
projects he blamed for its own financial difficulties and 
for the general sluggishness of trade. In one dispatch 
in 1880 the industrial programme of the Meiji leaders came 
under severe censure;
159. C.P.Japon.XXVI. May 19, 1878. Geofroy to Waddington.
160. He had already been in Japan for over a year before 
he became charg6 d*affaires in Feb. 1879? and had three 
years1 experience in China, from I87I to 1874.
161. C.P.Japon.XXVII. March 12, 1879- Balloy to Waddington.
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,f Ils lie savaient pas o& ils menaient le pays 9 mais 
ils esperaient que l'aventure leur rapporterait honneurs 
et profits. Sous ce rapport, ils ne se sont pas trompes...*- 
C!est grace d leur avidite que le Japon est convert aujourd 
!hui de toutes ces associations qui ont pour but de monopoliser 
telle ou telle branche de commerce ou d1Industrie et qui 
present si lourdement sur la prosperity generate o'1 162
He saw only one remedy - stern retrenchment - which
he wrongly believed to be beyond Japanese capability.
He concluded therefores ft je crois pouvoir pr^dire que le
Japon marche sfrrement a l!anarchie? peut-etre meme au
d&nembrement, cela d6pendra de lfetat des principales
Puissances Etrangeres, 1'Amerique y comprise, au moment
critique.1
The Meiji Governments industrial programme was not 
the only aspect of Japanese political life with which Balloy 
found fault. His criticisms of the workings of Japanese 
justice were fi/erce, and the fact that changes had been
in boiSsoWe's Work 1 ^ 4
madeAgave him an excuse for greeting it extremely coldly.
Yet for all his dislike of the existing Government, Balloy 
never wavered from the anti-liberal attitude of previous 
French Ministers. His comment in February, 1880, on the 
agitation for a democratic Government, provides a good
162. C.P.Japon .XXVII. Hov.12,1880a Balloy to Barthelemy St.
Hilaire«
1 6 3. C .P .Japon .XXVII. Hov .12.1880 . Balloy to Burthyieuiy St. 
Hilaire. Balloy was so impressed by the seriousness of the 
financial crisis that, when in September he heard rumours 
that a loan was to be sought in Europe, he wrotes “Si vous 
appreniez, M. le Ministre, que le Gouvernement Japonais est 
en pourparlers avec une maison de Banque Francaise, il serait 
prudent de la prdmunir contre les dangers que courraient ses 
capitaux." C.P.Japon.XXVIII.Sept.14.1880. Balloy to Freycinet.
164. See C.P.Japon.XXVII. Aug.5.1880. Balloy to Freycinet. His
successor Roquette was much more fair-minded. After a
/continued).....
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illustration of this s 1 je n1 envisagerais pas sans
apprehension au point de vue des relations Internationales
de ce pays avec les Puissances Etrangeafs 1’ inauguration
d’un system© de Gouvernement qui aurait forcement pour
effet de diminuer, sinon de detruire, le principe d1autorite
r ep r e s ent e par 1e K ikado." ^ ^^
Balloy left Japan in December, 1880• Bone of his
successors was quite so vehement as he, though Tricon,
who was Minister from mid-1882 to mid-1883? came fairly
near, at least until the rapprochement brought about by
France’s difficulties with China* Up till then he was
decidedly anti-Japanese, and his resentment at what he
considered Japan's presumptious treaty revision proposals
in 1882 led him to assert that "les dignitaires qui ont
fait la revolution de 1868 ne cherchent a nous emprunter
nos instruments de civilisation que dans I’espoir de
pouvoir s'en servir un jour contre la civilisation et 
l88contre nous*” This warning had not been voiced
since the time of Duchesne de Beliecourt* and to some 
extent this fact indicates how little serious attention was 
paid to Japan by France in the early years after the 
Restoration*
164. (continued*)
scrupulous examination of the codes he admitted that the 
only objection France could have concerned the quality and 
experience of the Japanese judges* C.P.Japon.XXVIII. July 29? 
1881* Roquette to Bar'thelemy St, Hilaire.
1650 C.P.Japon.XXVII. Feb*8*1880* Balloy to Freycinet.
166* C.P.JaponoXXVIII. July 19?1882* Tricou to Freycinet.
In conclusion, it must be observed that the on-the-spot 
reaction to Japanese progress of French representatives in 
Tokyo was much less favourable than that of Europe* This 
was remarked upon by Balloy in 1880* 1 Ce que je ne
m'explique pas,'1 he put it, w c'est comment le Japon a pu 
nous jeter assez de poudre aux yeux pour nous faire croire 
en Europe qu'en adoptant nos moeurs et notre civilisation
167il allait §tre notre Champion, notre avant-garde en AsieJ’ 
Whatever the reasons for Europe's encouragement may have 
been, the pertinent question here is how to account for.the 
highly unsympathetic attitude of many of the French 
representatives* A reading of the French archives suggests 
that four factors were involved. One which was of lesser 
importance than the others may have well been the difficult 
conditions under which diplomats worked at this time.
This seems to have induced a somewhat jaundiced view* 
Secondly, there was the fact that Japan was in such a 
hurry to make herself respectable that many of her reforms 
appeared ill-considered and gave offence to those whose 
country was taken as the model. Nor could diplomats be 
expected to approve when reforms were guided by nationals 
of other Powers* More important than these considerations^ 
was the resentment, which was felt particularly strongly 
by Berthemy and Balloy, at the use Japan was making of 
Western methods and techniques. If Japan succeeded in
167* G.P*Japon.XXVII. Nov.12.1880. Balloy to Barthelemy
St.Hilaire.
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raising herself to the level of the Western Powers, abandon­
ment of the cherished belief In Western uniqueness and 
inherent superiority would become an unpleasant necessity.
These three factors, alone, however, can scarcely account 
for the bitterness of some of the attacks that have been 
cited. One must recall, in addition, that for most of 
this period, and especially during the later years, Japan 
was seeking to revise the Treaties* The Powers would have 
liked to refuse Japanese demands from the strong moral 
position that Japanese backwardness made the abandonment of 
extraterritoriality impossible and unreasonable® The fact 
that Japan actually was imitating the West made this argument^ 
though still employed, much less satisfactory, and in any 
case it could obviously not be used forever. Gradually, 
the representatives were compelled to have recourse to a 
legalistic defence of their privileges, out of keeping with 
19th century ways of thought. Though they tried to forget 
moral considerations, they could not hide from themselves 
the fact that the Japanese did see the question in these 
terms, and their unconscious resentment at being unable to 
cloak their countries1 material interests with the justification 
that Japan refused to abandon her old ways, may be inferred 
by their indignation at what were not, in fact, unnatural 
demands on the part of the Japanese. Tricou’s dispatch 
of July 19, 1882 is a good example of this. 1 Je ne 
presumais pas assez de I1ambition, mais trop de la discretion
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Japonaise. La cour de Tokio ddvoile enfin ses vis6es
] 68
sans ambages et dans leur etendue• Elle jette le masque .**
This extravagant language -was prompted by nothing more
than the announcement by the Japanese Government that it
wanted new treaties which might be terminated, rather than
a mere revision of the old ones. Similarly he described
a Japanese plan to achieve autonomy by separating the
commercial from the jurisdictional aspects of the treaty
as 1 un raisonnement pubril sans doute, mais d’autant plus
,169
Oaponais qu’il est pudrilo"' This resort to insult 
can surely be explained only by the unconscious resentment 
which ministers felt at being forced onjbo ground which 
their consciences found uncomfortable. It is ironic that 
after so many exhortations to modernise from well-meaning 
foreigners in the l8 6 0's, it should happen that in 1880 
Inoue could complain bitterly to Roquette of the scant 
encouragement given by the Powers to Japan in her attempts 
to transform her civilisation.**"^
168. C .P.Japon.XXVIII. July 19,1882. Tricou to Freycinet.
1 6 9. C.P.Japon.XXVIII. July 1 5 ,1 8 8 3. Tricou to Challeiwiel- 
Lacour. Tricou1s first dispatch, a month before, had referred 
to the !vanit6 enfantine* of the Japanese. C.P.Japon.XXVIII. 
June 1 6 ,1 8 8 2.




FRANCE AND THE EMERGENCE OF JAPANESE FOREIGN POLICY, 1870-181
(a) France and the First Steps in Japanese Diplomacy.
By 1873 the power of the Meiji Government was firmly 
established, and despite the challenge from samurai and 
peasant discontent which it had to face in the next few 
years it was never again in a position where its existence 
could be threatened by any manifestation of hostility on the 
part of the Powers. The chief interest In Franco-Japanese 
relations from this time on, therefore, concerns Japanese 
foreign policy, firstly the influence. If any, which French 
diplomacy had on Its early development, and secondly, and 
more important, the attitude of Japan towards the Franco- 
Chinese dispute of 1883-5 * The first of these questions 
can best be approached by considering the French position on 
the Korea and Ryukyu' problems, but before this, mention must 
be made of a lesser issue which particularly concerned 
France and which introduced Japan to international politics 
for the first time.
(i) The Franco-Prussian War and Japanese Neutrality
The outbreak of war between France and Prussia in 
July,1870, presented the young Meiji Government with the 
opportunity of proclaiming her sovereignty to the world 
and strengthening her position In international law.
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Her experience was not entirely reassuring, however, for 
the Franco-Prussian War also revealed in an unmistakeahle 
manner Japan1s weakness and vulnerability, and doubtless 
made more urgent the resolve of the Meiji leaders to achieve 
the speedy erection of a strong state.
The question of neutrality was first raised by the
Prussian Minister, von Brandt, on Aug. 18, 18 70. Since
the Japanese Government was not unwilling, and Outrey also
favoured the idea at this date, a provisional unofficial
neutrality was agreed upon. In justification of his
decision, Outrey pointed to 111* importance extreme qu1!! y
a a montrer aux Chino Is, comme aux Japonais, que, meme en
etat de guerre>les Puissances Europeennes seront toujours
pretes a unir leur action pour proteger les Interets Europeens
1dans ces deux pays
This happy state of agreement did not survive for 
long. On August 24, the Japanese Government proceeded to 
publish on Its own initiative a proclamation of neutrality 
based on an interpretation of Japan1s rights as a neutral 
which 'was much too broad for the French Minister. Growing 
awareness of the gravity of the situation in Europe, 
together with the appearance on the scene of Admiral Dupre,,
H  C 0P o Japon.XX. Aug•2 2.187O . Outrey to Gramont. It should 
be added that the murder of the French consul and others at 
Tientsin In June was still very fresh In the mind of 
Europeans and that French naval strength in Japanese waters 
was temporarily weaker than the German.
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whose frigate, corvette and gun-boat reestablished French 
naval superiority over the Prussian frigate and corvette in 
the Japan Seas^made Outrey anxious that France1s freedom 
of action should be restricted as little as possible.
He therefore^ objected in the strongest terms to the 
Japanese neutrality regulations, and with the collaboration 
of von Brandt and Sawa, the Japanese Foreign Minister, a 
revised set was drawn up whereby the only significant 
limitations on French action were a prohibition on the 
seizure of German ships of any kind within seven miles of# 
the Japanese coast and an obligation to let 24 hours pass 
before pursuing German warships leaving harbour. It now 
became possible for France to prevent trading activity 
by the twenty German merchant ships which normally
p
visited Japan.
It did not take von Brandt long to realise this might 
very well happen if France1s position In Europe became 
desperate. In the method by which he attempted to retrieve
the situation, however, he made a big miscalculation.
Instead of consulting with his French colleague as before,
he presented him with a fait accompli which turned the
2. See C.P.Japon.XX.Sept.30.1870. Outrey to Auvergne- 
Lauraguais., Outrey claimed that the first regulations Included 
some articles which were contrary to the Treaties. Von Brandt’s 
willingness to accept the changes of Sept.22. is difficult to 
explain. His memoirs refer to the neutrality, question only in 
the most general terms of the need for 'European solidarity.
See Movon Brandt, Dreiunddreissig Jahre in Qst-Asien. 3 vols. 
(Leipzig, 1901) vol.II. p.288-291.It seems most likely that 
at the time of the Sept. agreement the Prussian Minister still
/continued......
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question into one of prestige and thus ended all possibility 
of friendly agreement. By exerting pressure on the Japanese 
Government he induced it to issue, on Oct. 12, additional 
regulations which gave 24 hours' start to merchantmen as 
well as to warships, and, as had the original proclamation, 
prohibited hostilities In the Inland Sea. Outrey*s 
reaction was to reject outright any alteration In what 
he claimed was a tripartite international agreement which 
could not be changed except with the consent of all the 
parties involved. His argument found favour with most of 
his colleagues and on October 16, the Japanese Government 
officially withdrew the additional articles.4
Though Outrey displayed considerable skill in his 
handling of this question, the basis of his diplomatic 
victory lay In French naval strength. It was in Japan1s 
interest to' accept the German version of neutrality, but 
with no navy of her own to speak of, she would have invited 
humiliation had she attempted to implament the October 12th
2. (continued)......
had no reason to suspect that the French might change their 
attitude on the desirability of allowing trade to continue 
freely. This is roughly the view expressed by Parkes in F.0.46 
CXXVII.No d55 ® Oct. 22,1870. Parkes to GranvI3.1e.
3 . See G.P.Japon.XX. Oct.15,1870. Outrey to Favre. Also 
F*0.46o CXXVII. Oct.15,1870. Parkes to Hammond (Private).
4. See C .P.Japon.XX. Oct.2 8,1870. Outrey to Favre.
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regulations in the face of Outrey1s refusal to admit 
their validity. France was thus able to paralyse German 
shipping and gain some local prestige by the refusal of the 
German warships to meet the French challenge. Von Brandt 
himself refused to accept the Japanese renunciation of the 
October agreement, and strove continually to impose his 
view by making threats about an indemnity, though In the 
end no such demand was made. The significance of this 
episode for Japan was obvious. It warned her of the 
twofold need for increased military strength and diplomatic 
caution. The domestic and foreign policies of the Meiji 
leaders in the next twenty years showed that they had 
learned the lesson well.
(ii) France and Sino-Japanese Relations
Of greater importance than the difficulties arising 
out of the Franco-Prussian War was the question of the 
French attitude to Japan1s relations with China, which, 
next to Treaty Revision, was the main preoccupation of 
Japanese diplomacy in the first half of the Meiji era.
Sino-Japanese relations centred around the twin problems 
of Korea and the Ryukyus, and since both these areas were 
vulnerable to Western naval strength, the Powers were In a
5« See Ilanabusa Nagamichin Meiji Gaiko-shi (Diplomatic 
History of the Meiji Period;, Tokyo, 1960. p'. 18.
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position to exert a very important influence on the
policies of the two Far Eastern states towards them.
Both problems might have been expected to attract
the attention® of France. She had, in 1855, signed a
treaty with the Ryukyu authorities, and French missionaries
6had resided there. More important, the islands occupied
a strategic position as possible coaling stations.
Despite these considerations, however, France showed
virtually no interest in the area. The main reason for
this would appear to be that she never questioned Japan's
right to the islands. When Satsuma had participated in
the Paris Exhibition of 1867, the daimvo had been recognized
as King of the Ryukyus$ and when the islands were forced
to accept a centrally appointed governor in 1872, the reaction
of Turenne implied that this was purely an internal measure
which the Japanese Government had an indisputable right to 
7
take. The Japanese action did not, at this stage,
seem likely to be a cause of dispute with China, and no 
more thought was paid to the area for some years. When the 
murder of some Ryukyuan sailors by Formosan aborigines 
provided the pretext for an expedition to Formosa under 
Saigo Tsugumichi in 1874-, there was no suggestion by
6. The treaty was never ratified and the presence of 
missionaries had ended in the 1850's, however. See Cordier, 
Les Francais aux lies Lieou-Kieou. (Paris 1911).
7° See C oP .Japon .JCXI. Oct. 16,1872. Turenne to Remusat.
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Berthemy that Japan was r not within her legal rights.
Politically, too, Prance had reason to favour Japanese 
control 01 the Rypkyus. Though it was never explicitly- 
stated, the islands were more likely to escape German 
attentions under the firm hand of the Meiji Government 
than under the uistant control o€ China,
she Formosa expedition also gave rise to some 
interesting observations on European relations with 
China and Japan which throw some light, on one of the factors 
unu.erj.ying French inactivity, in June I8 7I, Iwakura sought 
.0erthemy1 s o 0inion on the ex pedition, ancl a 1 1liough the 
French Minister counselled him to withdraw cue Japanese 
troops as soon as they had chastised the natives lest 
Japan find herself at war with china, Iiis report to the 
p,iai d!Orsay suggests tnat he would not have been sorry 
to see his advice disregarded, observing that:
1f0n m ’ecrit de P'ekin que si le Japon echoue dans son 
cntreprise, 1 1©rgueil des chinois ne connaitra plus de 
bornes et deviendm intolerable, 11 he continued:n0r, il 
en sera exact erne nt ,'.e mese 5. Yedo, si le succes couronne 
1* expedition de Fornose. bn presence de cette situation 
je ne vois pas dfautrsparti a prendre que laisser les 
evenements suivre leur cours, thutt en les surveillant isx 
et en se reserv. nt d'intervenih diplimatiquement lorsquc les 
ciroonstances permettront de le faire avec utilite, Il 
importe, du reste, de ne pas perdre de vue qu* une guerre 
entre laChine et la Japon, suffisamment prolongee pour 
afi&iblir les deux adversaires et arretee avant que 1 1un ou 
l fautre soit fonde a s'attribuer la victoire, peut egargner
8 .) This concern about German expansion Waj seated explicitly regardxu 
Formosa. Berthemy reported to the quai that he was less opposed to the 
Formosa expedition than his colleagues, because he felt tnat it would 
either reav/axen China’s interest in Formosa or leave Japan in control, 
and in either case there was less chance of .,n incident occuring whici: 
could give Germany an excuse for seizing the island. C.P,Japon, XXIV 
May 22, I8 7A. berthemy to jecazes.
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aux Puissances maritimes la necessite d*entreprendre 
dans un avenir plus ou moins rapproache de couteuses 
expeditions 9 afin de conserver dans lfextreme orient une 
situation qu!il devient chaque jour plus difficile, a 
Pekin comme a Yedo, de maintenir intacte.1 9
Not all French diplomats were as Machiavellian as 
Berthemyj and in general the French attitude was more 
sympathetic to Japan9 or perhaps one should say more
10hostile to China 9 than would appear from this dispatch. 
Nevertheless? it was representative in that, underneath 
the wishful thinking about intervention it did reflect, 
more or less faithfully, the negative character of French 
thinking on Far Eastern questions. The basic rule of 
French diplomacy was still to avoid entanglements outside 
Europe.
The Formosa Expedition had largely been conceived 
by the Meiji Government as an outlet for samurai frustration 
It was, however, very much a second best. The first hope 
of both the restless samurai who had lost their social 
function and their han loyalties, and some leaders who saw 
the problem of national defence in the purely military terms 
of a previous age, was the conquest of Korea, In 1873? 
while Iwakura, Ckubo, and many of the young modernisers
9, C.P.Japon.XXIV. June 30? 1874, Berthemy to Decazes.
10, Bee e.g. Decazes1 reply, in which while accepting
Berthemy1s general conclusions he held that the danger to 
Western interests would be greater if China defeated Japan 
than vice-versa. C.P.Japon. XXIV. Aug. 27, 1874.
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were still abroad, the advocates of a Korean expedition
had come to comprise a majority of the Government, and
when the Iwakura mission returned, It was only after a
bitter struggle between Okubo, Iwakura and KIdo on the
one side, and Saigo, Itagaki, Soyejima and Eto on the
other, that Japan was brought back to a policy of inward
strengthening first.
For some time, certainly, an expedition appeared
likely, and since the Foreign Representatives knew of
11this through Soyejima, it might have been expected
that the possibility of war would have stimulated the
powers to give the problem of Korea, and especially
Japan1s ambitions there, serious consideration.
It might certainly have been expected that France
would do so. Not only did she have persecuted
12missionaries in Korea but their persecution had previously 
led to the first serious incursion Into the !Hermit 
Kingdom1 by any Western Power. The French expedition of 
1866, however, had proved a complete failure, and Frenchmen 
had since done their best to forget about It. Nevertheless,
11. Soyejima was extraordinarily frank In his discussions 
both before and after his resignation. See especially
the reports by Parkes in F.O.46.CLXVII. No.62. Aug.18, 1873, 
and F.O * 4-6. CLXVIII. No.91- Nov. 3, 1873- Parkes to 
Granville.
12. Their case was presented the following year by Charles 
Dallet. Histoire de INEgllse de H Coree, 2 vols. (Paris 1874)
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missionary persecution continued to be severe and France 
might well have seen in Japan1s plans an opportunity of 
securing religious concessions, even If Korea’s poverty 
was too well known for there to be any great hopes of 
trade.
Any expectation by missionaries that this would be 
so were doomed to disappointment® Not only did the Seikan 
Hon fail to prompt any reconsideration of French policy 
towards Korea, but the whole question was regarded by 
Berthemy as no more than a side-issue in comparison with 
his treaty revision negotiations, and he did not even 
bother to demonstrate the weaknesss of the Japanese plan.
The sketchy information which he passed on was hardly of 
a nature to interest a Quai d’Orsay which was obsessed 
with European Issues at this time4 Korea
had always been the province of the French Minister in 
China rather than Japan.
Though the Meiji Government decided against invasion 
in 1873? it continued to seek the opening of Korea and; 
by a show of force, occasioned by an attack 011 a Japanese 
surveying party, a treaty was secured In 1876 which made 
a first breach In Korea’s stubbornly-held Isolation policy. 
To St. Quentin, however, the treaty seemed of little 
importance. He showed scarcely any interest in the 
advantages that might result and none at all in its possible 
International repercussions. His main reaction was a
negative one. The treaty would be welcome ns!il 
n!etait malheureusement a craind.re que ce succes n!augmente 
encore 1'orgueil du Japon de maniere a rendre de plus 
en plus difficiles, sinon precaires, les relations avec
1*5
ce pays.1  ^ The Quai d’Orsay did not even consider
the matter worthy of comment.
About 1878-9? the era of cautious conservatism in
French foreign policy began to wane, and this trend was
evident in the Far East too, more particularly in Xndo-
China, but also to a certain extent in Korea. In April
I8789 Geofroy9 the French Minister in Tokyo, began to
interest himself in the fate of the missionaries in the
still little-known peninsula*. Having failed to secure
the co-operation of the French navy,'3'4’ he was about to
take the unprecedented step of asking the Japanese
Government to intervene when Terashima spontaneously
offered his good offices and sent a letter urging the
19Korean Government to release the missionaries. y The 
Japanese intervention does not appear to have been 
successfnljbut it was a gesture which helped pave the 
way for something of an entente between Geofroy and the 
Japanese Government. Japan1s policy towards Korea was
13* C.P.Japon.XXV. March 11, 1876. St. Quentin to Decades.
14. See G.P.Japon.XXVI. April 29? I878. Geofroy to Waddington 
15• See C.P.Japon.XXVI. May 28, I878. Geofroy to Waddington.
now one of preventing Russian encroachment by opening
her to the world generally, and since this seemed to
Geofroy to be in France’s real interests also, he
assured Iwakura of his support in December 1878, and at
the same time urged his Government to consider co-operating
16with Japan and other interested powers*
Owing to the vagaries of French diplomatic appointments
this harmony of views between France and Japan soon
disappeared. Geofroy returned home on leave early in
1879? and his successor, Balloy, who had previously served
as First Secretary, enunciated at once an entirely opposite
view of the Korean situation* To support Japan’s efforts
to open Korea, he claimed, would be to appear to put
themselves at Japan’s beck-and-call, and her pretentions
would become intolerable. France should, therefore,
17appear to lose interest in the question. Despite his
lower rank, the cautious Quai d’Orsay preferred his analysis
to G-eofroy’s and a further overture by Inoue, the new
18Foreign Minister,was treated with extreme reserve.
By 1880, the possibility of co-operation seemed to have 
departed. It is impossible to assess the importance of
16. See C.P.Japon.XXVI. Dec.l.1878. Ibid. Dec.17,1868. 
Geofroy to Waddington. On Japanese policy, see H.Conroy,
The Japanese Seizure of Korean (Philadelphia i960) pp.84-101.
A
17. See C *P .Japon.XXVII. April 9? 1879* Bal3.oy to Waddington
18. Balloy’s dispatch was approved by Waddington on May 18, 
1879? (C.?.Japon.XXVII). Inoue*s approach was reported in 
C.P. Japon .XXVII. Nov.19*1879. Balloy to Waddington.
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the change in French attitudes, Japan continued to
favour the establishment of the Western Powers in Korea,
on the diplomatic level, as the most effective means of
neutralising this vital area, and the withdrawal of the
French promise of co-operation, though a disappointment,
did not mean that the Powers had decided not to seek treaties
On the other ha^ d, the French decision may have contributed
to the delay in securing them and it was during this
interval that China began to reassert her suzerainty over
the states on her periphery. It is arguable, therefore,
that the French failure to link her efforts with those
of Japan allowed Korea to fall back into the Chinese orbit,
thus making eventual conflict between the two Far Eastern
powers inevitable*
Before Geofroy1s departure the other Sino-Japanese
problem had unexpectedly emerged again. It had seemed
to be solved when the diplomatic settlement of the Formosa
Expedition had implicitly accepted Japanese sovereignty
over the islands. However, the situation had become
uncertain again in 1876, when the Ryukyus, having resumed
the tradition of sending a tributary mission to Peking in
the previous year, sought Chinese support in a struggle
19against W  modernisation by the Meiji Government. '
When China proved unable to help because of her preoccupation
19. See Hanabusa, op.cit* p.31*
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with her dispute with Russia over her Central Asian 
frontiers, the Ryukyuans turned towards the representatives 
of the Western Powers with whom treaties had been signed*
The reaction of G-eofroy to their envoys was privately 
sympathetic, but officially discouraging.20 He reasoned 
that if the Ryukyus ceased to be Japanese, they would 
come under Chinese rule, ands 1 Si I1 ascendant de l*une 
ou de 1*autre des deux Puissances devait etre favorisd 
par nous, ce serait plutot, ce me semble, celui du Japon 
sur qui nous avons moralement et materiellement plus de
pi
prise.1 “ This was by no means the end of the problem
for China proceeded to reassert her traditional claims
in 1881, and there were strong rumours in I883 that she
intended to resort to force, even though Japan had offered
PPto hand over to her the southern islands. China1s 
new attitude, and her increased military preparations 
did make a certain difference to the French position in 
that Roquette felt that Japan might be advised to give up
20. See C*P.Japon.XXVI. Dec. 2, 1878. Geofroy to
Bouree. (Head of the Oriental Department at the Quai d'Orsay).
21. C*P.Japon.XXVI• Nov.18, 1878. Geofroy to Wadding Id  n.
22. Japan1s offer was conditional on China conceding to 
her most-favoured-nation rights. See Hanabusa, op.cit.
p • 3 2 •
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22the Ryukyus entirely rather than risk war, hut his 
views clearly had no influence on Japanese policy.
France*s official attitude remained one of absolute reserve, 
which concealed5 as Geofroy*s comment showed, a partiality 
for Japan.
p A
On this matter5 as on Korea there could be no real 
change in basic attitude, only in tactics. France*s own 
difficulties over her Annam protectorate meant that 
there could be no question of her siding with China.
As Iricou, a later French Minister, wrote in 1882s nLes 
pretentions de suzerain^e de la Cour de Pdkin, pretentions 
qui se manifestent actuellement dans toutes les directions,
23. See G.P.Japon.XXVIII. Oct.12,1881. Roquette to Barthfelem;
St. Hilaire.
24. Balloy did not object to the opening of Korea, but 
thought it should be done by means of a joint naval 
demonstration by the Western Powers, excluding Russia, 
which he suspected of harbouring designs of domination.
Bee C.P.Japon. XXVII. Oct. 7, 1880. Balloy to Barthelemy 
St. Hilaire. In April 1881 the Foreign Minister expressed 
exactly the traditional French attitude, when he emphasised 
that 1 nous devons aussi nous appliquer a ne pas rester en 
arridre et & profiter des avantages qui seront acquis aux 
autres Puissances dans ces parages,1 but at the same time 
warned that they should have no thought of 1 nous associer
d aucune action exlusive, ni de prendre seuls ou avec 
une autre puissance une attitude prononcee qui risquerait 
de nous entrainer soit dans des difficulty en extreme 
Orient soit dans des rivalites avec certains Cabinets 
Europdens .1 C .p .Japon .XXVIII. April 15, 1881.
Barthelemy Bt. Hilaire to Roquette.
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me paraissent devoir tenir notre vigilance en 6veil,
surtout du cote de l’Annam* J!estime pour ma part qu*en
these generate9 nous avons interet a les ddcourager
25partout et en toute occasion.” ' Nevertheless, for all 
France1s latent sympathy “with Japan1s aims, her desire 
not to increase her difficulties in Indo-China by arousing 
Chinese suspicion and hostility, together -with her 
traditional caution, and the personal inclination of 
her representatives in Tokyo, deterred her from supporting 
Japan openly.
Thus, the influence France exerted on Japanese 
foreign policy remained slight even though in Far Eastern 
politics the two countries had much in common. It would 
probably not be too much to say that France neglected? 
during the first decade and a half of the Meiji era, the 
opportunity to build up a position of goodwill and trust 
that might well have been useful later.
(b) French Policy towards Japan during the Fr
Dispute. 188V 5.
The years 1883-5 form the most interesting period 
in Franco-Japanese relations during the Meiji era, and 
might have proved of great significance for both French 
and Japanese policy. Their importance derives from the 
fact that during this time the possibility of alliance.
25. C.P.Japon.XXVIII. Oct.16,1882. Tricou to Ducler%.
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or entente5 between France and Japan entered into the 
calculations of both countries* In the end, this 
episode left no lasting imprint on Franco-Japanese 
relations? and thus its significance lies mainly in the 
light it throws upon the character of Japanese foreign 
policy in the i860's and in the perspective it lends to 
the Anglo-Japanese alliance of 1902* Because they were 
inconclusive, and perhaps also because neither party was 
really certain what the others true position was, the 
diplomatic manoeuvres and evasions which took place have 
remained unstudied and, indeed, almost unknown. Neverthe­
less, despite the failure of an alliance to emerge, it 
would be unwise to assume that an agreement was impossible.
In the Far Eastern situation of the early 1880’s
co-operation between France and Japan held out the promise
of considerable advantages for both countries. The point
which stands out most obviously at this period is China’s
struggle to maintain her territorial integrity and her
traditional claim to suzerainty over the countries
26bordering her frontiers. This claim to suzerainty was 
one which affected France and Japan more than any of the
26. ”On the heels of the military reconpuest of 
Chinese Turkestan.....(China) launched a gigantic political 
and diplomatic offensive aimed at restoring her dwindling 
or dormant prestige and influence In Tonkin*Annam, Burma, 
Tibet, Korea, and Manchuria.” A, Malozemoff. Russian 
Far Eastern Policy. 1881-1904. Berkeley, 1958. p.20.
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other Powers with Far Eastern Interests. It was, in
fact, the issue that sparked off the Franco-Chinese
Dispute, which first awakened in the French Government
an awareness of Japan as a military power. Since the
late 1870's France had been concerned to prevent the
treaty which she had imposed on Annam in 1874 - a treaty
which gave her a virtual protectorate over the latter1s
27external relations - from becoming a dead letter," but
not until Jules Feriy formed his second Cabinet in 1883
was there any Premier willing to act effectively. Like
most other Frenchmen, he could not free himself from the
illusion that China, despite her traditional position,
would not resist France's attempt to extend a protectorate
over both Annam and Tongking. Instead he found stiff
opposition from Chinese Irregular troops, and a conflict
began which eventually escalated Into war on a much
broader front, extending to Formosa and the Chinese 
28coast.
As has been seen, Japan too was in dispute with China
over the letter's claims to suzerainty, and the hope that
they would be weakened or undermined led her to take an
29exceptional Interest in France's actions. y This hope
27. For a detailed study of the origins of the Franco- 
Chinese Dispute, see B.L..Evans. The Attitudes and Policies 
of Gt.Britain and China toward French Expansion in 0o"chin­
ch ina . Cambodia . Annanuand Tongking „ lBp^BTT^Ph. D . thesis— "T   T— "   I'—n—r-n 1- 1 i— m ‘ ri rrrvw m rin mmm g—rirr i~-ir~r|tr.i rwiir ' nir.Miniiiriirw fn rtriii mu ■     nnwWTiwunn in iiwiriMiTTmr ifW
University of London, 1961.
28. The details of the war and the various negotiations 
that were carried on are treated clearly in T.F.Power,
Jules Ferry and the Renaissance of French Imperialism..
New York, 1944.
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applied less perhaps to Korea, -where the issues were complex, 
than to the Ryukyus. The latter were in Japanese 
possession, but the Meiji Government was in some 
apprehension lest Li Hung-Chang should invoke the long 
history of tribute missions from the ruler of the 
Ryukyus to reassert China*s claims. Korea, on the
other hand, if not exactly under direct Chinese rule, 
was an area in which Chinese influence had been fairly 
actively exercised, and Japan had made little advance 
towards establishing either her own control over the 
peninsula or even a position equal to that of China.
This situation was, perhaps, less disturbing than a power 
vacuum into which Russia might enter,but for many Japanese, 
whether motivated by concern about China*s ultimate ability 
to keep Korea out of Russia*s hands, by a desire to 
introduce the 1 hermit kingdom* to the benefits of
29* A valuable general interpretation of Japanese 
foreign policy can be found in an article by Professor 
Oka Yoshitake, “Kokuminteki Dokuritsu to Kokka Riseiu 
(National Independence and Raison d*Etat) in vol. 7*
(Sekai no naka no Nihon) of the series Kindai Nihon Shiso- 
shi Koza.^flkyo.~TqT 5T~On the period of the Franco-Chinese 
Dispute several relevant articles have been written by 
P * eng Tse-Chou, which will be referred to in the course 
of this chapter.
30. See, e.g.Foreign Minister Inoue to Minister in China, 
Enomoto, July 18,1883* No.63 in vol. 1 of the collection of 
records held by the Japanese Foreign Ministry entitled
*Tongkingni Kansuru Shin-Futsu Sens0.* (hereafter refer? 
 as f a t A N  .SpJifrlP) • (The Sino-French War Over Tongking)
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modernisation, or by simple thirst for territorial 
gain, it was a most unsatisfactory state of affairs, 
and for the Japanese Government itself, aware of the 
intensity of feeling which the Korean issue had aroused 
a decade before, the problem represented a point of weak­
ness which its nationalistically-minded opponents might 
seek to use to their own advantage. Japan could hardly 
hope as yet to establish her influence in the peninsula by 
her own strength alone, but in alliance with a Western 
Power the situation would be transformed. Nor were the 
profits likely to be one-sided. France's chances of 
concluding her own dispute speedily and successfully would 
be greatly increased were China to be faced with Japanese 
forces as well as French, and this was a powerful factor 
for a government which was finding itself involved in a 
larger undertaking than it had anticipated, at a time, 
moreover, when economic depression was beginning to cause 
a strain on French agriculture and finances. There even 
existed some Frenchmen, army officers who had helped train 
the Japanese army in its early stages and were now rising 
towards the higher ranks in France, who had some 
appreciation of Japan's possibilities, not only as a
21temporary friend, but also as an ally in the long term.
31. See Chanoine, General, Documents pour servlr a 
I'histoire des Relations entre la France et le Janon, 
Paris, n.d. (c.1907) p.172.
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The effects of such an alliance can only he guessed at.
(i) The First Approaches.^  r ■w.Tm<*awninea » i*ii'iiiiM i-in iM j f  w — iruwrii i 'iiuiin nii i i ininipi
The first real sign that something of importance 
might come of the situation was in June I883, when news 
reached the outside world of Commandant Riviere's defeat 
and death outside Hanoi the previous month. This event 
seemed to indicate that China might prove more difficult 
than in previous years and that the situation might require 
a stronger force than France had on hand. On* June 13th, 
the Comte de Viel-Castel, France's Charge d'affaires, 
sent home a dispatch which suggested that the reinforce­
ments France needed might well he found in Japan. Hot 
only did he detect pro-French sympathies, but also a desire 
to join the French sides n,..„ce ne serait plus seulement 
en spectateurs, mais bien cote-a-cote, ou frdres d'armes, 
que les Japonais songeraient a nous suivre dans la lutte 
ou ils nous voient engages contre le Celeste Empire."32 
The dispatch gives no justification for this conclusion 
other than that a vice-minister of foreign affairs had 
requested that Japanese officers be allowed to follow 
the operations of the French troops in Tongking, that 
according to rumour three Japanese warships were prepared 
to cruise in Chinese waters, ready to protect Japanese
32. See C.P.Japon.XXIX. June 13, 1883. Viel-Castel to 
Challemel-Lacour.
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nationals; and that public opinion appeared to favour 
war if it were possible to form an entente with France, 
which Viel-Castel termed 'I’allie de leur choix.1 
It may be that Viel-Castel had received other information 
of a more convincing nature, but this seems most unlikely* 
Japanese Foreign Office r e c o r d s ^  give no indication what­
soever of any inclination towards war at this stage*
It may be that Viel-Castel, a man with no previous diplo-
24matic experience at this level, was overwhelmed by the
excitement that followed the French reverse, and invested
the intense Japanese interest with more significance than
it actually possessed* By July 3rd, he was reporting
that 1 ii — non seulement le reve d'une alliance effective,
mais celui d'une entente basee sur des interets communs,
parait avoir delaisse pour le moment le cerveau de ce 
✓ 25peuple leger.,|J^  It is possible that what had really
33* Apart from the three-volume collection of dispatches 
on the Franco-Chinese War, which are admittedly incomplete, 
the Gaimusho also houses four volumes of copies of tele­
grams which were of value to this chapter. They are listed 
under the titlesDenshin sha-o (out-going) and Denshin 
sha-rai (in-coming). They, too, are incomplete, however, 
covering only parts of 1883 &nd 1885*
34. He was a first secretary when he unexpectedly took 
over from Tricou.
35* C.P.Japon.XXIX. July 3, 1883- Viel-Castel to Challemel-
Lacour.
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36changed was his interpretation of the Japanese reaction.
Whatever the true extent of Japanese interest in an
entente or alliance with France, the fact remains that the
French believed Japan to be interested. Indeed, the Quai
d1 Or say had been ax^ are of a certain amount of concern on
Japan's part about events in Indo-China even before this was
reported from Tokyo. In the early months of 1883* it had
been approached twice by Frederick Marshall, an English
adviser who supplied the Japanese Foreign Office with most
of its political intelligence from Paris and who now gave
the Quai d'Orsay to understand that Japan desired diplomatic
37co-operation against China. Paris was therefore faced
with the problem of what response to make as early as
April. The first reaction of the Foreign Minister,
Challemel-Lacour, was to instruct the French
representative to find out directly what might be made
28out of Japan's interest. This dispatch reached Tokyo 
in early June and probably helped to arouse Viel-Castel's
36. The fact that his judgement was somewhat over-hasty 
can be further illustrated by a report he wrote on Sept.
4, in which he asserted that "Un courant sympathique entre 
la Cour de Tokio et le Gouvernement Franca is semblera.it 
done exister en ce moment au plus haut degre, et il 
paraitrait qu'il pourrait aisement franchir la limite qui 
le separe d'une entente proprement dite." C*P.Japon,XXIX. 
Sept.4, 1 8 8 3* This again seems to bear no relation to 
Japanese Government policy.
37* See C.P.Japon.XXIX. April 17, I8 8 3* Challemel-Lacour 
to Tricou. The date of Marshall's first approach is 
uncertain; the second was on March 22nd.
38. Ibid.
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excitement. It was supplemented by a further injunction
on July 6, although the Quai had not at this time yet
received Viel-Castel*s sensational June 13 dispatch.
This new order reveals some of the characteristic illusions
of French diplomacy as well as the actual extent of
official French interest in Japan at this dates
"Les ressources militaires et maritimes du Gouverne­
ment du Mikado sont en effet assez considerables pour que? 
sans vouloir poser actuellement les bases d'une alliance 
effective, nous ne negligions pas de nous rapprocher de 
lui et de nous assurer un concours que les circonstances 
peuvent rendre utile. II importe done de ne pas perdre 
de vue l§s divers moyens d!influence dont nous pouvons 
disposer*cet effet et qui nous creent, des a present, une 
situation en quelque sorte privilegiee." 39
The means of influence referred to were the French­
men employed in high positions by the Japanese Government, 
or having access to top-ranking Japanese officers. Of 
the Frenchmen connected with education, it was expected 
thats "Vivant au milieu de la partie la plus intelligente 
et la plus active de la population de Tokio, lies avec des 
journalistes influents, ces professeurs pourraient avoir
sur 1*opinion une action reelle qu'il importerait de
✓ . 4 0diriger dans le sens de nos interets." While the Quai) 
for its part, declared that it would show itself more
41
sympathetic towards Treaty Revision, the tone of the
39* C.?.Japon.XXIX. July 6, 1 8 8 3. Challemel-Lacour to 
Viel-Castel.
40. Ibid.
41. The Quai was prepared to take the initiative by stating 
its willingness to sign a new commercial arrangement and make 
some concessions on jurisdiction, all this being conditional, 
however, on the adhesion of other Powers. For fuller details, 
see Chapter VI.
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dispatch indicated that it was relying mainly on the efforts 
of influential Frenchmen in Japan. It clearly expected 
that they would be able to keep government and public 
attention focussed on Japan's grievances against China and 
that this would predispose the Meiji leaders to respond 
favourably to any approach which France might later make.
How far its suggestions were implemented it Is difficult to 
tell, but they certainly never produced the swing to France 
that had been hoped for, and it is significant that the 
French charge d'affaires never claimed any credit for his 
efforts in this direction. That these unofficial methods 
had no visible result is hardly surprising* There were 
good reasons for the lack of any serious response from the 
Meiji Government at this time. In particular, French 
diplomats did not seek to conceal that the French Govern-
42ment was still hopeful of the collapse of Chinese opposition,
and therefore really preferred not to be drawn Into a
complicating entanglement with Japan. So long as Franco-
Chinese negotiations continued, and they did so until 
43October, u the Japanese Government could scarcely have
42. This expectation appears In all the Quai's dispatches 
to Tokyo in I8 8 3* In March 1884- it flatly rejected Marshall's 
new suggestion of a collective approach as inopportune. C*P* 
Japon.XXX. March 19,1884. Ferry to Sienkiewicz.
4 3 . They were resumed again in'March-April 1884, and the 
convention of Tientsin was signed between Li Hung-Chang and 
Commandant Fournier on May 13-. However, belief that China 
had violated this agreement led the French to resort to 
undeclared war in June, though negotiations were carried on 
sporadically in Europe.
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treated the cautious French approaches as a worthwhile
.  I  .  44proposition.
Another reason why the Japanese response was negative 
may have been the attitude.of the French representatives 
In Tokyo. Viel-Castel was not, in June, insensible to 
the advantages an agreement might bring. He pointed 
out that valuable information could be gleaned from the 
Japanese officers who had been carrying on spying activities 
In China, and he rated Japan's military valour highly. 
Moreover, the various disadvantages seemed to be outweighed 
in his mind by the Importance of France's objective.
However, his dispatch ended with a sentence that did much 
to vitiate his conclusion. "D*autre part," he wrote,
"1'extreme reserve a laquelle Votre Excellence veut bien 
faire allusion est devenue d'autant plus obligatoire qu'il 
n'y a pas a se d.issimuler qu'ici comme peut-etre ailleurs
44. It was the less likely to do so after Aug. 4 1883, 
when it received a report sent from Hachisuka (though almost 
certainly written by Marshall) on June 22. (Shin-Futsu Senso. 
vol. I. No.46.) In this detailed document, which Includes 
some valuable comments on the Quai d'Orsay's thinking and 
methods, it was alleged that there was a basic split over 
French polics^  towards Annam, with Challemel-Lacour advocating 
extreme measures while Ferry was among those seeking to 
avoid a rupture. The influence of the split was that much 
greater, it was implied, in that it appeared "as if one 
of these parties was in ascendancy one day and the other 
the next day". In these circumstances the hazards of an 
agreement would have been increased considerably.
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les Japonais feraient sonner tres-haut la possibility
d'une entente que les evenements viendraient peut-etre
 ^ ✓ ✓ 45romp re avant qu'elle n!ait ete consacree." lie here
touched on a which, especially with his successor,
Sienkiewicz, was a powerful obstacle to any agreement•
Either from fear of alienating China, or from suspicion
that Japan might make use of French proposals as a
bargaining counter for her own exclusive advantage, or
from distaste at the prospect of treating Japan as an equal,
the French representatives hesitated to take any firm steps.
They MHRBiHriNHi to show , at the right moments, that France
46
was seriously interested in collaboration with Japan, and 
their failure to make use of the telegraph on several 
critical occasions* left the Quai df0rsay in the dark about 
the mood in Tokyo and thus in no position to order a less 
cautious approach.
The same hesitation was not shown by all French 
diplomats. Tricou, when he was transferred to China, went 
with the conviction that* 1 Nous n'avons quTa dire un mot, 
et nous pouvons etre assures du eoncours* du Gouvernement
45. C,P.Japon.XXIX. June 13, 1883* Viel-Castel to Challemel-
Lacour .
46. According to Sienkiewicz Viel-Castel waited a week before 
carrying out the Quai!s July 6 instructions. C „P.Japon.XXIX. 
Nov. 79 I8 8 3 . Sienkiewicz to Challemel-Lacour. On the other 
hand, he may have exceeded those instructions on Sept. 1, when 
he had an interview with^Inoue, which is recorded in Shin-
Eut.au Sen so ? vol. I. No. 75* If the Gaimusho version can be
believed, Viel-Castel urged that if China were to attack Annam 
or the RyUkyUs, Japan and France should co-operate together
as eternal friends.
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47Japonais o1 A force of twenty thousand Japanese would
he enough9 he believed, to rout the entire Chinese army.
His distance from Japan did not prevent his seeking frequent 
interviews with the Japanese Minister and Consuls in which he 
urged their Government to join France. Nor did he disdain 
to influence the Meiji Government by supplying information1 
that Li Hung-6hang was aiming to make war over the Ryukyu
48question. His efforts were of little importance, however, 
partly? no doubt, because the Japanese suspected that he was 
really interested in finding a diplomatic prop to support his 
threats against China, but principally on account of the 
basic principles of the Meiji Government’s foreign policy.
Cii) The Foreign Policy of Inoue Kaoru
The foreign policy of Inoue Kaoru was, in fact, the
crucial factor in the failure of the French to evoke any 
response from the Japanese Government during the course of 
the war. Japanese foreign policy generally has been the 
subject of much controversy, but at the period of the 
Franeo-Chinese dispute, at any rate, it x^ ould appear to
f
have been essentially pacific. There is considerable 
evidence in the Japanese records for the view that at this
4-7. C .P .Chine ,LXI. June 1 9 , 1 8 8 3. Tricou to Ferry.
48. Shin-Futsu Senso« vol.l. No.52. July 3?I8 8 3* Shinagawa
to Yoshida, For the approaches of Tricou and Galy, the French 
consul in Shanghai, Shin-Futsu Sens5. vol. 1. No. 65. July 31? 
1 8 8 3, Shinagawa to Inoue5 No,1059 Oct.22, l8o3? Enomoto to 
Inoue5 vol.l. No. 1 3 8, Feb. 79 1884, Higashi to Ito.
time Inoue' s main concern, apart from Treaty Revision, was 
to establish stability in the Far East and if possible • 
remove the potential causes o.f conflicttfin the years to corned 
This did not imply neglect of Japan's own interests, for 
underflying Inoue’s policy- there existed the assumption that the 
situation could not be stable so long as China refused to 
recognise Japan’s interest in Korea, and condemned the 
latter to perpetual weakness by supporting conservative 
factions at the Korean Court1against the progressives.
In addition, the meiji Government, and particularly the 
Choshu elements in it, had good reason for wishing to avoid
4-9 •)■ The attempt made by Inoue after the Tientsin Convention 
in 1885 offers the clearest proof of this. In a telegram to 
Enomoto (Denshin sha-o, June 30, 1885) he asked the Japanese 
Minister to persuade Li Hung-chang that Korea's "foreign 
policy ' had very close bearing to the interests of both Japan 
and China and if left to herself no-one knows what foreign 
complications might arise which will seriously embarras them.
Therefore I propose that after Li and myself having confidentially 
consuited and formed her foreign policy Li will undertake 
to let Corea adopt and enforce the same." The scheme 
failed, because Li objected to the provision that the Korean 
king "should invariably consult with Li and through him with me", 
(Ibid. July 13,1 8 8 5, Inoue to Enomoto) on the ground that it would 
give the impression that Japan .was dictating to China. Inoue1s comment 
was:: "Such a plea of Li.•.shows the utter want of discerning 
the great and far-seeing idea which underlies my views." (Ibid.)
That this Korean policy of Inoue was nothing new is shown 
by numerous dispatches and telegrams, while on the French 
side•it was reported in June,1 8 8 3, that Japan was obsessed by 
a project "qui consisterait & faire declarer*, a l'instai* de 
celle de la Belgique, la neutrality de la Peninsule. Cordenne."
C,P.Japon. XXIX. June 13»18 0 3.Viel-Castel to Challemel-Lacour.
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a war before JapanBs own military strength had been built 
50up. ' This does not necessarily mean .that Inouefs
principles of peace,ful diplomacy were not genuinely held,
however, and the events of, 1 6 8 3 -5 show him consistently
resisting the; furious pressures,, both French and Japanese,
for the adoption of stronger methods. It was, in‘fact,
his attempt to implement his policy by . diplomatic means
in early 1883 that first made the Quai d 10 r say •. hope ful that
51
Japan might act against China. A glance at the follow"'up 
of Inoue’s approach then will serve to illustrate this policy 
and further explain the failure of France to incite Japan . . 
to action in the summer of 1 8 8 3*
The object of the Japanese initiative was to secure 
from France a promise to join ig a protest against China’s 
claims to suzerainty, in the hope that the latter might be persuaded 
to modify .her pretensions somewhat on account
50.) Referring to the early 1880ss Fujiwqra Akira says that ”as 
regards the strategy of Continental field operations, which were 
anticipated in a war with China, the Japanese were painfully aware 
of their deficiencies, not only in organisational aspects 
but still more in numerical strength. In 1882 they 
established an expansion plan to equip completely from 
1885 onwards, a force, doubled at one blow, of 28 infantry 
regiments,' 7 artillery regiments, and 7 cagalry, engineering 
and commissariat battalions.” Gunji-sh! (A History of the Army), Tokyo
1 9 6 1, p.43* ■
510 See above, p.209*
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of this. Between the time when Inoue sent his instructions , 
however9 and the time when Marshall made his second approach, 
the situation In Annam deteriorated, and the proposal for co- 
operation inevitably seemed to imply a greater willingness 
to be Involved in France1s affairs than had been intended*
Its significance was certainly exaggerated by Paris, perhaps 
because of Marshall1s own Inclinations, and this must have 
become apparent to Inoue by the start of May, when he 
received a report that the French Minister in China appeared 
anxious for Japanese co-operation. The result was a 
hasty withdrawal. On May 9? Inoue sent to Hachisuka, the 
Japanese Minister in Paris, a nervous telegram which reads 
111 to telegraphed France is completed £?eompelledJ by 
circumstances to take war measure against China; but we 
do not wish to go so far. What I...indicated in my private 
note to Marshall, was only to communicate mutually with 
France in regard to China and her minor neighbours and not 
at all intended to go as far as to take arms against China.
So refuse as soundly as possible any warlike support of 
France against C h i n a . T h e  Quai dr0rsay, however, was 
never informed of Inoue*s withdrawal and the Impression 
of Japanese eagerness which it derived from the episode 
was partly responsible for the belief, which it never
5 2. Nihon G-aikd Bunsho (hereafter N.G.B.) vol. 16. p.474-5* 
April 26, 1883« Enomoto to Inoue.
53® Denshin sha-5. 1 8 8 3° May 9*
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entirely abandoned, that France could afford to wait for
54its potential ally to take the initiative.
To understand fully Inoue's timidity and his annoyance 
over the dissemination in China of rumours of a Franco-Japanese 
alliance, it is necessary to recall the military and naval 
supremacy which China possessed over J apan, on paper at 
least, at this time. Until China was more fully engaged 
against France, fear of attack by her was a powerful factor
55in Japanese thinking. It was hinted at on several occasions'^ 
by Inoue and other Foreign Office officials as the reason why
54. This Is strikingly indicated by a remark about Bourse's 
recall from China made to Marshall by Billot, the Director 
of Political Affairs at the Quai d'Orsays "Pray do not take 
It as an encouragement for yourselves." See N.G.B. vol.17. 
p.462, March 23? 1 8 8 3. Marshall to Inoue. The Japanese 
archives give the impression that the French diplomats in 
China did not share this reluctance to take the initiative. 
However, the reports of these diplomats themselves would 
suggest that they were assiduously prompted by their 
Japanese counter-parts, and though It is beyond doubt that 
they urged on the Japanese the advantages of alliance, it 
seems clear that it was with the object of inciting the 
Meiji Government to make a proposal itself.
55* e.g. C*P.Japon. XXIX. Aug.23, I8 8 3. In this dispatch 
Viel-Castel reporteds ,fM.Inoue s'est eerie, et sincerement, 
je le crains; 'Mais une fois votre differend r&gle, tous 
ces armements, tous ces preparatifs de la Chine, ne oourraient- 
ils pas etre tournbs contre nous?' That Inoue was sincere
is suggested by his urgency in buying warships in 1 8 8 3.
See especially his telegram of Jan. 6, I8 8 3 * "We are in a 
hurry "to purchase the vessels in view of China's attitude." 
Denshin sha-o, 1883 .
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Japan could not entertain thoughts of alliance with France
or even officially accord her the favour of "benevolent
neutrality. These considerations, together with certain
57domestic factors, make it scarcely surprising that Japan 
declined the exceedingly tentative approaches of a Western 
Power whose governments were not noted for their stability.
The real opportunity for an alliance was to come later.
(iii) The Escalation of the War and the Diplomatic hull
Between July I883 and the final months of 1884 the
question of alliance or entente lost much of its intensity.
The Quai cPOrsay accepted that nLes vives repugnances que
la Cour de Tokio parait eprouver a se compromettre vis-a-vis
de la Chine nous interdisent de rechercher quant a present,
son concours en vue d‘un conflit que nous avons du reste
58le desir et l’espoir d*eviter.nJ Even though an unsuccessful 
attempt to reach a satisfactory settlement by means of 
Britain1s good offices, had forced Ferry to the conclusion 
that force would be necessary, the large votes of credit for 
a Tongking expedition passed in December 1883? seemed
56. The question of neutrality became a much disputed 
issue in 1884. See footnote 66.
57- Apart from military unpreparedness, it is worth 
mentioning Japan*s financial difficulties. The stability 
which Matsukata, the Finance Minister, had been introducing 
into Government revenues and expenditures since 1881 
might have been jeopardised by a military adventure.
58. C„P.Japon.XXIX. Jan. 8, 1884. Ferry to Sienkiewicz.
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59 *sufficient for the purpose., The reserve of the new
French Minister, Sienkiewicz, exceeded that of Viel-Castel
and he regarded his predecessors* efforts with distaste.
There is no record of his making any approach to the Japanese
government during this period.
It was not the case, however, that no approaches were
made. In China, where more urgency was felt thata in Japan
and where contacts with Japanese agents were frequent,
there were several attempts to raise the question again,
60all without success. One approach also came from an
unexpected direction, through Aoki in .Berlin in August 1884,
presumably in the hope that French reprisals on Foochow and
designs on Formosa might alter the Japanese Government’s 
61disposition. Again, the result was negative.
59* The French made some progress for a time, and were able 
to take Bac~Ninh in March. Li Hung-Chang opened negotiations 
with Commandant Fournier in April and a draft agreement was 
approved by Ferry on May 8. The Convention of Tientsin was 
signed three days later. By it China promised to withdraw 
her troops from Tonkin and France to respect China *s border.
The Convention was criticised in China and the Tsung-Li-Yamen 
ordered a halt to the troop withdrawal. A skirmish resulted, 
which momentarily convinced Ferry of China’s bad faith, and he 
took the decision in July to extend the war to the Chinese 
coast, once again misjudging China’s will to resist. See 
Power, op.cit. pp. 171-5*
60. The attempts of Tricou and Galy, referred to above 5 
Tricou was recalled at the end of Oct. I883.
61. Slain -Fu tsu~S en so, vol. 3. No. 261. Aug. 31? 1884. Unfortun­
ately the full dispatch from Aoki is missing and only a short 
summary bears witness to the approach. According to this the 
French ambassador in Berlin hinted that Japan might take over 
Taiwan. Since, however, there is no reference to any French 
approach in the correspondence between the Quai d’Orsay and 
its Ambassador in Berlin, it is hard to regard this as a 
serious offer. In all probability it was no more than a 
chance after-dinner remark.
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Some mention ought also to he made of two attempts at
unofficial diplomacy during 1884. When in that year the
Japanese Minister of War, General Oyama, visited Europe
with a high-ranking military mission, one of the French
officers assigned to accompany it was Captain Descharmes,
who had spent some years in Japan and was later to become
Minister of War. He had long favoured an alliance with
Japan and he now urged his views on Oyama, who apparently
1 lf encouragea trds vivement A en parler au gouvernement
fran§ais se portant garant de I1approbation absolue de celui 
62de son pays.1’ Whatever the truth about Oyama* s words
62or intentions, J the reaction of the French Minister of
War, General Campenon, was unmistakeable. Descharmes was
1 brutalement invite d se montrer serieux dans ses entretiens
64avec son ministre.*1
This was not Campenon*s last word on the matter, 
however. In September, the French failure in Formosa again 
led to the feeling that a quick solution would be difficult 
and introduced a sense of urgency into the French Government. 
It invited Oyama to return to France before leaving Europe 
and when the invitation was accepted by General Miura, a
62. Chanoine, op.cit. p.193*
63* Mr. Oyama Azusa, a Gaimusho historian, is of the
opinion that his grandfather was here expressing a purely 
personal opinion. Interview, Oct. 1965k
64. Chanoine, op.cit. p.193*
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Choshu general who was a leading member of the military
mission, Campenon was forced to make proposals of entente
to him. Though the French did not know it, the choice
of Miura to stand in for Oyama indicated the desire of
Inoue, ltd, and Yamagata, to avoid any commitment. If
his memoirs can be belJLeved, however, Miura, was not averse
to making the most of his negative role. While evading
any engagement by stating his lack of authority he buoyed
up French hopes by agreeing that it was time for Japan to
settle with China, and in return for this he secured the
promise that French ministers would attend to Japanese
grievances about treaty revision and facilities for Japanese
65students in France. ' Unfortunately his account was 
written forty years after the event and is vague on dates, 
so it is impossible to place too great a reliance on his 
version of an approach, which, if it happened in the way 
he states, was the most definite on record. One statement 
in Miura*s memoirs that is undoubtedly true, however, is 
that Inoue had no intention of entering into alliance with 
France. Throughout 1884 he continued to believe that 
Japan should not commit herself, and, far from seeking to 
take advantage of the rumours of alliance that were constantly 
being voiced in Tientsin and Shanghai, he assured LI Hung- 
£hang, through Minister Enomoto, of Japan*s peaceful
65» Miura G-oro, Kanju Shdgun Kaikorokru Tokyo, 1925« 
pp * 143”163 *
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intentions5 did his best to maintain Japanese neutrality, 
and even made some attempt to mediate between the two
. a 66sides *
(iv) The Incident in Seoul and, the Renewal of Interest
In December 3.884, just when France appeared to have 
accepted that Japan would never be budged, an incident 
occurred which reawakened Ferry1s hopes. This was the 
attempted coup d'etat in Seoul by Korean progressives sympa­
thetic to Japan - a venture which was speedily suppressed 
with the aid of Chinese troops and which involved attacks 
on the Japanese Legation and Japanese nationals. When
66. Shin-Futsu Senso, vol.3. Nos. 298*300.383*304. Nov.1884 
The question of Japanese neutrality caused a certain amount 
of difficulty between Japan, France and China in 1884.
France hoped at first that Japan would allow the French fleet 
to use Nagasaki,where stocks of war materials had been built 
up after the 1882 Seoul incident, as a base. Sienkiewicz 
reported (C.P.Japon.XXIX.Jan.3?1884. Sienkiewicz to Ferry) 
that there was no chance of this being conceded. The French 
continued to believe, however, that they were entitled to 
seek coal and provisions in Japanese ports, and the 
possibility that Hong Kong might be closed to them at some 
point made them little inclined to give way on this. Thus, 
when on Aug. 30? China notified Japan that she was at war 
with France and demanded her neutrality under the*M871 treaty, 
Sienkiewicz was forced to remonstrate with the Japanese 
Government to prevent the privilege being withdrawn. This 
proved no easy task, even when China withdrew her notification 
The fact that war undeniably did exist, even though not 
officially admitted, made the Meiji Government very concerned 
about the legal position, and Inoue showed a strong desire 
not to alienate China by openly favouring France. The end 
result was that he verbally Intimated that the Japanese 
Government would turn a blind eye to the purchase of coal, 
while reserving its eventual position. All attempts by 
Sienkiewicz to secure an official declaration that, as in 
1870-1, coal was not considered contraband, failed.
2 2 4  —
reported in Paris it caused the instant dispatch to
Sienkiewicz, of an important telegram which reads
1 Un telegramme de Patenotre m'apprend du collision 
qui vient d!avoir lieu en Coree entre Chinois et Japonais.
Ces ev&nements decider! peut-§tre le Japon d sortir du 
reserve ou il^fmaintient depuis le commencement de notre 
conflit avec la Chine, et £ saisir I1occasion de prendre 
a l'egard de la Cour de Pdkin une attitude rdsolue. Nous 
sommes en mesure de lui preter un utile appui, en 
empechant, par exemple, 1'envoi par mer de troupes Chinoises 
en Cor£e. On peut envisager meme 1'eventualite d'un 
arrangement final ou la question de Formose vient en ligne 
de compte. Le Japon peut done tirer un grand profit de 
la situation et nous avons de notre cote, de puissants 
motifs pour 1*engager dans une action contre la Chine.
Faites discretement ce que vous jugerez possible en vue 
de ce resultat, et tenez moi exactement renseigne par 
le teldgraphe." 67
This telegram indicated that France was on the
verge of positive action at last in its pursuit of an
agreement with Japan. It is noteworthy that Ferry only
required ^discretion* as opposed to the customary *extreme
reserve.* He had recently experienced some difficulty
68In securing new credits for Tongking and was thus very 
sensible of the benefits to be gained from Japan's support. 
Moreover, he had grounds for optimism about the outcome 
of a new approach. For the second time in three years, 
Japan's representative in Seoul had been attacked.
67» C.P oJapon.XXX. Dec.15, 1884, Ferry to Sienkiewicz.
68. P'eng Tse-Chou, 'Fuerii Naikaku to Nihon' (The Ferry
Cabinet and Japan,) in Shirin, vol.47. No.3* (May 1962) p.59* 
P'eng greatly exaggerates Ferry's financial difficulties 
however.
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As yet the background of Japanese intrigue was unclear 
and all that could be seen was the insult offered to a 
nation which prized Its honour highly. It was assumed 
by Paris that Japan would now see the necessity for force 
as the only way to counter China's stubborness.
This view was understandable but mistaken. Ito and
Inoue had not decided on war and still looked to achieve 
their aims by negotiation. They had indeed shown a new 
boldness in Korea, but this indicated not so much a 
change of policy as a change in the circumstances within 
which this policy operated. With the intensification of 
the French conflict with China, the Japanese anxiety over 
the Ryukyus had gradually disappeared, together with the 
fears of China's naval strength. This was especially 
true after the votes of credit for Ferry at the end of 
November. News of this was published in Japanese papers 
on December 1st. It showed France's determination not 
to back down and clearly made It safer for Japan to push 
her own claims. Indeed, it has been alleged that "the 
fact that the Ferry Cabinet intended to extend their Asian 
colonisation, and the transmission of this news to Korea 
seems to have exerted a considerable influence on Minister
69Takezoe and to have caused his sudden action." ' Whether
the connection was really as close as this is doubtful,
but It does seem likely that the Japanese Government was
69. Ibid.p.62. It seems unlikely however, that the news that 
new credits had been voted could have reached Korea by Dec. 4 
and P'eng gives no evidence for this statement.
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strongly Influenced In its policy towards Korea by French 
actions. This applies not just to the general influence 
of the new credits and war measures, but also to a more 
direct link which the French Minister in Japan had with 
developments in Korea. This link can be traced back to 
late 1882, when overtures were made to France by Korean
*toreformers, who claimed to be hostile to Chinese domination.
At that time Tricou had given them a very cautious reception,
*ft
but when two more approaches were made in 1884, Sienkiewicz,
though still reserved, was not uninterested, and he
suggested to Ferry that the Idea of Korea being modernised
no
under French auspices might be worth considering.
b i s
Ferry, however, had more than enough on n i  hands and
rejected the Idea, at least until diplomatic relations had
no
been established. This should have been the end of the 
matter, but in September, Sienkiewicz was twice visited by 
Goto Shojiro and Itagaki Taisuke, two former members of
70. C.P.Japon.XXVIII. Dec.2.1882. Tricou to Duclerc.
71o C.P.Japon.XXX. March 24,1884. June 7,1884. Sienkiewicz 
to Ferry. The approaches were made by Kim Ok-Kiun and So 
Che-pil, who, influenced by Japan's employment of French 
military instructors, wanted French help in the formation 
of a Korean army.
72. C.P.Japon.XXX. June 7,1884.
73* C.P.Japon.XXX. July 38,1884. Ferry to Sienkiewicz.
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the Meiji Government, who now led the principal political
74party, the JIvuto. Claiming to be motivated by hatred 
of China, dissatisfaction with their own government, and 
admiration for the French revolutionary tradition, they 
proposed that France should lend a million yen to facilitate 
the modernisation of Korea by her young reformers. Sienkie­
wicz appears to have given the impression that such help 
might be forthcoming, possibly from private bankers, though
his own reports make it hard to believe that he had any
75serious intention of following this suggestion up.
ho doubt Goto would soon have realised the unreality of
the situation $ but the news of the supposed French interest
was almost immediately leaked by him, if the Jlvuto-shi is
to be believed, to It5, now the leading figure in the Meiji 
76GovernmentF The reaction of the Government was swift.
74. C.P.Japon.XXX.Sept.15,1884; Sept.27,1884. Sienkiewicz 
to Ferry. The relationship of the two ex-samurai from Tosa 
with the Choshu leaders was not one of irreconcilable 
opposition, and Sienkiewicz was at first more inclined to 
believe that they were unofficial emissaries of the Government 
The Jiyut-Q went into dissolution at the end of October, on 
account of internal dissension and government pressure.
75. P ’eng discusses the question of Sienkiewicz’s response 
in 1 Chosen Mondai o me guru Jiyuto to Furansu”, In Hekishi 
Gaku Kenkyu. No.265, June 1962, pp.19-27» He calls the French 
Minister’s mention of a banker friend ’a diplomat’s gesture.’ 
Since Sienkiewicz did not mention any such point in his own 
reports, It seems likely that it simply represented the means 
he chose to retain a potentially valuable source of informatio: 
as to Japanese policy towards China.
76. See Itagaki Taisuke ed. Jiyuto-shi (History of the 
Jiyuto), vol.3. P* 128-9- lwanami” ufi~edition. Tokyo, 1958.
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lakezoe Shinichiro* its Minister in Korea* was sent back from
leave to Seoul where he soon commenced the discussions with
Kim Ok-Kiun and his fellow conspirators which led to the
attempted coup of December 4th. It is possible to interpret
Takezoe's action as intended merely to prevent control of
the situation from slipping into dangerous hands. As
Conroy points out* discovery of the Goto-Itagaki-Sienkiewicz
interviews. nwould build a sense of urgency in government circl
that the intriguers* whom they had been ignoring* must now
be weaned away from their French connections* and kept under
77surveillance.f Certainly the Japanese Government's
unwillingness to resort to arms in December 1884 makes it 
hard to believe that in October anything as serious as 
conflict with China was intended* even if it was hoped that 
the Chinese position would be undermined. However, thanks 
probably to rashness on the part of Takezoe* who seems not 
to have weighed the strength of the conspirators or the 
determination of their opponents nor awaited the permission 
of his superiors before committing Japanese troops to the 
protection of the conspirators and the king* the end result 
of Sienkiewicz's encouragement of Goto was a clash between 
Japan and China and a situation in which a Franco-Japanese 
alliance was a distinct possibility.
77* Ho Conroy* The Japanese Seizure of Korea, 1868-1910. 
Philadelphia* I960* p.l?2. Conroy gives a detailed 
description of the attempted coup. He finds the Meiji 
Government not guilty of complicity in it.
- 229 -
Nevertheless9 despite this development in Japanese
policy and despite the excitement of December 18849 the
78fact remains that no alliance did emerge. Was this
inevitable? It hardly seems likely that Japanese policy
was so inflexible that it could not adapt when confronted
by highly favourable circumstances* and there were3 In fact*
79signs that Inoue was becoming impatient with China, y 
In addition* there is some reason to believe that several 
of his colleagues felt strongly enough about events In
O  / " v
Korea to take the plunge into war. It Is true that
there still remained some powerful arguments against involve­
ment with France, For one thing* Japan was not yet properly
78. It is worth emphasising that no alliance ever was formed 
because P leng In an article entitled "Shin-futsu SensS ni 
okeru Nihon no Taikan Seisaku" (Japan's Korean Policy during 
the Sino-French War) Shirin. vol.43* No. 3* pp.124-143. (May* 
i960) says that Inoue 1 raised Japan's international position 
by co-operating with capitalist France.” p.124, Power* op.cit. 
p .185? is even more misleading when he states that Ferry
" rejected a Japanese proposal for joint action against 
China" in Dec. 1884.
79. In a telegram to Fnomoto which seems to date from the 
end of Nov. Inoue speaks of 'the stupidity of the Chinese 
Government1 with regard to its falling to accept Japan's 
mediation suggestions. Shin-Futsu Senso. vol.3« No.304.
80. In the first three months of 1885 the dispatches of 
Plunkett* the British Minister* frequently mention a 'war 
party' which he identified with Satsuma. I}M. Brown, Nationalism 
in Japan. Berkeley* 1955? p.124. also states that "By about 
1885 a quite powerful group within the Japanese Government 
was favouring military action against China."
equipped for war. For another* almost all the other Powers
81viewed the prospect of an enlarged conflict with disfavour.
Yet no foreign Power could be expected to side with China*
and the goodwill of France might have played a considerable
part in the achievement of Japan's principal aim of
treaty revision* both because France had been proving the
most difficult of all the Powers and because Ferry possessed
8?considerable influence with Bismarck at this time.
Moreover the added status Japan would derive from alliance 
with a European Power could not have been a negligible 
factor for a Government whose efforts had largely been 
directed towards the securing of Viestern recognition of 
Japanese independence and the achievement of real equality. 
There must have been considerable temptation to take 
advantage of the exceptionally favourable circumstances 
In which* as it soon appeared* France was urging Japan to
81. See C.P.Japon.XXIX. Aug.23.18835 Viel-Castel to Challemel 
Lacour. Britain and the English press continually spoke 
against an alliance* and In Jan.1885* Plunkett claimed that 
Russia had warned Japan against agression In Korea. F.0.46. 
CCCXXVII. No.23. Jan. 19* 1885. Plunkett to Granville.
A month later* however* he telegraphed Parkess "If Clto'sl 
negotiations fail* war seems Inevitables I expect both France 
and Russia would support Japan." See F.0.46. CCCXXVIII. No.65* 
Feb.26,1885. Plunkett to Granville.
82. On Bismarck's conciliation of France In 1884-5? see
A.J.P.Taylor* The Struggle for Mastery in Europe. Oxford 1954. 
pp.291-302. Taylor speaks of Bismarck "playing genuinely for 
agreement with France" In late 1884.
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pursue her own ends and was offering financial and
83naval help for the purpose,, ^
Since the general considerations for and against were
so equally balanced, it seems reasonable to look to a further
factor which may perhaps have decided the issue against
alliance with France. This was the diplomacy of Sienkiewicz.
Like several other French Finishers who had served in China
84before coming to Japan, he had a poor opinion of the
Japanese, and he resented the fact that when he arrived 
rumours were circulating that France had offered an 
alliance and been refused. Although he generally paid 
lip-service to the notion of an agreement with Japan, his 
real feelings were shown by a letter which he wrote to 
Rear-Admiral Mayer in January, 1884. In it he argued that 
,fnous Her, d*autre part, au Japon, par un trait6, ce 
serait nous placer entre deux peuples de race jaune, c*est- 
a-dire entre deux peuples qui9 malgre I1antagonisme qui
83. The possibility of entering into a financial relation­
ship with France, the second greatest capital-exporter, 
may have held a considerable attraction for some Japanese 
leaders who favoured raising a foreign loan for the 
purpose of extending the railways. Among those who advocated 
such a loan were Aoki Shuzo, who in 1885 urged Inoue to 
make war on China, and Kuroda Kiyotaka, who was popularly 
thought to be the leader of a *war party1. For their views, 
see Denshin Sha-rai, July 3, 18855 Ibid, Aug, 20, 18855
also Aoki Shuzo Shokan. (Letters of Aoki ShuzO) Kensei 
Shiryoshitsu, No.657* Vol.II. (to Inoue Kaoru) March 12 1885.
84. Sienkiewicz had been consul at Hong Kong,1872-6.
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existe entre eux, se comprennent beaucoup mi eux que nous
ne pourrons jamais les comprendre ' His real desire
was that Japan should undertake a completely independent
war against China* As an ally, he wrote later, she would
have been worth little because of her vanity, fickleness
86and unreliability.
It was scarcely to be expected, then, that Sienkiewicz
would receive Ferry’s order to make discreet approaches to
Japan with enthusiasm. Even so, the extent of his evasion
of his Minister’s instructions is remarkable. Eis
interpretation of discretion was so extreme that the
Japanese Government was actually unaware that an approach
87was being made. Two steps were taken to implement the
December 15 telegram. Firstly Sienkiewicz, while
answering a query by Inoue about Franco-“Chinese relations
dropped the remarks ”Nous ferons peut-etre egalement une
88excursion dans le Nord.” Secondly he charged a
85- Enclosure in C.P•Japon.XXIX. Jan.3? 1884. Sienkiewicz to
Feriy .
86. C0P .Japon.vol.31 .March 11,1885• Sienkiewicz to Ferry.
87* There is no reference in the Japanese records to any 
move by Sienkiewicz*and when on Dec. 24,1884, Plunkett 
reported to London some detailed and accurate information 
about French offers which he had secured from Yoshida, Inoue*s 
deputy, he was able to writes <*M* Sienkiewicz, the French 
Minister here, had never touched the subject either before 
or since the Corean revolt.” F.0.46. CCCXVIII. Dec.24.1884. 
Plunkett to Granville.
88. C.P.Japon.XXX. Dec.Ig,1884. Sienkiewicz to Ferry.
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'reliable person1 to say to a Japanese on close terms with
members of the Governments 1 Nous allons voir ce que savent
faire les japonais et ce qu'Ils valent. Vous ne vous
imaginez^d1ailleurs, pas ce que vous etes en passe de 
89gagner.1* y This was to say nothing that was not already
known, and was so imprecise as to be worthless. In the
same dispatch in which he described these measures he
revealingly added that the Japanese Government would take
advantage of French overtures in order to bring China to
terms9 and that Inoue appeared to expect a confidence on
his part - a confidence which he prided himself on not
giving. All this would have been infuriating to Ferry9
whose position was being jeopardised by lack of success
in Tonkin9 had not Sienkiewicz already destroyed his hopes
by telegraphing that the excitement of 1882 had not been
repeated. He summed ups 1 ...on cherqje a attenuer la gravite
90de la situation.1 y This? despite the fact that Sienkiewicz 
had not been In contact with Inoue or the Japanese Foreign 
Office since the first news of the Seoul incident had arrived5
89. Ibid. The Japanese was not named.
90. CoP.Japon.XXX. Dec.17*1884. Sienkiewicz to Ferry.Telegram
91. Making this point5 P'eng states that Sienkiewicz 1 could 
not have known yet how the Keiji Government would handle the 
Incident this time.” "Fuerii liaikaku to Nihon1 p.64.
Inoue9 he explains, only returned from Yamaguchi on the 
16th. Although Sienkiewicz could conceivably have seen 
him immediately on his return, it is highly unlikely that 
he would have failed to mention this.
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and despite the fact that only a fortnight before Goto 
Shojiro had Informed the French interpreter that the 
Japanese Government "qui nagudre encore avait peur de la 
Chine" was naujourd'hui resolu a entrer en lutte avec
op
cette Puissance'1. Thus to dismiss the possibility of 
conflict before seeking the official view can only be 
regarded as an extraordinary procedure.
The exaggerated character of Sienkiewicz's Interpret­
ation of discretion n when one compares it with
that of his colleague in China. Within two days of 
Sienkiewicz1s discouraging reply, Patendtre was urging 
upon the Japanese Consul, Ando, the advantages of an 
'action commun' with France,and when asked if he was
authorised to make overtures he did not hesitate to answer
94In the affirmative. Patendtre's eagerness* is shown 
by his promise that Japan would be able to raise a loan 
on low Interest In France.^ Nevertheless, even though 
such words seemed to Indicate that France was more anxious
92. C.P.Japon. XXX. Dec.4,1884. Sienkiewicz to Ferry.
93 * C.P.Chine. LXVI. Dec.19,1884. Patendtre to Ferry.
94o C.P.Chine. LXVI. Dec.24,1884. Patendtre to Ferry.
95- The evidence for this offer Is in a telegram of'
Dec. 20, 1884 from Ando at Shanghai to Inoue, contained In 
vol.3* of Nik-Kan Gaiko Shlryo Shusel„ (Collection of 
Japanese-Korean Diplomatic MateriaTsJ edited by Tanaka 
Shinkichi, Tokyo, 1962, p.43* Patendtre himself failed 
to mention this in his own dispatch5 which suggests that 
he might have been acting without authorisation.
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for an alliance than she had been9 the reticence of 
Sienkiewicz? through whom any serious approach would be 
expected9 oust have introduced an element of uncertainty 
into the situation and cannot have failed to arouse the 
suspicion that France was trying to lure Japan into 
making the first official offer9 either to use it as a 
threat to bring China to her knees? or else to secure an 
agreement on more advantageous t.o-pmg_ -i 11 -rf* ■■■■Xtvi i i u-.
(v ) The Diplomatic Background to the Tientsin Agreements 
Despite the fact that Japan did not respond to the 
French hints and offers in DecemberP 18849 the possibility 
still remainedj so long as China resisted concessions9 
that the two countries night come to some arrangement.
However9 there was a noticeable change in their respective 
attitudes. On the French side interest in alliance
o , A
diminished, as their forces began to gain ground in Tongking'
and as the assumption that Japan would not fight was again
accepted. Sienkiewicz in particular3 maintained that
1 les hommes qui exercent actuettement une influence
preponderant© dans les conseils du gqyernement passeraient
au second rang si la guerre venait a eclater,'* as a
convincing reason why war could not be expected^
96. Even the Echo du Japon, which had been advocating an 
alliance since 1883s now 9 in January 1885? spoke of Japan's 
help as unnecessary and ridiculed a Japanese newspaper for 
believing that Japan need only ask for an agreement to secure 
it on favourable terms. See the weekly edition of Jan.16.1885®
97® C„PoJapon.XXIo Feb.5•1885- Sienkiewicz to Ferry.
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Japanese interest5 on the other hand* increased.
Or perhaps it would he more accurate to say that the Meiji 
Government reluctantly found that it was being forced 
into the position where it had to reconsider the French 
proposition. Such* at any rate* is the conclusion to
be drawn from the reports of the British Minister* Plunkett*
q8
who was kept well-informed by Inoue and I to. He noted
the rise of war feeling at the start of January* and
telegraphed on the 11ths I am assured Cabinet desire
peace but very extensive military preparations are already 
99completed.1 A few days later he added that the war
party was pressing hard for action.100 Meanwhile* 1'Echo
98. Despite the authority of his informants* Plunkett's 
reports need to be evaluated with some caution. It is 
possible that the Japanese leaders deliberately exaggerated 
the pressure to which they were being subjected. They had 
an obvious motive for this in that* if the British Minister 
could be persuaded that Japan meant business* British concern 
lest trade be jeopardised and Russia given the chance to make 
further advances* could be expected to ensure that her 
influence was used In Peking to bring China to make concessions. 
That this did in fact* to some extent*happen is suggested by 
the letters between Plunkett and Parkes that are enclosed 
in F.0.46. CCCXXVIII. No.6?. Feb.26.1885; Ibid. Ho.66*
Feb.27-1885. Plunkett to Granville. It also allowed Japan 
to threaten China indirectly* though It should be noted 
that China tried to maintain her position by the same means. 
Nevertheless* the fact that Japan tried to exert Indirect 
pressure on China does not necessarily mean that she was not 
prepared for war in the last resort and Plunkett’s reports 
are in general supported by French impressions also.
99® F.0.46.CCCXXVII. Ho.9. Jan.11.1885. Plunkett to G-ranville.
100. F.0.46.CCCXXVII. No.11. Jan.16.1885. Plunkett to Granville
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du Japon was noting on January 2nd that 1 L! opinion
publique au Japon est vivement surexcite1 and that all
the newspapers were demanding that the government take
vigorous measures. The reason for these heightened
feelings in Japan lay In the failure of Inoue* during
his mission to Korea* to reach an agreement with China
about ■withdrawal of troops and future co-operation.
The political necessity for the Japanese Government of
an agreement by which China would acknowledge that Japan
had a legitimate interest in Korea* and without which
the risk of renewed conflict would remain* was obvious;
and it was in the hope of achieving it that the decision
was taken in February that I to should himself go to China1.01
It was obvious too* that If war was decided upon*
Japan could hardly afford to neglect the naval and financial
support of France. It Is not surprising* therefore* that
bn February 17th Sienkiewicz derived from an Interview with
Inoue the impression that nsans oser surlevegr la question
d’une entente entre la France et le Japon* il desirait
neanmoins en preparer le terrain pour le cas oh les evenements
10?la rendraient necessaire” while less than a fortnight
101. On the decision to send Ito* Plunkett commented that
1 My colleagues generally believe that If Counts Inouye and 
It5 could have had their own way* no special mission would 
yet have been sent to Peking* but their hand has been forced 
and Cou3it ItO's mission is the last card played to endeavour 
to secure the game In favour of peace.’1 F.0.46. CCCXXVIII.
No.82. March 11* 1885. Plunkett to Granville.
102. C.P.Japon. XXXI. Feb.17.1885. Sienkiewicz to Ferry.
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later the issue was broached explicitly, though without
commitment, when Roessler, the Meiji Governments
German adviser, urged through a French interpreter that
Sienkiewicz should make official o v e r t u r e s . A b o u t  the
same time Plunkett was reporting, after 1wonderfully frank1
interviews with Ito and Inoue that so far French advances
had not been accepted but that 11 if Count Ito came back
empty-handed from Peking, war with China and an arrangement
with France would ensue.11 As early as January 16th,
the British Minister had reported that Admiral Kabayama
and General Takashima, who had been on Inoue1s mission
to Korea, had gone straight to Shanghai, and he commented!
"This looks suspicious as it is the French Minister
10^there who is negotiating for alliance with Japan Ml. y 
On March 9? he further announced that Kuroda had gone to 
Saigon, officially on a pleasure trip, but in public 
belief to be ready to combine future operations with the
D L O  ^
French commanders. On the French side Bougouin, the
military attache, was informed by General Miura in April 
that 11 Dans six mois, et peut-etre m&ne plus tot, le Japon 
d6barquerait une armee en Coree sous la protection de la 
flotte de IVAmiral Courbet .,T With all these signs of
103* C.P.Japon.XXXI. March 1885. Sienkiewicz to Ferry.
104. F.O. 46. CCCXXVII. No.71. March 1, 1885. Plunkett to 
Granville.
105* F.0.46. CCCXXVII. No.18 0 Jan. 16, 1885* Plunkett to 
Granville•
106. See enclosure to Parkes in F.0.46. CCCXXVIII. No.8 2 . 
March 11, 1885. Plunkett to Granville.
107* C.F.Japon.XXXI. April 8,1885* Sienkiewicz to Freyeinet*
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a tougher attitude it is hard to resist the conclusion 
that if China had refused to yield for much longer the 
idea of alliance would finally have been accepted by Japan*
As events turned out? Ito’s mission to China was 
successful enough to permit the maintenance of Inoue1s 
pacific policy* Both France and Japan benefited from 
China1s readiness^ clearly influenced by knowledge of 
Japan’s threats of co-operation with France5 to extricate 
herself from external complications while compromise was 
still possible.*^® Treaties were eventually signed? 
with Japan on April 189 and with France the next day,^1'
To France, China abandoned her traditional rights in Indo­
china 3 though she escaped the imposition of the indemnity 
that Ferry had sought* To Japan she Implicitly acknowledged 
some share in her suzerainty over Korea. So the idea of 
a Franco-Japanese alliance vanished9 just when it was about 
to materialise? having finally had the diplomatic effect 
that had always been its basic purpose.
108. Some acknowledgement of the fact that China recognized 
how much her difficulties would be increased by the prospect­
ive alliance between France and Japan may be seen in Li Hung- 
Whang’s declaration to the French consul that nc'etait grace 
a I1accord r^ceminent Intervenu avec le Gouvernement Francais 
qu'il avait pu arriver aussi facilement a une entente avec 
le Japon*11 C.P .Chine. LXVII. April 18? 1885. PateCnotre to 
Freyeinet.
109® In actual fact? a preliminary agreement had been 
signed with France on April 4. See Power, op.cit. p.189®
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CONCLUSION
In conclusion it may be worth summarising the reasons 
why an agreement failed to materialise? and also to try 
to establish? as far as the evidence will allow? exactly 
what was at stakes whether alliance? entente or merely 
some tacit understanding.
To take the latter point first? is It justifiable to 
speak In terms of alliance? when discussing the approaches 
made by France to Japan? As regards I8 8 3? and indeed 
most of 1884? the answer to this question is probably 
’no’? If one understands by the term ’alliance’ a long-term 
alliance? such as that signed later between Japan and 
Britain* What France wanted throughout the whole period 
was a military agreement whereby Japan would co-ordinate 
the deployment of hex* troops in Korea or north China 
with that of the French in Tongking? Formosa and south China. 
Despite the rumours that circulated in Japan and were 
half believed by the Meiji Government itself? France 
never actually reached a decision to seek a formal 
alliance. Thus? until late In 1884? the Meiji Government 
would have gained from agreement with France no more than 
the temporary furtherance of her own interests at China’s 
expense? together with some help in treaty revision.
From the Japanese viewpoint such an arrangement could not 
be regarded as satisfactory. On the one hand the basic
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preference of the men who controlled her foreign policy
was? as Inoue!s approaches In 1883 had shown? for co-operation
on the diplomatic plane alone. On the other hand the
risks of such a temporary agreement? involving? as it
would? war with a nation whose leaders appeared to have made
some progress in military self-strengthening? figured
more prominently in the Japanese Government’s calculations
than Its potential advantages. Before entering into an
agreement? therefore? Japan would have had to he sure that
It was of a more permanent character. ,Above all? It
would have had to be agreed that neither side should
make peace separately and that after the conclusion of
peace Japan should not be left to face China’s displeasure
alone. In other words? one of the prerequisites of
.Japanese co-operation was that it should be embodied In a
110regular alliance or something approximating to it.
Up until the last quarter of 1884? at least? this was 
either not seriously considered by Prance or? if considered? 
was evidently regarded as an unnecessary complication.
Whether France would have been more willing to consider 
it after that date? however? is another question. Had the 
other prerequisite of Japanese co-operation - China’s refusal
110. This was recognised on occasion by the French representa­
tives in Japan. See C.P.Japon. XXIX. Aug.23$1883. Viei-Castel 
to Challemel-Lacour; Ibid. Nov.7?l88§? Sienkiewicz to Challemel- 
Lacour. There is however? no record in French archives of any 
actual discussion at the Quai d’Orsay of the pros and cons of 
alliance.
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to make concessions - continued, it is likely that Japan 
■would have been forced to seek alliance with Frances and 
in that case it is doubtful whether the obligations and 
encumbrances of such an alliance would have outweighed 
in Jules Ferry’s mind the advantages of a quick settlement 
to a colonial war, which, begun with little serious thought, 
had dragged on far longer than originally expected. It 
seems especially doubtful in view of the fact that the war 
in Indo-China, though not unpopular in itself, was, because
Hi
it was bound up with national honour, " a cause of acute 
embarrasment and eventually, as Ferry found on the fateful 
night of March 30, 1885, of downfall* There seems no 
reason why a man who had been willing to co-operate with 
Germany should have refused to pay the comparatively small 
price which would be demanded by Japan, even if this was 
distasteful to some of his subordinates* Moreover, the 
offers of a low-interest loan by Patenotre and the 
approaches made to Mifura, even if they cannot be accepted 
with absolute reliability as expressions of French official 
policy, do suggest that the French Government’s attitude 
had begcome much more positive than it had been in 1883 *
In the end it was probably only Li Hung-Shang's willingness
111* Power, op.cit*p.180, referring to the end of 1884, 
observes that ”The real role of Tonkin in French domestic 
politics was to give an already determined opposition a 
point vulnerable to attack by patriotic arguments, a course 
made possible because the campaign in the Far East was 
going poorly.11
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and ability to compromise in 1885 that prevented the
first alliance between Japan and a western Power* J
There were other reasons than Li Hung-Chang*s diplomacy,
however, which prevented an alliance from being made in
the two years preceding April 1885 * Many factors played
their part, among them the disapproval of Britain and other
Powers the tactics employed, and the distrust felt, by
both sides, the low estimate of Japan’s military value by
the French Minister of War5 and the French misconception
of Japan’s eagerness for an agreement* One must also take
into account the somewhat intangible factor of French
reluctance, both in Tokyo and Paris, to link France with
a country which was still not considered sufficiently
110
civilised to exercise jurisdiction over foreigners o'"
The greatest impediments to alliance, though, were 
on the Japanese side* Even when the fear of Chinese 
military strength which was repeatedly expressed in I883 
faded, a fundamental obstacle remained* This was 
Inoue’s and Ito’s policy of seeking security and stability 
through diplomacy rather than war. The main danger for 
the Japanese leaders was still Western expansion in the
112. Too much should not be made of this point, however, 
since Japan’s respectability had grown enough by 1885 for 
her to be considered a possible ally by Britain in case 
of war with Russia. See F.0.46. CCCXXVI. Wo .64. June 8 ,
1885 in which Lord Granville wrote to Plunkett, should
be glad to have your opinion as to any steps that It might 
be desirable to take now or hereafter with the view of 
seonri n a l l i a n c e  . ’*
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112Far East.  ^ They were not eager,therefore9 to see 
China weakened so long as they could achieve a reasonable 
settlement without war. In very favourable conditions 
this reluctance might have been overcome? but at the 
moments when international circumstances seemed most 
promising there were always diplomatic factors working 
in the opposite direction. Thus a Franco-Japanese 
alliance became nothing more than one of history's 
might-have-beens.
113. For evidence of this see F.0.46. CCCXFIII. Dec.31.1884, 
where Plunkett reported to Granville that Japanese Ministers 
1 speak somewhat as if they considered such an alliance 
with a Western Power against an Eastern neighbour were 
contrary to the rules of the garae...*1 A little later 
Inoue observed with concern that %...the European colonial 
policy is beginning very strong and aggressive in the 
direction of Asia.” Denshin Sha-o. 1885° May 16. Japanese 
newspapers often voiced the same complaint.
CHAPTER VI.
FRANCE AND THE REVISION OF THE 'UNEQUAL TREATIES 
For all the interest of the manoeuvres that took place 
during the Franco-Chinese War, the diplomatic issue which 
most concerned Japan was Treaty Revision. An almost 
perennial theme of diplomacy, its importance is difficult to 
exaggerate. For the Japanese, revision of the treaties meant 
removal of the humiliating stigma of inequality, and the 
desire to achieve this aim. not only dominated diplomacy in 
the 1880*s and 1890!s, but was also one of the major factors 
In the acceptance of modernisation. Legal developments and 
reform, in particular, were prompted by the need to show the 
Powers that foreigners could abandon their special legal 
privileges writhout fear of the consequences, but many other 
changes also owed much to the Japanese belief that they would 
convince the Western Powers that. Japan was becoming little 
different from themselves. The importance of treaty revision 
went beyond this, however. It permanently affected the 
structure of Industry in that, during the long period in 
which Japanfs lack of tariff autonomy prevented her from 
adopting protective measures, it was impossible to stimulate 
economic growth except by Government sponsorship and subsidies 
to particular enterprises« The result of this was to encourage 
the growth of zaibatsu, great companies, whose domination of
the modern sectors of industry had far-reaching social 
and political consequences for Japan. An even more direct 
influence of Treaty Revision on politics was as a weapon to 
employ against the Government. The long drawn-out negotiations 
with the Powers in the late 1880®s and early I890fs were a. 
source of deep frustration for every Japanese, and criticism 
of the handling of the negotiations was the most effective 
way of uniting disparate opposition groups in assaults on the 
Hahbatsu leaders. The feelings which could be roused by this 
issue were strong enough to seriously disturb, the Government 
and to cause it to introduce even sterner repressive measures 
than before against political agitation. More significant 
than this, however, was the tendency of the opposition parties 
to change the emphasis of their slogans from minken (peopled 
rights) to kokken (national rights) as a result of the success, 
which had attended their criticism of the Government’s weakness* 
in its handling of Treaty Revision. (1 ) In i»eturn for 
momentary advantage they embraced a chauvinistic policy which 
in the long-run was bound to strengthen the military, their 
main rival as heir to the power of the; Meiji oligarchs.
Finally, the overall effect of the long drawn-out Treaty 
Revision negotiations was to produce disillusionment and
(1 ) This is an important theme of Inoue Kiyoshi’s Joyaku 
Raise! (Treaty Revision), (Tokyo, 1955). See also H. Conroy,
The Japanese Seizure Of Korea, pp.216-21 8.
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cynicism among the Japanese about Western pretentions to 
conduct international relations in accordance with impartial 
justice rather than military power.
In view of the immense importance of Treaty Revision to 
Meiji Japan and the length of the negotiations, the attitude 
of the Western Powers clearly demands close attention. (2). 
France’s part in Treaty Revision was less important than that 
of either Britain, which had far more at stake commercially 
than any other country and which had too much power in the 
Far Fast for any solution to be possible without her agree­
ment, or the United States, which set the pace in accepting 
the Japanese demands. Nevertheless, it was not insignificant 
To begin with, the French treaty with Japan, like that, of 
every other country, contained a most-favoured-nation clause 
which meant that complete revision would have to wait, at 
least in theory, on her consent. However, once the leading 
Power had given way, it became politically impossible for 
others to resist for long unless united, and the real Interest 
in France’s role lies in the early and middle periods of 
Treaty Revision, before Japan decided to concentrate on
2. There are very few studies of Treaty Revision in Western 
languages. The three most important works are F.C.Jones, 
Extraterritoriality in Japan, (New Haven, 1931), F.V.Dickins, 
The Life of Sir Harpy Parke a, vol.2, (London, 1 89i+), and P.J. 
Treat, Diplomatic Relations between the United States and
* ,' r r — rrny^T i^TTi'T-r^ i^ ^ ir ^TntiiT-ii-ir-» -- ir-rTiTnVT^mrtirT-r-rrrr' !»■ iimi .vr rmniinWiTfi-»;m g.iuw iiii.rrrTgapff^ awy.^rM
Jamn,_1J53-1895, 2 vols, Istanfora, 1932). All of these,
hoirever, appeared too early to make use of European diploma tin 
archives. There are a considerable number of Treaty Revision 
studies in Japanese, of which the most notable are Shimomura
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separate negotiations with. Britain. In these years Before
exerted a  considerable iwfiuewce on
1890 France................... .|.L;UMUiia^LMmsdthe course of
events, partly 'because her co*»operation and support was
sought By Britain whenever the latter feared isolation,
partly Because her own political and commercial interests, or
her representatives’ conception of them, led her on occasion
to further or hinder Japanfs cause.
France fs attitude towards Treaty Revision was moulded
By several factors. The most Basic was her commercial position.
Though not on the same scale as Britain's, her trade with Japan
was substantial and her interest in the maintenance of the low
tariffs of 1866 was therefore high. However, the difference
in value Between her imports from, and her exports to, Japan,
though less than that of some countries, was not inconsiderable.
Whereas she took approximately one fifth of Japanfs exports,
she supplied no more than one tenth of the goods imported into
Japan. Since any measure of Treaty Revision was certain to
affect Japanfs import duties far more than her export duties,
France stood to lose much less than Britain, whose trade wasA
extremely heavily on the side of exports to Japan. In view of
2. (Cont. from previous page)Fujio, Mei.ii Shonen J5yaku Kaisei— 
shino Kenkyu (Studies in the History of Treaty Revision in the 
Early Years "of the Meiji Period) (Tokyo, 1962), Yamamoto 
Shigeru, Joyaku Kaisei-shi (A History of Treaty Revision)
(Tokyo, 1 ^ WTT^Q-^niura Kf too... Kindai Hihon no Hoteki Reisei
>  w  ^  " ^ ^ ^ j J fr^ p » T i7 iT r^ i^ n ,nrrri,,‘»-Tr Hrr rin,'r..T*,rtn if»im»r 'fT  mi im  I'pir » i i wiiM'i r *  ; hi>
(The Legal Formation of Modern Japan) (Tokyo, 1957).
Especially important for the diplomatic side is the G*aimushOfs 
Joyaku Kaisei Keika G-aiyp, (Outline of the Process of Treaty 
Revision,Tokyo, 1^ 950,; "This is a supplementary volume to the
(Japanese Diplomati?%ocm^ts^7eliTTngBST o ra^ rea^y^^Vi^ion) 
k vols• (Tokyo, 19U1 -50) (hereafter cited as JKKN&B.) which
(Cont. on next page)
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this it is somewhat surprising that for the most part France 
showed herself no more accommodating towards Japanfs hopes of 
tariff revision than Britain. 5Part. of the explanation for 
this is to "be found In her special interest In the abolition 
of export duties on si11c and in the sale to Japan of warships, 
since her desire to achieve these two objects made her 
reluctant to give up any potential bargaining counter, but 
by itself this is hardly sufficient* At least as important 
were the political and psychological factors that were involved* 
Among political factors the most obvious was the French 
involvement in Indo-China, which at one point led the Quai 
d fOrsay to make a significant change in France's hitherto 
intransigent attitude * It also, however, caused France's 
representatives to adopt an extreme position, partly from 
resentment that the lure had not succeeded, partly in order 
to maintain a position from which further concessions could 
be offered, if such a line of approach should appear promising* 
Unfortunately for Japan, no stich opportunity again seemed to 
present itself, and the French posture hardened into one of 
permanent opposition to Japanese demands. Its eventual 
emergence from this phase appears to have been largely the 
result of a growing awareness of Japan's increased military
2* (Cont* from pi*evious page) contains almost all the Japanese 
documents of any importance^ as well as many communications 
from foreign diplomats.
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strength and of the difficulties that might be encountered 
if the Western Powers found that they had to deal with a 
clamorous Parliament rather than with the leaders who up 
to 1890 had no institutional opposition to worry about.
This changed feeling* on France's part also, however, 
owed something to the influence of the Franco-Russian 
Alliance, since with Russia eager, until 1891 at least, to 
arrive at some understanding with Japan, some encouragement, 
was naturally directed towards her ally to remove existing 
sources of friction with Japan* Yet another political 
consideration that weighed upon France was j^lousy of 
Germany, though this, like the Indo-China influence, led her 
towards both conciliation and obstinacy according to the 
circumstances. In general the effect was to produce hostility 
towards any policy v/hich owed its origin to German initiative 
and from which Germany could draw credit* Finally, it should 
be remembered that France's attitude throughout almost, the 
whole of the period was coloured by her sense of inferiority 
following the Franco-Prussian War* This was fortunate for 
Japan in so far as it meant that France was never prepared 
to stand out for the conditions she desired if all the other 
Powers had decided to give way, but it also had an adverse 
side. Her view of Treaty Revision vras strongly affected by 
her sensitivity about French prestige, with the result that 
she was inclined, whenever the danger of isolation was slight.
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to resist even minor concessions, on the ground that 
consistent resistance was the only way of winning Japanese 
respect•
France also had a cultural interest, in Japan which might 
have been expected to modify her extremely unfavourable 
attitude towards Treaty Revision. Much of the work on the 
new legal codes which were intended to justify Japan's claim 
to complete judicial autonomy was carried out with the aid of 
French experts and with the Napoleonic Codes as the chief 
model, and since France generally saw the propagation of her 
cultural traditions and values as one of the main aims of 
diplomacy, the Japanese might have been pardoned for imagin­
ing that their legal reforms might be given an enthusiastic 
welcome. Any hope, however, that, France would raise fewer 
objections than other countries to the abolition of 
extraterritoriality was soon shown to be illusory. Whether 
through irritation at the number of changes that were made to 
Boissonadefs drafts, or annoyance that the French jurist was 
one of the most ardent opponents of the arguments with which 
the European Powers buttressed their resistance, or simply, 
as her ministers usually claimed, owing to doubt as to 
whether Japan had judges capable of administering the new 
system fairly, France was as hostile as any Power towards 
every proposal to place foreigners under the jurisdiction 
of Japanese courts.
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Such, were the main factors and interests which either 
permanently or occasionally conditioned the French attitude 
towards Treaty Revision. (3)* How in detail they affected the 
French negotiations and the general course of Treaty Revision 
is the main subject of this chapter, hut first it is 
desirable to describe briefly the objections Japan had 
against the 1853 Treaties with the U.S.A., Holland, Russia, 
Britain and France, and the similar agreements with other 
Powers in succeeding years* From the Japanese point of 
view there were three major defects in the Treaties, and 
these were of sufficient material and psychological importance 
to justify their use of the term Unequal1 in describing 
them. The most obvious mark of inequality was the fact that 
whereas all the Western countries had insisted on clauses 
guaranteeing most-favoured-nation treatment, Japan herself 
possessed no such safeguard, and the provisions relating
3* It may be worth pointing out here that, unlike Britain, 
France was not forced to pay a great deal of attention to the 
views of the French: community in Japan* They were relatively 
few in numbers, and had no organisation of their own, and 
though their views were occasionally sought by the French 
minister in Tokyo there is no indication that their opposition 
to revision was ever able to prevent any change of policy which 
the Quai d*Orsay considered desirable for political reasons• 
This is not, of course, to say that the interests of French 
na t i ona1s were ignored *
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to her rights in other countries were meagre. This, however, 
was of little practical importance in the 19th century and 
was no more than a nominal objection in comparison with the 
two other complaints. The one which was voiced most in the 
earlier period of Treaty Revision was that Japan had been 
inequitably deprived of tariff autonomy* By the 1858 Treaties 
import and export duties had been fixed for the duration of 
those Treaties. Hot surprisingly in a period of enthusiastic 
Free Trade advocacy, these duties; were made fairly low, though 
not unreasonably so, but the Bakufu had bequeathed to Meiji 
Japan a heavy burden by agreeing, in 1866, to a new Tariff 
Convention which brought almost every item down to 5%* (h).
The lowness of these duties was a major obstacle to the 
establishment of. modern industries in Japan,, and from the late 
1870fs, when protectionism returned to Europe in full force;, 
they were out of keeping with International trends.
h® The signing of this new Convention did, in addition, to 
some extent prevent the Meiji Government from claiming that 
the Treaties had been imposed upon Japan by threat of force. 
According to Roches, the other Foreign Representatives would 
have been satisfied with a base of 10% -12% but he persuaded 
the Bakufu to accept the figure of 5%« See C .0. Yedo, IV,
Bee. 1 , 1865| also C.P. Japon, XIV, June 26, l866jboth Roches 
to Drouyn de Lhuys• Roches was presumably aiming to restore 
the Bakufurs position in foreign eyes; only by this hypothesis 
can the Bakufu1 s decision be understood, for the danger that 
the Powers would use force to lower tariffs in 1866 was 
negligible. The move was successful in the short run, but 
this was obviously no consolation to the leaders who overthrew 
the Tokugawa.
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nevertheless, although from the early 1880!s the Powers were 
prepared to allow some modifications^ the price asked in 
return was so high that Japan was forced to put up with them 
until 1899.
The other great objection, which probably rankled most 
deeply of all with the Japanese, and which dominated Treaty 
Revision from the middle 1880fs, related to the legal 
provisions of the Treaties* These had established the bases 
of a system of extraterritorial jurisdiction, similar in 
theory to that which had been granted to Europeans by the 
Ottoman Empire from a position of strength in the 16th century, 
but even more similar to that which had recently been intro­
duced after victorious war in China. Under extraterritoriality, 
foreigners were not subject to Japanese jurisdiction, except 
in cases where; they brought actions againsb Japanese, and in 
practice many of the offences committed by them, against 
Japanese law went unpunished by consular courts* In the 
conditions, of the 1860!s and 1870fs the system was: accepted 
by most thinking Japanese as the only way in which the gulf 
between Japanese and Western legal standards could be part­
ially bridged, but with the drafting of Western-style codes 
from the late 1870fs onwards some recognition of Japanese 
progressiveness was expected of the Western Powers* Wien 
this- was not forthcoming, or was so gi*udging that the Japanese 
attempt to make something of it had to be hedged in with very
substantial conditions, it aroused fierce resentment among
all politically-conscious Japanese*
A good deal of the Japanese opposition to the Treaties
was due to the way in which clauses whose drafting lacked
precision were interpreted by the Powers* Until the time of
Olcuma, for instance, the Japanese Government was obliged to
accept the Western view that the most-favoured-nation right
was an unconditional one, which entitled any Power to claim
for its nationals any privilege granted to another Power
without making an equivalent concession* More important than
this, however, was the fact that,because of her weakness,
Japan was unable to resist the Western interpretation of the
clause relating to the conditions; of revision* Article 20
of the French treaty, which was not unrepresentative, stated:
,fXl est egalement convenu que chacune des deux Hautes 
Parties contractantes pourra, apr&s en avoir prevenu 
1 ! autre, une annee. dfavance, a da ter du 15 a out 1872, 
ou apr&s cette epoque, demander la revision du present 
Traitd pour y faire les modifications ou y inserer les 
amendements que 1*experience aura it- d&montres necessaires.
This provision was by no means as clear as, say, that 
included in the 1860 Commercial Treaty between Britain and 
Prance, but it was substantial enough for the Meiji Govern­
ment to expect that it gave Japan the ultimate right to 
denounce any clause which had come to appear unsatisfactory. 
This interpretation, received additional support from. the.
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fact that the Treaties had actually been revised three times 
in the 1 860 ?s. (5). Since by accepting and seeking modifications 
the Powers had accepted the principle that the Treaties could 
he changed by mutual consent at any time, the inclusion of a 
revision clause in the Treaties could have had no meaning 
unless it signified that both Japan and the Treaty Powers 
were entitled from 1872 to rescind unilaterally any 
concession granted in 1858* This conclusion was not one 
which the Powers chose to accept. Except for a momentary 
hesitation about the legal position at the beginning and a 
brief attempt in 1873-4- by the French Minister to impose the 
extreme interpretation that the revision clause also gave the 
Powers the right to ask for new privileges: (6\ , the standpoint 
which they consistently maintained throughout almost the 
whole course of the Treaty Revision negotiations,, was that 
no changes could be made without their consent. The 
unfortunate corollary of this for Japan was that the Pov/ers 
were entitled to compensation fox’ foregoing their rights, 
and they v/ere not disposed to sell these cheaply.
5* The three occasions were the postponement of the opening 
of Nigata at the end of 1859 9 the postponement of opening of 
Edo, Osaka, Ilyogo, and Niigata in 1862, and the 1866 Tariff. 
Convention.
6 .* !3aaasJftii, i - f r r -  p u A Q .ft. See i>ejow.
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a) The First Phase of Treaty Revision (1 869'-1 87U).
The jtfirst demand for Treaty Revision on the Japanese side was 
voiced almost immediately after the Restoration, when on 
Feb. 8, 1868, at Iwakura Tomomi's instigation, an internal 
proclamation declared the new Government's intention of 
revising the treaties. (7). The importance of this proclam­
ation lay in its implicit disavowal of the old Jol position 
which logically would have required the total repudiation of 
the treaties rather than in any challenge to the Powers, for 
as yet, the inexperienced Japanese leaders had no concrete 
scheme of reform to propose. Indeed, the Meiji Government 
was not to formulate any clear ideas of its own until. 1876• 
This early phase of Treaty Revision, therefore, was character* 
ised firstly hy the Western Powers’ reaction to the mostly 
rather vague intimations of the Meiji Government that it 
desired to see changes effected in the Treaties, and secondly 
'by the Japanese attempt to prevent alterations being made 
which would impair rather than improve Japan's position. (8).
7m See Yamamoto, op. cit. p. 107.
8. luring this first phase the most important foreign country, 
as far as Treaty Revision was concerned, was the United States, 
The confusion which attended the Iwakura mission's visit to 
Washington in 1872 and the way in which it was induced by 
technicalities of Western diplomatic language and procedure to 
discuss Treaty Revision with: Secretary of State Pish are- 
brought out in a recent article by Marlene J. Mayo, *A 
Catechism of Western Diplomacy: The Japanese and Hamilton 
Pish, 1872", Journal of Asian Studies. (May, 1967).
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In the case of France, the earliest indication that 
Japan intended to take advantage of the revision provision 
after 1872 was received on February 23? 1869. Like most of 
his colleagues Outrey informed the Japanese Government that 
he could not discuss revision before the fourteen years had 
elapsed, and thoiigh he asked it to specify the articles on 
which changes were desired, his comments make it clear that 
he did not accept that one party alone could decide what 
those changes should be. (9)* In view of this rather 
unsympathetic reaction and the Foreign Ministry's awareness 
of its ignorance of international law, it is not particularly 
surprising that the whole subject, was dropped until 1871 •
When the Japanese claim was renewed on June 30? 1871 > 
a note of caution was in evidence. The communication from 
Sawa and Terashima spoke only of modifying ,run certain 
nombre de dispositions presentant des inconvenients.1 (10),
The Initial reaction of the French. Government showed that- 
such caution was not misplaced. Though nothing specific 
had been said of unilateral denunciation, Remusat saw the
9. G*G* Yedo, V, March 15,1869* Outrey to la Valette*
10* C*P. Japon* XXI* July 11,1871? Outrey to pavre*
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Japanese note as reason for maintaining French troops in 
Yokohama. (a 1). However, the French attitude v/as not yet 
as rigid as it was to become later. In May, 187 2, Remus at 
requested 1’urenne to report on the working of consular 
jurisdiction, (\ 2). and in his reply the charge d*affaires 
admitted that the existing system was imperfect and urged 
that mixed courts' be established and that the right of 
preventive arrest be granted to the Japanese, (13)* never­
theless even Turenne, who v/as markedly sympathetic towards 
Japanese aspirations,considered that any further measure of 
Treaty Revision would be premature and his realistic 
assessment of Japanese hopes clearly indicated that complete 
revision would take a very long time, *En effect,** he
concluded, ,fbien quTiis s foecupent
actuellement d fune fagon serieuse de codifier leurs lois, 
en leur donnant les adoucissements que reclame notre 
civilisation, bien qu’en principe nous puissons admettre
11 * C.P. Japon XXI, Sept, 21 1871 * Edmusat to Marine.
12, C.P. Japon XXI, May 7 1872. Eemusat gave as a reason that, 
the Japanese Ministers ,font< manifesto 1 ’intention de 
revendiquer, comme un des attributs de la souverainete 
terrltoriale, une plus grands autorite judieaire.**
13. C.P., Japon, XXI, July 17 1872, In a later memorandum, 
Outrey argued that the jurisdiction question should be solved 
by means of a gradual transition (C.P. Japon.XXI. Dec. 17 
1872) and Turenne*s comments showed that by the end of his 
stay in Japan he had moved a little nearer to the Japanese 
position. By April 1873* he was prepared to give Japan a 
merited encouragement by permitting Japanese magistrates to 
deal with a limited range of offences committed by foreigners.
avec eux que le droit de juridiction qui nous est concede 
par les Trait6s n*est que temporaire, et qu*il leur fera 
re tour quelque jour, il est notoire que nous ne pouvons 
pas d*ici a plusieurs ann6es faire bon marche de cette 
juridiction, car nos interSts ne pourraient etna 
sauvegardes si on les leur confiait avant l*epoque qufils 
auront form6 des juges integres et capables de mettre en 
pratique ces nouvelles lois.1 This argument was to
receive constant reiteration from the lips of various French
representatives, usually in a much more rigorous and dogmatic
form, in the next decade and a half.
As far as France was concerned, the actual problem of
working out some trifling concessions to meet Japanese demands
did not materialise at that stage• The feelers that had been
put forward by the Foreign Ministry in Tokyo in June, 1871,
were discontinued when the decision to send a high-ranking
mission to America and Europe was taken. The task of laying
the ground for Treaty Revision was entrusted to Iwakura, but
it was not envisaged that he should actually commence
negotiations, and after the confusion that was produced by
Fish*s offer to discuss a new treaty, the mission was not
particularly eager to raise the question when it arrived in
Paris at the start of 1873* In reply to Remusat*s offer to
examine any propositions that Japan might make, Iwakura
stated that the chief purpose of the mission was to convey
to the Powers Japan*s feelings towards them; apart from that,
it weIcomed the opportunity of gathering the Powers* opinions
on Treaty Revision, but no step would be taken until the
1 C.P. Japon. XXI. July 17* 1872. Tulrenne to R^musat.
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mission returned to Japan, (l 5). When, in fact, the members 
of the mission did arrive back during the summer, they were 
mostly too conscious of the immense disparity between their 
own country and the countries they had visited to have much 
hope of gaining anything of value from renewed negotiations. 
Thus the Meiji Government did not take the initiative in 
resuming talks until. 1876, and Finance was not approached 
until 1877 *
This is not, however, to say that there were no further 
developments concerning Treaty Revision* in 1873 and 187U* 
and the Japanese experience during this period may well have 
contributed firstly to the delay in taking up this prime 
diplomatic objective, and secondly to the cautious approach 
that marked Terashima1 s handling of the problem between 1876 
and 1879* The attempt of the European Powers to secure Treaty 
Revision on their own terms is an episode v/hich has received 
little attention, but it undoubtedly served to warn the 
Japanese of the dangers of acting over-hastily, and it is of 
particular interest to a study of French policy because the 
French Minister in Japan from June, 1873 to April, 1875* 
played a leading role in this European bid.
15- M.D. Japon. II. Jan. 2hP 1873* Compte-rendu of conference 
between Remusaf and Iwakura. Eemusat prefaced his remarks by 
saying that France was satisfied with the treaties at present.
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The European attempt to revise the treaties was not 
really due to a European initiative. It was the Japanese 
intimations, before and during the Iwakura mission, that 
they wished to commence negotiations which prompted the 
Powers to make preparations for such an eventuality, and by 
the time the ambassadors returned to Japan the machinery of 
revision was in operation* The Quai d*Orsay had taken two 
important steps to set it in motion. One was to consult the 
principal chambers of commerce in Prance, the most important 
of which expx^essed the view that tariffs should be lowered 
if possible. (16). More important was the appointment of 
Jules Berthemy, previously Minister at Peking and Washington,t ", 
with the specific mission of accomplishing revision* (17)* 
Berthemyfs attitude suggests that he believed the post at 
Tokyo to be incommensurate with his abilities and standing
16. C .0. Yedo. VI, July 20 1873* Broglie to Berthemy* Apart, 
from the lowering of tariffs the general view was that the 
status quo should be maintained.
17* The clearest evidence of this is an anonymous letter, 
dated March 1 , in the Moniteur des Spies, of April 17* 1875* 
Berthemy, it was reported, had himself stated at a recent 
dinner that; ,fsa mission itait remplie.1* The writerfs comment 
was; 1 Or, eomme il est. an vu et su de tout le monde que notre 
envoye n'avait d*autre mission que 1 Tattention de la revision, 
comme on l*avait choisi tout expres pour cette tdche delicate 
en raison de son tact et de son habilete, il est permis de 
supposer qu*il a echoue, comme son collegue anglais, puisqu*!! 
annonce que sa mission est terminee, alors que les ehoses 
restent dans le meme etat.”
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and felt that only a striking success v/ith revision could 
compensate him for this. As a result he at once began a 
campaign to remove the one great restriction that the treaties 
had preserved - free access to the interior. Despite the fact 
that French opinion had hitherto opposed rather than favoured 
the complete opening of Japan, (l 8). and despite the fact 
that any Japanese Government which granted such a concession 
would have made its position within the country untenable, for 
the next 18. months* Berthemy pursued this objective relentlessly.
For Berthemy and his British and German colleagues the 
problem, of opening the interior was that much less difficult 
to raise because Soyejima, the acting; Foreign Minister, had, in 
response to Italian pressure early in 1873? offered fx^ ee access 
to Italian traders under a passport system if Italy would agree 
to their being subject to Japanese laws and law courts outside 
the treaty ports. Though the Italian minister was tempted, 
the plan failed when the Italian government was advised by 
other European governments to keep in line and when it was 
made clear to Soyejima that this new privilege would be claimed
18. Eoches had frequently warned against free access on the 
grounds that it would lead to an over-intensive rearing of silk­
worms which while bringing quick profits would impair the quality 
of the stock in the long run. His views were echoed by the Lyon 
Chamber of Commerce in 1868. See C .C . Tedo. V. Aug. 6, 1868. 
Outrey to Gramont. See also the views of Duseigneur in the 
Moniteur des Soies of June 15? 1867* Outrey, too, in his memor­
andum of Dec .17? 1872, (M.D. Japon II.) was opposed to the 
opening of the whole country though he did hope that a passport 
system would be established whereby merchants would be allowed 
to visit the commex^cial centres.
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as an unconditional right by the other Powers. (i 9). The 
very fact, however, that the Japanese government, in the 
hope of proving that extraterritoriality was not really 
essential^had shown that it was prepared to consider the 
conditional opening of Japan, convinced the Foreign Representat­
ives that they were, morally justified in claiming free access 
in return for making the concessions that they themselves 
believed sufficient to safeguard Japanese interests• Heedless 
to say, their conception of Japan!s interests did not entirely 
coincide with that of the Meiji Government, which could EgSggEal 
SBBI hardly be happy at giving up its only important bargaining 
counter in exchange for the right to deal with petty offences 
outside the Tx*eaty ports. Consequently it soon became apparent 
that even Soyejima, whom the Foreign Representatives considered 
sympathetic to some extension of foreign rights, was becoming 
moi^ e reserved and was unwilling to commit himself until the 
Iwakura mission returned home. Although Iwakura was to arrive 
within a matter of months, at the stax*t of September, Berthemy 
was irritated by the delay* He held It to be wrong that a 
country which claimed, to be entering the way of progress should 
restrict foreigners to a few ports and he urged upon his
19 * Bee C.P. Japon* XXII* March 17? 1873* Turenne to RSmusat; 
Ibid. May, 12, 1873? Turenne to Remusat; C*P„ Japon XXIII. Aug. 
17? 1873* Berthemy to Broglie
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colleagues the necessity of working on the Japanese
■i • 20Government without delay* ‘ An interview in August
with a conciliatory Soyejima persuaded him for a time that
the negotiations which were promised within a month were
21likely to result in European demands being met, but
two conversations with Iwakura and the Japanese Government’s
slowness in replying to the Foreign Representatives’
reiterated, demand for talks soon reversed that favourable
22impression, ~ ° Before long Berthemy was beginning to doubt 
whether success: could be. achieved by what he deemed a. 
reasonable approach* By November he was writing to his 
Minister ominouslyi
20, C.P* Japon, XXII, July 27, 1873* Berthemy to Broglie*
21 * G.P* Japon* XXIII, Aug* 12,, 1873* Berthemy to Broglie,
22, C.P* Japon* XXIII* Oct. 12, 1873* Berthemy to Broglie*
The Foreign Representatives had presented a draft eet of 
regulations relating to access to the interior, the main 
features of which were their acceptance that foreigners outside 
the treaty ports should be subject to local regulations and 
their insistence that offenders should be handed over to, and 
judged by, their own consul*. The Japanese failure to reply at 
once was presumably due partly to the dispute over a Korean 
policy which led to Soyejima¥s resignation on October 22nd, 
but the main cause was undoubtedly their embarrassment over the 
position in which Soyejima had placed them. To allow access 
to the interior would open the way not only to awkward incidents 
between Japanese and foreigners but also to foreign economic 
penetration and although in theory foreigners would still not 
be able to own property, Japan would have very little left to 
hold out in the future as an incentive for complete treaty 
revision when that aim was made possible; by the establishment 
of a reliable modern legal system*
- 266
,fVous n ’apprendre^ done pas sans surprise, M. le Due, qua 
l'accueil emgresse, pour ne pas dire plus, dont 1 fambassade 
japonaise a ate en Amerique et en Europe a eu un resultat 
diame'tralement contraire a celui^qu’en attendaient sans 
doute les gouvernements interesses et que ce resultat 
vient de se traduire par un refus pur^et simple de la part 
du nouveau Ministre des Relations Exterieures de^discuter 
les propositions soumises a lfexamen de son predecesseur. 
Traite en enfant gate, le Japon abuse de la position qu'on 
s ’est plu a lui faire.lf
For a man of Berthemyfs temperament, this situation was
not one to he accepted without a struggle. Strong protests, 
and the hint that the remaining payment on the ShijStsekia
Indemnity would he insisted on were the Japanese Government un­
cooperative, led Terashima, the new Foreign Minister, to px^ omise
a counter-draft incorporating the conditions under which Japan
2d
would allow free access, hut this had still not heen produced
hy the end of the year, The Foreign Representatives had already
reminded the Meiji Government of its indemnity obligation hy
this time, hut the latter appeared on second thoughts to have
decided that this financial burden was preferable to the
penetration of the interior and Terashima had promised to pay 
25
hy July, 187^. Thus a major diplomatic weapon had heen blunted
and Berthemy was forced hy the end of the year to conclude that
as long as Iwakura remained in power there was little chance 
26
of progress.
23#) C.P.Japon. XXIII. Nov.9,1873# Berthemy to Broglie.
21^.*) G.P,Japon. XXIII. Nov.20,1873. Berthemy to Broglie.
25#) G.P.Japon, XXIII. Dec.7*1373- Berthemy to Broglie. The 
indemnity actually was paid off in 1871}..
26.) G .P.Japon. XXIII. Bed1.28,1873. Berthemy to Broglie.
ITliis verdict was made to seem a little pessimistic in 
January, when Terashima, reverting to the caution that normally- 
characterised the Meiji Government1s conduct of diplomatic re­
lations, gave Berhhemy to understand that access to the interior
27
would he allowed for purposes other than trade. Though this
'by no means satisfied the French minister, it gave him hope
of a change of attitude on the ifiore important question* Once
more,however, disappointment followed. Ho attempt was made
hy the Meiji Government to implement its half-promise, and a
number of incidents concerning foreign diplomats occurred which
were dealt with in what the foreign Representatives re-
28
garded as a half-hearted and tardy manner. By late June it 
had bec6me clear that the Japanese Government had no intehtion 
of agreeing to any change in the jurisdictional situation until 
it was in a position to claim the total abolition of extra­
territoriality. At an interview with Terashima and two other 
Japanese Ministers, the Foreign Representatives were informed 
thatt the Dajokan, the highest government council, had rejected 
both the Western proposals and the Foreigg Ministry’s counter­
proposals, plainly a move dictated by the hope of ending all 
further discussion.
27*) P.Japon. XXIV. Jan.19*1874. Berthemy to Becazes.
28.) C.P.Japon. XXIV. May h?l87k-l Ibid. May 8,l87U* Berthemy 
to Decazes.
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As a result of this action, Berthemy, Parkes, and von 
Brandt faced the problem of finding new tactics which would 
justify the continuation of the negotiations. They were able 
to do so by concentrating on an argument which up till then they 
had no more than hinted at. Since the Japanese Government 
employed several hundred foreigners to 'whom in manji cases free­
dom of movement was necessarily allowed, the foreign Re­
presentatives clhimed that all their nationals were entitled 
to this privilege by right of their most~favoured~nation 
clauses, and at the end of their interview they informed 
Terashima of their view in unmistakfcable terms. By Berthemy, 
at least, this was intended to be more than an idle threat.
The dispatch in which he reported these developments to the 
Quai d ’Orsay ended with a recommendation that the Powers act 
firmly:
’Le moment est neanmoins venu pour les principaux 
d ’entre eux de decider s ils accepteront la 
situation faite a leurs nationau* par 1 ’obstination 
injustifiable des conseillers actuels. du Mikado, 
ou bien s ’ils clonneront a leurs Representants 
les instructions necejisaires pour vaincre des 
obstacles qui disparaitront, j fen sui.s certain, 
devant J. ’expression .nettement formulee d ’une 
volont6 commune.1 y
Whether the French and other European Governments would 
have agreed to Impose their will upon Japan by means of joint 
action is somewhat doubtful.
29*) C.P.Japon.XXIV. July8,1874-.
The collaboration of Britain would have been essential, yet
Parkes does not seem to have been so committed to the cause
30
of free access as Berthemy. Even the Quai d ’Orsay, though
initially sympathetic, in pftac'tiee did little to implement
31
the suggestion of its representative. Reactions might well
have been less negative, however, had not the Meiji Government
heeded the Foreign Representatives* language and taken steps
to draw the sting from their newly-awakened irritation. By
its note of July 13 it conceded to foreigners possessing the
recommendation of their legation the right to a&k the Japanese
Foreign Office for passports permitting them to travel within
Japan for the ptopose of health, study, or other important
32
reasons, trade alone being specifically excepted. This com­
promise was welcomed by the British Foreign Office and, to a
33
lesser extent, by Parkes, and though Berthemy was still
30.) P.OJ46. CLXXXI. Up. 157* Aug.21,187^. Parkes to Berby. At 
this period Parkes’ attention was almost exclusively occupied 
by the possible consequences of the Formosan Expedition.
31*) A dispatch of July 16,187A, (C.P.Japom. XXIV) from Decases 
had spoken in fairly critical terms of Japanese obstructionism 
and was quoted by Berthemy to Terashima. On September 30,187U,
(G.P.Japon, XXIV) Decazes wrote again, approving Berthemy for 
his line of action and stating that he had recommended collective 
action to the other Cabinets,but the lack of reference to this 
move in the Foreign Office’s correspondence with Parkes and 
in the correspondence between the Foreign Office and Paris In­
dicates that the Berthemy line was not pursued with any: vigour, 
if at all. The same Sept.30 dispatch actually states:, in fact, 
that stronger pressure would not only have failed to secure the 
opening of the interior but would have offended the Japanese 
ministers.
32.) C.p.japon. XXIV. July 20, 187^; Berthemy to Decazes.
33*) See F.0.1+6 • CLXXXI. Ho.137* Aug.21,187^ -, Parkes to Derby, 
and the Foreigg Office comment on it.
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dissatisfied enough to push his colleagues into drawing up
3k
another collective note reiterating their previous demands, 
all hope of substantial treaty revision was now at an end.
The Japanese Government would not have consideregd yielding 
further unless clear evidence had emerged of the Powers* in­
tention of talcing firm collective action. Negotiations were 
not resumed and when positive instructions from Paris failed 
to materialise "by December, 187U> even Bertherajt, whose energy
had heen one of the chief features of this phase of Treaty
idea of »£•
Revision, gave up all/N renewed effort. Nevertheless, though
little substantial change had emerged from this first phase,
the results might have been very different had the Meiji
Government shown itself less flexible.
3U.) G.P*Japon. Aug.l8,l87U* Berthemy to Decazes.
35*) Berthemy admitted this in a dispatch of Dec. 6,l87i+
(C.P.Japon. XXIV), The Quai d ,0rsayts failure to exert itself 
in his support is probably attributable to the Japanese con­
cession of July 13th, Japan?s successful conclusion of the 
Formosa Expedition, the French desire to maintain a military 
mission in Japan, and habitual caution.
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b) The tSecond Phase. 1877-1889*
When the 1bsue of Treaty Revision was next taken up, the
Mei^i Government not surprisingly approached France only when
extensive preliminary negotiations had been carried out Ydlth
36
other Powers, At the beginning of this second phase, Foreign
Minister Terashima, supported by the Finance Ministry under
Okuma and Matsufcata, confined Japan's demands to straightforward
37
revision of tariffs. The sympathetic response, first of Fish,
then of Evarts, led to a new treaty being signed with the U.S.A*
after two years of talks, on July?25, 1878. This treaty was
to come in force, however, only when all other countries had
revised their treaties with Japan, so that the problem of
securing the assent to raised tariffs of the ma^or European
Powers still remained. Nevertheless there were some hopeful
signs at this stage. Both Russia and Italy were favourable
to new treaties, the one for political, the other for commercial 
38
reasons. Unfortunately for Terashima, Britain and Germany were
36.) The three phases Into which this account of Treaty Revision 
is divided are intended to refer not to# phases of Japanese dip­
lomacy, but to the stages at which the French attitude to Treaty 
Revision Underwent important change#. After 1877 France no 
longer sought to take the initiative in Treaty Revision, since 
she realised that any change in the system would have to be a. 
compromise favouring Japan. Except briefly during the Franco- 
Chinese dispute, therefore, she consistently opposed all efforts 
to alter the situation, an attitude which changed In the late 
1880's* only when Japan's increasing strength convinced French 
diplomats thact fundamental Treaty Revision was inevitable and 
that France should make the best bargain she could, before her 
treaty was denounced unilaterally.
37*) For the background to the Japanese resumption of negotiations 
see Shimomura Fujio, "Joyaku Kaisei", (Treaty Revision) pp.73-75, 
in KOnishi Shiro ed., jy^ndai^Shnkai (Modern Society) (Tokyo,195h).
By this time there were also some demands for protectionism from
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much less responsive and while these two countries stood to­
gether the chances of even moderate success were slight, so 
long as Japan refused to yield over the opening of the interior 
to# trade. France's attitude could not materially affect the 
situation, hut owing to the existence of a certain amount of 
divided opinion between Paris and Tokyo as to what line of 
policy was in France's beet interests her influence was even 
less than ik might have been. The inclination of Geofroy, 
the minister in Tokyo who received the first definite Japanese 
project of a revised tariff in February, 1878, was to make 
concessions to Japan without too much bargaining, in the hope 
that France might avoid incurring Japanese displeasure . Hot/;
that he felt that the new duties suggested, which ranged from
5% to 30%, were completely justified, but so long as woollen 
muslins did not suffer, French interests were in no real danger. 
His advice to his government, therefore, was to offer
37 •) contd/.. the nascent Japanese press.
38.) Ibid. p.75*
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t!un accueil facile aux ouvertures du Gouvernment 
Japonais et de ne point subordonner notre 
acceptation a, une entente avec 1 Singleterre 
dont les interets au Japon sont essentiellement 
distincts des notres.1*-^
The opinion of the Quai d'Orsay on this question provides 
one more example of how local and international factors tended 
to he viewed differently in Toltyo and Paris. In April, 1878, 
Foreign Minister Waddington replied that before deciding France's 
position oh tariff revision, he wished to know how the 
Foreign Office felt.
39.) C.C. Tokyo.I. Feb.10,1878. Bee also his dispatch, written 
after a visit from Terashima, of Oct.16,1877» (C.P.Japon XXVI).
In It he stated that: ".. ,un refus des Puissances Europeennes 
aurait probablenient pour resultat de precipiter la conclusion 
d’un arrangement sgpare entre le Japon et les Etats-Unis, 
arrangement auquel nous serions tot ou tard forces de nous 
rall&er." This reads curiously in the light of the subsequent 
failure of the U.St.«Japan treaty to make any real impact on 
the Treat# Revision* dtit it does reveal the continuing French 
fear of isolation, which meant that Japan need not worry 
overmuch aboiit a French refusal to acquiesce in any ne?/ treaty 
which had won general agreement. It may he worth adding that, 
about this time Geofroy was becoming concerned about France's 
diminishing prestige in Japan. (Bee C.P.Japon. XXVI. Jan.28, 
1878. Geofroy to Waddington)
"Je n'ai pas a revenir ic®," he wrote, "sur^les 
considerations g^nerales qui nous en^agent a 
mainterplr dans noB rapports ^_avec les nations de 
1 'Extreme Orient, particulierement avec le Japon, 
l'harmonie de vues, dont se sont en toute 
circo3jstanee inspires les diffSrents Cabinets 
Europeeps et^quiQa fait jusqu'ici leur force et 
leur security." ^
When the Quai d'Orsay was formally presented with Japan's
demands by its Minister in Paris, Sameshima, it gave them an
kl
extremely cool reception, and though Geofroy still felt that,
general considerations apart, France would do well to align
herself with the U.S.A. rather than Britain, he was forced
by his instructions to inform Iwakura that France found the
compensation that Japan was offering in return for higher tariffs 
k2
insufficient.
k0.) C.P.Japon. XXVI. April U* 1878. Waddington to Geofroy.
All) Bee C .0 .Tokyo. I. Sept .20,18?8. Waddington to Geofroy.
The French Government did not refuse absolutely to discuss the 
question, but it did inform Sameshima, as a later memor­
andum by Ueofroy put it,that "toute n6gociation d'ailleurs 
nous semblait inutile qui n ’embrasserait pas les mesures propres 
& <§tendre les relations commerciales des deux pays en facilitant 
I'acc&s du Japon aux citoyens et aux capit&ux Frangais."
M.B.Japon II. (June 26,1879). This was in line with the British 
position at the time. As Geofroy observed, to adopt such a 
standpoint was to abeopen the question of extraterritoriality, 
which had proved insoluble in 187-^1-, and was now to find itself 
inextricably linked to the question of tariffs, a development 
which made Treaty Revision inordinately complicated and was 
undoubtedly a major factor in preventing the achievement of 
even partial revision for a very long time. Some of the 
responsibility for this also rested ?/ith the Japanese who were 
impatient with any measure of progress which did not promise 
the abolition of extraterritoriality. Terashima's re­
placement by Inoue in Sept.,1879, was largely the result of this 
dissatisfaction. See Hanabusa, Meiji Gaik6-shi,p.65. 
k2.) C.P.Japon. XXVI. Dec.13,1878. Geofroy to Waddington.
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In 1879 the want of unanimity over the attitude France
should adopt towards Treaty Revision was made good by Geofroy's
return to France. His successor, Balloy, had no difficulty
in accepting the Quai d ’Orsay's subordination of French interests
to cooperation with Britain, and there was no question of his
becoming an advocate forJapan. Indeed, his opinions gave Japan
even less hope than those expressed by the ^uai d 1 Orsay.
Explaining, as he did, the Meiji Government's desire for Treaty
Revision as an attempt to distract the Japanese people from
its domestic grievances, rather than as a genuine national 
h3
aspiration, he was hardly likely to search for compromise.
His advice to the Quai d'Orsay in fact was;
"Laisser le Gouvernement Japonais faire ses propos­
itions jusqu'au bout sans lui repondre. Une 
fois que tout ce qu'il demand© sera connu, nous le 
prierons de dire ce.qu'il nous offre en ©change.
Ses propositions seront vraiCsemfcfeblement insuf- 
fisantes. Rous pourrons alors faire sT notre tpur 
des contre-propositions, et come, de 1'aveu meme 
de Monsieur le Ministre des Affaires Strangeres, 
le Gouvernement Japonais est oblige de se creer des 
ressources nouvelles, nous le tiendrons par la 
question d'argent, et nous 1 'obligerons"a en passer 
par ce que nous trouverons juste ci'exiger de lui 
en compensation des charges plus 6levees dont il 
frappera notre commerce.
43.) G.P.Japon. XXVII. July 25*1879. Balloy to Waddington,
i^li-.) C.C.,Tokyo. I. Dec. 13*1879* Balloy's language to Inoue 
on this occasion is not without Interest: "ne perdez pas de 
vue que, plus vous vous montrerez liberal avec nous, plus vous 
arriverez vite d votre but qui est de recouvrir 1'integralite 
de vos droits. En examinant les affaires k un point de vue 
etroit et mesquln comme c'est malheureusement trop souvent le 
cas vous ne nous encouragez pas & vous faire des concessions
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These somewhat Machiavellian suggestions were superseded a
few months later when the proposals of Inoue, the new Foreign
Minister, were actually made known. ,fNotre replique/* Balloy
then stated, Hdoit erfcre le rejet pur et simple des propo-
✓ U5
sitions actuelles comma hases de negociations ,,f At the same
time he informed the Quai d fOrsay that he had Been working
with some success on his British, G-erman, Russian, Austrian,
and Dutch colleagues to induce them to recommend the same
46
response to their own governments. Until this point the Quai, 
despite several other dispatches from Balloy bitterly 
criticising the new draft codes and the workings of Japanese
47
justice, had preserved something, at least, of Geofroyfs
impartiality, and in June, 1880, it haa recognized that the
48
1866 tariffs were excessively moderate, hut in the face of
45.) 0.0 ..Tokyo. 1 his, July 21,1880. Balloy to Freyeinet.
46.) For his vigorous and outspoken approach to Kennedy, the 
British charge l.f affaires, see F.O .46 , CCLXVIII, No.123.
July 13,1880. Kennedy to Granville.
47.) C.P.Japon. XXVII. Sept .15,1879; Ibid. April 22,1880. 
Balloy also took the unusual step for a French diplomat of 
seeking the opinion on Treaty Revision of French traders at 
Yokohama. Bee ft1Echo du Jauon. Rec.12,1879 * Clearly this was 
with the intention of gaining support for his opposition to 
the Japanese proposals. Normally little heed was paid to the 
views of interested merchants. SeeL fEcho du Japon*s complaint 
in its edition of Nov.25,1881.
48.) C .0 .Tokyo. I his. June 11,1880. Freyeinet to Balloy.
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Balloy1s strong advice and the apparent unanimity of the other
important European powers, it now rejected Inoue*s proposals 
49
outright.
Balloy was not, and could not 'be, an important figure in
the history of Treaty Revision, but attention has been paid
to him here because his language so strikingly conveys the
basic essence of French Treaty Revision policy from the late
1870*s to the end of the l880fs. Fundamentally France was
content with the status quo, saw no reason to encourage Japan,
and was generally to be found dragging her heels whenever
concessions were mooted. Even those ministers in Tokyo who
did not share Balloy*s anti-Japanese feelings followed his
line rather than that which Geofroy had tentatively suggested.
Roquette, for instance, who replaced Balloy in December, 1880,
was a relatively impartial observer of the Japanese scene, as
his painstaking and extremely fair-minded analysis of the new
50
paenal code and code of criminal procedure showed. Never­
theless, despite his friendly relations with members of the 
Japanese Government and Foreign Office, he never felt able to 
give more than vague assurances of French sympathy in replyto 
Japanese appeals for advice and encouragement.
49*) C.C.^okyo. 1 bis. Nov.24*1880. Barthelemy St. Hilaire to 
Balloy, Formal rejection, however, was only conveyed to Inoue 
in December, 1881. See 0.P.Japon. XXVIII, Dec .8,1881. Roquette 
to Gambetta. Inoue*s tjroposals had gone beyond what he suggested 
In early 1880. Owing partly to pressure from public and col­
leagues, and partly to the completion of a new penal code and 
a code of criminal instruction, he decided to extend the scope
of Treaty Revision to extraterritoriality as wall as tariffs.
50.) C.P.Japon. XXVIII, July 29,1881. Roquette to Barthelemy 
St. Hilaire.
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His assurances, moreover, were always coupled with admonitions
to de patient and to 'be content with minor improvements for
the next twenty years at least. From the first he urged Japan
to adppt a less demanding position and to appeal to the Powers
for understanding of her progress and needs, hut the fact that
he himself, after making all these points to a disillusioned
I to in August, 1881, called them Tf consolations banales**
suggests that he really had little confidence in the efficacy
51
of such methods. His one concrete proposal, which he made in
conjunction with his British and German colleagues, was a
European conference on Treaty Revision, but though this was
welcomed hyylnoue, hy the time It5 and Terashima, the two
Councillors specially concerned, had come tofdecision in
August, 1881, the whole project had "been drought to ntoght by
52
the opposition of the British and German Governments. However*,
the idea of a European conference can hardly de regarded as a
significant break in French policy. In regretting the decision
of the European Cabinejs Roquette wrote: ^Si mes colleagues et 
moi^eroyons quf^ l eut ete preferable de negocier en Europe, 
c'efait pour tacher d'arrivep a donner le moins possible et 
contender c©pendant les DeleguSs du Japon, tandie qu'ici, il 
est plus que douteux que nous arrivions a une entente?
51•) C.P.Japon. XXVIII.Aug.10,1881. See also Ibid, March 2,1881 
Ibid, March 18, 1881. All Roquette to Barth^lemy St. Hilaire* 
52.) G.P,Japon. XXVIII. July 1,1881; Ibid, Aug.10,1881.
Roquette to Barth6lemy St. Hilaire.
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En effet, dans la future revision, il s agit seulement de faire 
des concessions - nous n'avons rien "a attendre puisqufon n fa 
rien a nous offrir •* il fallait done avec beaucoup de courtoisie 
et d 1 empressement exalter les progres des dix dernieres annees 
et assignor eomme recompense tel albandon de nos droits dans 
une limite prevue et arr&tee a l*avance. L famouts-propre est 
ici le grand mobile de tons les hommes d ’Etat, et, se trouvant 
en Europe, ravis d fun compliment sort! de la douche d rune 
personnage illustre, ils eussent exige bien moins ^ et eussent 
prefere la^satisfaction d !une louange 'S la realite* d*une con- 
cession.** ^
Roquette!s attitude offered no great hopes for Japanese 
aspirations hut at least it was not overtly hostile. The 
next minister, Tricou, who arrived in June, 1882, was opposed 
even to the suggestion that the treaties should not he regarded
5k
as permanent. In common with his colleagues, he was prepared
to accept minor tariff concessions and the introduction of
mixed tribunals in commercial matters, but these socalled
concessions were to be hedged around in his scheme of things
with conditions, and would, moreover, only be granted if
foreigners were permitted to travel in the interior for,-purposes. 
55
of trade. To take this position was tantamount to rejection
of the possibility of Treaty Revision, since the Japanese
Government would gain a mere fraction of j^ gjh its
demands, while in return if would give up its sole commercial
bargaining-counter, and render itself open to the accusation
53*) C.P.Japon. XXVIII. Aug.10,1881. Roquette to Barthelemy 
St. Hilaire.
5k*) C.P.Japon. XXVIII. July 15,1882. Tricou to Ereycinet.
55 •) C .0 .Tokyo . II bis, Aug .11+1882. Tricou to Ruclere.
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that it was endangering national independence.
Daring Tricou*s stay in Japan France maintained her
position as the most obstinate of the major Powers, hut with
his sudden transfer to China in mid-l#83, French policy was
to swing; briefly to the other extreme. This swing, however,
was not due to any personal factor but to the outbreak: of
hostilities involving French and Chinese in Annam. It was,in
fact,Paris which initiated the change of attitude, when in ^Sne,
in the hope of securing some form of Japanese assistance, it
decided to offer to renounce the principle of the Treaty’s
permanence, to return to Japan gradually the right to impose
administrative regulations binding on foreigners without
diplomatic intervention, and to negotiate a separate commercial
agreement, all of which ideas had received a hostile reception 
57
from Tricou. The French action was all the more significant
in that it was taken, not only without consultation with
Britain, but in the knowledge that it would undermine British
56.) Oka, in his previously cited essay, !,Kokuminiite&i Dokuritsu 
to Kokka Hisei," pp.14-17* stresses the fact that all sections 
of opinion in Japan showed a similar consciousness of Japanese 
inferiority to foreigners at this time, and the fear of economic 
or* political domination from outside was strong enough in a 
large numbex1 of the Government’s critics for them to oppose im­
mediate mixed residence in the interior even in exchange for the 
abolition of extraterritoriality.
57 •) At the end of 1882 the Quai had itself endorsed Tricou*s 
reservations on both points. 0.0.Tokyo. II bis. Bov.24*1882. It 
informed Tolyo of its changed attitude in July. C.P.Japon. XXIX. 
July6,l883* Challemel-Lacouir to Viel-Castel. See also JM&GjEi.
Vol.II., documents 292-302, pp.918-969* The latter consist mainly 
of reports by Hachisuka and Marshall, in one of which it is stated 
that the change of attitude was only arrived at after the Commerci 
JftrMHraqrsril Department of the Quai d'Orsay was subjected to con­
siderable pressure by the Political Department. Ibid. p.924. 
Nothing of this dispute is visible in the French archives, un­
fortunately .
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Treaty Revision strategy* Even if in substance France made
no concession that could not he reversed if other Powers did
not follow suit, it was the first initiative in Japanfs favour
which she had taken® and was not without some influence on the
Governments of Belgium, Holland, Italy, Spain, and Switzerland,
which hitherto, at least, had adopted a detached attitude*
All these Powers, in fa&t, expressed approval of the Gorman
59
Governments: compromise circular of July 1},. With other Powers
more of less sympathetic also, Britain, by the end of 1883,
was forced to modify her position to the extent of accepting
that the new commercial treaties should he denunciable after
ten or twelve years, providing that Japan had: been opened to
foreigners for a period of perhaps three years before notice
60
of termination was given.
58.) Britain had moved further from its late 1870*s position 
than had France up to this point and had, in the 1882 pre­
liminary revision conferences in Tokyo, collaborated with 
Germany in the drafting of a tariff project which would have 
gone some way towards meeting Japanese objections on the score 
of low import duties. However, commercial expediency dictated 
that her liberalism should go only so far, and in a circular 
of April 16, 188S, she attempted to secure the prior agreement 
of the Powers to her proposal that the new treaties should be 
unlimited in duration, Ibid. p.922.
59*) Jd.vaku Ilaisei Keika Gaivo* p.203. It was claimed at the 
time by Marshall that the French attitude had stimulated the 
German action also. JKKNGB-. vol.II, p.929, Marshall to Ito. J 
July 19,1883*
60.) Ibid.p.832. Mori to Inoue, via Hanabusa, Bee 13, 1883.
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This slight success proved less important than it might 
have heen because the French change of attitude had sprung not 
from any basic re-alignment of policy towards Japan but from 
a temporary panic due to events in Indo-China. When it was 
found that the situation co\xld be contained and that, in any 
case, Japan was anxious not to risk ChinaTs enmity, the tra­
ditional negative stand was, as far as was decently possible, 
resumed. This was indicated by the Quai as early as July, 
when in its reply to the British Note, it stated that it did 
not accept the argument that the new commercial treaties might
be unilaterally denounced by Japan, and showed strong signs
61
of reverting to the policy of entente with Britain* Sienkiewicz 
himself was even more decided. His observation in November,
1883, that unous avons accorde au Japon des concessions tres- 
importantes dans la question de la revision des traites et nous
t / /n avons obtenu, en echange, que le temoignage de la crainte
62
que 1 Empire Chinois inspire aux Ministres du Mikado” did not 
augur well for Japan. The feeling that Japan had not responded 
to French generosity as she ought, and, possibly, the hope
61.) Bee the dispatch of Ju^y 7,1883, from Challemel-Lacour to 
Comte d rAunay, French charge d'affaires in London, enclosure 1, 
Marshall to ltd July 19,1883, Ibid.pp. 933-5 • From a talk between 
Marshall and Clavery, the Commercial Director at the Quai d'Orsay 
it would seem that the main reason for the swift appearance of 
second thoughts was the hostility of the Commercial Department, 
which had immediate control over Revision policy. Enclosure, 
Hachisuka to Inoue, Oct,3,1883* Sienkiewic& to Challemel-Lacout 
Ibid. p.974-3




that she might yet perceive what she stood, to gain, appear
to have persuaded the French Minister that France1s interests
would best he served hy his leaving the initiative on Treaty
Revision to Inoue and then discovering objections to Japan!s
6 3
proposals which had previously been overloofeed, His determi­
nation to resist Further concession was reinforced by the fact 
that Germany had now taken the lead in encouraging Japan,
"Accepter les propositions Aiieman0.es, c ’est a dire fixer,^des 
maintenant, 1’epoque ou les traites pourraient etre denonces 
dans leur ensemble par le Japon," he wrote in J)ecember, 1883> 
Hce serait non seulement compromettre les interets de nos 
nationaux, mais servir 1 ’influence de 1 ’Allemagne qui, ayant 
P£is 1 ’initiative de cette concession^exorbitante, serait n 
necessairementgseule o 'en tirer les benefices qu’elle peut 
avoir en vue," ^
He saw no injustice to Japan in this line of procedure* Bike
Balloy he believed that the Japanese leaders had themselves
raised the Treaty Revision question as a means of gaining
popularity. In reply to the German claim that revolution might
result from continued intransigence, Sienkiewiez maintained
that the Meiji Government would not dare to stir up agitation
65
when they themselves might well be the victims.
The main way in which Sienkiewiez implemented this policy 
was to demand compensation for the concessions expected of 
France. In particular, he continually insisted that the export
63.) Ibid.
G ,G *Tokyo ,111. Dec .30,1883. Sienkiewiez to Ferry,
65.) Ibid,
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duty on silk be abolished. In itself this was not a claim
which was particularly unwelcome to the Japanese. Borne loss
of revenue would be involved but this would be offset by higher
import duties, and in any case there was advantage to be gained
from improving the balance of trade by boosting silk exports
and encouraging domestic production. The snag lay in the French
requirement that Inoue should announce the abolition before
or during the approaching Revision conference. If Japan agreed
to this, she ran the risk of incurring similar demands from
other Powers, all of whom had agreed to accept the import tariff
worked out in 1882 but might be expe&ted to resent any special
treatment for France. Great efforts were made by Inoue and
Hachisuka to persuade France to be content with a verbal
guarantee that would bind Japan morally but would not have the
character of legal obligation which could be regarded as an
acceptance of foreign interference with Japanfs export tariffs.
These efforts were in vain. Although Sienkiewiez, Ferry and
Freyeinet relaxed France's demands slightly with regard both
to form and timing, the essential feature remained - Japan
must publicly state her intention to abolish the duties at
66
a session of the Revision conference.
66.) Sienkiewiez was not sent full powers to take part in a 
Revision conference until Inoue agreed. For the various stages 
of argument see G.P.Japon. XXIX,Dec,1883; 0 .P.Japon,May 3,l88h; 
C.C.Tokyo,III, June9,l88h; Ibid, July ll,l88h; ibid. July 33^ -889: 
Ibid, Aug. 22,18814.; C.a.Tdkyo, IV, Dec .13,18814-; Ibid, Dec .15,1881*.; 
Ibid, Dec .19,l88ij.;Ibid, Jan.28,1883; Ibid,Feb .13,1883; Ibid,Feb, 17
i 85AcInoo; Mayi+,1886; Ibid, May,6,1886; Ibid,May 19,1886; Ibid, 
May 28,1886. See also JKKRQB, vol.II. pp.1027-1073.
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In the end Inoue did make a declaration, though not until 1886,
67
when a new series of Revision conferences was being held, and 
fortunately for Japan there were no repercussions, possibly 
because the representatives of other Powers were too exhausted 
by the negotiations to wish to reopen the one question that had 
finally been solved. This piece of good luck, however, had 
nothing to do with French diplomatic, tact. Throughout these 
years, France persisted In adding this extra complexity to the 
enormous problems faced by Inoue even when the hope of using 
Treaty Revision to seeinre Japanese support against China had 
disappeared and even though the silk duty removal was far from 
essential to the French silk industry.
Part of France's reluctance to dispense with a public
undertaking on this question may have been due to the suspicion
that once Japan had secured her increased import tariff she might 
find some excuse for not implementing a merely moral obligation, 
but the main reason was undoubtedly that Japan's obvious re­
luctance to acquiesce in her demand provided France with a 
valuable tactical advantage in her policy of avoiding further 
concession. As has been seen, this policy was determined by
67.) C .0.Tokyo. IV. June 9,1886. Sienkiewiez to Freyeinet.
The declaration was made on June 8, in reply to a question from
Sienkiewiez. Since, however, the negotiations broke down next 
year and the old Import tariff remained in force, the silk export 
duty was not removed after all. It is one measure of the length 
of the Treaty Revision negotiations that before they ended the 
French and Japanese silk industries had so changed, that the 
abolition of the duty was opposed by France as a possible threat 
to the silk-reeling section of the French industry. See Hanotaux* 
instructions to Harmand, C.P.Japon. XXXIX, June 9,1894
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political as well as commercial considerations, and much of the 
tenacity with which it was held was due to this fact, Repeatedly 
the claim was made by Sienkiewiez that Treaty Revision had become 
a question of influence: France had nothing to gain from fol­
lowing her rivals hut rather would win the respect of Japan for
68
her consistent display of independence.
In reality, however, France's position was not completely
independent. She felt the need to buttress herself by reaching
a new entente with Britain, the Power least likely to abandon
69
her rights in Japan, and when Plunkett, the Minister who had re­
placed Parkes, showed a disposition to moderate his demands in order 
to end the continual negotiations, France was forced to modify
68.) Bee e.g. C.P.Japon. XXX. July 31>18814-> whe£.e^  Sienkiewiez 
wrote to Ferry that since "lesAeoncessions exagerees que nous v 
pourrions faire, seraient plutot attributes a 1 'influence exercee 
sur nous par les autres puissances, nous devons, ce me semble, 
maintenir strictement les principes que nous devons dtfendre et 
les demandes que nous avons; formulaes. G'est, a un autre point
de vue, 1 'unique moyen de ne pas perdre en consideration ^ux 
yeux des Japonaisl" It is hardly siirprising, in view of this 
attitude, that Treaty Revision took Japan so long to achieve.
69.) For SI enki ewic zr s r ea soning, see C,C. Tokyo .111. May 25,188L1. ♦ 
Sienkiewiez to Ferry. In reality, a working understanding proved 





The limitations which fear of isolation placed on French 
action were shown clearly in the 1886-7 Tolcyo conferences which 
led up to Inoue*s failure and resignation. After a good many 
changes of strategy the Japanese Foreign Minister had felt com­
pelled by feelings within the country to attempt simultaneous 
revision of both the commercial and jurisdictional sides of the 
Treaties. This did not suit the French minister, who, though 
relatively little concerned about tariff charges, was extremely 
reluctant to countenance any concessions in the more fundamental
matter of extraterritoriality, and had already proposed in vain,
71
early in 1886, that the two matters IB be treated separately#
70.) Her weakness was recognised by Sienkiewiez when, after claim­
ing to detect an Anglo-German entente in Far Eastern affairs in 
1886, he advised ^  ftEt, dSs lors, il s!agit, en ce qui touche la 
(Question de la revision, de *ie pas montrer JL Vm moindre liberalisms 
que les Puissances, tout en nous reservant, de proposer des 
amendments serieux aux pro jets souznis a* la Conference. Une attitude 
differente de notre part n fentravepait probablement pas la marcfee 
des choses. Les Puissances, malgre notre opposition, conclueraient 
avec le Japoi^  des traites auxduels nous serions obliges de sous- 
crire nous-memes dans un temps plus ou moins eloignes". C #p#Japon. 
XXXII. Aug .h?l886« Sienfcewicz. to Freyeinet. The Quai d f0rsay 
expressedidentical feelings later the same month. 6) .c .Tokyo .V. 
Aug.27?l886. Freyeinet to Sienkiewiez. It should perhaps be added 
that no Power could maintain a completely independent position, 
both because of the difficulties her nationals might face in Japan 
and because, as Marshall observed in 1883? the European Powers 
"have always regarded the revision of the treaties with Japan as
a guestion which concerns them collectively, as an element of the 
dealings of Europe with Asia." JKiniOR. vol.II. p.992.
71.) C.P.Japon. XXXII. Jan.28,1886; 0 .C.Tokyo.IT. Jan.30,1886 both 
Sienkiewiez to Freyeinet. Sienkiewiez believed that Inoue would 
personally have been content at this stage with a commercial treaty 
only. GIP.Japon. XXXI Hov.31,1885* Sienkiewiez to Freyeinet.
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He was more than dubious about the standard of justice that
could be expected from the promised Japanese law courts and
was specially anxious to preserve the strong foreign position
72
in the ports already open. In May, 1886, for instance, he alone
opposed strongly the German™supported Japanese proposal to have
the consular courts apply Japanese laws where the penalty was
73
less than 5,000 francs fine or 3 years in prison. When, however,
in June, agreement was reached between Germany and Britain based
on an earlier Japanese declaration, and France became isolated,
Sienkiewiez decided to make a tactical retreat by making known
that he was sympathetic towards the principle of the plan if
l b
not to the plan itself. This was admittedly in accord with
the strategy he had mapped out the previous month of avoiding
blame for the breakdown of negotiations while seeking to modify
or nullify any proposals which he considered dangerous. However,
such a strategy proved unworkable ihen France was unable to find
another Power or group of Powers to align with; and, when, during
late# 1886 and early 1887? the details of the new project were
being thrashed out, Sienkiewiez discovered that he was alone
in maintaining his former position virtually intact.
72.) See e.g. G.p# Japon. XXIX. TVb *9,1881},; Sienkiewiez to Ferry.
0 .C.Tokyo.IV. Aug.29,1885. Sienkiewiez to Freyeinet.
73#) C .0.Tokyo.IY.May 16,1886. Sienkiewiez to Freyeinet. Foreign 
Minister Freyeinet telegraphed that Japanese laws could onlybe 
made applicable if first approved by the Powers. Ibid, May 21,1886. 
74.) C .0 .Tokyo. IY. June 24,1886. Sienkiewiez. to Freyeinet.
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Not only was he forced to admit, as early as June, 30,1886,
that the abandonment of consular jurisdiction was a political 
75
necessity, hut in the detailed discussion of the mixed courts
which were to replace it he was unable to secure from Japan
what he considered a proper recognition of Francers importance*
Supported by Plunkett, Inoue refused in November to accept French
as an official language in Japan1s new courts* WhenSienkiewiez
stated that he could only accept the unfavourable vote of the-
Conference under an ad referendum formula, he was attempting to
set an example which, if followed by other Powers, could have made
the Confex»encefs work meaningless. He was challenged, however,
by the impatient British Minister, who thus encouraged the
Japanese delegates to act firmly* As Sienkiwwiez described it,
they "poussex^ent les choses a l 1 extreme et declarerent qu'ils 
suspendraient les reunions de la Conference jusqufau jour ou_ 
je serais en mesure de donner une reponse formelle st la Conference 
sur la question des langues. Faisant alors ressortir ce qu'il 
y avait d*anormal dans le proced<rauquel on avait recours, je 
donnais^les^votes que je n etais pas libre de refuser*.. Dir^ 
a un delegue etranger qu!on suspendra, et cause de lui, les re­
unions, d fune Conference,” he resentfully added, 1,n fest-ce point 
dire egajement qufon fera retomber sur lui les consequence*de ^  ^
cette mesure et n fest-ce point, pargsuite, exercer sur ce delegue 
une pression morale caracterisee.
Thereafter, Sienkiewiez adopted the policy of voting for every
conference decision,even those to which he publicly objected,
hoping thus to make the other delegates aware that he was
75*) C *C.Tokyo. IY. June 30,1886. Sienkiewiez to Freyeinet.
76,) C.C.Tokyo. V. Dec.28,1886. Sienkiewiez to Flourens.
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forma'* / f
re-introducing the ad referem&umAin another guise. His claim
that this had made Inoue reconsider his earlier attitude was
to some extent justified by the Japanese readiness to promise
France a generous share in the allocation by nationality of
78
foreign judges to serve in Japanese courts, nevertheless, the 
fact that Sienkiewiez, despite his Gfovernment’s expressed dis- 
pleasKre at Japanese methods, dared not risk a disruption of the 
Conference indicated that France was unlikely to stand out against 
its completed decisions unless she could find an ally among the. 
other dreat Powers•
As it turned out, France was delivered from the necessity 
of choosing between unpopular isolation and ignominious retreat 
by an unexpected development. When Inoue1s new plans for 
mixed tribunals with foreign judges, submission of Japan's new 
codes to foreign approval, and the complete opening of Japan, 
were leaked, first to other members of the Meiji G-overnment, 
and then to the politically-conscious public, opposition began
77.) C.C.Tokyo. V. Jan.30,1887. Sienkiewiez to lourens.
78.) C.G.Tokyo. V. March 22,1887. Sienkiewiez to Flourens.
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to grow alarmingly within Japan itself. The fear that the
independence of the nation was being threatened combined with
existing political rivalries both to undermine Inoue!s support
within the Cabinet and to bring about the resurgence of organ-
80
ised opposition to the Government. Inoue endeavoured to meet
the objection that he was yielding Japan's sovereign rights to
foreigners by attempting to withdraw the provision for a foreign
veto on the Japanese codes, but this not only met with opposition
on the part of the Foreign Representatives but was far from
sufficient to satisfy either those critics who realised that
the Western Powers would concede little at that juncture and
79p) Inoue had kept his negotiations secret even from^Yamada, 
the Minister of Justice. See Shimomura, JOyaku Kaisei* p.82. It 
is generally agreed that the source of the original leakagewwas 
Boissonade, who objected to the employment of foreign judges in 
Japanese courts and the necessity for seeking foreign approval 
for legal codes which were primarily designed to suit Japan. Al­
though his hostility may have derived fwnni resentment at the idea 
of his own work being tampered with, he was able to present an 
argument which was convincing to several members of the Government 
His memorandum on the subject can be found in Yoshino Sakuzo (ed), 
Meiji Bftnka £enshu (Collection of Materials illustrating various 
aspects of the Meiji Period) vol.VI. Gaiko-hen (Diplomacy),, Tokyo, 
1928 ,pp .i4li.7~i1.7i, It was secretly published and, together with the 
memorandum of Tani Kanjo, an oligarch from Tosa,who resigned from 
the Government over this issue, provided the opposition with use­
ful ammunition against Inoue's proposals. See Inoue Kiyoshi,
Joyaku Kaisei,pp.112-117.
80.) Most of the leaders of the earlier opposition parties, plus 
some right-wing nationalists, came together briefly under the 
nominal leadership of Goto ShojirS in the Daid5 Banketsu. Bee Ibid 
pp.119-138.
- 292 ~
therefore advised that Treaty Revision be postponed until Japan
had proved the extent of her progress or those opponents who
claimed to believe that the 1858 Treaties could be denounced 
81
unilaterally. As a result Inoue adjourned the Conference sine
die on July 19,1887, and a month later admitted defeat by 
82
resigning.
81.) The first alternative was forcefully propounded in Tani's 
lengthy memorandum, which he presented to the Emperor on Aug.9* 
I887, and which was translated by the French Legation in 1888.
C.P.Japon. XXXIII, Jan 22, 1888. Boutgatel to Flourens. The demand 
for unilateral denunciation was made many times by Japanese news­
papers, but in the 1880's it was not taken seriously by diplomats, 
see e.g. C P.Japon. XXX. May 1,1881^ . Sienkiewiez to Ferry.
82.) It wa£ stated by Sienkiewiez in 1889 that Ito had been 
deeply involved inlnoue's resignation, just as in that of Okuma 
later: uDe toutes ces complications, ce qui ressort de la. mani&re 
la plus nette, e'est le but que poursuit le Co^ rfce I to. En 1886, il 
pretait Jout son appui au pro jet de revision elabore par le Comte 
Ino-ouye. Ce m'eme appui, il ne l fa point marchande, dans 1 'origins, 
au Comte Okuma. Mais, dans un cas comrne dans l'authe,cet^ippui
s est transforms en opposition augsi tenaee que dissimulee au 
moment precis ou: paraissaient s'evanouir les graves difficultes 
que rencontrait la conclusion de nouveaux fraites.,i C*C.Tokyo.VI. 
Nov.1,1089. Whether Ito's actions were due to the fear of being 
overshadowed by a Foreign Minister who achfe&ved Treaty Revision, 
as Sienkiewiez insinuated,or whether they should be attributed to ] 
his sensitivity to the changing mood of public opinion, must remain 
an open question. It may be worth adding that the French charges 
d'affaires, Bourgarel, expected I to to be replaced by Kuroda as 
Prime Minister at any moment. When this occurred in May,1888, both 
he and the Russian Minister congratualted themselves on what they 
regarded as a Choshu defeat. See C.P,Japon. XXXIII. Sept.19,1887; 
Boutgatel to F&ourens; Ibid, May 6,1888; Ibid, June 2,1888, 
both Bourgarel to Goblet.
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Inoue*s resignation was obviously caused primarily by his 
failure to gauge the strength of anti-foreign feeling and fears
83
and the extent to which the Government *s authority had declined.
Nevertheless it is possible that he might have succeeded in
securing a limited measure of Treaty Revision if he could have got
an agreement signed before the political parties had recovered
from their l88i+ collapse and before the country began to react
against the ’'Europeanisation1 policy which the Government fostered
in the middle l880*s. That an agreement did not emerge was
largely due to the conservatism of the European Powers and among
them Prance was pre-eminent in obstructiveness. In August, 1883,
Sienkiewiez had outlined his attitude of Treaty Revision:
11 Je dois, d'ailleurs, nappeler ici, une fois de plus, que tous 
mes collegues sont disposes a faire aux Japonais des concessions 
plus larges que celles que nous leur accordons. Je sais, merne, 
qu^onme reproche de retarder la solution de la question de la 
revision par les difficultes que je soul&ve en^ce qui touche la 
juridiction. La marche que j ai suivie jusqu'a^ce jour, me 
parait, cependant, s'expliquer d'une maniere tres-simple : ^
qonvaineu qu'au point de vue politique, nous n*avons pas interet 
& rester toufc-a~faif ■ en dehors de ce mouvement qui porte les N 
Puissances d fair^ des concessions aux Japonais, je m'attache a 
moderer dans la mesure^du possible ce que ces concessions pour- 
raient avoir d*exagere"7 me reservant de faire une opposition o, 
treb-ferme aux mSsures qui nous seraient directement nuisibles. ^
Except for the brief swing in 1883 this was the line of policy
83.) In this connection it may he noted that in 1891 Sienkiewiez 
claimed that the Meiji Government would have been able to control 
the Diet if it had established it before 1887, while its prestige 
was still high. C.p.Jappn. XXXV, April 10,1891,Sienkiewiez 
to Ribot.
81+0 0 ,C .Tokyo . IV. Aug .29,1885 . Sienkiewiez to Freyeinet.
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which French diplomats attempted to follow throughout the Inoue 
period. Whether France had much influence on the course of 
Treaty Revision is open to question, hut there can he 110 doubt 
that what influence she did have was directed towards delaying 
the negotiations and extracting concessions which a Japanese
j
Foreign Minister could ill afford.
c) The Thira Phase, 1889-1896.
For Japan, the resignation of Inoue, though of great im­
portance politically, did not clearly mart: the end of the second 
phase of Treaty Revision, since Okuma, Inouers eventual successor,
though he adopted different tactics and a less accommodating 
65
manner, took as the basis of Japan's demands a project sub­
stantially simitar to that of his predecessor* It was not until 
he too had been foreerfto resign as a result of popular attack 
and weakening of Cabinet support, and the opening of the Diet 
had become imminent, that the Japanese Government decided,in 
February 1890, that it must brave the hostility of the Powers and 
demand the abolition of extraterritorality withhno legal guarantee 
other than the evidence of Japan's progress* For French diplomgcy 
however, the turning-point came sooner, in the first three months 
of 1889. It was not until then that France was involved in 
Treaty Revision again since Okuma had preferred to Negotiate 
separately with those countries which were more favourable to
85.) Apart from executing the Treaties^literally in a number of 
ways which damaged foreign interests, Okuma was much blunter 
than Inoue. See Sienkiewiez's complaints to Spuller in C.G.Tokyo 
VI. July 6, 1889.
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Japanfs desires o p  which were too important to "be ignored. ^ranee's 
reputation obviously meant that she would only be approached at 
the last.
Sienkiewiez’s first reaction to the new approach was to hope
that either Britain or Germany would seek an entente with France,
but his main preoccupation was with preventing France from being 
86
isolated, and when>In March, the Foreign Office did approach 
the Quai in the hope of rallying it to support its reservations
87
on Okuma1s project, Sienkiewiez advised against cooperation*
He was influenced partly by his experience with Plunkett in the 
mid-l880fs, which led him to believe that Britain would leave 
B’rance isolated again if, for political or commercial reasons, she 
decided on a policy of concession, but also by his conviction 
that consular jurisdiction was; doomed to imminent abolition and 
that it was more realistic for France to resign herself to the 
loss of ‘jurisdictional rights and concentrate on securing sub­
stantial compensation on the commercial side. In May the Quai
88
d'Orsay expressed its complete agreement with these recommendations,
It is impossible to single out any one factor as decisive
in this reversal of the o3.d French attitude. Undoubtedly the
old fear of isolation was present still, and the disposition to
concession which it encouraged was reinforced, momentarily at least
by the advice of the Russian Minister, who, in accordance with his
86*) G.C.Tokyo. VI. Jan.12,1889. Sienkiewiez to Goblet.
87*) C.C,Tokyo. VI. March 16,1889, Spuller to Sienkiewiez; Ibid 
March 18.1889, Sienkiewiez to Spuller.
88*) C.C.Tokyo. VI* May U,1889. Spuller to Sienkiewiez.
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Government's policy of removing Japanese distrust, urged
Sienkiewiez. in 1889, to execute a master strike of diplomacy
89
"by accepting the Japanese project without reserve. On a different
level the influence of Japan's modernisation was also important.
By May, 1889, Sienkiewiez had mellowed sufficiently to he able
to urge: "Be negligeons done pmen pour n'etre pas les derniers
a signer 1'emancipation du seul peuple de tout lfOrient qui
se soit attache serieusement, de son mieux, suivant ses forces
9°
et ses moyens, a s'assimiler la civilisation occidental©
nevertheless, to attribute great importance to admiration of
such developments as the establishment of a Diet would probably 
91
be a mistake. Much more fundamental, especially after the 1890 
army manoeuvres, se^s to have been the realisation that modern­
isation had endowed Japan with a new strength which could not
92
lightly fee ignored. It was in this context primarily that the 
establishment of constitutionalism in Japan affected Treaty 
Bevision. With an elected Parliament imminent, Prance was forced
89.) 6J.c.Tokyo, VI, May 18,1889. Sien&iewicz to Spuller. There is 
no evidence, however, that Russia attempted to put pressure on 
French policy towards Japan in any way.
90.) Ibid.
91.) On the eve of the promulgation of the Constitution, Sienkiewiez 
admitted that Japan had made astonishing progress in government, 
and even added "on serait tente de croire quails vont resoudre les 
grands problemes politiques qui s'agitent depuis si longtemps en 
Europe." But he maintained that in demanding a Constitution the
enlightened classes" had given evidence of suffering f»om illusions 
or vanity, and that the existing system was quite satisfactory.
C.P.Japon. XXXIV, Eeb.h,1889. Sienkiewiez to Goblet.
92.*) See e£g* C.p.Japon. XXXIX. Jan.h, 189*1. Sienkiewiez to Gasimilr-
Jbier, in which Sienkiewiez criticised Europe foi^taking Japan 
more seriously.
» 297 -
to anticipate the possibility that the Emperor's authority
might be weakened and KBBI the Government Hi replaced by a
party cabinet or forced to bow to popular passions, thus-
presenting the Powers with the unpleasant alternative either
of employing force or of giving up their rights without a 
93struggle* These factors, together with the more
uncompromising diplomatic approach of Okuma and the realisation 
that,with the possible exception of Britain, no other Power 
was likely to resist for long the demands; of a. nation which 
might soon play an important role in the Par Eastern situation, 
all made it Inevitable that Prance would sooner or later choose 
the less dangerous course of concession* What was surprising 
was the flexibility she displayed in altering her tactics*
9 UNot only did she switch her emphasis to commercial matters 
but some care was taken to inform the Japanese Government of
* QR
Prance's willingness to negotiate. Japan could thus
concentrate on Britain, conscious that the main decision 
had been taken by Prance and that she could be more or less, 
ignored for the time being* In these circumstances, Francefs 
influence on the final phase of Treaty Bevision was even less, 
than in the preceding period. The principal features worthy
93* This was Sienkiewiez fs reasoning in C.P. Japon. XXXIV,
Feb. kf 1889. Sienkiewiez to Goblet.
9*4-. This was first suggested by Sienkiewiez in March, 1889.
C .0. Tokyo. VI. March 18, 1889. It was confirmed in June by 
Spuller, when he instructed his representative to concern him­
self "principalement d obtenir un traitS avantageux au point de 
vue commercial." Ibid. June 26, 1889. It was frequently
(Continued on next page/
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of note were the rejection of co-operation with Britain 
and the stubbornness of Prance1 s bargaining within the limits 
she considered realistic , hut neither can he regarded as 
having any special importance., and in terms of their influence 
on events they probably cancelled each other out#
The French unwillingness to align, themselves with Britain, 
certainly weakened, the latter *s stand, to some extent.* It
er
meant that she had to should-Athe main burden of resistance and 
risk: the ruptures of friendly relations with Japan at a time 
when her position in the Far East seemed threatened by the 
Russian decision to go ahead with the Trans>-Siberian railway. 
Had Britain been able to secure an understanding with France, 
other cEur ope an Powers might have been attracted to her. She 
might, then have expected that some of Japan’s: resentment would 
be diverted towards them. It was not surprising, therefore,, 
that she made, overtures: to France on at least three occasions 
during these years-. The first,, as has been seen, was in March,
9b. (Contd • from previous page •)... .reiterated in succeeding
years *
95. Bee G.C. Tokyo V I * Feb. 25, Sienkiewlcz. to G-oblet
(1889)
C.C. loiyo IX March 30» 1894* CasdLmI1M?eTie* to SienMewiez..
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1889, when the attempt failed because of Sienkiewicz’s 
96 *distrust. # The Quai. d*Orsay did not actually question this, 
but in July of the same year it urged its representative to 
concert, with M s  British colleague; over the treaty signed by 
Oleoma with Mexico. This treaty challenged the European inter­
pretation of their most-favoured-nation clauses by opening the 
interior to Mexicans in return for recognition of Japan’s, right 
of jurisdiction. SienMewiez was far from happy about Okuma’s; 
claim that the mos t^favour ed~na t i on treatment might be
98conditional, and he made verbal reservations about the treaty,
but he declined to make a written protest in combination with
the British charg& d ’affaires:. Although informed by the Quai
that Fraser was empowered to act. in common, Sienkiewicz
maintained that Britain appeared to wish to act alone in the 
100.
matter. Since at the same time he claimed that strong action 
might seriously compromise France, it seems more than likely 
that hie assessment of Fraser*& attitude was a highly subjective 
one. Once again, however, his judgement was accepted by the 
Quai without question.
96. 0*0*. Tokyo. VI. March 118-, 1889• Sienkiewicz. to Spulletr.
97. 0.0. Tokyo VI. July 27, 1889* Spullet to SienMewiez,.
98. G.G. Tokyo. VI. July 21 1809* Sienkiewicz. to Spullet.
99• G.G. Tokyo. VI. Aug. 1 , 1889* SpullelT to Sienkiewiez.
100. G.G. Tokyo. VI. Aug. 5;. 1889, SienMewiez to Spullet.
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The possibility of an Anglo-French entente was raised
again in. January, 1890, on this occasion by Fraser, but his
initiative withered in the face of Sienkiewicz.1 s bitter
1 01memories of the mid-eighties. * One more attempt was made
in. June, when Lord Salisbury requested- French, support for his:
1 02counter-project, * but even though Japan's terms were by
then much higher than in January,.. Sienkiewicz still, discouraged
the idea, this time on the ground that the British project
1 0^was not a. practical basis for negotiation* Once again
the Quai. d'Orsay accepted his reasoning and this third failure
brought Britain's efforts to an end. France herself made no
attempt to concert her attitude with other Powers,, and the main
interest from 1890 lies-, in the tactics she employed in
bargaining with. Japan* Because of the decision of Okurna and
succeeding Foreign Ministers** to deal with the Powers; separately,
concentrating first on Britain, most of this bargaining took
place after July 1894* There were, it is true:,, serious
negotiations in 1889 with Okuma, and it even seemed probable
1 Oil•that a treaty woudd be achieved, but Okuma was forced to
101 . C.C. Tokyo. VI. Jan. 22, 1890. Sienkiewicz. to Spuller.
102. C.C. Tokyo. VII. June 1.4* 1890* Bibot to Sienkiewicz,.
103* C.C. Tokyo. VII. July 30, 1890. Sienkiewicz to Bibot,.
1014.. This was stated in the review of the history of Treaty 
Bevision. which, prefaced ItDanotaux's: instructions to Marmand in 
18911* C*F* Japom. XXXIX. C.C. Tokyo. VI. July 6* 1889. 
Sienkiewicz; to Spuller*
resign before the final bargaining sessions could take place 
and a; treaty signed in 1889 would,, in any ease,, have involved 
fewer changes than, one signed after the Diet had been 
inaugurated. Thereafter, onllp tentative approaches?, evidently 
with the end of discovering if there was any change, in the.
ivii exij
French, attitude.,, were made until A u g u s t 1894 following the
signing of the British treaty in the preceding month,
negotiation of a new treaty was definitely -undertaken by 
108Mutsu* By this time Sienkiewicz had been succeeded by
Harmand, who, despite. M s  pro-Japanese inclinations^ was in 
no hurry to open discussions?. Though it was impossible for 
him not to be aware that the state? of feeling in Japan made it im­
possible. for Treaty Revision to be postponed indefinitely, he 
did anticipate that a certain degree; of hesitation in coming
106to terms might prove useful in securing special advantages.. *
In the event, he was not mistaken. Mutsu rs complaint in March
1895* that "Japan's tariff proposals are already more, favourable
#» ny
to France than to any other Power, 1 * attested to the success?
105. There were some brief exchanges between Aoki and 
Sienkiewicz? at the start of 1890, between Enomoto and Collin de 
Plancy in Jan. 1892,, and between Mutsu and Sienkiewicz In 
March, 1894* See? G.G. Tokyo. VI* March 7, 1890; C.C, Tokyo 
VII. March 25» 1890; C.C. Tokyo. VIII Jan. 1.?, 1892; C.C. Tokyo 
IX. May 18. 1894*
106. C,C. Tokyo. IX. Aug. 17, 1894. Harmand to Hanotaux.
107. JKfflGB.. vol. IV? p.718. Mutsu to Bone, March. 7j* 1.88&* 
Bone was Japanese Minister in Paris, where the bulk of the 
arduous? negotiations? eventually took place. They can be 
followed in some detail in Ibid. pp653r*818*
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of Prancefs tough negotiating, yet more than a year was still 
to elapse before agreement was reached. In the meantime France: 
pressed for further concessions, in particular for reductions 
on the proposed import duties for woolen, muslinswines: and 
perfumes. Her demands for commercial compensations of this 
hind, however,» were strongly contested by Mutsu, who feared 
the repercussions that they might have on. Powers with greater 
interests in Japan*s import vtrade, In the end, however, a 
compromise agreement was reached, and the new treaty signed 
on August k.fv 1896*. It might well have taken longer but for 
a secret arrangement that Japan would buy warships from. France. 
Warship orders-, had been linked with Treaty Kevision in the 
French, view since 189b* when they received considerable emphasi©
in Harmandf s instructions,  ^ * and/ on several occasions in
'  ,)
1895 and 1896 hint©1 had been, dropped to the Japanese (Government
that if treated favourably on this score France; might be dis-
109posed to generosity on other matters• In April, 1896,
there was a suggestion, of possible success when, on the basis of
108* The Quai d f0rsay believed that it had received a raw deal 
over the I893*naval orders* C *P. Japon• XXXIX. June 9* 1891+. 
Hanotaux to Harmand. Instructions.
109. In Nov., 1895''* Harmand made known to the Foreign and Navy 
Ministers that France would consider that she had been badly 
treated if she did not receive her share of the coming order©. 
Until this point, he wrote to Hanotaux, he hesitated to 11 fa ire. 
comprendre plus: clairement au Ministre lui-mdure que Jo pouvais, 
c once voir une certaine correlation entre la signature d.e notre 
traits et les commandos de materiel naval a donner a 11industria 
franpaiseC.C. Tokyo, X, Nov. 1,b* 1895• The Quai itself 
raised the question in Jan., 1896, with Sone, who stated that 
such matters could only be dealt with in Tokyo, In his report 
home, however, Sone observed that 11 if French- Government be 
assured, of one at least of shipbuilding orders, I think: it will 
be easy to conclude the treaty, otherwise it is very difficult 
to come to understanding without making concessions *w  J .K.K.N.G.B.  
vol. IV. p. 758. Bone to SaionJI. Jan. 15 • 1896. . .
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long interviews on the subject with Prime Minister Ito and 
Navy Minister Saigo, Harmand. telegx*aphed the Quad to postpone
11 Gits signature of the new treaty, until it heard from, him again.
Then, in June, the French Miniate** reported that orders had
been given to the Societe des Forages et Chantiers de la
111Mediterranee. * There was no open admission by Japan that
any bargain had heen reached and no documentary evidence
appears in the voluminous Japanese printed sources, but in
view of the heated state of Japanese politics, this is hardly
surprising* There seems little doubt that the purchase of
French, ships shortened the Paris negotiations by some months.*
7 The treaty between. Japan and France was ratified without
difficulty by both the Chamber of Deputies] and the Senate on
October 29, 1897, and December 23, 1897 respectively, and came;
112into effect on August 4, 1899. * It was substantially the;
same as the treaties:, which most of the other Powers had already 
signed* From the commercial angle,, the revised treaties:, 
naturally favoured the Powers, but. since Japan was free to 
denounce them after twelve years and since they neither retained
110* C.P* Japon. XIV. April 23, 1896. Harmand to Hanotaux.
111*. C.C. Tokyo, X_, June 19, 1896. No details are given. It 
seems lilcely that the orders concerned either the erulselr A&uma, 
launched in 1899, or I* Normand torpedo-boats completed the same 
year. These were the only ships purchased from French yards 
between 1895 and 190b. Bee F.T. Jane, The Imperial Navy of 
Japan. London, 1901*. pp .195-6.
112. The text of the new treaty, together with its: protocol and 
tariff schedule, can be found in JKKMB&. voJLlV,pp*790-801*. There, 
was no date in the Chamber of Deputies: in the Senate a 
postponement motion was defeated 163 to /8. A report of the
debate, in which some Senators complained about the tariff
(Continued on next page/
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an unconditional most«favoured~nati©n~clause. nor any element 
of extraterritoriality, they were clearly no longer founded 
on an. unequal relationship. By dint of colossal efforts,
Meiji diplomacy had finally achieved its first objective. It 
has been scarcely possible here to outline the main developments 
of France*s attitude towards Treaty Bevision, let alone do 
justice to the extraordinary complexity of the negotiations 
and the enormous patience and persistence of Japanese 
diplomacy. Basically, however, Financefs position was simple.
She was well aware of the advantages she enjoyed under the 
unequal treaties and was only prepared to abandon them when 
abandonment seemed necessary. The moral, question inherent in 
the situation was ignored, and if the Japanese insisted on 
introducing it, a moral justification could always be found 
in the argument that if Japan had really Westernised itself 
sufficiently for foreigners to be subjected to Japanese 
jurisdiction, then it would act like a Western country and
112 (Contd. from previous page).,, agreement, can be found in 
Journal Officiel de la Bemtbliaue Francaise. 1897. vol. XII,
PP. 1479-82, .............
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allow foreigners to travel, trade, and set up their own
establishments anywhere in Japan. ^  ^  * If the basic attitude
was simple, however, a considerable amount of fluctuation
took place over questions of detail and in some cases the length
of the negotiations meant that there might be a complete
reversal of attitude towards a particular problem. This
was true of silk export duties; it was also partly true of a
much more important matter. In 187b one of Berthemy1 s main
arguments in favour of the complete opening of Japan was that
the existing situation compelled foreign merchants "a subir
le ruineux intermediaire des corporations indigenes qui
monopoliSent, avec I1assistance des autorit6s, toutes les
11 libranches: du commerce... . I f  By 1895 circumstances had so
changed that the French vice-consul at Nagasaki, Steenackers, 
saw the prospect with some regret. "Quant aux commercants," 
he wrote, "le droit d facheter eux-mSmes les soies et autres 
produits. dans I ’interieur, ne fera que leur enlever la garanti'e 
que 1 facheteur pouvait avoir en operant avee des intermediaires 
Japonais..." ^ ^ *
In conclusion, some reference should be made to an aspect 
of Treaty Revision which, though it never became an important
1 13* "C fest lorsque il se pr6tend entrer s&rieusement dans la. 
voie du progres, lorsque il se targue d*une politique franche- 
ment lib£rale, ... *c!est d ce moment qufon le voit refuser sans 
raison avoiiable aux ndgociants, aux: industrials, aux voyageurs 
strangers, 1 * authorisation de sfavancer d plus de six lieux dans 
1 finter!eur du pays." C.P* Japon. XXII, July 27, 1873, Berthemy 
to Broglie. Berthemy fs indignation was not shared by all 
French diplomats, but his maimer of reasoning was* Only 
fleetingly did any feeling that advantage had been taken of 
Japan appear, and this feeling was confined to the tariff qu^stio
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political issue, reveals something of the underlying realities
of the question* For many years French representatives
interpreted the Treaties to their advantage and did not
hesitate to pounce on any Japanese infringement of them,,
however slight. Yet in 1893, after thirty-five years of treaty
relations, Sienkiewicz could write to the Quai d ’Orsay:
"Par mes rapports des 2b Juillet et 10 Aout,fi 1885, ..*jfai 
eu I'honneur d !appeler l fattention du Department, sur 1 'etrange 
et dang£reux privilege dont jouissent les Franqais au Japon, 
de n*6tre point tenus d ’observer les lois de police et de 
surete. Ne relevant que du tribunal consulaire, ils ne peuvent 
evidement pas <§tre punis de peines prevues par des lois 
japonaises et ils n ont point, d fautre part, a redouter les 
lois de police franpaises:, l faction de celles-ci ne sfetendant 
pas au dela du territoire national."116. Clearly it.was
not only in their provisions but also in their execution that
the 1unequal treaties* were unequal.
11b* C.P. Japon.. XXIV. Jan. b, 187b* Berthemy to Becazes.
115. C .0. Tokyo. X . Jan. 19, 1 895* Harmand to Hanotaux.
116. C.C. Tokyo. IX. April 2, 1893* Sienkiewicz to Develle.
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CHAP1L..R VII.
TAN DECLINE OF FRFFCK INFLUENCE. 185^ - lopl.
As in previous periods, jicnc’n policy towards Japan was
strongly influenced Letweea 1J8p and 1898 by tne diplomatic 
situation in furope, icwever, yhcrea up tm 1o80 au least,
this influence had v/oznted to restrain ail her overseas
activity, it now helped bo turn it, as far as Japan was
concerned, in a more positive direction. Until the alliance
with Russia, was concluded in the aarly 1 wpO * s France
remained theoretically isolated against the *Jr iole Alliance, but
with her army and defence reorganised, she felt less
vulnerable than in the necade immediately following the
Franco-Prussian War. ,, sudden attack by bismarck was no
longer feared. Indeed, the latter had actually courted Francer s
friendship between 1083 and 1683* French hostility to.jurews
her recent conqueror, on the other hand, had scarcely
diminished, and she sought to combat german influence and
increo.se her own wherever she could. ihis rivalry was bound to
be reflected in French policy towards Japan, since the latter,
although showing particular interest In German Ideas and values
about this time, was an a rea in vfeich France had a considerable
tradition of influence. French concern was increased by the
recognition, from about 1ocj)0 onwards, that Japan was
becoming a military power which could not be
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entirely neglected in Far Eastern affairs. ac^ ec*
stimulus was jealousy of England, which, like hatred of
Germany, was a constant element^ in French foreign policy.
Jealousy of other Powers and aspirations to influence 
were, together with concern for existing privileges, the 
chief characteristics of French policy in Japan during the 
first half of this period, but there was one other consideration 
which, though it operated only from 1890, carried much more 
weight and made the closing decade of the 19th century a 
turning point. This was the Franco-ftussian alliance, which, 
though not applicable in theory to the Far East, in practice 
deprived France of her independent role in Japan. With 
its appearance, much of what French ministers in Tokyo had 
been hoping for was made meaningless.
h ) T u h r b  ,oPr^sti£e_and_Infjjience*
i) The Religious Protectorate .
1®. The first clear recognition of Japan’s military potential 
by a French Minister was in 1890, following the grand 
manoeuvres to which the Foreign Representatives had been 
invited. Sienkiewicz, was sufficiently impressed to accept 
that.,when the officers trained in Europe reached the higher 
ranks, the Japanese army fisera une armde redoutableV, and 
he further admitted that i?on peut presque affirmer _que le 
J apon e st a 1 *abri d *une invasion.u C. P. Japon, XXXIV,
April 10r 1890. Sienkiewiez- ftY§. Ribot. Oddly enough, France, 
which in 1880 had become the*country to maintain a military 
attache in Japan, had just suppressed the position. A new 
attache was appointed three years later, however.
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Between 1885 and 1894 no major issue of international
2politics arose to trouble the Far Eastern situation,
Japanese foreign policy, based on the caution of Inoue,
and the unpreparedness of the military, entered a phase of
extreme passivity*#Only one political question of any
magnitude involving the Powers existed - the perennial
one of Treaty Revision.
2• The remarkable stability from 1885 to 1894 came as a 
surprise to Sienkiewicz, who had seemed to predict new turbulence 
when in June, 1885 he spoke of the Far Eastern question (the 
first French use of this term) replacing the Eastern question, 
C.P* Japon* XXXI* June 29, 1885* Sienkiewicz to Freycinet* 
Surprisingly, the Port Hamilton affair and the Korean problem, 
aroused little interest in Sienkiewicz: or the Quai d!0rs.ay* 
Indeed, the French Minister showed that he had come full circle 
when in Jan* 1.894, he advised that France had no real interest 
in Korea and should not get involved, in any way* C*P. Japon* 
XXXIX, Jan* 4, 1894* Sienkiewicz to Gasimir^Pdrier•
3* Some interesting analyses of Japanese policy can be found 
in the French records* In March, 1886, Sienkiewicz attempted 
a general survey in which he implied that Japan had, for the 
sake of her territorial integrity, to maintain good relations 
with all, since, as he admitted, ITLes grandes Puissances sont 
devenues, dans ces derniers tempst fort envahissantes.vt Enormous 
sacrifices,,he added, had been made to establish an army and 
navy, ffmais avant que ses forces soient organisees, des incidents 
peuvent naitre• Le Japon est si riche en lies 1n C.P*Japon. XXXII, 
March 1, 1886* A similar view can be found in^an earlier report^ 
which also recorded the low; opinion of Japan*s generals held by 
the French officers in Japan* C*P* Japon* XXXI. Oct* 8, 1885 
Sienkiewicz to Freycinet* During his eleven years of service 
in Japan Sienkiewicz became aware of the feelings that favoured 
an entente between Japan and China, but he never believed that 
such an outcome would materialise* C.P.Japon. XXXV, July 25,
1891 Sienkiewicz to Ribot* A later dispatch suggests that his: 
confidence on this matter was due to his conviction that the 
two races despised each other. C.P. Japon. XXXIX* Jan.4, 
Sienkiewicz to Casimir-P<5rie1c. Despite this, he continued to 
believe that peace would be preserved even if China interfered 
still further in Korean affairs. One reason was the con­
viction that Britain had been putting pressure on the two 
countries since 1886 to subordinate their mutual diiferences
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France 1s attitude in this was motivated partly by commer­
cial interestj partly by habit, and partly by prestige. In 
this case, however, prestige was conceived in the negative 
sense of the effect thought-to be created on the Japanese 
mind by FranceTs ability to resist continually all concession 
to Japan.demands. Moreover, the pattern of Treaty Revision 
had been set in preceeding years, and attitude to it did not 
properly represent the growing respect for the new Japan.
Had a new political issue arisen, France would probably 
have been tempted to seek Japanese favour by lending her 
moral support. In the absence of such an issue FranceTs 
representatives turned to other spheres, and their' concern 
with religion and education* was,after Treaty Revision, 
their chief preoccupation between the Franco™ Chinese and 
Sino-Japanese \Afars. ^
3 (cont.) to the need to maintain a united front against 
Russia. Ibid. Also C.P. Japon.XXXIV', Dec,4, 1890. Sienkiewiez- 
to Ribot. On another level* lie argued that*. nles hommes 
qui president aux destinees du Japon ne se guident point; 
surtout* on ce qui touche la direction a donner aux affaires 
extdrieures, dfaprds les passions populaires. Ainsi il y 
a quelques annees encore il existait deux systemss de 
politique au Japon; celui du Gouvernement, et, celui. de 
I1 opposition. Alors que les hommes politiques delopposition 
e talent en faveur d^ne. attitude de resistance, dTagression 
meme, et ne reculaient pas devant la prospective d !une guerre, 
les membres du Cabinet etaient partisans d*une entente avec 
le puissant voisin.0 C.P. Japon, XXXIX, Jan.4,1894* Sienkie­
wiez to C'asimi t?-Pettier.
4. Lack of space prevents more than a cursory mention of some 
of the less important problems that arose. Perhaps the most 
interesting was one that was carried over from the previous 
period - military Instruction. The decision of Tamagata 
not to renew Commandant Berthautts contract in 1888 infuriated 
French diplomats in Japan and led to the withdrawal of 
Berthaut and Captain Lbfebvre before their work was fully 
completed. This episode is discussed by Presseisen, Before 
Aggression ,pp 128-130. , (c^t)
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Of the two, the religious question was the first to become 
important. It emerged in the autumn of 1885* when an Imperial 
audience was granted to Mgr. Osouf, bishop of northern Japan, and 
bearer of an unprecedented Papal letter .5 This letter 
expressed the Pope’s appreciation of the religious libei»ty which 
the Meiji Government had allowed missionaries to enjoy, and was 
perhaps designed to elicit an explicit declaration of religious 
liberty. The issue fox1 France was thus no longer the old one of 
securing toleration. Instead, it iras the question of Japan’s 
religious future, and*in connection with that, France’s religious 
protectorate over Catholics in the Far East. The audience 
given to Osouf prompted some lengthy speculation by Sienkiewicz 
regarding the prospects of Japan becoming a Christian country.
k( cont. from previous page.) Another military question of some 
interest was that of factionalism in the Japanese Army. In 
1886 Captain Bougouin, the military attach^, detected the 
appearance of an intermediary faction between those of Choshu and 
S atsuma^  Who s eleader,was Pr i no e KomafsuuandXwhose bhief memb ers 
were Generals Horie, Miura, and Soga. C.P. Japon. XXXII, Oct.8, 
1886, Sienkiewicz to Freycinet (inclosure). In the 1890’s the 
Legation had close contacts with Komatsu’s brother, Prince Kanin, 
who was to be Chief of Staff in the 1930’s. C.P.Japon. XXXVI.
Feb *9,1 892; Ibid. Feb.24,, 1892. See also C.P.Japon XXXVI,
Jan.22,189.2; C.P.Japon, XL, Aug.23,1 894; and C.P.Japon, XLIV,
Aug*5,1895* French hopes rested partly on this faction, partly
on the officers trained in France or by French officers, and 
partly on Sat-Chd rivalry, to reverse the pro-German trend in 
the Army. Encouragement of pro-French officers was wisely 
confined to the social level, however.
5*) See C.P. Japon* XXXI, Sept.14*1885♦ Sienkiewicz to Freycinet.
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He began by noting the reactions of Inoue and I to to this event. 
Inoue, he said, had not attempted to hide his satisfaction at the 
step taken by the Pope,, a step which, as Sienkiewicz did not 
neglect to point out to him,
wcontribuerait & faire rang au Japon parmi les Puissances 
de 1’Occident, " and at a further meeting he had remarked to 
Sienkiewicz that ”Le Japon a tout emprunte aux pays d ’Occident, 
son systeme d ’administration, ses lois, son organisation militaire, 
et surtout ses m^thodes d ’enseignement et d ’Education. Dans un
avenir prochain il sera dot6 comme les pays d ’Europe et d ’Amerique 
d ’une constitution. II lui restera & faire un pas de plus, a 
emprunter egafement & 1 ’Occident la religipn chretienne. 11 est 
prepare d accepter ce grand changement .'f °
Ito, Sienkiewicz added, had expressed himself in the same 
sense.
In reflecting on these events Sienkiewicz suggested that the 
Meiji Government had been thinking of the advantages of making 
Japan a Christian country for some time. It was not, he was 
quick to point out, anything to do with the conviction that 
Christian doctrine and morality were superior to Buddhism. On 
the contrary, the Japanese leaders were absolutely indifferent to 
religion as such. What had motivated their interest was its 
possible relevance to international relations. It was because 
extraterritoriality nowhere existed in Christian countries, that 
Christianity was regarded by many Japanese ”comme 1’attestation 
indiscutbe de 1’etat de civilisation le plus avanc6 qui existe.”?
6.) Ibid.
7.) Ibid. This fact was also recognised by the missionaries 
themselves. See Midon’s quotations from the Jiji Shimpo and the 
Hochi Shimbun In Les Missions Gatholiaues. Jan.9,1885*
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The fact that the motive which might incline Japan towards 
Christianity was expediency rather that genuine religious 
feeling by no means detracted from Sienkiewicz!s interest in 
the question. Just as It6 and Inoue v^ rere thinking in 
political terms, so was he concerned primarily with the non­
religious advantages that might accrue to France from her 
religious protectorate. Up to now, the French minister 
argued, this right of protection had been theoretical only, 
since all Catholic missionaries in Japan had been entitled to 
protection as French nationals anyhow. However, since the 
protectorate could also be extended to Catholic missionaries of 
other nationalities if the case should arise it provided an 
influence which France should not disdain, even if it rendered 
her subject to the jealousy of other Powers, including non- 
Catholic ones. He also felt that if the Governmentfs favour­
able tendencies bore fruit there might be a strong Buddhist 
reaction, in which case 1 des complications qu’il est impossible
Q
de pr^voir aujourd’hui peuvent surgir,1’ * and the religious 
protectorate might be invoked. Sienkiewiczfs reasoning on this 
point was far from clear, but the suggestion seemed to be that, 
apart from showing that France still had an important role to 
play, the so-called protectorate would somehow encourage the 
growth of Catholicism, which already claimed 60% of the 50,000 
converts. Progress in this field would inevitably be accom­
panied by something which he personally considered of much
8 .) C.P. Japon. XXXI. Sept.14,1885.
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greater* importance - the spread of the French language. No
other "benefit was envisaged.; tire impression given is that this
q
was a sufficient end in itself.
The adoption of Christianity as an official religion was
discussed further in October. The audience given to Osouf,
which had, Incidentally, been arranged through French diplomatic
channels, had given rise to speculation among other ministers
in Tokyo, the Russian and British in particular. There was
general agreement that, whatever the date at which the Japanese
1 0became Christians, * the situation would be marked by the
Japanese Government’s official adoption of one particular sect.
The Russian Minister, Davidov, considered that the Orthodox
Church had none of the disadvantages of the other sects, while
Plunkett, though himself a Catholic, believed that Catholicism
was out of the question because the Japanese would never accept
the French protectorate. Sienkiewicz disagreed, arguing that by
then the protectorate v/ould have disappeared of its own accord.
The only argument that he produced in favour of Catholicism,
however, was that there were great analogies, In regard to
11worship, between it and Buddhism. * He might have added that 
there were good political reasons also for hoping for Catholic 
success♦
9.) Ibid.
10.) To Sienkiewicz, at least, this was an "evenement eloignee 
encore, mais prevue et inevitable." C.P.Japon. XXX, Oct.20,1885. 
Sienkiewicz to Freycinet. The main obstacle, he felt, was 
Buddhism: l’N ’6tait la crainte de soulever contre eux la masse des 
bouddhistes, les Ministres Japdnais proclameraient aujourd’hui le 
Chrlstianisme.1 Ibid. Buddhist opposition, however, did not 
concern him \mduly, since he believed that it was fated to dis­
appear entirely within a few years.
11.) Ibid.
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As tviro Japanese historians of this period point out, ,fa
Catholic's attitude towards his Pope was similar to the attitude
the Japanese Government wanted to inculcate with respect to the 
1 2E m p e r o r * Since this was being noted in Japan about the same
time that, in the attempt to prove to the West that Japan had
become a civilised country, 11 the Government as a matter of
policy encouraged members of the upper classes to become 
9
Christians,” it is obvious that Catholicism stood in a fairly 
favourable position.
The hopes of a great mass conversion to Catholicism, 
based on a government lead, were soon to be dashed to the ground, 
however. The main reason for this halt in its swift progress 
was the reaction against all aspects of Westernisation that 
emerged strongly from about 1886, prompted partly by the failure 
to achieve an acceptable offer of Treaty Revision from the
12.) Ohata Kiyoshi and Ikado Fumio, in Kishimoto Iiideo, ed.
Japanese Religion in the Mei.ii Era,Tokyo, 1 956, p .21 2 . They 
add that in the 1680*8 "the Japanese realised that Modern 
Catholicism did not oppose monolithic government. In the 
secular realm, their own power would be strengthened if the 
number of Catholics increased”. Ibid.
13*) Ibid. Some suspicion of all forms of Christianity, however 
must have remained, both for traditional reasons and because of 
the connection between Christianity and the People's Rights 
Movement. See Sumitani Mikio/'Tennd-sei no Kakuritsu to 
KirisutO“kyo " (Christianity and the Establishment of the 
Emperor-system) in Mei.1i~shi Kenkyu Sosho. (Collected Studies in 
Mei.ii History) vol .q.,Tokyo, 1 95o, pp.210-2U6. In this historianus 
viewr, thiTMeiji rulers had difficulty in accepting Christianity,, 
which was ''critical of the foundation on which their power stood1 
Ibid., p.21 2. Exactly the same argument had been advanced by 
Duchesne de Bellecourt, M.D. Japon I. Aug. 30,1863. Bellecourt 
to Drouyn.
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Powers. From the Japanese Government's point of view an. 
additional inhibiting factor may well have been, as Plunkett 
foresaw, the French attitude to her protectorate. Regardless 
of the fact that this right could have little, if any, impor­
tance in Japan, since it was absurd to imagine that French action
might be needed to protect Catholics from hostile Buddhists, it
1Uwas decided, principally by Freycinet, that the religious 
protectorate must not be relaxed. The real reason for this 
insistence lay in events in China, where France's position in 
religious matters had given her advantages and influence which 
she had never dared to seek in Japan. This position was now 
in danger. Embittered, perhaps, by the anti-clerical tendencies 
of the French republicans, and hopeful that greater success 
would come if it could show itself independent of any Foreign
Power, iMttfeBasfea ;f t r 1 d1 hiffr 
the Vatican was attempting to demolish the foundation of 
France's privilege by establishing direct relations with the 
Chinese Government.^* While the Quai d'Orsay was putting- 
strong pressure on the Vatican through the French ambassador 
there to reverse this decision,^* it was determined not to 
allow its stand to be weakened by any evasion, however small,
1h.) See his instructions to Sienkiewicz. C.P.Japon. XXXI.
Nov.20, 1885.
15.) C.P. Japon. XXXI1. Feb .1 2,1 886.. Freycinet to Sienkiewicz.
16.) See C.P. Japon. XXXII, Nov.5,1886, In which the Political. 
Director, Malouet, brought Sienkiewicz up to date on develop­
ments In Europe.
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of the principle that France must act as intermediary for the
Pope. However, though this principle had been followed with
regard to Osouffs audience in 1885, there were signs that
Japan as well as the Vatican was reluctant to be bound by such
rules in future. After some efforts, Sienkiewicz had secured a
promise that the letter in which the Emperor was to reply to
the Pope would be presented by the Japanese representative in 
17France, * but he suspected that a danger remained that the
Japanese wished to enter into direct relations with the Vatican
1 8and might make use of Austria as an intermediary. * Sienkiewicz
attempted to sabotage Vatican schemes by urging upon Aoki Shuzo
that a Papal nuncio In Japan might be forced to show excessive
zeal and thus rekindle the religious question and he suggested
that other countries might try to establish protectorates over
their own priests without having France's experience and skill
1 9in smoothing over disputes. He was not, however, at all sure
that his arguments had proved convincing and he suspected that
the Japanese Government was under strong pressure from several
20of his colleagues on this Issue.
17.) C.P. Japon. XXXII. March 16,1886. Sienkiewicz to Freycinet*
18.) C.P. Japon. XXIII, March 25, 1886. Sienkiewicz to
Freycinet. Telegram.
19.) C.P. Japon. XXXII, March 28, 1886. Sienkiewicz to Freycinet.
20) C.P. Japon. XXXII, June 11, 1886. Sienkiewicz to Freycinet.
The same accusation of foreign jealousy is made in a report of 
July 10, 1886, by Admiral Piennier, who laid the main blame for 
the damage done to the French position on the English press.
C.P. Japon. XXXII. Aug.28, 1886. Marine to Quai.
Eventually the contradictions in the French position
wore Sienkiewicz down. By September, 1886, he was questioning
whether, if the Vatican was determined to proceed with its
aims, ,fil convient £ nos interdts de maintenir une situation
douteuse et qui bientdt ne nous vaudra plus que des ennemis
21et des embarras de toute sorte.” * He even suggested that it 
might be wise to abandon the protectorate even if the Vatican
did not establish direct relations with China, since this
oo
would break the anti-French entente• * The Quai d'Orsay, 
however,was less defeatist. Indeed it had already solved the 
problem. The Political Directors* note of Nov.5,1886, gave 
Sienkiewicz the news that on the representation of the French 
ambassador, the Pope had consented to adjourn sine die a 
decision which would have been considered a 'mauvais proc£d<§ 1 
towards France.
Because of the Vatican's fundamental differences with the 
Kingdom of Italyr,; France could exex^ t strong pressure on the 
Pope over di]3omatic matters. The Quai d'Orsay might have been 
somewhat less pleased with itself if it had been aware that 
the Japanese Government would be less willing to resign itself 
to acceptance of the traditional state of affairs. In Decem­
ber, 1887, when Sienkiewicz had returned to France on leave,
21.) C.P. Japon.XXXlI. Sept.10, 1886. Sienkiewicz to Freycinet.
22.) Ibid. Behind this entente, Sienkiewicz suggested, lay 
the influence of Cardinal Manning, v/ho "n'est probablement 
qu'un instrument de la politique anglaise.*1 A pencilled Quai 
d'Orsay comment found the report 'fort discutable.'
23.) C.P.Japon. XXXI1, Nov.5,1886.
- 519
the charg6 d 1affaires, Bourgarel, discovered that in the still
undelivered letter from the Emperor there appeared a passage
which invited the Pope to enter into direct relations with 
pkJapan. Bourgarel, who saw this not as the result of
foreign scheming hut as an expression of Japan!s desire for
independence and equality, could only hope the Vatican would
not take up the offer* He made no protest; and the letter
was eventually not only left unchanged hut was handed over to
the Pope hy, of all people, the Japanese Minister to Germany.
This step brought forth a demand for an explanation hy
Sienkiewicz when he returned to Japan, hut Okuma, the Foreign
Minister excused himself hy hlajming Inoue, and the incident
25was allowed to drop. France, despite German and Italian
opposition, had received renewed assurances from hoth the
Vatican and China that France should continue to act as
26intermediary, * and the Japanese Government's tendencies no
longer represented any real threat to the French position* As 
for the hopes of a massive victory for Catholicism in Japan 
itself, this was now seen as only a dream*
2I4..) C.P. Japon. XXXIII, Dec .27, 1887* Bourgarel to Flourens. 
25*) C.P. Japon. XXXIII, Oct.25» 1888. Sienkiewicz to Goblet.
26.) C.P* Japon. XXXIV. Feb*9, 1889. Goblet to Sienkiewicz.
A long dispatch from Sienkiewicz to Spuller explained that
27
individual conversions were all that could now be hoped for.
M M  analysis of the situation ended with the regretful con­
clusion that the religion most likely to become s State 
Religion was Buddhism - he ignored Shintoism - while the form 
of Christianity with the best chance of considerable success,
especially if a Japanese Protestant should found a new sect,
«  ^ 28* was Protestantism.
y, _ French j®dueation_ in_Japan.
One of the reasons why Sienkiewicz favoured the chances of 
Protestantism in Japan was the attention that Protestant mission­
aries paid to education. In making this point Sienkiewicz 
returned to a preoccupation which was in the 1890's to amount 
almost to a French obsession. Since one of the main advantages 
that was hoped for from the spread of Catholicism in Japan was 
the propagation of the French language, it is hardly sur­
prising that France also pursued this aim by more direct means 
during these years. Concern with French schools and the teaching 
of the French language in Japan dated back, of course, to long 
before Sienkiewicz's arrival In Tokyo. As early as 1864 the
27.) C.P. Japon. XXXXIV, Dec.1,1889. His reasons were 
interesting. Apart from the reaction against foreign influences, 
the decline In Government authority, which the French Minister 
attributed to cjuarrels within the governing oligarchy, meant 
that even if the Meiji leaders decided that Japan should 
become a Christian country, the mass of the population would
not follow blindly, and the emancipation of minds that was 
beginning to reveal, itself very clearly made the missionaries' 
task even more difficult.
28.) Ibid.
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Quai d’Orsay had transmitted to Roches a reguest from the
Minister of Education for information as to the extent of French
29teaching there* The request was somewhat over-optimistic
for at that time the only French school in Japan was the one- 
man undertaking of Mermet de Cachon in Hakodate* The situ­
ation was transformed when Roches and Mermet instituted their 
French school in Yokohama for the purpose of training the sons 
of fudai daimyo and other Tokugawa supporters* * This project 
however, came to an end with the Restoration, and for some years 
both the Quai d ’Orsay and the representatives in Tokyo sho?/ed 
scant interest in the matter. With the partial recovery of her 
international standing at the end of the 1870’s, however, France 
once again became concerned that her cultural assets should be 
brought to bear in support of her pursuit of political prestige* 
Geofroy complained on more than one occasion®!>f the prevalence 
of the English language and lamented that despite the fact that 
French was necessary for attendance at the Military School and 
the study of law at Tokyo University, it was steadily losing 
favour, but he made no suggestions for remedying the situation. 
Its further extension was impeded, according to a later French 
report, by the favour bestowed on English by Japanese officials,
■Zp
despite the French tendencies of Japan’s educated classes.
29*) See G.G* Yedo* III. Dec *22, 1861*.*
3§>.) See C.P. Japon* XIII. March 18,1863,* Ibid, April 1+;
C.P* Japon. XIV. Feb *5, 1866 j all Roches to Drouyn.
31.) See C.P.Japon XXVI. Jan.28,1878; C.P.Japon. XXVII, Jan*13, 
1879; both Geofroy to Waddington.
32.) C.P. Japon. XXVIII, May 19,1882• Conte to Freycinet. The 
charge d ’affaires ad interim justified this last statement by 
reporting the establishment of the Soci£t6 Japonaise de langue
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Until the arrival of Sienkiewicz, no French minister was
prepared to try to improve the situation, perhaps because
their periods of stay in Japan averaged less than two years.
Sienkiewicz himself had been in Japan for two years*.
before he took any steps in this direction. His first show of
concern appeared in his report on Osouffs audience, when he
regretted that the French missionaries had insufficient funds to
33establish proper primary schools. As a partial solution he
arranged with Osouf to introduce into Japan one of the orders 
which devoted themselves to teaching.^* He had good hope of 
success in such a venture since French was still the language 
most studied after English, despite the progress of German.
32. cont. from previous pa&e). fran9aise. Details of this 
society, which was founded in Oct., 1880, by young officials, and 
whose full title was Bociete Japonaise potir la propogation de 
la langue francaise au Japon, can be found in L ’Echo du 
Japon, Jan.7, 1881 ; March 17, 1881 ; Jan. 6, 1882; and Feb .17, 
1882.
33*) With French as an extra subject. C.P. Japon. XXXI,
Sept .11+, 1885.
31+.) Sienkiewicz had tried, he said, to do this earlier, but 
had found on the part of Osouffs deputy, Midon, (,un esprit 
etroit et incapable de comprendre les services reciproques que 
peuvent se rendre les Missionnaires d ’une part, la Puissance 
protectrice de l fautre.” Ibid.
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However, some time was to elapse before this plan could be
implemented* It took Osouf over a year to find an order willing
to take a chance on what was inevitably a somewhat hazardous
35commercial venture, and although in 1887 there was good news
for France in the assurance of the Francophile Vice-Minister
of Education, Tsuji, that 6,000 yen would be allocated to
the recently founded ecole francaise for a chair of French law,
36in the meantime German made more headway than French* *
From the late 1880’s this relatively casual approach to the
question of the propagation of the French language and values
was abandoned* Francefs comparative unimportance, In both the
political and commercial sides of Treaty Revision had been
emphasized by the refusal to accept French as a privileged
language in the proposed mixed courts and law codes. The
irritation felt by France at this led to pettiness on occasion,
as when Bourgarel was reprimanded for allowing the use of
English In a document concerning a transaction in land between
37France and Japan. * It also led to much inflection both on 
the part of Sienkiewicz and various Frenchmen employed in the 
Japanese educational system as to how the difficulties facing 
the spread of the French language could be overcome* The 
number of different, often conflicting, plans that were
35*) C*P*Japon. XXXII . Oct*17? 1886, Sienkiewicz to Freyeinet. 
The efforts of the Congregation des Marianites, which had 
agreed to set up a school, would be followed with sympathy, 
Freyeinet stated in reply to this dispatch. C.P.Japorx* XXXII, 
Dec* 13, 1886*
36.) C.P.Japon. XXXTII, April 12, 1887* Sienkiewicz to Flourens.
37.) C.P.Japon* XXXIII, June 11 , 1888. Goblet to Bourgarel.
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suggested to the Quai d fOrsay was extraordinary, even allowing 
for the varying backgrounds, experience, and prejudices of
their authors* The bases on which the theorists had to work
were three: the small, mostly elementary, schools established
by missionaries, which numbered 66 at the end of 1889, bad
3,1+00 pupils .(compared with 10,000 pupils for American
missionaries) and received a 600 franc subvention from the
Legation; the Marianist Ecole de lfEtoile du Matin, with its
11 teachers but hopes of greater expansion, which catered for the
sons of the wealthy and influential, both Japanese and foreign,
at Tokyo; and the ecole de langue francaisfi, which had been
founded by the Japanese Societe de langue francais^ had been
allotted by the Japanese Government in 1887 a subvention of 3000
yen to encourage the study of law and pay its 2 teachers of
French, but had by 1891 been eclipsed by the ecole de droit
frangais (also run by members of the Soci6te de langue franqaise)
to such an extent that the number of pupils had declined from
11+0 in 1887 to 33 in 1891 , and its subvention had been abolished 
38by the Diet. # The basic questions ?/ere what segment of Japa­
nese society and what stage of Japanese education France should
attempt to influence;* Arrivet, a teacher at the Lyc6e 
(To kyo First School)
SuperieurAflHHBHB* held in 1891 that they should concentrate
on the ecole de langue franqaiseand higher specialised education,
whereas Sienkiewicz, with more sympathy for the Marianists,
38.) These details are taken from various reports, but princi­
pally C.P.Japon, XXXIV, Dec.1,1889. Sienkiewicz to Spuller, 
and C.P.Japon, XXV, S e p t . 1891, Sienkiewicz to Ribot.
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wanted to find scope for French education at all levels, with
pupils of the Morning Star School graduating to the Lycee
Sup6rieur and thence to the Imperial University, where the
study of French language, history, literature and philosophy
had recently heen expanded, thanlcs partly to the French Minis-
text's efforts. He sought official financial "backing from
the French government for French education at two levels, 1800
fcancs for missionary schools and 6000 francs for the ecole de
langue francaise, with a strict surveillance being placed on the
employment of these funds. These suggestions underwent forced
reconsideration only a fortnight later when Sienkiewic^. heard
that the ecole de langue francaisemight be closed down. As an
alternative he suggested the provision of scholarships to
encourage students to enter* the French section of the Lycee
Supei’ieur * This idea was supported by Collin de Plancy, the
charge d !affaires in 1892, who also came out in favour of a
regular1 publication in the French language for Japanese x^eaders^
Thanks largely to the support of the Societe de langue francaise
and the fact that Collin de Plancy did not await Quai d'Orsay
axoproval before launching it, the Revue Francaise du Japon
6oisso«a4e in
appeared the same year. With numerous contributions fromAits 
early stages, it lasted for five years.
39*) Both opinions are in C.P. Japon. XXV, S e p t . 1891. 
l+O.) C.P. Japon, XXXV", !Aept.20, 1891 . Sienkiewicz to Ribot.
1+1.) C.P. Japon, XXXVI, April, 5» 1892. Collin de Plancy to 
Ribot.
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..'his sudden burst of energy is accounted for by Collin
de Plancy’s discovery that French had been overshadowed in
popularity by merman, and was evenk being rivalled by Italian.
This alarming fact led to a considerable increase of interest at
the yuai d'0>rsay. In August, 16 9 2, Foreign Minister Ribot
promised 1000 francs for the ecole de langue francaise,
together with 300 francs each for missionary schools and 
hithe Mariani&ts. Trie 1000 francs subvention, which was for
one year only, was used by Sienkiewicz, however, not for the
ecole de langue francaise but for bursaries at the Lycee
Superieur. It apparently qchieved its purpose since in 1691, at
the demand of students in the Flench section there, .french replaced
English as the second language in the medical section, as will as
11
being resumed dt the Laval School. These improvements were regarded 
by Sienkiewicz as justifying a request for an increased subvention 
but this was refused by foreign minister aanotaux for technical
13budgetary reasons. Three months later, however, a new
report was produced by Micliel Hevon, professor of law at Tokyo
Ufiiversity, which, while registering srme improvement in
the French position, also showed more clearly than ever before
16the weaknesses in it, ang ±n October, ..anotauz aoked the new 
minister in Tokyo, harmand, to suggest some .practical measures
Id.) C.P.Japon. XXXIX. Aug.1,1692. Ribot to Collin de riancy.
Ip.) C .P.Japon. XXXIX. March 2 o, 1891. oienkiexd.cz to Casimir-P^rier• 
Sienkiewicz aid not euplain his action, but in 1o95 Azjivet claimed 
that it v/as because ne feared its rivalry would be dangerous for the 
marianists’ school. Joe C.P.Japon. XLII. march b,1893• Harmand to 
Hanotaux.
If.) C.P.Japon. XXXIX. March 20, 1o9l. Jienkiev/icz to Casimir-P§rier.
Ip.) C.P.Japon. XXXIX, June 23, I09I. Hanotaux to Harmand.
AH 1 Ti’nr* 1 n t tr-s 1 lodl. narmano. co Hanojraux.uo,; Enclosure 111 o.P.Japon. XL.Jepjr‘ ’ '
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for remedying the situation.^* The persons from whom Harmand 
sought advice were Revon and Arrivet. Revon, impressed by the 
fact that the private French schools had succeeded in getting 
very few of their pupils accepted in the Lycee, felt that 
Francefs main efforts should be devoted to the state schools, 
particularly the primary and lower secondary schools which sup­
plied the lycees and through them the University. To Introduce 
French courses it was necessary, he argued,to persuade the Japa-
hQ
nese authorities of the usefulness of French. * Arrivet
agreed with much of this. He too advocated the virtual
abandonment of private schools, including those run by the
missionaries, which he refused to take seriously, but his
remedy was different from Revon*s. It was in three parts;
firstly, the establishment of a club fofe French-speaking
Japanese, secondly,the improvement of the Revue Francaise du
JapfJn (aided by French subsidy), and thirdly,the institution of
49bursaries in France or Indo-China for Japanese students.
Heither of these reports was acted upon at once by Hanotaux,* 
who wished first to know Harmand*s opinion. But there was 
a strong hint that determined action would at last be taken,for
the Foreign Minister commented that ,fL ’affaire est a mes yeux
* 50tres-importante .‘f^  * Preoccupied by the Sino-Japanese war
and its aftermath, Harmand had no time to formulate considered
47.) C.P.Japon. XL. Oct.25, 1894.
48.) C.P.Japon, XLII. March 8, 1895- Harmand to Hanotaux.
49 •) Ibid, Among Arrivetfs criticisms of the Morning Star 
school were that its teaching of Japanese language, literature 
and history was not good enough to attract Japanese pupils who 
wished to proceed to High School and University, and that in 
order to mould their charges, the Marianists took them at too 
early an age.
50.) C.P.Japon. XLIII, May 10, 1895* Hanotaux to Harmand.
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conclusions until January, 1896, when he showed himself in 
general agreement with Arrivet in favour of the establish­
ment of a new ’Club Pranco-JaponaisT and the improvement of 
the Revue Francaise du Japon, or at least its re-orientation as 
a more effective organ of French propoganda. He believed that 
French would find its best opportunity among an 6lite, which
would propagate French ideas better than any French professor,^ 
and he had hopes of enlisting among the supporters of the prop­
osed club several members of the Imperial Family. The best 
way of developing an elite which was truly Francophile was to 
extend to as many Japanese children as possible the teaching of 
French at an elementary level and to send to France on scholar­
ships those who showed the greatest promise, thus ensuring that 
they really were imbued with a love of French culture. In
addition, efforts should be made to persuade the Japanese
52Government to send students to France itself. *
51 .) ’’Hotre ambition doit consister d agir sur le Japon par les 
idees, et nous n ’y arriverons que par 1 *intermediaire d fun 
certain nombre d ’hommes superieurs, sortis du sein de la nation, 
bien plut6t q.ue par 1’action directe de professeurs,lf he wrote. 
Those Japanese who had spent several years in France, he added, 
"peuvent etre consideres comme nos clients naturels, comme les 
partisans volontaires ou les propagateurs inconscients de notre 
influence intellectuelle et morale.'* C.P.Japon. XLV. Jan.10,
1896. Harmand to Hanotaux.
52.) Ibid. This idea of facilitating study in France by young 
men of ability or rank was not new, though previously it had be«n 
restricted to the military sphere. After the partial rupture 
caused by the sudden end of the third French military mission 
there had been a good deal of doubt in Japan as to whether 
Japanese military students would still be permitted to enter 
French military schools, and from the fact that the number of 
new entries dropped from 18 in 1888 to 2 in 1889 and 1 in each 
of the following two years, it would seem that in practice 
Japanese students ?/ere discouraged. There was, however, one
notable exception. One of the Japanese students already^ in 
France was Prince Kanin, brother of Prince Komatsu, WB&s&sstimm
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The reception given to Harmand’s suggestions cannot yet he 
discovered since the French correspondence with Japan after 
1896 is not open to inspection. However, the fact that no 
reply was sent in the nine months after the Qua! received his 
dispatch makes it seem somewhat unlikely that the request was 
granted in full, if at all. The fact that the Revue Francaise 
du Japon came to an end in 1897 makes the latter a distinct 
possibility. Nor is there any indication in later writers, 
such as G6rard, the first French Ambassador to Japan, of any 
notable expansion of French education.
What exactly was hoped for from the propagation of the 
French language and culture in the late 1880!s and early 1890*s 
and why was so little ever done to support the various education­
al projects financially? The ansv/er to the first question in 
part holds the key to the second. Several motives can be 
d&tbcted. In April, 1894? for Instance, Sienkiewicz, in 
importing that some of the French students at the Lycee 
Superieur« were seeking the creation of a chair for aFrench 
professor of civil engineering at the University, noted that 
'’Cette creation pourrait avoir, dans un temps donn6, une 
importance serieuse pour notre Industrie 53 * Revon, too,
When he finished his course at the Ecole de Saumur, it was inti­
mated to Sienkiewicz that the Emperor hoped to see him permitted 
to enter the Ecole Superieure de Guerre, the highest of France’s 
military colleges. C.P. Japon.XXXIV. Feb .12, 1890. Sienkiewicz 
to Spuller. At first the Quai rejected the idea, on the grounds: 
that the instruction there was confidential. C.P.Japon. XXIV.
Feb .24*1890. Before long, hov/ever, the temptation to establish 
influence proved too strong, and in June, the admission of Kanin 
was authorised as an exceptional fanpour. C.P.Japon. XXXIV. June 
12, 1890. Ribot to Sienkiewicz. Even when Japan broke . .(cont)
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saw practical consequences in the extension of F r e n c h  studies.
flic benefits, in his view, flight extend iron the import of
french pharmaceutical products bo the commissioning of french
battleshipsi these references bo commercial auvantage were
rare, however* More important by far was the mixture of desire
for admiration and pursuit of influence, which, though usually
taken for granted, occasionally led the writer into ecstatic
prose. hevon, for instance, in speaking of Ireneh studies in
the faculty of letters at the University, claimed that
”ellcG pourraient avoir une profonde influence morale aur 
1*esprit des jeunes generations, et en faisant aimer notre 
littcrature, elles ieraient aimer notrc genie national.frere 
du genie national du Japon, par tant de noble cotes.”
Less lyrical, but more openly political, was the reasoning
of harmand in 1 8 9 6. his belief that cultural links vmulu have
a political value was clearly shown when he urged that
f?il n'es'G Liable pour aucun Franqais que notre pays, lui, 
a le plus grand interet d attirecr^lui, en vue de son action 
future politique et meme economique gnu sur le Japon, 
le plus possible de jeunes gens distinguds et do les 
sousfcraire ainsi au rayonnoment J.ittdraire, scientifique et 
artistique de 1 1 Alleiaagne . M
;;2 . cont. from previous -page.) a verbal promise by Gyama by 
engaging a German officer for the lokyo ,,'ar College, the ’rencli 
veminent did not force i:.anin to leave, as sienkiewicz advised. 
Th- Quai comment on this suggestion was unambiguous,in face - 
t h e t wo wo r a s 1 Ira is non.®. C.P. Jaoo n. XXXV , Jan. t-, 1 oh 1 . 
sienkiewicz to Xibot • When he returned to Japan, Kanin became 
a frequent visitor at the French Legation. C.P.Japon. XXXVI.
Feb.9*1392. soilin de Plancy to Pihot.
33.) C.P.Japon. XXXIX. April 3,1C9-'f. dienkiev/icz to ^asimir-F6rier 
j k ,) C.P.Japon. XLII. March 8,1o93° harmand to ^anotaux.
" j Ibid.
3 6 .) C.P.J^pon. . I V , Ja n.10,1u96. Jarman d t o Ha no t a ux.
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Francois, a teacher at the Military School, was even more 
explicit In his linking? of culture with politics. He feared 
that Japan, now her value had "been shown hy her victory over 
China, might be tempted into an anti-French alliance by the 
promise of Indo-Ghina.
,fCes redoutables eventuality sont & prevoir,” he warned,
*'et d&s aujourd’hui, nous devons prendre, pour les conjurer, 
toutes les mesures n6cessaires, et dans nos possessions indo- 
chinoises, et au Japon, en nous errant des sympathies, des amis 
si possible, qui par lf6tude de notre langue, auront appris a 
nous connaltre, & nous juger par eux-mdmes, & nous voir par 
leurs propres yeux.* 57 •
It is obvious that the concern of Frenchmen for the exten­
sion of French studies was increased after 189U. As Francois 
noted, "Cette question d*influence a pris subitement une impor­
tance considerable, depuis les sxicc£s railitaires bclatants
5 8 .remport^s par le Japon sur la Chine.” * How, therefore, is it 
possible to explain the Qua! d TOrsayfs tardiness in implementing 
the suggestions of its representatives? Budgetary considerations 
alone would surely not have prevented the expenditure of a few 
thousand francs a year on so important an objective. One answer 
is that the SIno-Japanese War and Japanfs increased strength ke 
could not be entirely separated in Francefs thinking from the 
obligations of the Pranco-Russian Alliance. Because Japan 
figured much less prominently in French foreign policy than in 
Russian, France was gradually losing her right to an independent 
role in Japan in the 1890fs, and the concern of French.
57.) C.P. Japon. XKTII. June 13> 1895* Harmand to Hanotaux.
58.) Ibid.
- 332 -
ministers In Japan to extend French influence by way of cultural 
prestige can be seen in part as an attempt to counter a 
tendency that had become evident to the Japanese even before 
1895. Similarly the reluctance of Paris to implement the 
various proposals suggests that while it appreciated the end 
that was sought it realised that basically it had to choose 
between influence in Japan and alliance with Russia. The Sino- 
Japanese War forced it to choose, and its neglect of French 
education in Japan was a natural consequence of Hanotauxrs 
decision to join in the Triple Intervention*
« 1 2 ™  - EE « 2-2 01 2 2 Allig-S-Sg^ and^  Japan.
Even before the Triple Intervention of 1 895 the Franco-
Russian alliance had been exerting an influence over French
policy and French standing in Japan. Signs that the two
countries were drawing together were in evidence in Japan as
early as 1887 9 when the French were informed of the contents of
59 •the Emperor’s letter to the Pope by the Russian Minister.
After 1890, when the rapprochement was developing into alliance, 
the influence of Russia was exerted in favour of France making 
concessions to Japan over Treaty Revision, Russia’s qDolicy at
/T A
this time being to win Japan’s friendship* *
59.) See C.P. Japon. XXXIII, 0ct.25> 1888. Sienkiewicz to 
G-oblet •
60). "Depuis quelque temps surtout, la Russie semble attacher 
le plus grand prix & gagner l ’amiti<§ et meme la confiance des 
Japonais.” C.P. Japon. XXXIV. Dec.1, 1889. Sienkiewicz to 
Spuller. The passage was specially marked by someone at the 
Quai d ’Orsay.
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However, Japanese distrust of her powerful neighbour
remained acute and even though at that date France had no formal
ties with her, Sienkiewicz was complaining as early as 1891 that
her friendship with Russia was placing her in an unfavourable
light. He was in favour of showing general goodwill towards
81 .Russia but of stopping short of anything more compromising*
It was natural for a diplomat to object to any development which 
would deprive him of the capacity to attract the friendship of 
the country in which he served, and this consideration was re­
inforced by the fact that Japan was clearly a valuable poten­
tial ally* Nevertheless, despite Sienkiewiczfs representations, 
French Foreign Ministers inevitably saw things more in 
European terms. Regional considerations mattered little besides 
Russia’s ability to rescue France from her long isolation, a 
fact which was abundantly proved by France’s participation in
the Triple Intervention, against the advice of Minister Harmand
62and against France’s own interests in the area.
The effect of the Triple Intervention on France’s relations 
with' Japan was immense and lasting. Despite all his hopes that 
France’s essential goodwill would be evident and reciprocated, 
Harmand was forced to registei* in June, 1896, the failure of his 
efforts. The feelings of bitterness against France and Russia, 
he wrote, far from diminishing, had actually grown deeper;
61.) C.P.Japon. XXXV. March 11, 1891 . Sienkiewicz to Ribot.
62.) The diplomacy of the Sino-Japanese War lies outside the 
scope of this study, but it may be mentioned that Harmand was a 
keen advocate of a Franco-Japanese understanding as the best 
protection for France’s position in Indo-Ohina.
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’Les Japonais des classes sup^rieures eux~memes, ...
s’eeartent de plus en plus de nous, et, malgrd tous les 
efforts quaje fais pour les attirer chez moi, je suis oblige 
de constater que leurs visites deviennent plus rares, et leur 
attitude moins ouverte, m^me parmi les militaires.1 63.
France’s situation, he felt, had suffered more than German^’£ 
since "l’on nous considere a present comme les alli6s d6fini~ 
tifs des Russes et comme decides a epouser jusqu’au bout toutes 
leurs querelles ." It was a sad state of affairs for a nation
which above all wished to be admired.
The conclusion of the Franco-Russian alliance marked the end 
of ah epoch in the history of French policy towards Japan.
It is true that the difficult atmosphere of 1895-6 was even­
tually to disappear, and after the Russo-Japanese war, indeed, 
there was a real rapprochement between the two countries, based 
partly on the new understanding between Russia and Japan, 
partly on the convenience for Japan of the French Bourse. 
Nevertheless, there was a great difference between the decade 
preceding the First World War and the years before 1890-1895.
From the signing of the 1858 Treaty up until the final stages 
of Treaty Revision, France, for all her weaknesses and embarrass­
ments, had retained an independent role in Japan. Once the all­
iance with Russia was signed that was no longer possible.
63.) C.P.Japon. XLVI. June 25, 1 896 . HUfm&nc/ to Hanotawx,
6h.) Ibid. Cuttings from Japanese newspapers had illustrated 
clearly the changed view of France. Whereas In January, 1895, 
the Yomiuri was praising ‘’la grande voix de la France,1 and the 
Kokumin was urging that ,ril faut absolument qu’d son tour le 
Japon trouve un moyen de manifester elairement sa sympathie 
envers la France comme aussi sa reconnaissance, in July the 
Nippop y/as attacking her bitterly and dismissing her as an 
independent force: RSa participation a 1 ’oeuvre de 1 ’interven­
tion dans 1 ’ExtrSme-Orient doit §tre consid6ree comme la suite
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The verdict of the H^ippon*' that 1 la imputation de la France
n ’est plus que dans le passe; sa gloire n ’est plus de ce
6 *5si^cle” Jm may have 'been over-harsh, but as far as Japan was
concerned, it was painfully close to the mark.
6 1 cont. from previous page) de son asservissement a la 
Russie et a 1 ’Allemagne. C.P. Japon. XLII, Jara.11 .1 895; 
C.P,Japon, XLIII, July 13? 1895? both Harmand to Hanotaux.
65.) C.P. Japon XLIII. July 13? 1895* Harmand to Hanotaux.
-  336-
CHAPTER VIII.
LF^minii'HHin < ■  iT>iinnrw>wi«iiiiriiini'in
FHENCH TBA3PE M B  ITS INFLUENCE ON FRENCH POLICY.
&) 2^™-^£eSeii Sr2^ 2*-
As was seen earlier, although trade was the basic Justi­
fication and ultimate reason for the treaty with Japan, few 
tangible signes of interest in seculfcng the treaty were shown by 
French traders themselves. Consequently it is not surprising to 
find very little French commercial activity in Japan in the years 
immediately following the opening of the ports. Statistics for 
those early years are, of course, both unsystematic and un­
reliable, especially on the French side. The French government 
refused to appoint a full-time consul at Yokohama until 1870, 
despite the protests of its diplomatic representatives and the 
French merchants there, and thus it was left to a member of 
the Legation Chancellery to attempt to unravel the affairs of 
a port which accounted for about three-quarters of the entire 
trade with Japan, This was a far from easy task. The Japanese 
customs officials were inexperienced and unhelpful, and the 
traders themselves notoriously made false declarations about the
4
value of their goods. * Since in addition, a good deal of 
smuggling was carried on and much French trade was conveyed in 
foreign ships, it took a considerable time to reach any very 
exact conclusions as to the amount of imports from, and exports 
to, Franc e.
1.) See the report by the Vicomte de la Tour du Pin to Belle- 
court, which claimed that 25% should be added to official 
figures to get something like a true picture. C .0. Yedo.
June 2, 1861. Bellecourt to Thfcuvenel• This was still the case 
in 1876. C.C.Yddo.VI. July 15>1376, St.Quentin to Decaaes.
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Nevertheless the overall pattern and growth of 
French trade are not hard to discern. Its development 
was very slow in the first three years. Although Belle- 
court had arranged for French interests to he looked after 
'by British traders/ acting as consular agents in Yokohama, 
Nagasaki and Hakodate, by March, 1860, there were still only 
four Frenchmen at Yokohama, out of a total of 120 Europeans, 
and Bellecourt was doubtful about their ability to compete with
p
the large English and American houses,"* To ensure the 
development of French trade he therefore worked on the 
Bakufu to extend the foreign to twice its former
size and allocate one-fifth of the new area to Frenchmen. 
Despite this official encouragement the French community did 
not establish a definite position for* itself for several years. 
At the start of 1863 the number of Frenchmen in Yokohama was 
still only eight, for which unsatisfactory state of affairs 
Bellecourt blamed French caution:
2.) C.P. Japon. II. March 2k9 1860. Bellecourt to Thouvenel.
3.) C.P. Japon. II. June 15* 1860. Bellecourt to Thouvenel.
To prevent the French ‘concession’being lost to France by French 
speculators who had no intention of trading permanently bui 
only wished to take advantage of the high prices likely to 
develop, Bellecourt stipulated that Frenchmen could only sell 
this land to other Frenchmen. Ibid. This measure produced 
much dissatisfaction among French traders and vrns dropped by 
Poches in 1865. See C.P. Japon. V. Jan.Li-, 1862. Bellecourt 
to Thouvenel. C.C.Yedo. III. Nov,29, 1863. Bellecourt to 
Drouyn; C.G. Yedo. IY. Feb.1 , 1865. Poches to Drouyn.
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,f...il est probable qu’avant d fentre~ 
prendi»e des 6tablissemens lointains, 
les maisons fran§aises auront voulu 
commence!* par se rendre un compte 
exact des avantages que pouvait leur 
procurer lfemploi des Soies du Japon, 
et qu’elles auront prefere laisser 
d fabord & d fautres les chances des 
premiers risques en se bornant a 
que1ques essais .11 if.*
1863? however, marked a turning-point in French trade
with Japan. Between January and October, the number of
Frenchmen at Yokohama rose sharply to 32 and before the end
of the year it had reached Ifl . * Of equal significance was the
decision taken by the Messageries Imperiales at this time to
extend their service to Yokohama, thus releasing French traders
to a large extent from their dependence on English shipping and
6shipping routes. *' The cause of these developments^ was the
sudden rise of the silk trade. Until late 1859 it had not
been realised in Europe that Japan might prove to be an
7important silk exporter, * and the instructions given to 
Bellecourt by the Quai d*Orsay had ignored the entire subject,
Q
concentrating only on possible French imports into Japan.
In the event French imports found it difficult to make much
impact. Only champagne among French wines found much favour.
Articles de Faris, burdened by a 20% import duty, proved very
9disappointing, On the other hand, even in the first years:,
4.)C.0. Yedo. III. Oct .29?"! 863 * Bellecourt to Drouyn.
0.0. Yedo. III. Nov. 29? 1863* Bellecourt. to Drouyn.
6.) C .0 . Y6do . III. Nov. 1 863 * Quai d f0rsay memorandum.
7.) According to a North China Herald article reprinted in the 
Moniteur des Soies of Oet.31,1863? the fact that Japan produced 
silk only became known about the middle of 1859*
8) C.G. Yedo.I. May 2k9 1859; C.P.Japon. 1. June 8:, 1859. 
9*)See e.g. C.C.Yedo II.Feb.1 ,1 862. Bellecourt to Thouvenel.
Japanese silk boosted the volume of exports to a total far
beyond French imports into Japan. In 1861, for instance, the
first year for which any overall estimate of French trade was
attempted, silk exports to France direct from Yokohama amounted
to c.2,600,000 francs, compared with only 500,000 francs for 
1 0imports. * The following year saw a deelihe in exports but they
still outweighed the 8571 ,023 francs worth of imports consider- 
11ably. * Then in 1863 came a steep rise in silk exports to
1 2France; one estimate put the figure at 8 million francs.
This total does not appear to have increased by much in the
1 3following three years . In 1867 and 1 868>, however,
Japanese exports to France again took a colossal leap. In
10.) Ibid. This was Bellecourtfs estimate, the official 
figure for exports being 2,160,000 francs.
11.) C.G.Y6do. II. April Ilf., 1863 • Bellecourt to Lrouyn. The 
official figure for exports was 1,596,987 francs, of which
1 ,Jl97,135ff * were due to silk. In addition, a good deal of 
Japanese raw silk was bought by Frenchmen in London, where 
over 26 million francs worth was imported in 1862. Moniteur 
des Soies.Jan.2. 1861]..
12.) The estimate was Roches1. C.C.Yedo. III. Sept.1, 186L|*. 
Roches to Drouyn.
13.) No figure is found for 186U either in Rochesf corres- 
pndenee or in Anna les du Commerce Ex ter leur.. but it was px*obably 
smaller, for political reasons. The official figures for 1865 
was 7*967,000 fr., Annales du Commerce Exterieur, XLIII.
Chine et Indo-Chine. Faits Commerciaux. No .1+0. (Jan., 1868)
For 1866 the same source placed the total at 9,885,OOOfr•
Ibid. Faits Commerciaux. No .1+5 .(June, 1870). The figures 
given here relate to goods destined for France, (Commerce speci­
al), not Just passing through France (Commerce general). The. 
latter are usually substantially larger.
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the former year, they more than doubled to 20,221 ,000 francs,14.
and in the latter, despite the civil was being waged in Nor-
reasons for this rapid growth lie partly in the more liberal 
attitude of the Bakufu but also in the development of a new 
item of trade - the silkworm egg - which for a few years was
3,771,150 fr. in 1866, 7,163,557 fr. in 1867, and 25,232,962
increase in volume, however, since prices rose steeply during
this period, mainly owing to increased demand.
The second half of the 1860fs also saw French imports into
Japan flourishing. The 1865 figure of 546,000 fr. quadrupled
to 2,025,000 fr. the following year, and in 1867 soared to 
1 87,480,000 fr. * About 3i million francs of this resulted
19from the orders given to Coullet but it seems clear that 
other' sides of commerce also profited from Eoches! good
14.) Ibid. Faits Commerciaux. No.45. (June, 1870). Of this 
total,11 ,914,000 francs came from raw silk.
15.) Ibid. Faits Commerciaux. No.50. (Nov.1876).
16.) Another factor was the success of Messageries Imperiales 
in diverting an .increasing amount of silk destined for the 
European Continent from London to Marseilles. As a result 
France received direct more than half as much raw silk as went 
to London in 1866-7, a very different proportion from that of 
earlier years. Moniteur des Soles.. 0ct.12. 1867.
1 8thern Japan, they almost trebled to 56,809,501 fr. The
to rival the raw silk in value 1 6 . Silkworm eggs accounted for
1 7fr. in 1868. * This increase did not represent a matching
17.) Annales du Commerce Exterieur, XLIII, Chine et Indo-Chine 
Faits Commerciaux. Nos. 45 & 50.
18.) Ibid. Faits Commerciaux. Nos. 40 & 45.
20relations with, the Bakufu. * This level was not sustained
in succeeding years. In fact, it was not approached again
until the mid-1870fs and was only exceeded in the 1880*s.
Trade statistics for the Meiji era are a little more
satisfactory, at least after 1873* Those for the preceding
four years are sufficient to show that Japanese exports to
France fell considerably after the .Restoration, though this
drop, like the earlier rise, was partly caused by a change in
21the price-level. * The early 1870Ts also saw the decline of
the silkworm-egg trade, while raw silk, after a momentary set-
22back, continued its steady rise. * Thereafter the pattern of 
trade saw few sudden changes. Silk, and silk products, 
remained by far the most important item of Japanese export to 
France. In 1885 they accounted for 23>837,740fr♦ out of a 
total of *9,254,771f*.» and as late as 1901 raw silk alone 
made up lj.0,lilj.6,000fr ♦ out of a figure of 77 * 060,000 fr.2 *^
20.) Gf. Moniteur des Soies. Oct.12,1867* which reprints a 
letter dated June 19? from a Frenchman at Yokohama in which the 
following appears: ,?.il y a de plus, pour le commerce francais, 
de meilleures chances d'affaires que pour le commerce des * 
autres nations, a cause.des analogies de caractdre et de climat 
qui existent entre le Japon et la France, a cause aussi des 
sympathies politiques qui paraissent incliner le Japon vers la 
France de preference d tout autre pays *M
21.) Annales du Commerce Extdrieur XLIII. Chine et Indo-^hine♦ 
Faits Commerciaux. No.50. The editor of this official publi­
cation related the decrease in French trade to the effects of 
the Franco-Prussian War.
22.) A sketch of the history and decline of the silkworm trade 
can be found in L'Echo du Japon of June 27*1879.
23.) See the pamphlet by a French consular official, E. Glavery, 
Les Strangers au Japon et les Japonals i, 1 'etranger, Paris,
i - m n - n  -i u t iim h t imhi m  ...... .. n n irw  m ii.m mrnir i unii i—n i i~a mi ■ iimnm iniimin frtiiiiiiiinw m   ■tTnii . i . . i iTiiii.. iiiiiw iw i* irw iiinr in Y iiiii™ inm nw u MMiiii MiiPim iwnii r i  hmhhi'iiiiiih n h  i mv • nrfcii mi n i»W *m i^ h i m  *
190i|..
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As regards French imports into Japan, a staple finally emerged
in the mid-1870's in the form of woolen muslins, which by 1876
exceeded all other items put together in value and continued to
28-take an ever larger share in Franco-Japanese trade. With
the expansion of the Japanese navy in the mid-1880's another 
item of considerable importance also appeared. Munitions and 
warships were sought in huge quantities from Europe, and 
France made a considerable, and not unsuccessful, effort to 
share in these orders. However, although this aspect of trade 
made a difference of some millions of francs to the total 
value of French imports, in sheer size it always remained far 
inferior to woollen goods, and its importance was as much
P5
political as commercial." It was certainly far from suffi­
cient to alter significantly the overall balance of trade, 
which had always favoured Japan, and from the 1880*s did so 
overwhelmingly. Indeed, from 1875? which was a disastrous 
year for Japanese silkworm dealers, right up until 1951? there 
was no peacetime year in which Japanese imports from France 
exceeded her exports to that country. Some idea of the 
actual ratio as well as the rate of trade growth may be obtained 
by comparing the average annual figures during the respective
2k*) The value of woollen muslins imported from France rose 
from just under 5 million francs in 1872+ to 12 million francs 
in 1875? when they amounted to 60^ of total French imports to 
Japan. G .0 . Yedo. ¥1. July 15? 1876* St. Quentin to Hecazes. 
25*) Seeub&low.
phases of growth or decline in French imports from and
o f
exports to Japan between 1873 and 191^."“ * Between 1873 and
1881 French exports to Japan averaged i*oughly 15i million
francs a year. Then, from 1882 to 1887? they suffered a con-
27siderable drop to approximately 7i millions." *
26.) The following figures are taken from Table 2+2 in the 
section on trade in the statistical appendix to Kyoto Daigaku 
Bungakubu Kenkyushitsu ed., Nihon Kindai-shi Jiten, (Diction- 
ary of Modern Japanese Histo2^T7*^>^yo, 1*958. pp. 882-893* 
Unfortunately the figures given are those for general commerce, 
which could be anything from 10% to 100% larger than those for 
special commerce, although 25$ appears to be a rough average.
The division of the years 1873-1 91U into phases has been made 
with the intention primarily of indicating the periods at which 
significant change occurred in the value of imports and exports 
rather than in comparing them exactly with each other. Since 
the disparity of import® and export values is evident from any 
set of figures, little point would be served by forcing the 
figures into artificial patterns for the sake of direct com­
parison. Since the fortunes of exports and imports were not 
linked intimately with each other, the respective phases chosen 
are not always the same.
27.) This striking drop can be attributed mainly to the effects 
of the Matsvikata deflation, though partly also to the stagnation 
in France following the imposition of pi’otective tariffs^ in 1881 
See Y. Guyot, Le Commerce et les Commercants ♦ Paris, 1909?
PP * 357-359 *
They picked up somewhat between 1888 and 1893 when the figure
rose again to about 12+ million francs, and thereafter there was
a slight increase which maintained itself until 1913* The aver-
28.age for this period was in the region of 17 million francs.
The figures for French imports from Japan show less fluc­
tuation. After a gradual rise in the 1870fs and 1880.1s, they 
steadily accelerated from the 1890*s to 1914? when they received 
an extra impulsion from the War. Betv/een 1873 and 1880 they
averaged 24% million francs a year, a figure which rose betY/een
1881 and 1887 to almost 40 millions, and between 1888 and 1902 
to about 65 millions. Then in the following eleven years, they
climbed, on average, to 112 millions a year, their best single
year b&ing 1913? when they stood at 165 million francs, com­
pared with a best year for French exports of 22 millions in 
1900.
28.) These values have been converted from yen into francs, 
in approximate correspondence with contemporary rates of ex­
change, in order to maintain continuity with previous figures 
and also because the franc fluctuated less than the yen, which 
depreciated rapidly until Japan went on the gold standard in 
1897• Nevertheless the price level in France did fall by about 
40% between 1873 and 1896, to rise again by about the same 
amount between 1896 and 1914? and in the light of this, it can 
be seen that, except during the 1880*3, French exports to Japan 
changed very little in quantity over the whole forty years.
This disparity was inevitable, given the.French demand for 
Japanese silk,and it cannot be said that the French Government 
showed any great concern about it, at least before 1900. It 
was, after all, small in terms of overall trade, and a good 
deal less substantial than that caused by her trade with China?^* 
Nevertheless, French traders, and the French commercial men­
tality, did occasionally come under criticism from French 
diplomats in Japan for their unadventurousness and ineffic­
iency. Borne of these criticisms may, perhaps, be disregarded 
as prejudiced or ill-informed, but others seem fairly well- 
founded. Roches’ unfavourable comparison of French silkworm 
buyers in Japan with those from I t a l y , f o r  instance, is 
supported by the success of the Italian silkworm-rearing 
industry and the slow but mnmistak®able decline of the French 
in the I870fs and 1880Ts.^ * In the 1870’s criticisms of this 
kind are no longer encountered, but they make a definite
29.) In 1873, for instance, France imported from Japan 20,290, 
256 francs worth (Annales du Commerce Exterieur, XLIII, Chine et 
Indo-Ghine, Faits Commerciaux No.50.), but her total imports 
amounted to 5,600,000,000 francs (M.Block, Statistique de la
fy X. k \  i nmrnmimm 11< 11      iwuum
France, Paris, 1875* vol.II. pp.282-294*) Both figures relate 
to special commerce. Even in 1907, when Japanese exports to 
France had increased considerably, Japan, with 83 million francs, 
figured only 16th on the list of countries supplying French 
imports, whereas China, with 212 million francs, came 8th. Guyot* 
op. cit., p.3&0. Although France regularly sold more to Japan 
than to China, except In 1868 and 1869 this superiority was 
easily outweighed by French imports from China.
30.) C„C. Yedo. V. Jan.7, 1868. Roches to Moustier.
31 .) See G. Chapman, The Third Re-public of France, London,
1962 .p.109.
return in the mid-1880’s with the campaign to secure naval orders 
for France. In view of the concern felt by the French Govern­
ment that French : should re-
32main in full operation, * the failure to secure so many 
orders as Britain and Germany required some explanation by 
French diplomats, and they found it, pretty consistently, In 
the inefficient selling methods of French companies. In 
1886, when the raae to supply the Japanese havy had only just
begun, Sienkiewic.z'“c5omplained that only one French establish-
' J
ment was directly represented in Japan, and the fact that
*w,
this complaint had not been heeded was seized upon by Collin
de Plancy in 1892 to explain the decline in French prestige
3Liafter three large orders actually had been gained. Some 
improvement both in expert knowledge of the market and in 
construction certainly was needed. One ship had taken longer 
to build than the contract stipulated and was further reported 
to be unseaworthy; another had had two accidents on the way 
to Japan and had still not arrived after 60 days, and a third
32.) This consideration is explicitly stated in an instruc­
tion sent to Sienkiewicz on the occasion of a mission to Japan 
by M. Jehenne, agent of an important French concern. The 
importance attributed to naval orders can be judged by the 
Quai’s reminder to Sienkiewicz that: ®L’int6r§t qui s’attache 
au succ£s des negociations pouiCsuivies par la Gompagnie des 
Forges et Chantiers n ’a pas besoin d ’etre demontre." C.C. 
Tokyo. IV, Oct.9, 1885. to Sl&nkiewicx.
33*) C.P. Japon. XXXII. July 9, 1886. Sienkiewicz to Frey- 
cinet.
34») C.P.Japon* XXXVI, Jan.26, 1892. Collin de Plancy to 
Ribot.
-  347 -
■y C
had failed by 3 knots to reach the required speed. Since,
in addition to these failings, French ships tended to he more
36expensive than those of France fs rivals, * most of the successes
which French industry achieved probably owed something to special
influence or pressure of some kind. The influence of the French
designer, Bertin, for instance, was a powerful factor in
deciding the Japanese navy to equip itself with cruisers, which
the French could build fairly well, rather than large battle-
37ships, in which field French shipyards could not compete. *
It was also hoped that the Japanese Navy Minister from 1890 to 
1892, Admiral Kabayama, might be tempted by the S'rand Gross of
33*) Ibid. Even this was less embarrassing than the case of 
the tJnebi*, an earlier order from France which sank without 
trgj.ce somewhere between Singapore and Japan. See C.P.Japon.
XXXIII. Jan.22, 1887. Sienkiewicz to Flourens.
36.) This is only hinted at in the correspondence between 
Paris and 'Tokyo bu’jj^^g^ljsar^admission can be found in a letter 
of May 11 , 1896, fromA8&piSiA Chanoine. According to Descharmes, 
French companies charged 25% more than ArmstrongTs and took one 
to two years longer to build. See Chanoine, op. cit. p.178.
37.) See the report of July 10, 1886, by Rear-Admiral Rieunier 
to the Ministry of Marine, which the latter sent to the Quai 
d r0rsay. C.P. Japon XXXII. Aug.28, 1886. Sienkiewicz to 
Freyeinet.
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*58of* the Legion of Honour4* * to favour Prance, but whether this 
method wver contributed to French success is doubtful# The 
one clear case of successfully influencing Japanese purchasing 
policy by non-commercial considerations occurred in1896, ?/hen 
Japan1s need to cut short the protracted Treaty Revision nego­
tiations presented France with an opportunity to bargain
3 9 .which the latter did not let slip, 
b .) C&mmercial Influences on_French Policy^
The French Governments concern over the sale of warships 
raises the question of the extent to which French policy was 
dictated by considerations of trade. In theoz^ y, of course, the 
creation and continuation of a situation in which trade could be 
carried on freely was the original and basic justification i*°r 
the French diplomatic presence in Japan. However, after the 
Bakumatsu period, the existence of the Treaties, and therefore 
of trade, was no longer in question, so that the chief way in
38.) C.P. Japon. XXXVI. Jan.26.1892. Collin de Plancay to
Ribot; also C.P.Japon XXV, June 5? 1891, in which Sienkiewicz 
recommended the award in the following terms: *J*ajouterai que 
nous avons d*autant plus d 1interst & le faire qufil est question 
d'un emprunt.int&rieur assez serieuse a lTeffet d'augmenter les 
forces de la Marine Japonaise.*' Though the Quai d fOrsay rejec­
ted the suggestion, the language which it used shows that it 
saw the problem in the same way: il y aurait lieu d fattendre
qufil nous ait donn6 des preuves reelles de ses sentiments a 
notre egard.” Sienkiewicz Yiras therefore permitted to inform 
Kabayama of the possibility. C.P.Japon. XXV. Sept .1 7 ,1 891 .
Ribot to Sienkiewica.
39.) See the chaptex1 on Treaty Revision for details.
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which policy might he influenced by trade was removed.
Even before this, in any case, trade was sometimes used by 
France as a cloak for other motives, and after the Meiji 
Restoration* it was cez^tainly never the shackle on French poli­
cy that British trading interests were on British policy.
This point must be so apparent by now that it need not be 
pursued. What is worth investigating more fully, however, is 
the question of what influence was exerted on French policy by 
particular commercial needs or pressure groups at x particular 
times.
The topic which, above all others, suggests itself in this 
context is what special commercial motivation, if any,there was 
behind Roches1 pro-Bakufu policy. The argument was first deve­
loped by Otsuka, and has been more or less accepted by most 
other historians, that it was Roches1 pursuit of his mission to 
develop French trade which led him into blind support of the 
S h o g u n Up to a point this can be accepted, though with the 
reservations that this official concern with trade was nothing 
new, that it need not have excluded other motives, and that the 
initiative for the BakuiWffrench link came as much from a group 
of Japanese officials as from Roches himself. It is clear from
his reports that the Bakufaf s lifting of restrictions on the
in
silk trade and cooperation^the provision of silkworm eggs did 
much to convince Roches of its good faith and friendly feelings
Ij-O.) Otsuka, Bakumatsu Gaikoshi no Kenkyu. p. 295.
-  350 -
towards France. The argument "becomes misleading, however,
when the assumption is then made that the extension of French
trade was only possnVble if Roches acquired monopolistic
hirights in Japan. * The two items generally mentioned in 
connection with Roches* alleged monopoly are the export of 
silk and the import of arms and munitions. While admitting 
that Roches* was not unhappy at the thought of France holding a 
special position with regard to either of these important 
sectors of trade, one may question the justice of the accus­
ation that he was seeking monopolistic rights in any meaningful 
sense of the word.
To take the silk question first, it is true that there 
were rumours in Yokohama, which were to some extent accepted 
by both Winchester and von Poelsbrock, the Dutch Minister, that
Roches had monopolistic intentions with regard to silkworms
1+2eggs and possibly raw silk itself. # But the facts to support
such a supposition either do not exist or have been subject to
misinterpretation. That suspicions should have been aroused
at the time is not altogether surprising. In the early 1860*s
the vast bulk of silk exported from Japan went to England,
whence it was largely re-exported to France. This was a
constant source of irritation to the Lyons market and it was
1+1 .) Ibid. See also Ishii, Meiji I shin Ron, pp.270-271 •
1+2.) See F.0.1+6. LIII. Feb .28,1 855* WInohester to Hammond 
(Private);, Their suspicions became known to Roches, who 
chided his colleagues for them, but it is interesting that he 
declined to inform Drouyn de Lhytys of the details of this mis­
understanding. See C.P.Japon. XIII, April 26, 1865. Roches 
to Drouyn.
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largely in order to remedy the situation that the Messageries
Imperiales were encouraged to extend their service to Yokohama.
It was against the background of the Messageries* decision that
Roches arrived in Japan. His activity was not such as to allay
the fears that had been aroused among the English merchants of
new competition, and his secretive nature could hardly have been
better calculated to stir up wild accusations. One of his first
actions after the political impasse had been removed by the
Shimonoseki Expedition, was to request the Bakufu to supply him
with 15,000 silkworm eggs for the purpose of regenerating the
French silkworm rearing industry. The Bakufu1 s i*esponse was
astonishing in view of its previous lack of cooperation. About
AO,000 eggs were brought to Roches and a French expert, named
Barlandier, was allowed to select the best specimens ‘This
move was followed, early in 1865, by a Bakufu request, which
Roches supported, that the French G-overnment supply the ShSmin
IlRWith 16 of the new French rifled cannons. Their arrival in
June did not go unnoticed. * Finally, In the autumn of 1 865? 
Roches accepted a further gift of silkworm eggs from the
b3 •) 0 .C .Y^do,111. Sept. 1, 1 861].. Roches to Drouyn.
1+1+.) C.C.Yddo,111. Nov .9,1 86U* Roches to Drouyn.
1+5.) C.P.Japon. XIII. Jan.16,1865* Roches to Drouyn.
1+6.) See P.0.JL|_6. LV. No.96. June, 7, 1865* Winchester to Russell 
i+7 •) C .C Yedo. IV. Sept .11 , 1865* Roches to Drouyn. Whether 
or not this gift was provoked by Roches is uncertain. He himself 
claimed that it was a spontaneous act by the Bakufu. On the 
other hand, it is stated by Duseigneur In the Moniteur des 
Soies of March 17, 1866, that Roches asked for a second con­
signment at his prompting.
Bakufu.^
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These three actions were connected and given an
48exaggerated interpretation by English opinion in Japan.
But if solid evidence rather than mere suspicion is taken 
into account it is plain that they presaged no attempt to 
establish a French monopoly. If one looks at the question 
from the French angle itself9 for example9 one finds that
Roches* original purchase came under fire from French as
49well as English traders9 and his second acquisition was
50received with mixed feelings in France as well. The
complaint was made that he was competing on unfair terms with
genuine traders9 and that once the restriction on the export
of eggs had been lifted at the start of 1865 any further
official action was unnecessary. Still more significant9
although Roches had been warmly congratulated by Drouyn de
Lhuys^ on the success of his first initiative9 he was
informed in 1865 that silkworm eggs should henceforth be
51left to the industry itself. With both his Minister and
48, Winchester’s suspicions appear in his private letter to 
Hammond of April 27 9 1865 9 in F„0.4-6. LIV, See also the attack 
in the Japan Heraldq which the Quai enclosed with a request to 
Roches for an explanation in C.0.Yddo IV. Sept. 25° 1866.
49° Moniteur des Soies? Jan,7*18659 Jan ® 14 ? 18 65 * The Main 
opponent was a merchant named Fila9 who ? having secured silk­
worm eggs himself after much difficulty9 resented Government 
competition;, as he regarded it? and was particularly aggrieved 
that Roches had not paid the 5$ export duty.
50, Moniteur des Soles« Jan.13,18659 March 17? 1866,
51* C.CcYedo* III. Dec. 22.1864. Drouyn to Roches. Drouyn*s 
Instruction not to Intervene further does not appear in any 
of the series but is referred to In C.C.Yddo. IV, Sept.11.1865. 
Roches to Drouyn.
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his own traders demanding an end to official intervention, it
is hard to see how Roches could ever have thought of creating
52a monopoly9 even if he had wanted to.
Nor is the ease of the import of arms by the Compagnie 
Franco-Japonaise much more incriminating. It is true that 
Roches spoke of Japan becoming a French market, but it is 
important to observe that he -saw this prospect in terms of 
the British position in China, which, in so far as it was 
largely a British market, was so .mainly because of British 
capital resources and established connections with important 
Chinese merchants. The Compagnie Franco-Japanaise was a 
short-cut to the same end* but that it did not imply an actual 
monopoly was expressly stated by Roches when he wrotes-
1 XI a etd bien entendu, d*ailleurs, que le gouvernement 
japonais renoncerait a tout action sur ces Compagnies auijb 
que celle qu’exercent les gouvernements Buropdens sur des 
associations de ce genre et qu'il dviterait soigneCusement de 
fournir aucun motif de plainte soit au commerce en general, 
soit a aucune des autres Puissances en particulier, en s’inter- 
disant d*accorder aux Compagnies en question des privileges 
incompatibles avec I’entidre liberte rdservee aux operations 
Commerciales des Strangers.1 53
52. That5 in any case, he did not want to, is indicated by 
his comment on the Bakufu edict of May 1866, which finally 
permitted silk to be brought direct to Yokohama without any 
transit dutys MJe crois superflu d!appuyer sur 1Timportance 
de cette mSsure.1' C .P .Japon.XIV.May 27? 1866. Roches to 
Drouyn.
53. C.C.Yddo, IV. Oct. 17? 1865» Roches to Drouyn.
The Company appeared likely to secure a large share of
the Japanese Government1s orders of foreign manufacturers
but9 as Winchester himself had earlier admitted9 nA Government
going beyond its own territory to trade is a private individual
44and can suit itself as to a market W* What did disturb
the English colony about Roches1 schemes was that Government
imports might be paid for 1 by consigning all the available
silk worm eggs to France and as much silk as may be wanted to
cover the contracts "  On this point9 however? Winchester9
at least9 had his mind set at rest by Roches 9 who declared9
after raising the topic himself^f wthat no such schemes were
in contemplation1* and rtthat if he pursued such vicious
commercial schemes he would deserve to be put to the door
(a la porte) by his governmento*1 J In view of the doubts
about Roches1 two very limited operations on the part of
French merchants9 the caution of the Quai df0rSay9 and the
fact that the supplies of silk and silkworm eggs far exceeded
the value of French imports into Japan9 it seems not unreasonable
to accept Roches1 good faith In this matter*
There is further evidence that Roches was not aiming at
a monopolistic position for France* Declarations and
proposals that he made on various occasions9 show him* in
54* F.0*46* LIII. Feb*28.1865* Winchester to Hammond (Private).
55« Ibid *
56 * Ibid *
diametrical opposition to the usual view, as a firm believer
in free trade* It should be remembered that Roches1 Lyons
background was one which would have endowed him with a pre-
57disposition towards free trade* To judge by some of Roches1
language in fact, free trade was almost as much an ideology
with him as it was with Gobden or Bright* The vehemence
with which he repudiated the Idea of monopoly has already
been seen In his declaration to Winchester* His message to
Choshu in July 1864-, contains a similar ideological elements
JJ.comme les hommes sont tous Freres, le Trds-Haut a decide, 
dans sa Supreme misericorde, qu’ils auraient entr’eux des 
rapports amicaux et des relations commerciales qui les mettr- 
aient tous ci ineine de profiter des avantages qu!il a concddds 
aux diffdrentes nations et aux differentes contrees.1* 58
That this was not mere verbiage is indicated by what
Roches wrote in 1865 In connection with the approaching
tariff revision negotiations mes collegues adopteraient,
sans difficulty, la base de 10 a 12$^mais j'espere amener le
Gouvernerfht Japonais a consentir a ne nlus lever sur touifs
especes de merchandises, sans distinction,qu1un droit de 5^®,!^
That this was eventually achieved undoubtedly owed much to
Roches and suggests that he was not engaging in duplicity, as
Parkes suspected, when he unsuccessfully proposed to Drouyn
that the French Government should support a plan to make
6oNagasaki and Hakodate free ports.
57® —the siIk-merchants of Lyon, who disposed of the great part 
of their output abroad... %were natural freetraders.,! Chapman, 
op.cit., p.145*
58* F*0 .46*VL.No.50. Aug.23?1864* Alcock to Palmerston* Inclos«Sw 
17® Roches to Prince of Choshu, July 21,1864.
59® GoC.Yedo* I? * Dec.1.18650 Roches to Drouyn.
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All this is not to argue that Roches’ professions need
always be taken at face value, or that In practice he was not
prepared to see Frenchmen take advantage,of the favour in
which France stood. Moreover, in one respect he was opposed
to complete freedom of trade* The desire of many silk
merchants for complete access to the Japanese silkworm areas
found no sympathy with him. The reason for this, however,
was no nefarious scheme, but the belief which Duseigneur and
many other experts held that the disease which had struck the
silkworm-rearing industries of France and the rest of Europe,
and even much of Asia^was caused by ’grainage industriel*,
61
the excessive commercial breeding of the silkworm.
Their anxiety lest the Japanese silkworm should have its 
quality impaired before the French varieties recovered was
62shared by Roches and may have contributed to his reluctance 
to see any new ports opened. Apart from this, however, he 
took no actual measures to restrict the export of eggs, and 
in general it may be said that the evidence that Roches’ policy 
was decided by the pursuit of monopoly rights is practically 
nil.
60. C.P.Japon.XIV. April 24, 1866. Drouyn to Roches, F.0.46.
LXV*. No. 18. Jan.31? 1866. Parkes to Clarendon.
61. See e.g. the Minister of Agriculture’s report to the 
Emperor in Moniteur des Soies, July 22, 1865®
62. C.C.Y£do.III. Oct. 15, 1864. Roches to Drouyn.
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Apart from Roches and the sale of warships cases of 
commercial or economic pressures influencing diplomacy in 
anything hut a general way, are comparatively few. In fact, 
it is oust as easy to find examples of commercial interests 
falling to have the influence that might have been expected 
of them. For instance, though the need for Japanese silk-* 
worms \tfas already being felt in 1862, the French Government made 
no special effort to coerce the Bakufu into relaxing Its pro­
hibition on their export, even though this prohibition was in 
fact contrary to the Treaty. It was claimed that Drouyn de
Lhuys did instruct Bellecourt and Roches to facilitate the
6 2purchase of silkworm eggs,  ^but there is nothing in the
archives to support this, and it Is worth noting that Drouyn
specifically referred to Roches1 initiative1 with regard to
the first consignment of 15,000 eggs. Moreover, on the
very same day in 1863 that the fcloniteur des Soies was
proclaimings "Les prochains couriers du Japon vont avoir
65aussi une grande influence sur nos marches,n Drouyn was 
writing reproving dispatches to Bellecourt, in which he
spoke of France (,n!ayant pas jusqu'a present de grands interets
\ ^  66 a proteger dans les mers du Japon.™
63. By F.Jacquemart, in a report for the Societd Imperiale
dTAcclimation reprinted in the Moniteur des Soies. March 18,
1865. Drouyn was President of the Society.
64. C .C.YSdo .III. Dec.22,1864. Drouyn to Roches.
65 • Moniteur des Soies«, July 18, I863.
66. C.P.Japon.IX.July 18,1863. A few months earlier Drouyn had 
refused Bellecourt1s request for the establishment of a consul­
ate at Yokohama, stating that the expense 1 .. me serait nulle- 
ment justifide par le degre d1 importance de nos ijatdrets commer- 
ciaux et maritimes au Jauon.'1 C .C .Y^do .II .Mar. 21.18 63* Drouyn JoUfSlT poonrt *
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In the important question of Treaty Revision, too, where 
the views of trade might have been expected to be heard,
TZ
there is little evidence of consultation with the French
67community at Yokohama or with French Chambers of Commerce, 
and the main decisions were frequently taken for political 
rather than economic reasons® Furthermore, not only was ^
French policy not dominated by the desire to make Japan a 
new market for the export of capital, but from 1868 until the 
mid 1890*3 the very idea of a loan was only mentioned once
by a French diplomat in Japan, and that with the object of
68warning French banks about Japan* s financial instability,.
Against this, the examples that do exist of economic
influences on diplomacy are all, apart from shipbuilding,
connected with the silk trades, and for the most part had no
real political significance® In 1881 the report that the
Japanese Government had established a monopolistic silk-
selling company led to telegrams and a protest from the Qua!
d*0rsay, but Roquette allowed himself to be satisfied with a
6 7 * The Qua! consulted French chambers of commerce in 1873 
(G*C*Yedo.VI * July 20, 1873* Broglie to Berthemy) and Roquette 
requested it to do so again in 1882® (G«C ®Y6do.II„Jan.19*1882) 
though there is no record of this having been done* French 
merchants in Japan were asked for their views in 1879 by Balloy 
(IbEcho du Japon. Dec*12.1879) again in 1894 by Harmand 
(C*C*Tokyo IX® Sept*24,1894® Harmand to Hanotaux). Ho other 
instance of consultation during the quarter of a century of 
a century that Treaty Revision took has been found® ^
68® C.P*Japon* XXVII. Sept*14,1880. Balloy to Freyclnet.
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Government promise that the company did not possess official 
6 oprotection® ' Three years later a more important instance
occurred* In this case France demanded the removal of the
Japanese export duty on silk In return for her agreement to
a revised tariff, an act which considerably complicated Inoue*s
already difficult task, and contributed to the failure of the
70revision conferences® Finally In 1897-8 a law passed to
'H
encourage a" direct export of silk by Japanese merchants by
means of a bounty caused anguished protests from French and
British traders® Eventually the remonstrances of the Foreign
Representatives and the threat of imposing a duty on Japanese-
imported silk,equal to the bounty on Its entry into France,
71secured the suppression of the law.' These Incidents, 
however, though they involved diplomatic action of one sort 
or another, cannot be said to have had any effect on France's 
general policy towards Japan.
In conclusion it may be worthwhile to try and assess the 
economic importance to both countries of French trade with 
Japan® Its Importance for France was naturally less than for 
Japan, since It formed only a small fraction of France's total 
overseas trade* Nevertheless, its value was greater than 
these figures alone would suggest® The French silk Industry
6 9. CoC.Tokyo.II. Oct*28.1881® Ibid® Oct.31*1881® Barthelemy St. 
Hilaire to Roquette. Ibid. Undated telegram (Nov.3 or 4); Ibid. 
Nov*7*l88l. both Roquette to Barthelemy St. Hilaire.
70* See Chapter VI.
71* C .C .Tokyo .X. March 31?t897® Harmand iEoiHanotaux5IBID. April 
15,1897® Harmand to Hanotaux;Ibid .May 11.1897® Hanotaux to 
Harmand| Ibid.July 22,1897® Harmand to Hanotaux; C.C.Tokyo.XI. 
May.21.1 8 9 8. Harmand to Hanotaux. ____________ _
360 -
was one of the country's most important industries, and 
Roches was hardly exaggerating in 1864 when he claimed that 
•'l'une des sources principales de notre richesse national© 
menacerait de tarir si un element nqveau et sain ne venaIt 
regenerer celui qui fait defaut au jourd* hui f1 ^  Two
quotations, from official and unofficial sources, will serve 
to indicate the part played by the Japanese silkworm In saving 
the French industry from the effects of the disease known as 
pebrine. The first, which Is taken from a Government state­
ment to the Senate in 1866, echoes the hopes of experts who 
had studied the crisis for two or three years £ 11L' Industrie 
des soieis, eprouvee deja par plusieurs rnauvaises recoltes a 
compt§ vainement sur celle de 1 8 6 5, qui, plus d6favourable 
encore que les pr^cedentes, a demontre que les graines du 
Japon avaient seules, ou a peu pres, quant a present, le 
privilege de donner de bon*is resultats*n D The second
quotation, written five years later when the tide had
turned, confirmed the hopes of 1866; "Les graines japonaises 
ont puissamment aide la France, 1'Italie et d'autres pays, a
 ^  ^ n/\
conserver une Industrie qui, autrement, eut ete rulnde,"'
72* C«C0Yedo* III. Sept. 1.1864. Roches to Drouyn.
73® Quoted in Moniteur des Soies* Jan.27® 1866.
74. Reprinted In Moniteur des Soies, July 8,1871® Production of 
cocoons in France had declined from 26 mill.kilos in 1853 bo 
7*2 mill .kilos in 1856 and 4 mill.kilos in 1865 ® 1866 saw a brief 
recovery to 6,4000,000 kilos, but In I867 an all-time low was
reached with 3?4Q0,Q0Q kilos. The decline was then halted, but
real recovery did not take place until 1871? when 7?358?38° kilo 
were produced. By the mid-18701s the average figure was a little 
more than 10 million kilos. Moniteur des Soles, June 24, I8 7 6.
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proclaimed an article in l'Echo du Japon.
Japanese silkworms rescued the French silkworm-rearing 
Industry from almost complete extinction by providing an 
alternative supply while the French varieties recovered from 
their over-intensive exploitation. Their help was particularly 
valuable for two reasons. In the first place, the French 
Industry>like the Japanese Industry later, was largely 
organised on a domestic basis and the number of families which 
needed the work to supplement an inadequate return from 
agriculture was large - about 180,000, most of whom were 
concentrated in an area noted for its independence of Paris.
The social and political consequences of the collapse of the 
industry, therefore, would have been considerable. In the
76second place, finished silk was one of France's key exports. 
Without the use of Japanese silkworms by French rearers a 
sufficient supply of raw material would have been difficult 
to procure and the balance of trade, which in the 1870*s was 
becoming unfavourable to France, would have been worse than It 
was. In due course, high quality Japanese and Chinese raw 
silk became abundant and cheap enough to satisfy French 
manufacturing needs and the French silkworm-rearing 
industry slowly declined, both relatively and absolutely. 
Nevertheless, the fact remains that in the short-term the 
Japanese silkworm provided a cushion against the shock of
75® See Chapman.op.cit. p.109? Moniteur des Soies, April 8 ,1 8 7 6.
7 6 . Until overtaken by woollen goods In the mid-l8708s it had 
been France's chief foreign currency earner, being worth between 
4-00 and 500 million francs annually. Chapman,op.cit. p. 145®
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pebrine. This was for France the most valuable result of 
the Japan trade - more important than the additional outlet 
for woollen muslins and warships, which affected the French
J
economy only marginally*
The importance of French trade for Japan was of a 
different nature. As for France, it was most valuable during 
the ’sixties and ’seventies, even though its volume was greater 
in later years. For Japan it filled the extremely important 
function, in the ’sixties of providing a favourable balance 
of trade, and in the ’seventies of reducing the drain of 
specie from the country. In the decades before and after 
the Keiji Restoration, America, the great future market for 
Japan’s staple export of silk, was not yet in a position 
to deal with really large quantities of the one branch of 
production for which Japan was specially suited^ and for which 
production could be quickly expanded without the need for 
expensive equipment, Government initiative, or social 
disruption. Without the French and Italian markets. It is 
difficult to see how the Meiji Government could have 
afforded to lay the foundations of industrial modernisation 
In the 1870’s. Foreign experts, model factories, and 
subsidies for key industries would all have been severely
—  3^3 "•
77restricted in scope. Despite the many individual hardships
caused to Japanese producers both of silk and silkworm eggs.,
78by violent price fluctuations, it seems undeniable that 
the trade between France and Japan brought appreciable 
advantages to both.
77* An additional advantage can be seen in the fact that 
the Japanese Government was encouraged by foreign traders2 
among whom Frenchmen were prominent in this instance? to 
set up model filatures which would produce better quality 
silk. (See e.g. Moniteur des Soies, Sept.179 1870.)
This development provided the foundation for the even 
greater expansion of silk exports at the end of the century.
78. See e.g. Moniteur des Soies» Nov.4,1871? May 8,1875°
IF Echo du Japon9 June 27?1879* See also a letter from Ed. 
Schnell, a Swiss consular official in Japan9 which stated 
that some Japanese merchants committed suicide in 1866 on 
account of the over-supply of silkworm eggs, Moniteur des 
Soies ? July 21.1867.
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CONCLUSIONS
The characteristic which marked French policy towards 
Japan between 1854 and 1894 most strikingly was its negative 
quality. From the ..time when her first Treaty with Japan 
was sought and signed in the late 1850's to the final stages 
of its revision in the 1890's, France was notable for her 
almost invariable unwillingness to take an initiative.
She commenced her relations with Japan in the wake of the 
United States and in the shadow of Britain and she completed 
this period In tow to Russia. In the intervening years, the 
Quai d1Orsay's main concern was to preserve the advantages 
that had been so easily obtained In 1858. These advantages 
were primarily commercial, and French trade did, in fact, 
attain considerable proportions, but it cannot be said that 
the French Government showed particular enthusiasm for 
extending its scope, and traders themselves exerted almost no 
influence on French policy. Their views were consulted 
only rarely, and then mostly as a formality or an afterthought. 
Pressures from the ship-building and silk industries were more 
effective, but their influence remained marginal. If any 
consideration stirred France to positive action It was the 
desire to increase French prestige, an aim which was often 
linked with the desire to increase French influence. It 
was largely prestige which brought France to Japan In the 
first place and much of the French contribution to Japanese
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modernisation* especially in the military sphere* stemmed 
from the belief that it would confirm France as a power of 
the first order and make her achievements respected throughout 
the Far East. On a more political level* considerations of 
prestige confirmed France in her opposition to Treaty Revision", 
Even prestige* however* had its limitations. The propagation 
of the French language was generally admitted to be the main 
foundation for the admiration of French culture* yet the 
cause of expansion of French education in Japan never 
attracted from any Foreign Minister a sum larger than 4000 
francs* and most years received much less.
The negative quality that marked French diplomacy was not 
unique to France. None of the European Powers either mounted 
a sustained campaign to exploit Japan*s weakness by extorting 
new privileges or seriously attempted to secure her as a 
satellite or ally* which were the two basic alternatives of 
positive* Imperialist diplomacy. If anything* indeed*
France came nearest to pursuing both courses. Jules Berthemy 
played the leading role in the European attempt to revise 
the treaties in 1873“4* while in contrast to this* Leon Roches 
had,a few years earlier,come closer to making Japan dependent 
on the country he served than did any other Foreign Represent­
ative in modern Japanese history. I11 both these cases* 
the initiative belonged to the French Minister In Tokyo 
rather than to his superiors In Paris. Positive action of 
this sort was rarely promoted by the Quai d*Orsay and when an
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important political initiative did originate with the 
Foreign Minister, as in the,case of the decision to collab­
orate with Japan to weaken China in December 1884, or the 
decision of Drouyn de Lhuys to offer French help to the 
Bakufu in 1864 to open the Shimonoseki Straits, the French 
Minister in TokyoTs distaste for the idea considerably 
weakened its chances of success*
These facts invite a comparison of the respective 
parts played in French policy by the Quai d!Orsay and the 
French diplomats who served in Japan» One must recognize 
first that it is impossible to distinguish within the Quai 
d1Orsay .itself between the- Foreign Minister and his permanent, 
or near-permanent, senior officials. Almost none of the 
dispatches sent from the Quai dMDrsay which appear in the 
French archives bear any clear mark of their real authorship. 
Since, however, most French Foreign Ministers were in office 
for too short a time to gain much knowledge of so distant a 
country as Japan, and since in only one or two instances is 
there any discernible change of emphasis following a 
Ministerial changeover, it would not seem unreasonable to 
assume that Japanese affairs were mostly dealt with by the 
Political or Commercial Directors or their subordinates.
As French diplomats in Japan also succeeded each other at 
fairly frequent intervals, it might be imagined that they 
too would be easily controlled. For a number of reasons,
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this was not always so. To begin with, the only thing 
that the Quai d1Orsay impressed upon its agents was that 
they must avoid all complications which might lead France 
into costly military operations. This, however, was far 
from being a complete guide for diplomats faced with a variety 
of new questions arising out of changing circumstances.
The distance separating Paris from Tokyo made their problem 
a very real one. To receive a reply to a written dispatch 
took between three and four months, if it was quick, and 
until the early l880fs telegrams were not much better.
The latter means of communication, was, in any case, strongly 
discouraged by the Quai d’Orsay itself on account of its 
expense.
If distance presented a problem, it also presented 
ambitious diplomats with an opportunity. Roches certainly 
owed much of his success to this factor, and if, after the 
Quai dFOrsay had discovered how deeply he had involved 
France in Japanese politics, a closer watch was kept on his 
successors, there was still room for them to act independently 
in some areas and thus influence French policy by their person­
ality. This was especially true of the differing importance 
which successive agents placed on the pursuit of prestige 
and influence. Although the Quai d’Orsay always favoured 
this in a general way, it never until the later l880!s actually 
intimated to French diplomats that they should concern them­
selves with it, perhaps because it realized that from Paris
368 -
it was impossible to predict when opportunities would arise, 
although more probably because the extent to which Japan 
turned to the West for help in modernisation took it by 
surprise. From the time of the Franco-Chinese War, it 
began to be regarded, rightly or wrongly, as a matter of 
prime importance that France should be in a position to 
influence Japan by means of individuals or groups. By then, 
however, Japan was dispensing with most of her foreign experts 
and acquiring very few new ones. In these circumstances, the 
Quai d'Orsay was dependent on the efforts of earlier French 
representatives. As it happened, the majority of these, 
though not, for the most part, noticeably pro-Japanese, 
were extremely sensitive either tc the Idea of France1s 
civilising mission or to the credit that would accrue to 
France, and omitted no opportunity of recommending to Japan 
the employment of French lawyers, soldiers, and technicians. 
Had more of them been shaped in the Berthemy mould, however, 
the out-come would have been very different.
French representatives also had a discernible influence 
on the course of Treaty Revision. Their direct knowledge 
of Japanese conditions compelled the Quai d'Orsay to pay 
considerable attention to their views, and when negotiations 
were held in Tokyo they had a tactical advantage In that the 
Quai could hardly question their reasons for seeking or 
rejecting co-operation with other Powers, if they should 
choose to exercise their own prejudices. Generally, they
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used their position to hinder the work of Revision, and it 
is worth asking why this was so• One factor may have been 
that with very few exceptions all the diplomats who served 
as minister or charge d’affaires in Japan were men whose 
careers had been spent outside Western Europe. They were 
not accustomed to treat the officials with whom'they dealt on 
terms of real equality, and with these habits they did not 
adjust well to Japanese circumstances. Japan's attempts 
to recover full sovereignty, in particular, aroused extra­
ordinary hostility among French diplomats, whose early 
reports often complained bitterly of Japanese vanity and 
ambition. The fact that the one French minister who 
remained in Japan for a longer period showed unmistaka- 
able signs of mellowing in his attitude towards the Japanese 
suggests that the brevity of most representatives’ service 
was also not without its effects on French policy.
If the numerous changes in French representation tended 
to allow initial personal impressions to influence the 
character of French diplomacy in Japan, they also tended to 
weaken the force of recommendations sent from Tokyo, espec­
ially if they seemed to the Quai d'Orsay to threaten its 
policy of avoidance of complications. numerous cases of 
recommendations being ignored could be cited, from 
Thouvenel’s rejection of Duchesne de Bellecourifs advice
M opening
regarding the postponedrtSAof H$ogo, Osaka, Edo, and Wiigata 
in i860, up to Hanotaux’s decision, in total disregard of
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Harmand* s warnings of the effect this would have on 
relations with Japan, to join Russia and Germany in the 
Triple Intervention. In view of this, there is no doubt 
that in the last resort the Quai d'Orsay maintained its 
control over the important sectors of policy. Even when 
the major decision-making role was allowed to slip into 
Roches' hands, the Quai d'Orsay managed to retrieve the 
situation before it was too late. This meant that whenever 
there was a conflict, or possible conflict, between French 
interests In Japan and European considerations { which 
usually meant the need to keep on good terms with Britain^ 
the former were invariably subordinated to the latter.
The fact that French policy was basically negative meant 
that its Influence on Japan was less than it might have been. 
It is true that Roches' deep Involvement in the Bakufu's 
struggle for survival had the unlooked-for effect of hastening 
overthrow. After the Meiji Restoration, however, there 
was very little attempt by France to influence the course of 
Japanese politics or foreign policy, nor was there any thought 
of indirect influence by means of e conomic or financial 
penetration. The main, and almost the sole, exception was 
the French Interest In Japanese assistance during the Franco- 
Chinese War, but this was unsuccessfuD- and in one respect 
may have confirmed Inoue in his pacific policy rather than 
the reverse, since the possibility of alliance contributed 
to China's willingness to come to terms with Japan regarding 
Korea.
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All this is not to say that French policy was completely 
without influence on Japanese history. There can he no 
doubt that the French experts who came to Japan contributed 
appreciably to the consolidation of the Meiji Government and 
the establishment of a legal system suitable to a modern 
society. Much of the most Important work could not have 
been carried out had not various French representatives 
been concerned with prestige and influence. On the other 
hand, the unimaginative French attitude towards Treaty 
Revision helped to delay fulfillment of the ch^ef objective 
of the Meiji leaders some years longer than was probably 
necessary, and this had unfortunate repercussions on the 
character of both Japanese politics and foreign policy.
The reasons for the French attitude were clearly stated by 
Frederick Marshall in a perceptive memorandum in 1883•
•'When the question of revising the Japanese treaties 
first came before Europe, France took up an attitude of 
indifference towards Japan. Her Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs expressed, repeatedly, during several years, in 
private conversations, the opinion that France had nothing 
to care about in Japan, and that though she would probably.
In the end, act as other European nations might act in the 
matter, she would take no initiative therein, and would 
hold to the present treaty as long as she possibly could.1
"France gave several reasons for this attitude. She 
said. In substance, that her position In Europe was delicate 
and difficult, that her whole thoughts were absorbed by that 
position, that her trade with Japan was small and her political 
interests there null, that she would only create difficulties 
with her European neighbours by assuming an active position 
in the Japanese revision, and that she wished to trouble 
herself as little as possible about that revision.1 1 .
1. JJMKoIT.G* 3. vol. II .to .962. Enclosure In Hachisluka to Inoue,
— — —  Sept.13.1883.
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A study of the Quai d'Orsay archives confirms the 
truth of Marshall's allegations. The French Government's 
preoccupation with Europe prevented the Qua! d'Orsay from 
paying serious attention to the problems of the new Japan.
Nor, after Roches, did it have, except perhaps during the 
brief period when Turenne was in Tokyo, any Minister who had 
either an Instinctive understanding of Japanese potentialities 
or sufficient time to see that the changes taking place were 
not so superficial as they seemed. No French diplomat ever 
realised before 1890 how considerable a military Power the 
high degree of centralisation and the strong feelings of 
nationalism would make Japan. Yet France, more than any 
other Pox^ er perhaps., would have benefited from and might 
have achieved, an entente with Japan. The sense of Inferiority 
which she felt particularly strongly in the Far East because of 
her military and naval ‘weakness there might have been 
alleviated had she entered Into some sort of diplomatic 
collaboration with Japan. The position of both countries 
xtfith regard to China would have been strengthened and the Far 
Eastern situation might well have proved more stable on that 
account. Between France and Japan there were no basic 
conflicts of interest, and because Japan \Ajas not an important 
market for her, France's policy was not shackled by the need 
to consult with influential traders. Indeed, if she had 
paid a little more attention to Japan, she might have realised 
that the letter's economy had within a decade of the Meiji
- 373 -
Restoration become inextricably involved in the international 
economy and that it 'would have been almost suicidal for a 
Japanese Government to denounce the Treaties in order to 
break off trade relations. On Japan1s part? a tie based on 
common interests and -without any suggestion of political 
inequality would9 if France could have accepted it? have 
brought material and psychological advantages., To say that 
this was inconceivable at the time is to ignore the success 
of Leon Roches. Many of Roches* successors were men of 
ability? but to be a successful diplomat in Japanp something 
more was needed. When Sienkiewicz wrote in January 1894 ?
,!on est trop porte en Europe d ne pas prendre le Japon au
 ^ p
serieux/* ~ he was bearing witness also to his own failure3 
and that of his predecessors*to make allowances for the 
difficulties faced by a modernising nation. The main 
conclusion that emerges from a study of French policy towards 
Japan in the 19th century is that a great opportunity was 
missed through lack of imagination.
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GLOSSARY
Literally * tent government1. The administra­
tive machine which handled. Shogunate and 
national affairs.
The final years of Tokugawa rule*
Bakufu officials of the middle and upper levels 
of the administrative hierarchy* This group 
supplied the governors of cities such as 
Nagasaki *
Lords who held fiefs valued at 10?000 koku. 
(4*96 bushels) of rice per year or above* 
Divided into two categories, fudai and tozama9 
the former being the descendants of men who 
had supported the founder of the Tokugawa 
dynasty before the decisive battle of 
Sekigahara in 1600 *
Literally ’rich country? strong army’* A 
slogan which expressed the key aim of the 
Meiji leaders*
The main political unit in the Tokugawa period. 
The area ruled by a daimyS*
Literally ’government by han cliques.1 A term 
used by the opposition in their attack on the 
Satsuma-Choshu dominated Meiji Government. 
Tokugawa vassals with fiefs valued at less than 










Literally ’unity of Court and Bakufu’. 
Represented a programme which commanded wide 
support among all Japanese po3.itical groups 
in the first half of the i860’s.
A title widely used by foreigners to denote 
the Emperor *
The senior Bakufu council9 consisting usually 
of 4 or 5 of the more powerful fudai daimyo. 
Literally ’wave-men1• Samurai who had 
abandoned their han, often in order to attempt 
violent solutions to national problems* 
Literally ’closed country*. Referred to the 
Tokugawa policy of seclusion from the outside 
world *
Members of the warrior class which numbered 
about 5^ of the population and was divided 
into a considerable number of ranks.
Hereditary ruler of the Tokugawa Bakufu, 
whose powers to control national affairs were 
delegated to him, in theory, by the Emperor. 
Literally ’Honour the Emperor - Expel the 
Barbarian' * A slogan deriving from two 
distinct roots which merged after 1858 to 





In English generally ’tycoon*. The title by 
which foreigners generally referred to the 
Shdgun.
The second Bakufu council.
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APPENDIX A*
French Rep res en t a t iv e s In Japan. 3-859-1894*
Duchesne de Bellecourt* June 1859-April 1864. Previously a 
member of Baron Gros’ mission to China* Not listed in the 
DIcUonnaire Diplomatique* Later Consul-Gendral, Batavia*
Ldon Roches* April 1864-June 1868. Born 1809. Previous service>4»h tg *tr*w<aagccfcaatasiiwmi'M.xnfw^uJWJWu>« /  r-  r
in North Africa and Trieste.
Ange-Maxime Outrey. June 1868-October 3„871« Born 1822.
Previous service in Damascus, Beirut, and Alexandria*
Paul de Turenne d’Avnac. Chargd d’affaires, October 1871 ~
June 1873. Born 1842. Previous service in Japan, the Qua! 
d’Orsay (Direction Politique), and Washington*
Jules Berthemv. June 1873 ” April 1875. Previously Minister 
in Peking and Washington.
Ange-Guillaume Ouvre de Saint-Quentin. Charge d1 affaires , April 
1875 - May 1877. Born 1828. Previous service on Pyrennees 
Commission, in Stuttgart, Tangiers, and Lima. 
Francis-Henri-Louis de Geofrov. Kay 1877 - March 1879° Born 
1822. Previous service In Washington, Athens, Madrid, the 
Qua! d’Qrsay and Peking*
Marie-Rend-Davy de Chavisne de Balloy. Charge d’affairesuj.aum.num.ininni ................... iinHin.i...................S_»f
March 1879 m Dec* 1880. Born 1845. Previous service in Brussels, 
Berlin, Peking and Teheran*
Guillaume de Roquette. Dec* 1880 - March 1882. Born 1837« 
Previous service in London, Tangiers, Peking and Berne.
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Arthur Tricou. June 1882 - Kay 1883- Born 1837° Previous 
service In Beirut, Constantinople, Cairo, and Teheran.
Ulric de Vlel Castel. Charge d’affaires, Kay I883 - Oct* I883. 
Previous service in Madrid and St* Petersburg*
Joseph-Adam S1enkieyicz* Oct. I883 - Kay 1894• (On leave .... 11111 1 mini ■iinviirinliin inn iimnnm ■ininiinn 11■ 11~inmmnni pi.ii m iiimiB iiifiiipnuiiii >11 mn m i. iiitih  i mi ) i n| '
Kay 1887 - Sept* 1888 and Nov* I89I - February 1893)*
Born 18360 Previous service in Smyrna, Panama, Hong Kong,
Malta, Beirut and Cairo.
Ernest "-Adrien Bourgarel. Chargd d’affaires, May I887 - Sept *3.888 
Born 1850. Previous service in Peking, the Quai d'Orsay,
Berne, Santiago, and Home*
Vic tor-Joseph Collin de Plancy. Chafge* d’affaires Nov.- 1891 - 
Feb. 1893° Born 1853* Previous service in Peking, Shanghai and 
Seoul•
Pierre-Georges Dubail. Charge d’affaires, June-July 1894*
Born 1845- Previous service In Santiago, Peking, Chefou, 
the Quai d’Orsay, Rome, Quebec, .Amsterdam, and Shanghai*
Francois-Jules Harmand. July 1894 - 1905° Born 184-5 - Previous 
service in Bangkok, Tongking, Calcutta and Santiago*
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Date of Appointment *
July, 1852.
May 8, 1855.
January 5, 1860 (Interim). 
January 24, 1860.
October 15, 1862.





































January 29, 1883 (Interim).
Februazy 21, 1883-
June 16, 1883 - July 1, 1883 
(Interim).
September 16, 1883 - September 
29, 1883 (interim).
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I. Primary Sources
A. Unpublished.
n>— —i w w m  I'lPWuii'Wiif nt—  »■— w iM r t n n
i.^French.
Archives of the Ministere des Affaires Etrang&res at the 
Huai d 1 Orsay. Correspondance Politique. Japon. Vols.
I — XLVI. These volumes, averaging about 700 pages In 
length, cover the years 1854-1896. Their content is 
highly political, both because French Ministers interested 
themselves less in commercial and other matters than their 
British counterparts and because an indeterminate number of 
dispatches, particularly those coming under the heading of 
personnel, have been omitted in the compiling of the volumes. 
Thus dispatches are sometimes referred to which are not 
included in this, or any other,,series. The arrangement of 
the volumes is straightforwardly chronological, with Quai 
d’Orsay dispatch© s,A being interspersed with those from the 
French Minister in Japan. In the earlier volumes it is 
common to find duplicates of dispatches from the Correspondance 
Commercial©. Besides the correspondence between Paris and 
Tokyo, relevant dispatches to and from the French Ambassador 
in London are also included, as are a considerable number of 
inter-Ministerial communications, though these become rare in 
later years.
Correspondance Commercial©, Yedo. Vols.I-VI, (1859-1876). 
Correspondance Commercial©> Tokyo. Tols. I —XX • (1877-1899). 
These two series, which are really one, contain, as well as
- 383 -
the occasional political dispatch, the correspondence between 
the Commercial Department of the Quai d’Orsay and the Minister 
in Japan on matters of general commercial interest. They are 
very patchy in places, one volume covering the whole of the 
period 1870-1877, but they do provide the bulk of the material 
relating to the later stages of Treaty Revision.
Memoires et Documents, Japon. Yols. I-III. These three 
volumes, which cover the years 1854-$®, 1871-84, and 1864-73 
respectively, are of considerable importance. They contain 
most of the memoranda, either official or unofficial, which 
sought; to influence French policy, particularly in the 1850*a 
and 1860!s, and thus provide an insight into the working of 
the Quai d1 Grsay which is lacking in the other series. They 
also include documents which, because of their length, 
irregular form, or unusual source, were not inserted in the 
Gorrespohdance Politique. Among these categories fall Brunetfe 
letters, the translation of a Japanese historical claim to 
sovereignty over theRyukyus, the account of the interview 
between Remusat ISa® Iwakura, and a number of documents relating 
to the terms of employment of the military missions. 
Gorrespondance Politique, Chine. This series is an essential 
supplement to the series on Japan for the 1850*s and the 
period of the Franco-Chinese dispute.
Mdmoires et Documents, Ghine. Thou^a there is more material 
in this series than the comparable one for Japan, it revealed
nothing about the efforts of Patendtre to secure agreement
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with Japan in 1884.
Correspondance Politique. Allemagne. This series was used 
only to investigate the suggestion in the Japanese records 
that an attempt to secure an entente was made in 1884 through 
the Japanese Minister in Berlin.
ii.) Japanese.M m  M M  r  mram M  phoM KMMtf m l  M i
a) Archives of the Japanese Foreign Ministry (Gaimusho).
Tongking ni KansuruShin-Futsu Senso (The Sino-French War 
over Tongking), 3 vols. This undated typewritten series 
comprises a substantial selection, running to about 2,000 
pages in all, of the correspondence between the Gaimusho and 
its agents, both ministerial and consular, in China, Korea, 
and Europe. Unfortunately, not all of the 371 dispatches 
listed in the index are present, presumably because there 
was a gap between the time of its compilation and that of the 
volimes themselves. A separate series dealing with reports 
of a Franco-Japanese alliance is referred to in the index, 
and it seems likely the missing dispatches were placed in this 
instead, only to be destroyed by fire later, like the original 
dispatches.
Denshinsha-5 (Copies of Telegrams - outgoing) (1883,1885)
2 Vols *
Denshif^rai (Copies of Telegrams - incoming) (1883,1885) 2 vols. 
These four surviving volumes of copies of telegrams provide a
valuable guide to Inoue1s main preoccupations at this time.
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The Japanese Government used telegrams much more extensively 
than did the Western Powers and fortunately English was the 
only practical medium.
b) Material kept at the Diet Library, Constitutional History 
Records Room (Kenseishiryoshitsu).
Ito Hirobumi Kankei Shiryo (Records Relating to Ito Hirobumi), 
Series 624. Ito Hirobumi Ke Bunsho (ItOHirobumi1 Family 
Documents) vols. XIV & XV, (letters from Inoue Kabru).
Inoue Kaoru Kankei Bunsho (Records Relating to Inoue Kaoru). 
Series 657.Vol.I. (letters from Aoki Shuzo)
Series 661.Vol.I. (letters from Ito Hirobumi).
These three serim were the only ones at the Diet Library which 
yielded any infoimation regarding the Japanese attitude
towards the Franco-Chinese War. Other series looked at
contained letters from Inoue to Yamagate, Goto to Ito, and 
Kuroda to Inoue. The materials are of enormous value 
historically but difficulties of style make them an intimi­
dating proposition for non-Japanese,
iii. J. _BritishA
Foreign Office Records kept at the Public Record Office. 
F*^ *_46.* This series contains the general correspondence 
with the British Minister in Japan. It has been used 
extensively to supplement the Correspondance Politique Japon 
for the 1860’s, and also for the 1870’s and 1880’s in several 
cases when the policies of Britain and France were marked
either by cooperation or discord.
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0.17. This correspondence with the British Minister in 
China has been consulted for background to French diplomacy 
in China and Chinese attitudes in 1884.
F.0.27. This series, which contains the correspondence 
between the Foreign Office and the British Ambassador in Paris 
has been consulted for details of British approaches to 
France and for reports on French policy towards Japan.
F_.0j.391. (The Hammond Papers). Vol.I consists of letters 
between the Permanent Under-Secretary of State for Foreign 
Affairs and Alcock. Vol.XIV consists of letters from Parkes 




Nihon Gaiko Bunsho. (Japanese Diplomatic Documents), Tokyo, 
1933-. This high-quality Gaimusho series, which devotes a 
large volume to each year since 1868, has now reached the 
First World War.
Jgyaku Kaisel Kankei Nihon &aik5 Bunsho. (Japanese Diplomatic 
Documents relating to Treaty Revision,), 4 vols., Tpkyo, 
1941-50. An extraordinarily complete coverage of the Treaty 
Revision negotiations.
Documents Diplomatique s. vols.V <& VI. Paris, 1865-6. This 
general series contains a few extracts from Roches* dispatches, 
edited for public consumption.
Dogumtete Diplomatique3 g r a t ia, Paris, 1929 - This series
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has nothing on Japan before 1894, except a footnote in the 
1884 volume. Its coverage of the Tokyo side of the Sino- 
Japanese War is very far from complete.
Annales du Commerce Bxt§rieuri. This series consists mainly 
of reports to the Ministry of Agriculture, Commerce and 
Public Works, plus fairly detailed official statistics. Japan 
is covered in the volumes entitled Chine et Indo-Chine.
Journal Qfficiel de la Efoubliaue Prancaise. Paris. 1871 - 
Contains an account of the previous day’s debates in the 
National Assembly.
Hansard’s Parliamentary Debates. Third Series vol.CLXXXVT 
(1867).
ii X • _XJno f f ici al.
Beasley, W. G-. Sllect Documents on Japanese Foreign
Policy. 1853-68. London 1955. 0ontains 
some french documents, but is especial^ 
valuable for its long introduc tion. 
Billot, A.(un diplomats) L*Affaire du Tonkin. Paris, 1888. By
the Political Director at the Quai 
d’Orsay, but does not refer to Prancds 
interest in Japanese assistance.
Block, M. Statistique de la Prance. 2 vols.
Paris, 1875.
Boissonade, Gr.B. ’’Saiban-ken no Joyaku So-an ni Kansuru
Iken*’, (Opinion on the Treaty proposal







Sakuzo (ed.), Mei.ii Bunka Zenshu 
(Collection of Materials illustrating 
various aspects of the Meiji Period.) 
vol.VI. Tokyo, 1928.
1fLes Nouveaux Codes Japonais11, La 
Revue Prancaise du Ja~pon No. 8,
Sept. 30, 1892.
Pro.iet de Code de Procedure Criminelle 
pour 1 ’Empire du Japon. Tokyo, 1882.
Le Japon de nos Jours. 2 vols., Paris 
1877. One of the most penetrating 
accounts of the new Japan. 
Dreiunddreissiff: Jahre in Ost-Asien,
3 vols. Leipzig, 1901. T h o u i t  con­
tains some details of diplo­
macy, this is basically a general 
review of events in the Par East. 
Documents pour servir a I ’Histoire des 
Relations entre la Prance et le Japon. 
Paris n.d. A collection of letters to 
the leader of the first military missior 
by several members of the second, 
notably Descharmes and Dubbusquet.
Notes sur le Japon. la Chine, et l ’lnde. 
Paris, 1861. Contains the fullest








J.O. 1 *Le Japon et le Commerce Europeen*1 ,
Revue des Deux Mondes. Oct., 1856. An 
important article by a merchant who 
influenced French policy before the 
French treaty with Japan was signed.
l. Memo ires d 1 Auguste G-^rard. Pari$ 1928.
(This book by Harmand1s successor pro­
vides an interesting comparison between 
French policy in the 20th century and 
that of the period covered by this 
thesis.
Hara Kei Hikki ((The Hara Rei Diary),
10 vols. (Tokyo, 1950-1. ^he first 
volume of this famous source for 
I, Japanese political histozy contains
some references to Harafs work as
consul at (Tientsin during the Franco-
Ohinese War.
Denki Hensankei, Sejgax Inoue Roden (Life and
Letters of the Remarkable Inoue) 5 vols. 
lokyo, 1933-4. An old-style biography 
which quotes abundantly from original 
sources.
, Dubois de Japon. Indo-Ohine. Dmpire Birman (ouAva)
Si®j-*Annam_(ourf OpjsMnchine), Pehinsule
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Malaise. etc.. Cevlan*^. Paris 1850.
An illuminating expression of an im­
portant aspect of French feeling about 
the Far Bast.
Kurimoto I^aaKon (Jouri) Kurimoto JOun Iko. (The Posthumous
Memoirs of Kurimoto JOun), Tojkyo 1943* 
By a Bakufu official who was one of the 
chief architects of the special rela­
tionship with France and who became an 
outstanding journalist after the 
Restoration.
Les Origines de 1*Annie Janonaise.
Paris 1898. Colonel (later General) 







(Memoirs) vol.I. (Tokyo 1948.
Interesting comment on It6*s mission to
China, of which the author was a member
Kan.iu Shogun (A General*s
Memoirs) (Tokyo 1925* An important,
but not entirely reliable, source for
the French approaches to Japan in
mid-1884*
Souvenirs d*une Ambassade en Chine et 
au Japon en 1857 et 1858. Paris, I860. 
By a member of Gros * mission, but very
- 391 -
sketchy on Japan.
Montblanc, 0. de he Japon tel aufil est. Paris, 1867.
An anti-Tokugawa pamphlet.
Roches, L. Trente-deux ans k travers l fIslam.
2 vols, Paris, 1884-5. Roches* life- 
story up to the age of 40, told in 
flamboyant style. Provides valuable 
insights into his character. His 
sophisticated views about Arab students 
and French education are particularly 
worthy of note.
Rous sin, A, Une Qampa&ne sur les Qdtes du Jan on.
Paris, 1866. An account of the Shimon 
-oseki expedition by a participant. 
Interesting for its strong pro- Bakufu 
views.
Satow, S. M. A Diplomat in Janan. London, 1921. A
very important source, but one which 
has led Japanese historians to see a 
greater difference between Parkes* 
and Roches* policies than actually 
axis tad
Semall<§, Comte de Quatre Ans & Peking. Paris 1953.
Observations and gossip by a diplomat 
who served as charg6 d ’affaires 
between tiie departure 0f Tricou and
-  392 -
the arrival of Pat endtre in 1884. He 
has nothing to say about French ap­
proaches to Japan, but he does make 
some interesting revelations, such as 
that Tricou brought a Japanese mistress 
with him to Pekingin 1883,
Tanaka Shinkichi (ed.) Uikkan Gaiko Shiryo Shusei, (Collec­
tion of Materials relating to Japanese- 
Korean Diplomatic Relations), vol.Ill, 
Tokyo, 1962. Contains some documents 
not to be found in the G-aimusho ar­
chives, including an important telegram 
to Inoue about French overtures in 
Dec. 1884.
iii ..1 J^wspapers and Periodicals..
L *250110 du Jan on. This was the only French newspaper that had
any success in Japan. It was published in Yokohama from 1870 
to 1885 and a considerable number of copies are to be found at 
the Biblioth&que Rationale. These, however, are copies of 
the weekly mail edition, and though almost complete for the 
period 1880-85, are few for the preceding five years, and 
entirely lacking for the period 1870-75. A more complete 
collection exists in the Meiji Shimbun Zasshi Bunko in Tokyo 
University, and this has the added advantage of being composed 
of copies of the .daily edition. This collection too, however,
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contains nothing for the first five years. As a newspaper 
I 1Echo du Japon was not of much stature, but its coverage of 
the silk trade was extremely good, and it has provided a 
certain amount of useful information to supplement the 
relatively thin French diplomatic records. 
he Temps. This influential newspaper, which was closely 
connected with the French metallurgical industry, was consul­
ted in the hope of discovering whether there was any public 
interest in the idea of a Franco-Japanese entente in 1883-5*
It proved to reflect the official neglect of Japan in 
containing no serious article on her.
Annales de la Propagation de la Foi. Published annually in 
Lyons, this contains some useful material on early missionary 
efforts to enter Japan.
The Economist. The Foreign Oorrespondence of this Journal, in 
1866 and 1867,contains details, not found elsewhere, of the 
formation and failure of Coulletfs trading company.
L 1 BeonomisteFran^ais•. Has occasional articles on the 
progress of Japan from the late 1870*s, but contains virtually 
nothing on French interests in Japan before the iYteiji 
Restoration.
hes Missions Catholiques. A Lyons weekly, which is an impor­
tant source for the TJragami persecution and the later advance 
of Catholicism. It first appeared in 1868.
Le Moniteur des Spies. Another Lyons weekly, of even greater 
importanc-e. It first appeared in 1862 and soon became a
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forum for the vigorous expression of differing viewpoints about 
the French silk industry by leading merchants and experts. 
Contains much information about Japan in the 1860!s and 1870*s. 
Revue Militaire de I 1 Stranger. Between 1878 and 1885 occasional 
articles on the Japanese army appear in this semi-official 








The Foundations of Qonstitutionallt
in Modern Japan. 1868-1900. Cambridge, 
Mass., 1967*









ern Economic Development. London 1954.
Great Britain and the Opening of Japan
Siondon, 1951.
The Modern History of Japan, London,
1963.
Histoire de la Colonisation Franpaise, 
3 vols., Paris, 1946.
Japan1s Modern Century, Hew York, 1955 
nationalism in Japan, Berkeley, 1955. 
The Roots of French Imperialism in 
Eastern Asia, Hew York, 1954. Excels 
lent on French activities in China and 
Indo-China in the 1850fs but scareely 
mentions Japan.
Une Mission de L^on Roches & Rabat en 
1845,. Casablanca, 1947.
France and the Economic Levelopmait of
Europe. Princeton, 1961. 
French Public Opinion and 1
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Chapman, G*.
Clavery, E .






Affairs. Hew York, 1931.
The Third Republic of France; The 
First Phase, 1871-94. London 1962.
Les Strangers au Japon et les Japonais 
a 1 fStranger. Paris, 1904. A pamphlet 
France: A History of Hational Bcono-
mics,^1785-im> Hew York, 1939.
The Japanese Seizure of Korea. 1868- 
1910. Philadelphia, I960. Indispensa 
ble for an understanding of Japanese 
diplomacy in the Meiji period.
Les Franc ais aux lies Lieou K fieou, 
Paris, 1911. A short account which, 
like most of Cordier*s work, quotes 
generously from French records. 
Histoire de l ’E&Lise de Corde. 2 vols. 
Paris; 1874,
Life of Sir Harry Parkes. vol. 2, 
London, 1894. Reflects British suspi­
cion of Roches.
Les Relations entre la Franc e et la 
lhailande au XIXe si dele. Bangkok
1962. A study based on the Quai 
d 1Orsay archives which reveals many of 
the features of French policy towards











The Industrial Revolution in France. 
1815-48. New York, 1955.
The Attitudes and Policies of Great 
Britain and China toward French expan­
sion in Cochin China, Cambodia, Annam 
and lonking, 1858-85. Ph.D. thesis 
University of London, 1961.
Le Japon. 2 vols. Paris , 1853. Like 
all other writings on Japan of this 
period, based largely on the observa­
tions of earlier writers, such as 
Kaempfer.
M. The Armed Strength of Japan. London, 
1886. Not very perceptive and no 
serious attempt to evaluate the contri­
bution of the French military missions. 
Corea, the Hermit Kingdom. 7th ed., 
London, 1905.
The Making of Modern Japan. London, 1922. 
Le Commerce et les Commercants,
     I I i  »r.  —  —  ' I ■          7
Paris, 1909•
Lectures on the new Japanese Civil Code 
as material for the study of comparative 
.jurisprudence. Revised edition, Tokyo, 
Osaka, Kyoto, 1912.









Kiernan, E. ¥. G-.
Landes, D. S. 
Danger, W. L.
Lapeyrere, P. de
in Japan. Baltimore, 1950.
Qkubo Toshimichi. Berkeley, 1964.
Japon. Indo-Chine. Empire Bur man (Ou Ava). 
Siam. Annam (ou Gochin-Chine). Peninsule 
Malaise, etc.. Ceylan. Paris 1850.
The Imperial N a w  of Japan. London, 1904* 
Sakamoto Byoma and the Mei.ii Restoration 
Princeton, 1961.
The Japanese and Sun Yat-sen, 0ambridge, 
Mass., 1954*
Extraterritoriality in Japan. Hew Haven, 
1931*
Foreign Diplomacy in China. 1894-1900, 
London, 1928.
The Military Side of Japanese jjife,
London, 1924*
Japanese Beligion in the Mei.ii Era,
Tokyo, 1956.
British Diplomacy in China. 1880-85. 
Cambridge, 1939.
Bankers and Pashas. London, 1958.
The Diplomacy of Imperialism. Hew York, 
1951.











Christianity in a Revolutionary Age, vol•
HI. The Nineteenth Century outside
Europe. New York, 1959.
I-Iistoire Generale de la Soci6te des 
Missions Btrang&res. vol.Ill, Paris,1894.
G-., and Roth, A. French Interests and
Policies in the Far East. New York, 1941. 
Almost exclusively devoted to contemporary 
problems•
The Economic Development of Japan. 
Princeton, 1955.
Le Japon Moderne. Paris, 1894. One of the 
many undistinguished books by travellers 
in Japan at this period.
Russian Far Eastern Policy. 1881-1904. 
Berkeley, 1958. Rather sketchy on rela­
tions with Japan before 1894, and makes J 
no mention of the effedt of therapproche­
ment with France in this context.
La Religion de J£sus (Yaso Ya-kyo) Ressus- 
citde au Japon. 2 vols. Paris-Lyon, 1896. 
An important study, whose author made 
considerable use of the archives of the 
Societe des Missions Btrangeres. 
la Le Japon. I-Iistoire et Civilisation. vol.T.i. 
Paris 1910. Grood on the military missions.
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Power, T. F. 
Presseisen, E. L.
Priestley, H. J.
A Political History of Japan. 1868-1912. 
London, 1916.
British Trade and Traders in Japan, 1859- 
69. Ph.D. thesis , University of Lonctai 
1962.
Western Influences in Modern Japan, 
Chicago, 1931.
Introduction au Droit Japonais . Paris 1966 
Japan* s Emergence as a Modern State.
New York, 1940.
Le Japon et ses derniers Iraites avec les 
Puissances Europeennes. Paris, 1859. A 
reprint of a newspaper article by a 
missionary propagandist.
Jules Ferry and the Renaissance of French 
Imperialism. New York, 1944.
Before Agression. Tucson, 1965. A de­
tailed study of the French and German 
military missions and their contribution 
to Japanese military development, based on 
French, G-erman, and Japanese diplomatic 
and military records.
France Overseas; A Study of Modern Imper­
ialism. New York, Londsap. 1938.
France Overseas through the Old Regime.















he Japon. Paris 1941.
Pairbank, J.R., & Graig, A.M. East Aeias The 
Modern Transformation. Boston, 1965. 
Histoire des Relations Internationales, 
vol. VI. Paris 1955.
H. The Western World and Japan. London, 1950. 
A History of Japan. 1615-1867. London,
1964.
War and Diplomacy in the Preach Republic. 
Paris, 1951.
Democracy and the Party Movement in Prewar 
japan, Berkeley, 1953.
Histoire de la Prance Gontemperaine (E. 
Lavisse.ed.) vols.Vl & VII, Paris 1921. 
Political Ghange and Industrial Develop­
ment in Japan. 1868-1881. Stamford, 1955. 
The Struggle for Mastery in Europe,
Oxford, 1954.
War aadDiplomacy in the Japanese Empire. 
Lond®$,1936.
houis-Emile Bertin. Paris>1935.
Diplomatic Relations between the United 
States and Japan. 185 5-1895f ^ Stanford. 1952 
Dai Nippon. Paris, 1889. A general, and 
rather superficial, account of Japan by a
French captain, who served as a military
402
Wellesley, P. A,
instructor between 1885 and 1887.
The Paris Embassy during the Second Empire
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London, 1928.
Wilson, R. A. The Genesis of the Mei.ii Government. 1868-
21, Berkeley, 1957.
Yanaga, 0. Japan Since Perry, New York, 194®.
ii^)^Japanese Language.
Pujiwara Akira. G-unii-shi. (A History of the Army),
Tokyo, 1961.
Hanabusa Nagamichi* Mei.ii &aiko-shi (A Diplomatic Iiistoay of
the Meiji Period), Tokyo, I960.
Hat tori Shi so. Kindai Nihon G-aiko-shi. (A Diplomatic
History of Modern Japan) Tokyo, 1954.
Honjo Eijiro. Bakumatsu no Shin-seisaku. (The New Poli­
cies of the Bakumatsu period), Tokyo 1935.
Inoue Kiyoshi. Jffyaku Kaisei (Treaty Revision). Tokyo,
1955. A Marxist-nationalist account 
which stresses the importance of Treaty 
Revision in Japanese politics, but is 
excessisely influenced in its emphasis on 
the importance of popular demonstrations 
by the author's preoccupation with post- 
Occupation politics.
Mei.ii Ishin no Hokusaiteki Kankvo (The 
Meiji Restoration in its International
Ishii Takashi.
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Perspective) Tokyo, 1957. An Exhaustive 
study of the years 1862-68 by the leading 
Japanese scholar of Bakumatsu diplomacy. 
Its coverage of Prench policy is based on 
the notes taken hurriedly by Otsuka in the 
Quai d'Orsay in 1929. It accepts uncri­
tically the idea that Prance had imperial­
istic designs upon Japan.
Mei.ii I shin no Butai-ura. (Behind the Scene 
in the Meiji Restoration.) Tpkyo, I960.
A shortened paperback version of the 
above work.
Gakusetsu Hihan Mei.ii I shin Ron (The Meiji 
Restoration: A Critical Discussion of
Scholarly Interpretations). Tokyo 1961.
Itagaki faisuke Jiydt5-shi (History of the Jiyuto), 3 vols
Tokyo, 1953.
Matsushita Yoshio Mei.ii no Guntai (The Meiji Armed Porces),
Tokyo, I960.
Nakamura Kikuo. Kindai Nihon no H5teki Keisei. (The legal
Shaping of Modern Japan) Tokyo, 1957. A 
more moderate treatment of Treaty Revision 
from a mainly legal standpoint.
Nihon Gakujutsu Shinkokai (ed.) Joyaku Kaisei Keika &aivo
(General Outline of the Oourse of Treaty




narrative, based on the G-aimusho records. 
Kindai Nihon no Keisei (The Shaping of 
Modern Japan), Tokyo, 1947. An objective 
and lucid treatment of the period 1854-^ * 39 £ 
1890.
Bakumatsu Graik5-shi no Kenkvu (Studies in
■ ■ M a a a H r i iH i iM M M im M n M H M M M M A m  imm    i mnmmi— mihiMWiibwwH — n
Bakumatsu Diplomatic Histoiy) Tokyo 1952.
A posthumous work by the leading pioneer 
in the scholarly treatment of the subject. 
Saigusa Hiroto, iSlozaki Shigeru, and Sasaki Takashi. Kindai
Uihon SanCTo Gd.iutsu no Seiyoka. (The 
Westernisation of Industrial Technology 
in Modern Japan), Tokyo, I960.
Shimomura Fujio, Mei.ii Shonen Jo.yaku Kaisei-shi no Kenkvu
(A Study of Treaty Revision History in the 
Barly Years of Meiji) Tokyo 1962. Only 
goes up to 1875.
Mei.ii I shin no G-aiko (The Diplomacy of 
the Meiji Restoration) Tokyo 1948.
Umetani Hoboru. O-Yatoi G-aikokuiin (Honourable Foreign
Advisers), Tokyo 1965. Contains sections 
on Boissonade, Dubousquet.
Umetani Noboru. Mei.ii Zenki Seini-shi no Kenkvu (Studies
in the Political History of the Barly 
Meiji Period), Tokyo, 1965. A stimula­
ting approach to Meiji politics via
~  / 1 05  -
military history. Contains a fuller 
treatment of Dubousquet.
Yamamoto Shigeru. J5vaku Kaisei-shi (A Histozy of Treaty
Revision), Tokyo, 1945. Very detailed, 
hut somewhat out of date.
B.) Articles and Essays, 






* ‘Europe and the Wider World in the 
nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries1 1 in 
A.O. Sarkissian (ed.), Studies in Diplo­
matic History and Historiography. London 
1961.
I !Le Premier Trait6 de la France avec le 
Japon*1 I’oung Pao. XIII. 1912. Utilised 
the Correspondence Politique, Chine.
II The ’Modern* Army of Early Modern Japan* 1 
Far Eastern Quarterly. Nov., 1949.
* *La R§forme du Droit Penal au Japon*1 
Revue de Droit International et de Legis­
lation Comparte. XIII, 1880. A typically 
sceptical view*
* * A Catechism of Western Diplomacy: The 
Japanese and Hamilton Fish, 1872*1 Jour­
nal of Asian Studies. May, 1967. Useful
clarification of the purpose and circum-
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stances of the Iwakura mission.
**leon Roches in Japan, X864-68** ift 
Papers on Janan. vol.II, Harvard, 1963•
Ihe only detailed account of Roches in a 
Western language. Realistic on the 
Parkes-Roches rivalry, but accepts the 
traditional Japanese interpretation of 
French Imperialism in action without 
attempting to see French policy in proper 
perspective.
I !les Francais an Japon et la Creation de j-
II Arsenal de Yokosuka*1, La Revue Maritime 
May, 1939.
Ristelhueber, R. * *Un diplomats belliquex declare la guerre
d la Coree (en 1866)**, Revue d1Histoire 
Diplomatique. 1958, Ho, 2. An insubstan­
tial account based on the Correspondance 
Politique Chine, which makes no attempt 
to place the French expedition in the 
context of Korean history or even French 
policy in the Far Bast.
)_Japanese Language^
Fuji! $>adabumi. * *Uragami Kyoto Honda,i o meguru Hichi-
Futsu Kandtei*'. (Japanese-French Rela­




Christians), in Kaikoku Hyakunen Kinen 
Mei.ii Bunka-shi Honshu (Essays in Meiji 
History to Commemorate the Centenary of 
the Opening of the Countly), Kaikoku 
Iiyakunen Kinen Meiji Bunka-shi Jogyokai 
(ed.) Tokyo, 1953. Deals only with the 
problemidn 1867.
Hora Tomio. 1 'Bakilmatsu I shin ni okeru Ei-Futsu G-untai
no Yokohama-chuton11 (the Occupation of 
Yokohama by British and French Forces in 
the Bakumatsu and Restoration Period) in 
Meiji Seiken no Kakuritsu Katei (The Con-
mi   *  i nw^i Miiirrww— ^
solidation-process of the Meiji Grovernment) 
Meiji Shiry5 KenkyCL Renrakkai (ed.) Tokyo
1956. Mostly concerned with the years
before 1868. Based entirely on Japanese
sources.
Nezu Masashi. 1 f1864-nen no Parii Kyoj(Eafoji o me guru
Furansu Daini Teisei to Tokugawa Bakufu to 
no Kosho11 (The negotiations between the 
Becond Empire and the Tokugawa Bakufu 
surrounding the 1864 Paris Convention.), 
Rekishigaku Kenkvu. no. 210, 1956.
11 11 Bakumatsu no Furansu Gfaikd Bunsho kara
mita Furansu no Tai-Nichi Hosaku11 (French
Policy towards Japan as seen through French
Oka Yoshitake.
m
Otsuka fake mat su.
P*eng Tse-chou.
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Diplomatic Documents of the Bakumatsu 
Period), Shigaku. Zasshi. XIX^ I960. An 
interesting review of 5tsuka*s work, with ,s 
an interpretation of French policy, based 
largely on Otsuka*s Quai d1 Orsay notes, 
by a left-wing historian. Alone among 
Japanese scholars, Hezu sees a real 
difference between Roches1 policy and 
that of the Quai d*Orsay.
1 *Kokuminteki Kokuritsu to Kokka Rise!** 
(Rational Independence and Raison d*Btat) 
in Bekai no laka no Rihon (Japan in the 
World), vol. 7 of Kindai Hihon Shiso-shi 
Koza, (lectures on Modern Japanese Intel­
lectual History), TIokyo, I960. A master­
ly review of some of the major themes in , 
modem Japanese foreign policy 
11Fukkoku Koshi L£on Roches no seisaku 
kodd ni tsuite1* (Ooncerning the policy 
and actions of French Minister Leon Roches) 
Shigaku-Zasshi. XXVT, 1955* ^n almost 
identical account to that given in his 
Bakumatsu Gaiko-shi no Kenkvu.
* 'Shin-Futsu Senso ni okeru Rihon no 




during the Franco-Chinese War), Shirin, 
XLY11I, May, I960.
11 Puerii Naikaku to Nihon11 (The Perry 
Cabinet and Japan), Shirin. XLY, May 1962.
''CMsen Mondai 0 Me guru Jiyuto to Furansu” 
(The Jiy&to, France and the Korean Problem),
Rekishi^aku Kenkvu. No.265, June, 1962. j
|
''Pukkoku KOshi no^de mita Jiyuto '1 (The 
Jfiyuto seen through the TJyes of the 
French Minister), Shirin. XLYIII, March 
1965. j
P’eng's articles are mainly concerned with ) 
the position of the Jiyuto leaders. His 
statements about Prench policy are based on, 
the Correspondence Politique, Japon, July- 5 
December, 1884, but he exaggerates the ;
Prench eagerness for an entente with Japan ! 
and appears unaware of Sienkiewiez's role 
in obstructing any agreement.
*1 JOyaku Kaisei11 (Treaty Revision) in ;
KOnishi Shiro (ed.) Kindai Shakai (Modem 
Society), Tokyo, 1954. !
1 ’Tenno-sei no Kakuritsu to Kirisuto-kyo*1 ° 
(Christianity and the Establishment of the 
Pmperor-system), in Minkenron kara
Nashionariaumu e (Prom People's Rights to
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rakkai (ed.), Tokyo, 1956.
Toyama Shigeki. f'Mimpo-ten Ronso no Seijitgki Kosatsu*1
(A Political Consideration of the Dispute 
over the Civil Code), in Minfcenron kara 
Nashionarizumu e. Tokyo, 1956.
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